The 'War on Terror' metaframe in film and television by Buckle, Christopher
Glasgow Theses Service 
http://theses.gla.ac.uk/ 
theses@gla.ac.uk 
 
 
 
 
Buckle, Christopher (2011) The 'War on Terror' metaframe in film and 
television.  
PhD thesis. 
 
 
 
 
 
http://theses.gla.ac.uk/3014/ 
 
 
 
Copyright and moral rights for this thesis are retained by the author 
 
A copy can be downloaded for personal non-commercial research or 
study, without prior permission or charge 
 
This thesis cannot be reproduced or quoted extensively from without first 
obtaining permission in writing from the Author 
 
The content must not be changed in any way or sold commercially in any 
format or medium without the formal permission of the Author 
 
When referring to this work, full bibliographic details including the 
author, title, awarding institution and date of the thesis must be given 
  
 
The ‘War on Terror’ Metaframe in Film 
and Television 
 
 
 
 
Christopher Buckle 
MA, MLitt 
 
 
 
Submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the 
Degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
 
 
Department of Theatre, Film and Television Studies 
School of Culture and Creative Arts 
University of Glasgow 
 
June 2011 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
© Christopher Buckle, 2011 
 2 
Abstract 
 
Following the terrorist attacks of September 11
th, 2001, the government of the 
United States of America declared a ‘War on Terror’.  This was targeted not only 
at the ostensible culprits – al-Qaeda - but at ‘terror’ itself.  The ‘War on Terror’ 
acted as a rhetorical ‘metaframe’, which was sufficiently flexible to incorporate 
a broad array of nominally-related policies, events, phenomena and 
declarations, from the Iraq war to issues of immigration.  The War on Terror is 
strategically limitless, and therefore incorporates not only actual wars, but 
potential wars.  For example, the bellicose rhetoric towards those countries 
labelled the ‘Axis of Evil’ or ‘Outposts of Tyranny’ is as much a manifestation of 
the metaframe as the ‘Shock and Awe’ bombing of Baghdad.  As a rhetorical 
frame, it is created through all of its utterances; its narrative may have been 
initially scripted by the Bush administration, but it is reified and naturalised by 
the news media and other commentators, who adopt the frame’s language even 
when critical of its content.  Moreover, film and television texts participate in 
this process, with fiction-based War on Terror narratives sharing and supporting – 
co-constituting – the War on Terror discourse’s ‘reality’.   
 
This thesis argues that the War on Terror metaframe manifests itself in multiple 
interconnected narrative forms, and these forms both transcode and affect its 
politics.  I propose a congruency between the frame’s expansiveness and its 
associational interconnections, and a corresponding cinematic plot-structure I 
term the Global Network Narrative.  Elsewhere, an emphasis on the pressures of 
clock-time is evoked by the real-time sequential-series 24, while the 
authenticity and authority implied by the embedded ‘witness’ is shown to be 
codified and performed in multiple film and television fiction texts.  
Throughout, additional contextual influences – social, historical, and 
technological – are introduced where appropriate, so as not to adopt the 
metaframe’s claims of limitlessness and uniqueness, while efforts are made to 
address film and television not as mutually exclusive areas of study, but as 
suggestively responsive to one another. 3 
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Introduction 
I was working at Barclays in the machine room and one 
of the girls got a phone call from her husband telling 
her that one of the twin towers has been hit by a 
plane.  Spent the last 3 hours of the afternoon in the 
rest room watching the news in complete and utter 
disbelief.  For the first time I felt that the world was 
changing before my eyes. 
After work I met my gf for a quick drink, then got the 
142 to Brent Cross to watch Hendon play a Bedford 
Town side that had lost their first 7 games of the 
season.  Watched the news in the bar before going out 
and watching us lose 2-1… Spent most of the night then 
watching the news.  It was utterly compelling viewing.
1 
-  28yootoahfc, Drowned in Sound forum     
   
On September 11
th, 2001, nineteen terrorists – retrospectively referred to as 
‘The Hamburg Cell’ – hijacked four commercial flights in the United States.  Two 
were flown into the Twin Towers of the World Trade Centre in New York; 
another was piloted into The Pentagon in Virginia, while the fourth crashed in 
the Pennsylvanian countryside.  Approximately three thousand people died: 
passengers and crew in the hijacked planes, office workers and first-responders 
in downtown Manhattan, government employees of the Department of Defence, 
and the hijackers themselves.  Nine days later, President George W. Bush 
announced a ‘War on Terror’ that would target not just those groups responsible 
for the attacks, but ‘every terrorist group of global reach’.
2  One month after 
that, the US and its allies invaded Afghanistan; in March 2003, Iraq became the 
war’s second front.  A raft of further anti-terrorism policies were passed in 
support of these efforts, and the War on Terror became an accepted and oft-
invoked concept amongst politicians, the media, and the public alike. 
                                         
1 “8 years ago today.  What were you doing?”, Drowned in Sound, accessed 12 Sept. 2009. 
http://drownedinsound.com/community/boards/social/4198069  
2 ‘Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People’, Press Release, The White 
House, 20 Sept. 2001, accessed 27 Sept. 2011. http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/print/20010920-8.html      9 
It is not difficult to find personal testimonies concerning the events of 
September 11
th 2001.  The attacks continue to be subject to seemingly endless 
analysis, and have generated myriad statements and accounts from those who 
experienced their effects at some level.  Some testimonies have acquired 
greater cultural authority than others, creating a loose hierarchy that places the 
families of the dead and emergency services first-responders at the top, with 
first-hand witnesses in the tier immediately below.  The third tier is 
considerably larger.  This contains the significant proportion of the planet’s 
population who witnessed and have re-witnessed the events second-hand thanks 
to modern global communications technologies.   
The account offered by 28yootoahfc, a user of the online discussion forum of the 
UK-based music website ‘Drowned in Sound’, is as valid an example of this third 
group as any other.  His or her version of events may not be as interestingly 
unique as that of, for example, Sergeant John McLoughlin (pulled from the 
wreckage of the second tower), Lisa Beamer (wife of Todd Beamer, who 
perished on United Flight 93’s crash in a field in Pennsylvania)
3 or Rudy Giuliani, 
Mayor of New York at the time of the attacks.
4  But, in its mix of astonishment 
and banality, and its reliance on filmed reports transmitted from miles away, it 
is typical of a more widespread experience.  It is indicative of the experiences of 
vast numbers of people for whom ‘9/11’ constituted a defining historical event, 
an easily-recollected moment of personal experience colliding with a far larger 
geo-political narrative, but which unfolded ‘before their eyes’ on television or 
online, and not in their immediate vicinity. 
Posted in a thread entitled ‘8 years ago today, What were you doing?’, 
28yootoahfc’s recollection was followed by one hundred and seventy nine replies 
from other users keen to share their experiences.  There are predictable 
inclusions: attempts at bad-taste humour; paraphrased and confused attempts to 
define the attacks as works of art; and indignant comparisons to other events 
deemed ‘worse’ than 9/11 (notably the siege in Beslan in which hundreds died, 
but also famine in Africa and, the perennial internet forum topic of comparison, 
                                         
3 Lisa Beamer and Ken Abraham, Let’s Roll: Ordinary People, Extraordinary Courage (Carol 
Stream, Illinois: Tyndale House Publishers, 2003) 
4 Rudolph W. Giuliani, Leadership (London: Time Warner Paperbacks, 2003)     10 
the Holocaust).  More broadly, these accounts evidence the widespread impulse 
to narrate, indexing personal experience to the grander narrative of history. 
The decision to include certain facts may seem obtuse (the football score will 
likely seem insignificant to most), but it is typical of the way other Drowned in 
Sound users construct and narrate their own perspectives.  brokenchairs reveals 
she was watching Josie and the Pussycats (Elfont and Kaplan, 2001) with her 
friends when she heard the news; wrightylew was playing computer games and 
found out when he went downstairs to make a cup of tea; idle65 was told at 
after-school rugby-practice.  Amongst the prosaic details, one user, marckee, 
breaks out of the third tier to recount their first-hand observation of the towers’ 
collapse from the window of Newark airport departure lounge.  Their proximity 
to the events is valued, one responder remarking that there’s ‘probably no need 
for any other posts on this really after that’.  marckee’s actual post is not, 
however, a full account of their experience in the Newark departure lounge, but 
a link to a thread started the previous year on the same website, featuring many 
of the same contributors.  In the straightforwardly titled ‘September 11
th 
thread’ posted in 2008, marckee recounts the experiences in detail: tanks on the 
freeway, evacuation of the airport, muttered reactions from those watching 
President Bush’s address.  Already, marckee’s version of 9/11 is cemented in 
place and repeated on demand. 
For everyone else involved in the discussion, the details are less visceral.  Yet 
few admit to any uncertainty over their whereabouts or activities, despite the 
majority identifying themselves as very young at the time (the website’s 
demographic is broadly 18-25 year olds, and many of the accounts hark back to 
school-age experiences).  The majority support their crystal-clear stories with 
reams of detail: as well as 28yootoahfc’s football score, brother_moiph specifies 
the episode of The Fresh Prince of Bel-Air (NBC, 1990-1996) shown on BBC2 that 
evening, while Teddus notes the ‘record low’ turnout at another football game.   
Although I do not contribute to internet forums, I too could, if asked, narrate my 
experiences of the day.  The narrative would touch upon many of the same 
elements as those listed above (involving school bus rides and gawping at live 
news reports), and would be just as routine and un-illuminating.  But while I can 
strongly recall a version of events, I no longer have any way of distinguishing     11 
what is actual memory and what has been conditioned over time.  When I began 
this research project, I listed, for my own benefit, those parts of the ‘War on 
Terror’ that had made the biggest impact upon me personally: Staying up all 
night to watch live news reports of Baghdad being bombed in 2003; being both 
repulsed and fascinated by photographs of Saddam Hussein’s execution on the 
Internet; seeing the Twin Towers collapse in New York, live.  I was perturbed to 
realise, much later, that the last must be a false memory.  The first tower fell at 
9:59 am local time, the second at 10:28 am.  That would time their collapses at 
14:59 pm and 15:28 pm GMT.  I was in my final year of high school at the time, 
so would have been in a classroom when the first tower began to crumble, and 
walking towards the bus rank when the second fell.  I may have witnessed the 
towers collapsing, but I could not have watched them do so ‘live’.  Andrew 
Hoskins uses the term ‘media flashframes’ to refer to those events, like the 
attacks of 9/11, that are experienced as news images, their ‘apparent vividness 
and immediacy’ potentially causing a ‘mis-remembering of events; people seeing 
an event revisited on television in later times can easily convince themselves 
that they witnessed it originally on TV.’
5  He supports the observation with 
reference to a poll in which ‘a majority of Americans believed they had 
witnessed the Kennedy assassination live on television’, when the Zapruder 
footage was not in fact shown until five years after the event.
6  Neuroscientist 
Tali Sharot’s research into memories of the 2001 attacks draws a similar 
conclusion: 
People felt their memories were as accurate as videotape, while often 
they were filled with errors.  A survey conducted around the country 
showed that eleven months after the attacks, individuals’ 
recollections of their experience that day were consistent with their 
initial accounts (given in September 2011) only 63% of the time.
7 
Whether brother_moiph is correct about the television listings, or Teddus 
remembers the crowd capacity accurately is not something I can speculate on.  
But the Drowned in Sound thread does feature examples of similar false 
memories: brusma remembers being able to watch it on television because his 
college course ‘always finished at 1pm on a Wednesday’ (September 11
th, 2001 
                                         
5 Andrew Hoskins, Televising War: From Vietnam to Iraq (London: Continuum, 2004), p. 7 
6 Ibid p. 7 
7 Tali Sharot, ‘The Optimism Bias’ Time, 177.23 (2011), p. 36     12 
was a Tuesday); while vamos compares the attacks to the bombings in London in 
July 2005, bemoaning the way people exaggerated their proximity to danger by 
claiming some kind of narrow escape (i.e. ‘I should have been at that station at 
that time but I slept in’) in their status updates on the social networking site 
Facebook, until others point out that Facebook wasn’t introduced in the UK until 
after said event.  As distance from the event increases, established narratives 
will become more and more central to discussions of the attacks, and when 
these narratives are based not on experience but false memories, this becomes a 
possible cause for concern.  When we shift attention from the terrorist attacks 
of September 11
th 2001 to the war declared shortly after, the concern 
intensifies.    
This thesis focuses on a handful of War on Terror narratives, from cinematic 
depictions of the September 11
th, 2001 attacks, to television programmes 
dramatising counter-terrorist activities; from documentaries filmed in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, to fictional texts that look like documentaries filmed in Iraq and 
Afghanistan.  These texts are different manifestations of 9/11 and the War on 
Terror as depicted in popular culture, and the four sections into which the 
following chapters can roughly be divided do not combine to form a single, 
linear argument, just as the events themselves do not yield to simple 
reconciliation: timelines have been drawn, and histories have been written, but 
the War on Terror continues to be defined more by its breadth than by its 
narrowness.  This thesis examines some key trends that together are suggestive 
of certain congruities and overlaps, but which resist being folded into a single, 
all-encompassing argument.  There are a multitude of conclusions to be drawn, 
which together build into a partial portrait of the way ‘9/11’ and the ‘War on 
Terror’ have been presented and represented in the last ten years. 
A decade-worth of continuously proliferating texts in the twin fields of film and 
television (not to mention literature, print news media, internet web sites and 
other related areas into which this thesis will on occasion dip) clearly presents, 
however, far too vast a field of study.  Therefore, I want to make clear the 
motivation behind choosing certain texts over others.     13 
0.1 Willing texts 
Due to its nebulous nature, the ‘War on Terror’ can refer to numerous socio-
political constructs, or few, depending upon the parameters drawn by the 
commentator.  Therefore, it should be made clear what type of texts will be 
considered by this study.  This thesis is concerned with representations of 
politics (specifically, the area of politics pertaining to the War on Terror), as 
opposed to political representations.  This caveat does not preclude a political 
stance in many – perhaps even the majority – of the texts under discussion; for 
example, a film like Redacted (De Palma, 2007) is explicitly political in its 
examination of war crimes in Iraq, interrogating the subject at the level of both 
form and content.  But it is a common subject matter that is shared by all the 
texts under discussion, not necessarily a political agenda: in execution, they may 
be apolitical, overtly ideological, or attempting a political intervention.   
The ideology/politics distinction is thereby of diminished importance, though it 
is necessary to address it in brief.  Any discussion of ‘political’ film and 
television presupposes the opposite – a non-political form of film and television 
production.  If we consider the way in which film and television function at an 
ideological level, such a presupposition is problematical; as Andrew Sarris 
suggests, ‘it can be argued that all films are ultimately political either as 
statements or evasions’.
8  Although this is a valid conclusion, it arguably does 
not sufficiently acknowledge the vastly different qualities evident in films such 
as Battle of Algiers (Pontecorvo, 1966), Land and Freedom (Loach, 1995) or 
Lions for Lambs (Redford, 2007) in comparison to All That Heaven Allows (Sirk, 
1955), Amelie (Jeunet, 2001) or Transformers (Bay, 2007), for example.  
Drawing a distinction between the political and the ideological helps to identify 
what differentiates the former examples from the latter.   
All films are ideological to the extent that they are products of a social system, 
and either passively reiterate the dominant discourses or self-consciously 
perpetuate them; ideological ‘either by commitment or default’.
9  As Jean-Luc 
Comolli and Jean Narboni argue, ‘every film is political, inasmuch as it is 
determined by the ideology which produces it (or within which it is produced, 
                                         
8 Andrew Sarris, Politics and Cinema (New York: Columbia University Press, 1978), p. 6 
9 Ibid p. 68     14 
which stems from the same thing)’.
10  In his introduction to Hollywood Goes to 
Washington, Michael Coyne acknowledges the ways in which different classical 
Hollywood genres have been understood to relate ideologically to aspects of the 
‘American Dream’: 
Westerners on horseback and the lone man of conscience are 
monuments to self-reliance and inner resolve.  The multi-ethnic 
platoons so beloved of World War 2 movies are hymns to the harmony 
of the melting pot.  The impoverished, driven youngster who rises to 
riches is a testament to the virtue of hard work and the ease of social 
mobility.  The happy ending of the Hollywood musical is a paean to 
the promise of America – in essence, the guaranteed pay-off in this 
most wonderful of all possible worlds: Hollywood’s America is the land 
of happy endings.  In American movies, ideology is everywhere.
11 
However, Coyne concludes that, although ‘underlying political messages are 
virtually all-pervasive in American movies’, there is a distinct corpus of 
narratives that deal with the subject of ‘politics’ directly, identifying ‘political 
film’ as a genre in its own right.  Such films include Mr Smith Goes to 
Washington (Capra, 1939), All the President’s Men (Pakula, 1976) and Good 
Night, and Good Luck. (Clooney, 2005).
12   
Thus, while All That Heaven Allows et. al. have been interpreted as, in some 
sense, ‘political’, to do so entails a certain degree of excavation: Sirk read from 
a feminist perspective;
13 Amelie criticised for its exclusively-white Parisian 
setting, omitting the city’s cultural diversity;
14 and, more pertinently to the 
current discussion, Transformers identified by Paul Haggis as a right-wing 
response to the seemingly never-ending War on Terror, opposing skepticism and 
discontent with spectacle and a reassurance that ‘evil’ can be defeated.
15  Each 
of these arguments convincingly identifies an ideological element in the text, 
                                         
10 Jean-Louis Comolli and Jean Narboni, ‘Cinema/Ideology/Criticism’ in Bill Nichols (ed.), Movies 
and Methods: An Anthology, Vol. 1 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976), p. 24 
11 Michael Coyne, Hollywood Goes to Washington: American Politics on Screen (London: Reaktion 
Books, 2008), p. 8 
12 Ibid p. 8 
13 Jackie Byars, All That Hollywood Allows: Re-Reading Gender in 1950s Melodrama (Chapel Hill, 
NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1991) 
14 Stuart Jeffries ‘It’s hard for me to play romantic.  I come across as a bit of a jerk’ The Guardian 
6
th Aug. 2001, accessed Nov. 2010,  
http://www.guardian.co.uk/film/2001/aug/06/edinburghfestival2001.edinburghfestival 
15 Ali Jaafar, ‘Casualties of War’ Sight and Sound 18.2 (2008), p. 20     15 
but their respective plots are not ‘about’ politics; their ideological content is 
ancillary to romance, comedy, and spectacular action sequences.  Therefore, 
Transformers, within the scope of this thesis, is not a War on Terror text worth 
addressing.   
I have instead adopted Coyne’s approach with some minor alterations.  Texts are 
chosen for their direct depiction of aspects of the War on Terror at the level of 
content, including: ‘9/11’; ‘extraordinary rendition’; the wars in Iraq and 
Afghanistan; terrorism and counter-terrorism more broadly; and widening 
surveillance protocols - though as chapter one suggests, one of the key features 
of the ‘War on Terror’ is its rhetorical flexibility, applicable to a vast number of 
events, policies, phenomena and so on.  Coyne acknowledges that defining his 
corpus is complicated by those films which are ‘endowed with a distinctly 
political message’ yet which do not engage ‘primarily’ with ‘the world of 
American politics’; his examples include The Grapes of Wrath (Ford, 1940) and 
Forrest Gump (Zemickis, 1994).
16  So as to preserve the singular focus on 
‘political film’ as a genre, Coyne chooses to exclude them from the field of 
study.  The equivalent in this study would be those films that allude to aspects 
of the War on Terror, but do not make the connection overt.  Many attempts to 
identify a ‘post-9/11’ or ‘War on Terror’ trend in film and television have 
engaged in a kind of thematic excavation designed to bring such connections to 
the surface: for example, Jennie Carlsten’s article identifying liberal anger in 
The Constant Gardner (Meirelles, 2005) and 25
th Hour (Lee, 2002),
17 or Anthony 
J. Kolenic’s linking of ‘the anxieties of this historical moment’ to the comic-
based superhero narratives of Batman Begins (Nolan, 2005) and The Dark Knight 
(Nolan, 2008).
18  Similarly, Thomas S. Hibbs argues for a collection of observable 
trends in the ‘anxious’ film and television typical of the early part of the 
twenty-first century, including a renewed ‘quest for innocence’ and an emphasis 
on exhibitions of heroic virtue,
19 while Reframing 9/11: Film, Popular Culture 
and the War on Terror contains essays that, variously, examine the way 
                                         
16 Coyne, Hollywood Goes to Washington, p. 9 
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contemporaneous critical responses to the Napoleonic War-set Master and 
Commander: The Far Side of the World (Weir, 2003) framed it in relation to the 
War on Terror;
20 identify dystopic science fiction Brazil (Gilliam, 1985) as 
prophetic of the actions of the Bush administration;
21 and propose period 
Western Deadwood (HBO, 2004-06) as an interrogation of the simplistic moral 
logic of the Bush administration.
22 
This thesis differs from the above, in that, by only addressing those film and 
television texts that feature the War on Terror overtly in their narratives, it 
renders the excavation of further meaning at the level of content unnecessary, 
privileging form, rather than content, in the actual analysis.  The focus is on how 
and why such narratives are structured and styled in particular ways.  The texts 
under discussion are all ‘willing’ texts – not only are they all produced by 
Western members of the ‘Coalition of the Willing’ (predominantly US texts, 
though also British or co-productions), but they are all openly ‘about’ the War on 
Terror, and therefore willing to be interpreted as such.  If the content’s 
relevance is a given, we are free to explore nuances in form more thoroughly.   
For this reason, the abstractions of allegory will be avoided; searching for 
analogical relevance runs the risk of begging the question while casting analysis 
adrift in an endless sea of possible yet conflicting readings.  By way of an 
example, Gone Baby Gone (Affleck, 2007) ostensibly narrates a child’s kidnap 
and the ensuing investigation, culminating in the discovery that the missing girl 
was stolen by the well-intentioned, yet morally dubious police chief, acting out 
of fear for the young girl’s safety if left with her irresponsible and seemingly 
uncaring mother.  It is not difficult to identify themes of interventionism and 
exceptionalism in its plot, which circles the moral issue of circumventing the law 
for supposed humanitarian reasons; an allegorical musing on the pros and cons of 
unilateralist humanitarian intervention.  This is an approach adopted in part by 
Douglas Kellner in Cinema Wars: Hollywood Film and Politics in the Bush-Cheney 
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Era, in which he subjects a variety of US films released between 2000 and 2008 
to ‘diagnostic critique’.  Through this diagnostic lens, Saw (Wan, 2004) ‘puts on 
display the demented illusions, grotesque hypocrisy, obscene violence, and utter 
lunacy of the Bush-Cheney era’;
23 Sweeney Todd: The Demon Barber of Fleet 
Street (Burton, 2007) articulates ‘both the violence and the deep cultural 
pessimism of the Bush-Cheney era’;
24 and even Pirates of the Caribbean: At 
World’s End (Verbinski, 2007) supplies ‘a chilling reminder of Bush-Cheney 
administration “justice”’ in its opening scene.
25  
Some allegorical readings offer themselves up more readily, but while a film like 
Cloverfield (Reeves, 2008) might be arguably ‘about’ 9/11 (in that its scenes of 
urban destruction filmed on a camcorder self-consciously echo footage of said 
attacks) it cloaks its reference in science fiction.  Battle Los Angeles 
(Liebesman, 2011) lies somewhere in-between War on Terror allegory, and 
actual War on Terror text.  Its fantastical premise – aliens invade earth in order 
to acquire its natural resources – lends itself easily to the sort of reading 
conducted above on Gone Baby Gone: news reports speak of a ‘coordinated 
attack’ from an ‘unknown enemy’ which has left cities in flame and turned 
buildings to rubble.  US Marines must hastily mobilise to combat the threat, or 
leave the country (and, by extension, the entire globe) open to further assault 
(in this reading, the ‘enemy’ is both terrorist and imperialist).  Such an 
interpretation resembles analyses of science fiction texts of the nineteen-fifties, 
which mapped the perceived threat of communism onto extraterrestrial foes; for 
example, Invasion of the Body Snatchers (Siegel, 1956) understood as an ‘iconic 
cultural representation of its contemporary climate of anti-communist 
paranoia’.
26  As such, it would be exempt from the parameters of this particular 
study.  However, it is also arguably, at another level, an explicit depiction of the 
War on Terror.  Its characters are Marines training for deployment in the Middle 
East (their exact destination is not specified, but there are references to both 
Iraq and Afghanistan; furthermore, they train in desert-like conditions and wear 
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khaki fatigues), with the central character Staff Sergeant Michael Nantz (Aaron 
Eckhart) in the process of leaving the armed forces following an undeveloped 
incident on his last tour in Iraq that left several men dead.  The enemy fought in 
the film itself may be fantastical, but the focus on urban warfare, trauma, 
patriotism, and sacrifice is made consistent with rhetoric surrounding the actual 
military campaigns fought by America and its allies in Iraq and Afghanistan.  The 
connection to the War on Terror, in this example, is therefore more than just 
allegorical; it is partially explicit.  This would qualify it for potential inclusion in 
the sample of films under examination.
27 
One final example of an allegorical war on terror text will underscore further 
difficulties posed in defining the ‘War on Terror’ text.  Appaloosa (2008) stars its 
director and co-writer Ed Harris as gunman Virgil Cole, who along with his 
trusted right-hand man Everett (Viggo Mortensen) rides into the titular town to 
wrestle control from the lawless crooks terrorising its inhabitants.  Cole’s first 
act is to impose strict by-laws that give him autocratic control, infringing upon 
the liberty of the innocent in order to protect them from harm.  Occasionally he 
goes too far, beating one harmless drunk unconscious for disturbing the peace, 
but generally both men are presented as heroic and self-sacrificing, the film 
concluding with one settling down with a good woman and the other 
surrendering his legal authority as deputy in order to shoot a murderer who has 
evaded justice, before riding off into the sunset.  Through the haze of an 
allegorical reading, this appears unsubtle metaphor, and can be re-written thus: 
world hegemon the United States of America, with its trusted allies in the 
coalition of the willing, embark on a military-led campaign against the pervasive 
threat of ‘Terror’.  New laws are introduced that curtail individual freedom, but 
are justified as necessary tools in the newly declared conflict.  While their 
conduct is not perfect, we cannot expect it to be, and should remember that ‘a 
few bad apples’ (as Dick Cheney labelled those responsible for the prisoner 
abuse at Abu Ghraib) should not be allowed to spoil the entire project in the 
eyes of the world.  Nor should the restraints of international law be adhered to 
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if they straightjacket the US and impinge upon its ability to wage war where it 
deems such actions to be necessary.  The task remains unfinished, but will 
eventually yield a safe haven for the nation’s citizens to live their lives in, while 
their foreign policy-makers move on to deal with new threats, new enemies and 
new doctrines of war.    
It is possible to develop the reading further, drawing out the similarities to argue 
for a close corollary between debates over US foreign policy and the film’s 
themes, intentional or otherwise.  However, many of the themes and tropes 
linked above to foreign policy actions in the twenty-first century are already 
familiar generic conventions of the Western.  The thin line between order and 
disorder, the stoically heroic lawman, the marshal law of the frontier town: 
these constituent parts do not identify Appaloosa as a War on Terror film any 
more than they identify High Noon (Zinnemann, 1952) as one.  That is not to say, 
however, that such films will be entirely absent in the analyses to follow: 
tangential, contemporaneous texts such as Appaloosa are valuable in 
interrogating conclusions, while a predecessor like High Noon has a two fold 
value, historicising the development of certain traits, while also suggesting the 
two-way rhetorical influence of film and television narratives.  When George W. 
Bush repeats his maxim ‘you’re either with us or against us’ he in effect echoes 
Gary Cooper’s lone sheriff.  Bush declares the United States’ intentions to take a 
stand against evil with or without the support of the international community (or 
even its own citizens), just as High Noon’s sheriff defended the town single-
handedly despite a lack of popular support.  Labelling Bush a ‘cowboy President’ 
stems from more than just an acknowledgement of his Texan roots and his 
fondness for spending time on the ranch; it is a criticism of the perceived 
simplicity of his dichotomy between right and wrong, a dichotomy frequently 
dramatised in the Western genre.  Appaloosa resembles a War on Terror 
narrative because the War on Terror rhetorically resembles High Noon and other 
Westerns.  
To summarise, the texts that will be discussed in this thesis are those that 
address the War on Terror explicitly, by featuring aspects of the conflict 
prominently in their narrative content.  Allegory will be excised in favour of 
direct depictions of the war’s component elements, partly in order to 
pragmatically reduce the analytical sample.  This also helps pre-empt potential     20 
accusations of historical amnesia; the thesis focuses on 9/11 and the War on 
Terror, but I do not want to replicate the ‘9/11 changed everything’ mentality.  
Rather, treating the War on Terror as a representational subject, and not a 
paradigm shift per se, allows the thesis to address a range of disparate trends 
and developments drawn from a variety of disciplines.  Such developments did 
not necessarily originate at 8:46am on the 11
th September 2001, nor are they 
observable only in depictions of the War on Terror specifically: Bakhtin’s 
chronotope was first posited in the nineteen-thirties; the multi-strand cinematic 
narrative dates at least as far back to the Grand Hotel (Goulding, 1932), with 
further roots in the novel form; clock-time has been a governing force since the 
dawn of modernity; paranoia and conspiracy theories are at least as old as the 
United States itself; and the citizen journalist is part of a long-in-development 
historical trend towards members of the public contributing eye-witness 
accounts and visual documentation of news stories as they unfold, facilitated by 
developments in telecommunications stretching back to the telegraph.  
Furthermore, the rhetoric surrounding the War on Terror more broadly can be 
linked to long-held American ideals, including exceptionalism and manifest 
destiny – the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan lengthening a ‘shadow of war’ that 
Michael Sherry argues stretches back to the United States very inception.
28 
All this serves to undermine efforts to isolate the War on Terror as unique or 
unprecedented.  So why place it at the centre of a study in the first place?  
Because although it did not constitute the unprecedented paradigm-shift it was 
claimed to by certain figures, ‘9/11’ refocused American perceptions and 
priorities, making the War on Terror a compelling point of convergence for 
multiple disciplinary concerns.  Characterising the relationship between political 
subject and theoretical approach thus allows for the likes of ‘citizen-journalism’ 
to be discussed meaningfully in this particular context, without having to 
stipulate a direct, absolute and exclusive connection between the two; the War 
on Terror is simply a prominent lens (or, to preempt the language of chapter 
one, a metaframe) through which the phenomena have been propagated and 
examined.  Paranoia, pattern recognition and globalisation, to pluck an 
assortment of key words from the pages that follow, all pre-date 2001, but are 
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nonetheless frequently understood in relation to the War on Terror’s ‘era-
defining’ conflict. 
0.2 Sharks and flaming skyscrapers 
Hollywood is too deeply embedded in America’s culture 
to be isolated from its politics.
29  
-  Richard Brownstein 
A political film is one which informs the largest mass 
possible, people who are not necessarily militant.
30 
-  Costa-Gavras 
The second criteria governing selection relates to the concept of ‘the popular’.  
Speaking to Cineaste in 1976, Italian filmmaker Lina Wertmüller identified her 
artistic motivation as originating in and aspiring towards a sense of the 
‘popular’: 
My greatest desire is to make popular cinema… I hope I can do the 
same in America without resorting to sharks or flaming skyscrapers – 
but if it proves necessary, I’ll do this too.
31 
Due to the violent nature of the events of September 11
th, 2001, War on Terror 
texts struggle to avoid the inclusion of flaming skyscrapers, the media images of 
the collapsing towers of the World Trade Centre and their smouldering ruins an 
indelible component of the war’s iconography.  But Wertmüller’s unabashed 
embrace of ‘the popular’ as a conduit to provoking political thought in an 
audience is nonetheless instructive.  Firstly, it counters a pervasive association 
of political filmmaking with an aggressive or marginal position, though even 
Wertmüller cannot quite bring herself to accept the political opportunities of 
Hollywood without a disparaging aside about the perceived base tastes of its 
audience.  Such spectacular elements are not always, however, seen to leave 
the political filmmaker hamstrung when attempting to create a work with 
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popular appeal: in some accounts, they are conduits through which political 
content can be made palatable and enjoyable to those without a vested interest 
in the subject matter.  Screenwriter Mike Gray suggests that overt politics can 
enter the mainstream so long as they include a ‘traditional Hollywood element’ – 
if not sharks or flaming skyscrapers, then ‘tits and ass, guns and a chase’.
32  
Some dispute the end product’s political worth, with Guy Hennebelle coining the 
term ‘Z Movies’ to describe those thrillers that use political topics merely as 
background and do not subject it to any social or political analysis, the results 
borrowing ‘the dramatic recipes (plot revelations, palpitating suspense, 
traditional heroes) of the American-style detective story and [injecting] into it, 
as it were, a political theme’.
33  Named after Z (1969), the Costa-Gavras-
directed thriller that reconstructs the 1963 death of Gregorios Lambrakis, such 
films are criticised for what Charles Brooks described as an attempt to ‘apply 
the methods of North By Northwest to making The Battle of Algiers’
34 – the 
implication being that the glossy Hollywood (and therefore establishment) style 
of the former is incapable of the political statements valued in the latter.   
This study hopes to reposition the mainstream, popular text as a legitimate and 
influential source of political meaning (in a way that goes beyond the ideological 
model).  This is suggestive of what media analysts call ‘soft news’.  Political 
scientist Matthew A. Baum argues that those texts which emphasise 
entertainment over revolution expose ‘otherwise politically inattentive 
individuals’ to certain political issues ‘as an incidental by-product of seeking 
entertainment’.
35  A film like In the Valley of Elah may be to Brooks and 
Hennebelle’s eyes a politically-empty ‘Z film’, a standard tale of investigation 
and retribution with a conveniently topical but narratively-unnecessary War on 
Terror backdrop, but in another sense it possesses political expediency through 
virtue of tackling a particular socio-political subject matter at a time when such 
issues are at their highest level of newsworthiness.  Other examples display an 
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activist agenda, promoting social change and/or charity involvement via 
onscreen appeals and messages.  Costa-Gavras states:  
Whether the political film is militant or entertaining, documentary, 
semi-documentary or fiction, it is created to alter in varying degrees 
the viewer’s perception of certain socio-political situations.
36 
In this way, the popular product previously deemed ideologically compromised, 
reacquires a position of protest – it is newly accepted as a legitimate source of 
political thought. 
Whether airing a particular political topic translates to observable political 
action on the part of the viewer is a different matter, one which this thesis is 
neither able nor interested in attempting to explore.  But the related issue of 
influence – what chapter one will relate to the ‘reality effect of language’ - is 
worth briefly considering.  In its March 17
th 2008 edition, amongst articles 
pondering the escalating violence in Kenya, the unresolved Obama/Clinton 
battle for the Democratic Presidential nomination and the effect of rising food 
prices on the world’s poorest populations, Time magazine asked ‘Can a Film 
Change the World?’.
37  The article’s writer, Rebecca Winters Kegan, considered 
the political impact of films such as Blood Diamond (Zwick, 2006), An 
Inconvenient Truth (Guggenheim, 2006), Sicko (Moore, 2007) and The Kite 
Runner (Forster, 2007) and the potential effects of then-forthcoming releases 
such as Where in the World is Osama Bin Laden? (Spurlock, 2008) and Standard 
Operating Procedure (Morris, 2008).  Kegan concluded that ‘they can [change 
the world], but often not in the way filmmakers hope… they change the world 
not in wide swathes of multiplexes but one popcorn bucket at a time’.
38  Though 
the question posed was vague and the proposed answer delivered with suitable 
uncertainty, Kegan typifies an approach to political film (and media culture 
more widely) that holds media representations up against their real-world 
referents and political impact.   
I intend to consider the relationship between politics and film and television 
dialogically: film and television will be used to contextualise and understand the 
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war on terror, and vice versa.  The text, to adopt Bakhtin’s term, constitutes its 
own ‘utterance’.  Film and television have, at various times, by various writers 
and for various reasons, been argued to ‘mirror’ politics;
39 act as a ‘window’ into 
politics;
40 ‘represent’
41 politics; or give film and television makers a political 
‘voice’.
42  The relationship between the texts and the actual subject to which 
they relate will here be understood to be circular; the thesis will examine the 
ways in which certain aesthetics, structures and technologies have influenced 
the way in which 9/11 and the War on Terror has been depicted on screen, 
whilst also paying due consideration to the way in which the War on Terror has 
itself been affected by such depictions.  John Belton defines the relationship 
thus: 
The relationship between motion pictures and culture remains 
complex.  The movies are an integral part of mass culture and are 
embedded within it.  One does not produce the other; rather, each 
interacts with the other, and they mutually determine one another.  If 
films and filmmakers produce culture, they are also produced by it.  
Thus it is impossible to separate films and filmmakers from the society 
within which they exist.
43  
To borrow Douglas Kellner and Michael Ryan’s terminology, texts will be 
understood to ‘discursively transcode’ the social and political context in which 
they are produced, in order to ‘emphasise the connections between the 
representations operative in film and the representations which give structure 
and shape to social life’.  Kellner and Ryan argue that: 
Films transcode the discourses (the forms, figures and 
representations) of social life into cinematic narratives.  Rather than 
reflect a reality external to the film medium, films execute a transfer 
from one discursive field to another.  As a result, films themselves 
                                         
39 Siegried Kracauer, From Caligari To Hitler: A Psychological History of the German Film 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1947/1974), p. 129 
40 Critiqued in Robert A. Rosenstone, Visions of the Past: The Challenge of Film to Our Idea of 
History (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995) 
41 Lina Khatib, Filming the Modern Middle East: Politics in the Cinemas of Hollywood and the Arab 
World (London: I. B. Tauris. 2006), p. 69 
42 Michael Goddard, ‘Wajda, Grotowski and Michkiewicz: The Dialectics of Apotheosis and 
Derision’ in John Orr and Elzbieta Ostrowska (eds.), The Cinema of Andrzej Wajda: The Art of 
Irony and Defiance (London: Wallflower Press, 2003), p. 139 
43 John Belton, ‘Introduction’ in John Belton (ed.), Movies and Mass Culture (Athlone, London: 
Athlone, 1996), p. 1     25 
become part of that broader cultural system of representations that 
construct social reality.
44 
Examples of this process include Easy Rider (Hopper, 1969) and Woodstock 
(Wadleigh, 1970) transcoding ‘the discourses of the 1960s counterculture into 
cinematic texts in image, sound, dialogue, scene and narrative’; Red Dawn 
(Milius, 1984) and Rambo: First Blood Part 2 (Cosmatos, 1985) transcoding ‘the 
conservative discourses of Reaganism’ and, more pertinently, Syriana 
transcoding ‘mistrust in the Bush-Cheney era of government, big oil corporations 
and corporate power’.
45  Kellner goes on to argue that recent ‘War on Terror’ 
texts have been far from uniform, with conservative films transcoding ‘Bush-
Cheney discourses on foreign policy and militarism’, while the likes of Lions For 
Lambs and Rendition (Hood, 2007) transcode ‘liberal discourse critical of Bush-
Cheney administration politics’.
46  As stated earlier, the precise political content 
of individual texts is not the main subject of enquiry here, but the reminder that 
plurality exists is useful.  Kellner writes: 
One could argue that the language of film does not find its exact 
analogue in social events, nor does film discourse exist as a parallel 
mirror to actual events.  Rather, films take the raw material of social 
history and of social discourses and process them into products which 
are themselves historical events and social forces…
47 
These texts are one form of politics (policy decisions, war etc) transcoded into 
another (their cinematic and televisual presentation).   
This thesis aims to hold politics and film in what Slavoj Zizek terms ‘a parallax 
view’.  He opens his book of the same name by recounting two ‘remarkable 
stories’ from 2003: the first the discovery of a secret prison used in Spain during 
the 1930s, in which surrealist-inspired cells were designed to inflict 
‘psychotechnic torture’, which Zizek labels the ‘first use of modern art as a 
deliberate form of torture’; the second the revelation that Walter Benjamin was 
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murdered by Stalin’s agents in order to prevent the publication of an elaboration 
on his ‘Theses on the Philosophy of History’, as opposed to dying at his own hand 
as had been previously believed.  Zizek takes from this pair of seemingly 
unrelated tales the following: 
what the two stories share is that the link they establish is an 
impossible short circuit of levels which, for structural reasons, can 
never meet…
48 
The illusion, he continues, is  
that of putting two incompatible phenomena on the same level…, the 
illusion of being able to use the same language for phenomena which 
are mutually untranslatable and can be grasped only in a kind of 
parallax view, constantly shifting perspectives between two points 
between which no synthesis or mediation is possible.  Thus there is no 
rapport between the two levels, no shared space - although they are 
closely connected, even identical in a way, they are, as it were, on 
the opposed sides of a Moebius strip… revolutionary politics and 
revolutionary art move in different temporalities, although they are 
linked, they are two sides of the same phenomenon which, precisely 
as two sides, can never meet.
49 
I will endeavour to keep this incompatibility in mind during what follows.  The 
depiction of a terrorist attack in an episode of 24 or a film like Body of Lies 
(Scott, 2008) is not, evidently, the same as a terrorist attack viewed live on 
television, nor is this in turn identical to a terrorist attack experienced directly, 
in close proximity.  But that does not mean that there are no connections 
between the levels of art and politics; they exist on parallel planes, with 
moments of intersection through which they influence one another. 
Chapter one will introduce these connections by focusing on the War on Terror’s 
genesis – both its ostensible causal roots in ‘9/11’, and its rhetorical roots in the 
language of the Bush administration and the media.  As Adam Hodges and Chad 
Nilep note, ‘any transformation that has taken place… was affected through the 
use of language’,
50 with the War on Terror used to ‘explain, react to, justify, or 
                                         
48 Slavoj Zizek, The Parallax View (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2006), p. 3 
49 Ibid p. 4 
50 Adam Hodges and Chad Nilep, ‘Introduction: Discourse, War and Terrorism’ in Adam Hodges 
and Chad Nilep (eds.), Discourse, War and Terrorism (Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing 
Company, 2007), p. 3      27 
understand a broad range of political, economic and social phenomena’.
51  
Various ‘truth statements’ attached to 9/11 will be interrogated, with the ‘War 
on Terror’ identified as a persistent meta-frame, strategically amorphous and 
ambiguous so as to incorporate everything from Christmas shopping to 
immigration law.  
Chapter two will introduce film and television texts to the study by considering 
the substitution of facts with an emotional and openly-ideological ‘truthiness’.  
The War on Terror’s essential intangibility will be argued for, utilising theories 
of derealisation and the distancing effect of mediated experience to position the 
fiction text as an equally important component of the War.  All elements are 
experienced by the majority as images on a screen and sounds played through 
speakers; therefore, as an abstract, ideological conflict, the War on Terror is as 
much expressed in an episode of 24 (Fox, 2001-10) as in a news report showing 
Western troops stationed in the Middle East.  These opening chapters will 
together argue that the War on Terror is first and foremost a rhetorical 
construction, an ideological conflict for which the primary reality is its 
utterance, rather than the disparate events collated and conflated by its usage.  
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 will be recognised as the integral – if 
not necessarily instigating – event, rhetorically manufactured as ‘year zero’, 
abstracting both time and space, and acquiring numerous meanings through 
frequent re-invocation; meanings neither natural nor inevitable, but the product 
of a ‘reality-making’ effect that posits non-causal relationships as contingently 
causal through rhetorical association. 
Chapter three begins the task of unpicking some of the shared tendencies 
observable in many War on Terror narratives, focusing first on spatial 
organisation.  It will consider networks both geographical and narrational, 
beginning with the multiple narratives surrounding the War on Terror’s 
aforementioned rhetorical starting point, 9/11.  Of particular interest will be 
the events’ global significance, with the network of perpetrators and victims, 
investigators and observers covering vast distances.  As Richard Jackson notes, 
the War on Terror has: 
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Already made an indelible mark on both international relations and 
the dominant politics of most countries.  Its effects are horizontal and 
vertical, penetrating outward toward other states and inwards into 
the belly of domestic politics.
52 
Chapter three explores how – and why – the War on Terror’s narrative was from 
the beginning characterised by such multiplicity, simultaneity and polyvocal 
exchange.   
Chapter four will take this global ‘web’ and examine its relationship to notions 
of paranoia fuelled by secrecy and clandestinity, and argue that the resultant 
‘detective’ impulse impacts further upon the framing of the War on Terror 
narrative, presenting it as a complex enigma to be solved or ‘revealed’.  Making 
connections is also at the heart of chapter five, which will examine the hyperlink 
as both a method of navigation (both online and in hypertext novels) and as an 
analogy for the organisation of myriad spatially-diverse plots, which negate 
distance and refashion ‘space’ along the axis of ‘proximate relativity’.  Chapter 
six will then use these conclusions to frame its discussion of what I will refer to 
as the Global Network Narrative as typified by Syriana and Babel (Iñárritu, 2006) 
amongst others. 
Chapter seven will move away from the cinematic examples (and the 
accompanying focus on spatial organisation), by discussing the narrative forms 
encountered in various television texts, most extensively 24.  24’s ‘real-time’ 
structure will be examined in relation to Bakhtin’s concept of the chronotope, 
with the show’s temporal arrangement scrutinised in relation to clock-time and 
deadlines.  Chapter eight retains 24 as a focus of study, but widens the focus out 
to incorporate various examples of what Henry Jenkins describes as ‘transmedia 
storytelling’.
53  In doing so, this chapter will attempt to break down the dividing 
line that treats film and television as exclusive categories, by arguing for the 
migration of certain aesthetics and narrative structures across multiple 
platforms.  By introducing texts that fall into neither category (such as 
mobisodes and online animations), and others that hybridise the two (for 
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example, the feature-length, stand alone 24: Redemption [Cassar, 2008]), many 
of the narrative structures and aesthetic arrangements noted in the preceding 
chapters – notably, an emphasis on multiplicity, simultaneity, complexity and 
unexpectedness – will be suggested to exceed the medium on which they were 
first noted, and come to characterise the War on Terror more broadly.  
The final two chapters are ostensibly more concerned with aesthetics than 
narrative structure, but it will be emphasised throughout that aesthetic choices 
can influence narrative structure in quite a direct manner.  Chapter nine will 
consider the formal qualities of key documentaries, establishing a broadly-
shared preoccupation with a responsive and unprepared style that has been 
influenced both by footage shot on September 11
th, 2001 (facilitated by 
advances in communication technologies) and by broader trends in news media, 
particularly the increasingly central figure of the DIY journalist.  Finally, chapter 
ten will consider the frequency with which the ‘raw footage’ aesthetic identified 
in chapter nine in relation to documentary and news media is self-consciously 
evoked in fiction texts.  Again, the organisational effect of this aesthetic trend is 
of interest – in this case, unforced ellipses and a degraded image stream that 
suggest unpreparedness – but also the issue of verisimilitude: the semblance of 
unedited recording and un-composed framing suggestive of both individual 
ground-level involvement and ‘live’ transmission.  This will develop into a final 
argument that reintroduces the Global Network Narrative, in order to examine 
the way War on Terror narratives balance subjective (and therefore necessarily 
narrow) experience, and an objective surveying of the wider context.   
To summarise, this thesis will suggest that the War on Terror is a strategically 
flexible metaframe which manifests itself in numerous narrative forms.  These 
forms both transcode and affect aspects of the metaframe’s rhetoric: 
multiplicity, associational linking and global interconnectivity find corresponding 
narrative shape in the Global Network Narrative; the labour-led pressures of 
clock-time are evoked by the real-time sequential-series; while the authenticity 
and authority of the embedded ‘witness’ is codified and performed via a raw 
footage aesthetic.  Throughout, additional contextual influences – social, 
historical, and technological – will be introduced where appropriate, so as not to 
adopt the metaframe’s claims of all-pervading limitlessness and uniqueness.     30 
As this chapter outline suggests, this project is inescapably interdisciplinary, and 
echoes ongoing debates in multiple areas of research, including media studies, 
war studies and communication theory, not to mention the growing body of 
literature for which 9/11 and the War on Terror are the organising parameters.  
It seems necessary, therefore, to clarify this thesis’s disciplinary origins and the 
extent of its interdisciplinary aspirations before proceeding.  First, the frequent 
use of close textual analysis affirms its basis in film and television studies, as 
opposed to ‘media studies’ per se.  My research questions are aimed at 
understanding the ways in which certain film and television texts produced 
during the last decade have influenced, and been influenced by, a wider media 
ecology, and not at dissecting the logics and functions of the global mediasphere 
itself.  These questions stem from a series of broad observations relating to the 
key narrative structures and visual aesthetics most frequently encountered in 
‘willing’ War on Terror texts: issues of multiplicity, unpredictability and 
simultaneity; themes of ‘liveness’ and ‘real time’, causality and pre-emption, 
and conspiracy and paranoia, amongst others.   
Richard Grusin introduces Premediation with the assumption that: 
All media forms and practices are interrelated.  Thus I take up 
movies, television, and the internet; sports, entertainment, and news; 
academic, journalistic and popular texts; individual, collective, and 
mobile media.  Media should not be studied in isolation, but placed in 
relation to their patterns and flows of interaction as well as to their 
incommensurabilities and discontinuities.
54 
This project surveys a similarly broad range of texts and interests, albeit with 
more modest ambitions.  This thesis necessarily interfaces with multiple 
disciplines, but these are selectively used to support a central focus on 
cinematic and televisual narratives and aesthetics; all media forms and practices 
may indeed be interrelated, as Grusin states, but not all can be given 
satisfactory analysis in a single thesis.  Therefore, no absolute depth of 
knowledge is claimed with regards those secondary disciplines used to support, 
challenge or enhance the work that is conducted on film and television texts 
specifically.   
                                         
54 Richard Grusin, Premediation: Affect and Mediality After 9/11, (Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 
2010) p. 5     31 
This research is situated at the intersection of multiple areas of research – war 
studies, history and philosophy amongst them - but care has been taken to 
return its conclusions to the academic discipline with which I hold the greatest 
familiarity.  As a result, it is hoped that the study’s interdisciplinarity is not at 
the expense of its focus, thoroughness, or expertise.32 
1  Framing 9/11 and the War on Terror 
 
In less than two hours, between the first attack on the 
WTC and the crash of the fourth hijacked airliner in 
rural Pennsylvania, Americans discovered, or 
rediscovered, moral absolutes… There was good, and 
there was evil.  We could tell the difference again, and 
we could use those words again.
55 
-  George Weigel 
Our war on terror begins with al-Qaeda but it does not 
end there.  It will not end until every terrorist group of 
global reach has been found, stopped and defeated… 
Americans should not expect one battle, but a lengthy 
campaign unlike any other we have ever seen.
56 
-  President George W. Bush, 20
th September 2001 
 
Shortly following the terrorist attacks of September 11
th, 2001, President George 
W. Bush declared a war that would come to define his presidency.  The targeted 
enemy was not restricted to Osama Bin Laden or al-Qaeda (the apparent 
culprits).  Nor was it focussed solely on Afghanistan, whose Taliban government 
provided Bin Laden and Al-Qaeda with refuge – though Afghanistan was the first 
to feel its effects.  The stated enemy was ‘terror’ itself.   
As Secretary of State Colin Powell defined it, the intended goal was to reach: 
a state where people are no longer afraid of terrorist activities, where 
they can go about their lives not concerned about the kinds of things 
that happened on the eleventh of September or the kinds of car 
bombings that take place in Jerusalem, or the kinds of terrorism that 
[are] meted out by the guerrillas of Colombia.
57   
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This goal ignored geopolitical differences and posited a single ideological 
struggle that is as nebulous as it is ambitious; a struggle that conflates left-wing 
American revolutionaries and Palestinian nationalists – amongst other groups - 
and declares them two proponents of the same ‘enemy’. 
This chapter will examine some of the ways in which the War on Terror was 
rhetorically created, and its real-world effects.  This is not a specialised 
linguistic or philosophical study, but such studies exist, with common 
observations including: an emphasis on ‘good vs. evil’ over ‘right vs. wrong’ that 
casts the conflict in theological terms;
58 evocation of Just War theory;
59 the 
language of ‘moral accounting’ (in which ethical decisions are discussed in the 
language of commerce);
60 the dehumanizing effects of language (e.g. the 
characterisation of the enemy as ‘rag-heads’, and ‘sand-niggers’);
61 and a long-
standing sense of American exceptionalism with links to a frontier self-
mythology,
62 to give only a representative selection.  This chapter will touch 
upon some of these areas, particularly those that relate to interpretations of 
causality, and the broadly inclusive, protean nature of the War on Terror’s 
encompass.  The War on Terror will be considered as a symbolic frame that 
collates and conflates myriad concepts, policies, battles, incidents and attitudes 
much like the way the Cold War framework defined American foreign policy in 
the post-war years up until the break up of the Soviet Union. 
1.1  9/11’s faux-Grotian moment 
The world has changed in ways no one could have 
foreseen.  We cannot diagnose the events of 9/11 by 
any simple application of the usual tools.  They defy 
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our sense of legible order, and we cannot say when our 
categories will adjust again.
63 
-  Tom Rockmore and Joseph Margolis 
The allure of transformative moments transcends 
academic disciplines.  Their inherent appeal to scholars 
lies in their ability to serve as an interpretive lens 
through which to view transitions between old eras and 
emerging ones… International law is no stranger to this 
allure of the transformative…
64 
-  Laurence R. Helfer 
Before discussing the ‘War on Terror’ itself, it is worth debunking – or at least 
challenging – the frequently articulated assumption that ‘everything changed’ on 
September 11
th, 2001.  The belief that 9/11 heralded a new era in which old 
rules no longer applied was exemplified by former director of the CIA’s counter-
terrorism unit Joseph Cofer Black testimony to Congress in early 2002 in which 
he stated ‘there was a before-9/11 and an after-9/11… After 9/11 the gloves 
came off’.
65 
Its ‘year zero’ status is potentially contradicted, however, by evidence showing 
that preliminary planning for the supposedly retaliatory, pre-emptive invasion of 
Iraq began pre-9/11: ex-Treasury Secretary Paul O’Neill revealed to CBS News in 
2004 that ‘from the very beginning [of the Bush presidency], there was a 
conviction, that Saddam Hussein was a bad person and that he needed to go’, 
and that plans to depose the Iraqi dictator began shortly after President Bush’s 
inauguration, at least eight months before September 11 2001.
66  More generally, 
Naomi Klein argues that the ‘Shock and Awe’ doctrine was written in 1996 with 
re-fighting the first Gulf War in mind,
67 while ‘disaster-capitalists’ – disciples of 
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Milton Friedman’s Chicago School model of economics who ‘pray for crisis the 
way drought-struck farmers pray for rain’, and who had previous experience in 
turning a catastrophe into a profitable situation – were positioned in key White 
House roles ready to put such plans into action when the opportunity presented 
itself.
68  Rahul Mahajan, meanwhile, suggests that the first Gulf War ended 
without closure, and it was therefore inevitable that the Bush administration 
would seek some kind of ‘closure’, regardless of the attacks of 9/11.
69  The 
notion of closure already indicates the relevance of narrative theory to 9/11 and 
the War on Terror, a link awkwardly expressed by Donald Rumsfeld himself in an 
interview with Cal Thomas of Fox News shortly before his departure from office: 
I guess I don't think I would have called it the war on terror.  I don't 
mean to be critical of those who have or did or - and certainly I've 
used the phrase frequently… the word "war" conjures up World War II 
more than it does the Cold War, and it creates a level of expectation 
of victory and an ending within the 30 or 60 minutes of a soap opera.  
And it isn't going to happen that way.
70 
The irony is that, in its open-endedness, the War on Terror narrative structurally 
resembles a soap opera more than Rumsfeld appreciates.  In the soap opera, 
Christine Geraghty observes, ‘there is never… a sense that a resolution is 
possible or imminent’;
71 likewise in the deliberately nebulous War on Terror.  
Noel Carroll notes: 
If Aristotle was correct in asserting that tragedies have beginnings, 
middles, and ends, then it seems equally fair to observe, as many 
have, that soap-operas – an indisputable specimen of narrative - have 
indefinitely large, expanding, and wide-open middles, with no 
conclusions in sight.
72 
That Carroll’s phrasing echoes the title of the Oscar-winning documentary No 
End in Sight (Ferguson, 2007), which criticised the War on Terror’s lack of 
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achievable goals and counter-productive policies for producing a potentially 
endless state of conflict, only underscores the similarity. 
Despite the War on Terror’s apparent pre-2001 origins, 9/11 continues to be 
identified as the War’s ‘year zero’, the point from which all other events 
developed, in official reports as well as in the media and fiction.  The 9/11 
Commission Report sought to provide ‘the fullest possible account’ of the events 
that led up to the terrorist attacks of September 11
th 2001 in New York, 
Washington, and onboard United Airlines Flight 93, which crashed before 
reaching its intended target.  It purports to ‘look backwards in order to look 
forward’,
73 establishing a detailed chronology with the intention of shedding 
light on how the attacks were able to be carried out, and in the process to 
identify intelligence failures, so that recommendations can be made to ensure 
no repeat attacks are allowed to occur in future.  Its first chapter is a minute-
by-minute account of the day itself, while later chapters look back further to 
establish the series of events that led up to the attacks.  However, the ‘fullest 
possible account’ is severely limited: for example, the historical context only 
acknowledges prior engagement with the terrorist organisation Al-Qaeda, and 
not the reasons behind that group’s existence.  So although it eventually 
establishes a timeline that goes back as far as the 1998 bombings of the US 
embassies in Dar es Salaam and Nairobi, the Report only includes events that are 
considered to lead directly and causally to the attacks themselves.  The account 
is solely concerned with the events of the day itself and its direct build-up, and 
not the numerous precedents that can be drawn from the wider socio-historical 
and political context that 9/11 exists as a part of.   
The signifier ‘9/11’ evidences the symbolic abstraction that the day has become 
in popular rhetoric, its four syllables able to evoke a myriad of emotional, 
political and historical connotations.  The indelible connection between the date 
‘September 11
th’, and the terrorist attacks committed on US soil in 2001 has 
been used to add frisson and/or irony to some film texts: for example, Ken 
Loach’s short in the anthology 11’9’’01 (Various, 2002) has its Chilean 
protagonist writing a letter of empathy to the American people, pleading with 
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them not to forget the prior significance of the date in 1973, when the US-
backed General Augusto Pinochet violently deposed the democratically-elected 
Chilean President Salvador Allende in a CIA-backed military coup d’etat.  There 
is an implication that this prior ‘9/11’ can no longer lay claim to the date’s 
historical significance - it has been wrenched from chronological time to become 
symbolic of the attacks, emotions and responses of September 11
th, 2001, the 
very language used to refer to the terrorist attacks perpetuating the rhetoric of 
‘uniqueness’ and ‘world-changing-ness’.  That the signifier used is one of time 
rather than action (a date, rather than a description) is significant to later 
chapters which will look more closely at the role of chronological real-time in 
the narratives of the War on Terror – it is worth noting, for example, that the 
Japanese strikes on Pearl Harbour that brought the United States into World War 
II are not known as 12/7, but by their geographic location.  This is partly due to 
the fact that the terrorist attacks of September 11
th, 2001 were not restricted to 
a single location: summarising the day with reference to New York only would 
overlook those who died in the crash at the Pentagon or the crash in 
Pennsylvania.  Nonetheless, the temporal rather than geographic signifier merits 
further comment later in the thesis.  
There are other motivations behind drawing a line under the attacks and 
declaring anything prior an irrelevance and anything that follows part of a 
monumentally changed world.  It minimises the blame levied at the intelligence 
agencies - such an attack was unimaginable and therefore unforeseeable, 
meaning that they did not fail, since they could not possibly have seen such a 
seismic, unprecedented attack coming.  It is also echoes Chomsky’s observation 
that academia has a tendency to ‘proclaim every few years that we have 
“changed course”, the past is behind us and can be forgotten as we march on 
towards a glorious future’.
74   
Laurence Helfer characterises the ‘everything changed’ mentality as 
symptomatic of a temptation in scholarship and popular culture alike to identify 
‘Grotian moments’.  The term originates with the Dutch scholar Hugo Grotius, 
who Helfer credits with identifying the ‘first and only undisputed transformative 
moment – the change from a medieval world in which ecclesiastical authority 
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dominated secular power to a world controlled by industry and sovereign nation 
states’.
75  Since then, new Grotian moments have been proposed – from an 
American political perspective, the ‘crossroads’ presented by the end of the 
second World War and the fall of the Berlin Wall present the two most widely 
argued-for examples (proposed by the likes of Francis Fukuyama’s The End of 
History amongst others) – but, Helfer warns, ‘history is littered with erroneous 
labelings of watershed events that, in hindsight, seem little more than one in a 
series of points on a Cartesian line mapped out decades earlier’.
76 
Indeed, for any aspect of the War on Terror and September 11 2001, there exist 
precedents.  Terror-as-spectacle has been used by numerous organisations in 
support of numerous political causes: examples include the assassination of 
Israeli athletes by Black September at the Munich Olympics in 1972, and the 
World Trade Centre bombing in 1993.  Neither is the response from the US 
government unique: using fear to bolster faith in Presidential capabilities was 
evident in George H. W. Bush’s campaign against Democrat candidate Michael 
Dukakis in 1988, when adverts about the freed prisoner Willie Horton were 
circulated to discredit his opponent’s policies on crime;
77 the potential for war 
to offer an unpopular leader renewed public support was witnessed when 
Margaret Thatcher entered the UK into the Falklands War in 1982;
78 while the 
declaration of a ‘war’ when a more tempered social response might have been 
more appropriate finds precedent in the War on Drugs.
79  Even the ‘War on 
Terror’ itself is not a new concept: during Ronald Reagan’s administration, a 
similarly-phrased goal was articulated by CIA director William J. Casey,
80 and by 
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Reagan himself.
81  Furthermore, the neo-conservative agenda that underpins the 
Bush doctrine of foreign policy – pre-emption, the ‘1% doctrine’ (where Vice 
President Dick Cheney suggested that if a threat against the American people 
had even a one per cent likelihood, it should be responded to as if it were a one 
hundred per cent certainty) and so on – has its origins as far back as the forties,
82 
while many of the decisions made by the Bush White House have their roots in 
decisions made or policies perpetuated by the Clinton administration, including 
the following: 
The Clinton administration arguably violated the Constitutional and 
legal limits on the President’s authority; used military force outside 
the confines of international law; made the removal of Saddam 
Hussein a national priority as a matter of law; and supported US 
military planning for ‘full spectrum dominance’ of every military 
situation anywhere in the world.
83   
This last point is important - not only are 9/11 and the War on Terror less unique 
and epochal than the war’s rhetoric would try to suggest, neither is left-liberal 
protest correct to place the historical starting point of the ‘War on Terror’ era in 
January 2001, when George W. Bush was inaugurated as US President.  The ‘Bush 
years’ are no more unprecedented or removed from historical context than the 
events that occurred on September 11, 2001.    
Despite these precedents, the War on Terror has been widely considered a 
distinct period that warrants particular consideration – a focus this thesis 
unavoidably shares, though hopefully without lending credence to those 
assigning it Grotian importance.  Henceforth, this thesis is not concerned with 
the degree of ‘uniqueness’ found in the events of 9/11 or in the subsequently 
declared War on Terrorism.  Rather, the rest of this chapter will consider how 
and why it has been characterised as such by certain figures and institutions. 
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1.2  The War on Terror as symbolic frame 
Different metaphors imply different ways of dealing 
with things.
84 
-  Norman Fairclough 
Language matters, because it can determine how we 
think and act.
85 
-  George Lakoff and Evan Frisch 
Seth Lewis and Stephen Reese suggest that the War on Terror is best 
characterised as a ‘metaframe’, in that it ‘conjures up a wider world of 
meaning’.
86  Working from Reese’s own definition of ‘frame’ – ‘organising 
principles that are socially shared and persistent over time, that work 
symbolically to meaningfully structure the social world’
87 – they conclude that 
the ‘War on Terror’ is an indicative example of the metaframe since it: 
Comprehensively organises information, providing an umbrella for a 
wide range of military, political and legal policies; it is based on an 
abstract principle that is embedded in ideological struggle – an 
‘organising idea’ far larger than an individual text; it is socially shared 
as a rallying cry of nationalism in this ‘post-9/11 world’ and served as 
the backdrop against which the 2004 presidential election was played; 
it has been persistent, durable and constant since its introduction in 
2001; it is revealed through symbolism, as typified in Bush’s ‘Mission 
Accomplished’ landing on the USS Abraham Lincoln in 2003; and it 
lends clear patterns of structure, bifurcating the world into two 
camps – with us, or with the terrorists.
88 
Their article includes interviews with journalists from USA Today which examine 
the ways in which journalists ‘transmit’, ‘reify’ and ‘naturalise’ the war on 
terror as policy.  Many of the interviewees express concern over the accuracy 
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and helpfulness of the term ‘War on Terror’, but feel obligated to use it as, as 
the anonymous Journalist ‘J’ elaborated: 
If you’re on TV you have twenty seconds or thirty seconds for a spot, 
it gets the idea across, the context in which you’re talking about 
something.
89 
In addition to shorthand practice, an earlier draft of the article suggested 
another reason for the popularity of the War on Terror frame: 
The most powerful thing about the war on terror is that it fits into a 
headline really nicely.  [Laughs]  It doesn’t have a lot of letters… It’s a 
great headline phrase.  Seriously.  The fewer picas [a unit of 
measurement used in typography], the more likely it is to catch on.
90 
By talking about the War on Terror not just as a policy, an abbreviation or a 
metaphor, but as a brand, Journalist ‘D’ hints at the wider, persuasive power of 
the frame.  It is not just convenient terminology, but a concept that is seductive 
by design.  The phrase proved so seductive that subsequent attempts to re-brand 
it as the ‘Global Struggle against Violent Extremism’ were unsuccessful.  The 
positive connotations of its acronym – GSAVE - were presumably not 
coincidental:  
“It is more than just a military war on terror”, Steven J. Hadley, the 
national security advisor, said in a television interview. “It’s broader 
than that.  It’s a global struggle against extremism.  We need to 
dispute both the gloomy vision and offer a positive alternative”.
91 
However, President Bush was reportedly personally unhappy with the change, 
insisting that ‘war’ was still the most suitable metaphor.
92  
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Following the 2005 US election that awarded George W. Bush a second term in 
office, the New York Times featured an article by Matt Bai entitled ‘The Framing 
Wars’.  Bai identified language as key to the Democrat Party’s defeat: 
Even before the election, a new political word had begun to take hold 
of the party… That word was ‘framing’.  Exactly what it means to 
‘frame’ issues seems to depend on which Democrat you are talking to, 
but everyone agrees that it has to do with choosing the language to 
define a debate and, more important, with fitting individual issues 
into the contexts of broader story lines.  In the months after the 
election, Democratic consultants and elected officials came to sound 
like creative-writing teachers, holding forth on the importance of 
metaphor and narrative.
93 
 
Bai identifies George Lakoff as the figurehead behind this newly visible emphasis 
on ‘framing’.  In Moral Politics, Lakoff argues that US politics is framed 
according to two conflicting models of the family: the Strict Father (which, 
broadly speaking, frames conservative worldviews) and the Nurturant Parent 
(which broadly frames liberal worldviews).
94  These are not offered as 
prescriptive categories, but as descriptors whose careful analysis reveals a great 
deal about the way a multitude of issues on which conservative and liberal 
perspectives are typically at odds – from foreign policy to abortion – are divided.   
Lakoff employs his model with a more directly political agenda – his work moving 
from the descriptive to the proscriptive – in Don’t Think of an Elephant! Know 
Your Values and Frame the Debate, an ‘essential guide for progressives’ that 
proposed ‘reframing’ as key to potential Democratic victory in the 2004 
presidential elections.
95  Taking its title from a simple exercise Lakoff gives 
students of his Cognitive Science 101 class at Berkeley – in which participants are 
instructed not to think of an elephant, but invariably find themselves doing so – 
Lakoff argues that facts, intentions and reason are not the most important 
aspects of political articulation.  In the elephant example, negating the frame of 
an elephant still evokes it (Lakoff suggests that Richard Nixon delivered a 
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political example when he ‘stood before the nation and said, “I am not a crook”.  
And everybody thought about him as a crook’).
96  Therefore, when arguing 
against ideological opponents, he advises, ‘Do not use their language. Their 
language picks out a frame – and it won’t be the frame you want’.
97   
According to Lakoff, facts that contradict a preexisting frame are no guarantee 
that that frame will be abandoned, as the War on Terror’s genesis confirmed: 
The truth alone will not set you free. Saying ‘the President lied when 
he started this war’ puts the truth out there – but for many people it 
just bounces off.  A huge number of people in this country still believe 
that Saddam Hussein was behind September 11
th.  There are people 
who will believe this because it fits their understanding of the world.  
It fits their worldview.  Given that, it is appropriate for them to 
believe…  It is not that they are stupid.  They have a frame and they 
only accept facts that fit that frame.
98 
The way the rhetoric of the War on Terror effects understandings of causality 
will be returned to later in the chapter. 
Lakoff is one of several commentators to interrogate the decision to pick a 
framework of ‘war’ in response to the September 11
th, 2001 terrorist attacks.  
He suggests that framing the attacks as criminal acts would have offered greater 
opportunities for locating, capturing and punishing those responsible, noting that 
even figures in the Bush administration initially advocated a legalistic frame over 
that of military conflict.
99  But instead, a war metaphor was chosen, whose 
combatants were abstract principles and ideals: 
Literal – not metaphorical – wars are conducted against armies of 
other nations.  They end when the armies are defeated militarily and 
a peace treaty is signed.  Terror is an emotional state.  It is in us.  It is 
not an army. And you can’t defeat it militarily and you can’t sign a 
peace treaty with it.
100 
The essential problem at the heart of this ‘War on Terror’ metaphor, Ronald 
Dworkin suggests, is the distinction between the designation ‘war’ relating to a 
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status, and the designation ‘terror’ relating to a means.
101  A state of war such as 
that called into existence on December 8th, 1941 is accompanied by actual 
confrontation between the two opponents that enter into that state of war.  The 
War on Terror, by contrast, does not target a specific enemy or identify a key 
battle to be won.  Instead, it is designed to implicate a vast number of potential 
threats, enemies, targets and battles.  Its breadth is due to the essential 
malleability of its rhetoric: anything and everything can be declared part of the 
‘War on Terror’ if it suits the individual or group making the declaration, since it 
has no clear definitional parameters. 
1.3  War without limits: Defining the ‘War on Terror’ 
The main Egyptian newspaper had a big article called 
‘Axis of Evil’ recently.  They said there really is an ‘Axis 
of Evil’: the US, Israel and Turkey.  It’s an axis of evil 
aimed at the Arab states, and has been for years…
102 
-  Noam Chomsky 
War on terror is a political slogan – not a coherent 
strategy for national defence – and it succeeds 
brilliantly only as politics.  For everything else, it is 
quite illogical.
103 
-  William Greider 
Those critical of the policies enacted in the name of the War on Terror have 
subjected the term to substantial interrogation, questioning whether it can be 
accurately described as a ‘war’, and if so, whether the enemy is best described 
as ‘terror’.  As Noam Chomsky has pointed out, the latter claim is particularly 
dubious due to its flawed logic of fighting fire with fire, or in this case, 
combating the effects of international terrorism by provoking terror and fear 
through military actions:  
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There is actually one simple way for the US to decrease very 
significantly the amount of terror in the world, and that is to just stop 
participating in it.
104   
Further key questions relating to rhetoric include: who are the ‘international 
community’?  What is meant by ‘enemy combatant’ and why are captured 
Taliban or Iraqis not considered Prisoners of War if captured during the course of 
such a war?  What is it that distinguishes ‘enhanced interrogation techniques’ 
from torture as outlawed by the Geneva Convention?  In addition, the rhetorical 
euphemisms coined in past wars re-emerge: what is friendly about ‘friendly 
fire’?  How does military invasion entail humanitarianism?  As Chomsky pithily 
observes, even the phrase ‘peace process’ has traditionally lacked a clear 
definition, usually referring to whatever actions the US happens to be taking, 
even when such actions undermine rather than promote peaceful coexistence.
105   
The enemy in the War on Terror is similarly abstract and muddled, despite 
attempts to project it onto a cadre of nation-state targets.  The ‘Axis of Evil’ 
was the first significant category to emerge from the wider War on Terror 
umbrella, grouping together Iran, Iraq and North Korea.  Apparently coined by 
speechwriter David Frum (though he cedes credit to chief speechwriter Michael 
Gerson for substituting the original ‘axis of hatred’ for a more evocatively 
theological phrasing),
106 the term was consciously designed to echo the Axis 
Powers of World War 2.
107  The sense of moral certainty associated with the 
Second World War was opportunistically appropriated, though the actual 
similarities between Germany, Japan and Italy’s alliance in the 1940s and the 
supposed interconnections between Iran’s ayatollahs, Iraq’s secular rulers and 
North Korea’s isolated dictatorship are highly dubious.  Later, the United States’ 
ambassador to the United Nations John R. Bolton added Libya, Syria and Cuba to 
the list of supposed collaborative enemies (in a speech entitled, in appropriate 
sequel fashion, ‘Beyond the Axis of Evil’),
108 while Secretary of State 
                                         
104 Chomsky, Power and Terror, p. 76 
105 ibid p. 33 
106 David Frum, The Right Man: The Surprise Presidency of George W. Bush (New York: Random 
House, 2003), p. 238 
107 Ibid p. 236 
108 John R. Bolton, ‘Beyond the Axis of Evil: Additional Threats From Weapons of Mass 
Destruction’ Heritage Foundation Lecture, delivered 06 May, 2002 accessed Dec. 2010. 
http://www.futurodecuba.org/Bolton%20lecture.pdf     46 
Condoleezza Rice later still shifted the rhetoric from ‘evil’ to the less 
theological ‘tyranny’, naming the remaining ‘Axis of Evil’ countries (North Korea 
and Iran) along with Cuba, Belarus, Zimbabwe and Burma ‘Outposts of 
Tyranny’.
109  The language may have been modified, but the collation of vastly 
different countries and cultures into a single enemy remained.
110 
Throughout, the difficulty in defining ‘terrorism’ itself remains.  It is interesting 
that while wars are waged in the name of combating international terrorism, 
there is still no clear consensus of what the term encompasses.  The debate over 
whether the mass shooting at US military base Fort Hood by army psychiatrist 
Nidal Malik Hasan in 2009 constituted an act of terrorism or multiple acts of 
murder evidences the continued ambiguity, and indicates how violent events 
remain open to interpretation, rather than falling unproblematically into one 
category or another.  On the one hand, a Time cover story asked ‘The Fort Hood 
Killer: Terrified… or Terrorist?’, ostensibly questioning whether the shooting was 
the act of a radicalised Muslim terrorist or a mentally unstable soldier whose 
distress went unnoticed, but with an emphasis on the former.
111  Similarly, 
Senator Joe Lieberman repeatedly referred to the shooting as a ‘terrorist attack’ 
and requested Congressional Hearings to confirm his analysis.
112  By contrast, 
official preliminary investigations emphasised a psychological rather than 
political explanation for Hasan’s act of violence,
113 while the Department of 
Defense’s published report, called for by Lieberman, makes no reference to 
Islam as a motivational factor, to the Senator’s express disappointment.
114 
‘Terrorism’, this example seems to suggest, is difficult to define with any sense 
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of certainty, a conclusion supported by numerous studies of the term’s 
etymology and usage.  As Bruce Hoffman concludes:  
On one point, at least, everyone agrees: ‘Terrorism’ is a pejorative 
term.  It is a word with intrinsically negative connotations that is 
generally applied to one’s enemies and opponents, or to those with 
whom one disagrees and would otherwise prefer to ignore… Hence the 
decision to call someone or label some organisation ‘terrorist’ 
becomes almost unavoidably subjective…
115 
This subjectivity has not, of course, hindered the term’s widespread application 
in myriad legal and political contexts, despite the lack of agreement even 
between US state institutions as to the term’s meaning.  Hoffman notes that the 
U.S. State Department, the FBI, the Department of Homeland Security and the 
Department of Defense all use subtly different definitions, each of which 
‘reflects the priorities and particular interests of the specific agency 
involved’.
116  So the FBI’s definition incorporates material damage to private 
businesses by anarchist groups and domestic attacks on abortion clinics, 
reflecting its focus on the investigation of crime, while the State Department 
emphasises the ‘ineluctably political nature of terrorism and the perpetrator’s 
fundamental ‘subnational’ characteristic’.
117 
The consequence of such a loose definition was demonstrated by federal judge 
Joyce Hens Green in late 2004, when she demonstrated in court the full purview 
of such a loose definition: 
Green introduced a hypothetical case to Brian Boyle, a Justice 
Department lawyer: could the President of the US imprison ‘a little 
old lady from Switzerland’ as an enemy combatant if she donated to a 
charity not knowing that her money was eventually used to finance 
the activities of al-Qaeda terrorists?  After a long pause, Boyle 
responded: ‘possibly’.
118 
The definition is no clearer in other members of the Coalition of the Willing 
(another contentious noun to emerge from the War on Terror metaframe).  The 
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authors of Taking Liberties, a study of New Labour but with conclusions that can 
be applied to the Bush administration, note that ‘terrorism’, as defined in the 
UK’s Terrorism Act of 2000, amended in 2006, as ‘the use or threat of certain 
types of action where the use or threat is designed to influence the government, 
or to intimidate the public or a section of the public’, could include historical 
figures as far ranging as Jesus, Robin Hood, Gandhi, George Washington, 
Francois Mitterand, Martin Luther King, and the Suffragettes.
119  Furthermore, 
since anyone who ‘encourages or glorifies’ a terrorist is also by extension a 
terrorist themselves, all Christians following the teachings of the terrorist Jesus 
Christ are guilty by association: 
[as] a practicing Christian, so therefore worshipping Jesus, [Tony 
Blair] is risking a seven-year jail sentence under his own law… And as 
for Gordon Brown, he is a big fan of Ghandi, so he’s on the list as 
well.
120 
As previously stated, such loose parameters give the metaframe ‘War on Terror’ 
a broad encompass.  Part of the War on Terror’s function is to dissolve erstwhile 
boundary lines separating public and private, domestic and foreign, the everyday 
civilian and the militarised.  Soon, everything is potentially part of the War on 
Terror, as Welch observes: 
Even the debate over gay marriage has been framed with national 
security in mind. ‘So argued a woman interviewed by NPR (National 
Public Radio) at the National Association of Evangelicals convention in 
Colorado Springs.  Her reasoning: by breaking down the family, we’re 
not having enough kids, while ‘other countries’ with an agenda to hurt 
America are having boatloads of babies.  If we legalise gay marriage, 
the terrorists will eventually outnumber us.’
121 
Satirist Al Franken – now a Democratic senator – highlights a similar attitude in 
quotes from American televangelist Jerry Falwell: 
‘I really believe that the pagans and the abortionists and the feminists 
and the gays and the lesbians who are actively trying to make that an 
alternative lifestyle, the ACLU, People For the American Way – all of 
them who tried to secularise America – I point the finger in their face 
and say ‘you helped this happen’.  To which Robertson [Pat 
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Robertson, host of 700 Club on which the statement was made] 
responded: ‘well I totally concur’.
122 
In a comparable fashion, the ‘Warballs’ column featured in the satirical 
publication Private Eye ridicules attempts to connect a litany of subjects – from 
reduced profits at strip club Spearmint Rhino to increased purchases of burgundy 
mohair throws – to the effects of 9/11 and Iraq by members of the news media 
and cultural commentators alike, with the drop of customers at the former 
blamed on ‘the knock-on effects of the 11
th September terror outrages of 2001’ 
and the soaring sales of the latter attributed to the ‘death’ of modernism on 
9/11.
123   
In less extreme ways, seemingly unrelated cultural trends have been (and 
continue to be) routinely linked to 9/11 and the War on Terror – for example, 
Ruth La Ferla’s article ‘A Trend With Teeth’, published in the New York Times, 
that suggested a correlation between the popularity of vampire fiction like 
Twilight and True Blood (HBO, 2009 - ) and ‘real world anxieties’ such as the 
threat of terrorism.
124  Academics (including myself) also share responsibility for 
this expansion of the War on Terror from political doctrine to all-pervasive 
omnipresent cultural phenomenon.  To give just one example, Christmas, 
Ideology and Popular Culture contains several articles that address the War on 
Terror directly: Sheila Whiteley’s introduction notes the rise in G.I. Joe sales in 
the lead up to the Christmas of 2001;
125 Freya Jarman-Ives pins the success of UK 
Christmas number one ‘Mad World’ by Michael Andrews and Gary Jules on the 
invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan by arguing the song’s lyrics ‘spoke clearly to 
Britain’s national mood at that time’;
126 Christine Agiu considers broader 
intersections of Christmas and war;
127 while Tara Brabazon sketches the 
similarities between coverage of the 2004 tsunami that devastated large parts of 
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Asia and the coverage of the War on Terror.
128  Despite the ostensible focus on a 
Christian holiday - a brief that could be interpreted any number of ways - it is 
telling that so many opt to link the subject to an event popularly considered 
‘era-defining’. 
The War on Terror political currency also crosses international borders.  Zala 
Volcic and Karmen Erjavec use interviews with Serbian intellectuals to examine 
how discourse surrounding war was retrofitted to echo War on Terror rhetoric, 
concluding that ‘a discourse of “anti-terrorism” has been manipulated to justify 
violent political actions and past crimes’.
129  The language of the War on Terror 
has been appropriated in various places by governments keen to identify ‘their 
own fight against internal insurgents and dissidents, notably Russia, India, China, 
Zimbabwe, the Philippines, Colombia and Israel’ with America’s war.  Jackson 
notes that: 
Linking rebels and dissidents at home to the global ‘war on terror’ 
gives these governments both the freedom to crack down on them 
without fear of international condemnation and in some cases, with 
direct military assistance from America.
130 
It can also be linked to less militarised activities such as immigration control, as 
evidenced by members of Australian Prime Minister John Howard’s government 
rhetorically linking asylum seekers with terrorist threats, particularly during the 
Tampa affair in which a Norwegian freighter carrying four hundred and thirty 
eight asylum seekers rescued from international waters was refused entry to 
Australia.
131  The link was made explicit by Steve Reith, then Defence Minister, 
in an interview on the 13
th September, 2001:  
The New York act of terrorism just means that things are not going to 
be the same in the future as they’ve been in the past.  And one of the 
things that we will need to be looking at is improving security more 
generally and part of security is to ensure that you can properly 
process and manage and know who’s coming into the country and if 
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we are just going to have an open door then the fact is that that is an 
invitation for trouble in the future.
132 
If Chechnya, gay marriage, Norwegian ships and Christmas are all conceivably 
connectable to the War on Terror, its definition grows bloated and hazy.  In 
short, if everything is (or can be argued to be) the War on Terror, it ceases to 
have defining characteristics of its own.  It is amorphous and universal; 
effectively, nothing is war on terror, in so much as it is no more defined by its 
War on Terror status than by any other frame of reference, and the tag 
potentially loses its meaning and the metaphor its potency.  This inclusive 
tendency, facilitated by definitional ambiguity, helps identify the War on Terror 
as a proscriptive, organisational term rather than an indexical, descriptive 
statement of actuality: new components can be added simply by declaring their 
membership.
133 
1.4  ‘Don’t think of the War on Terror’: The persistence of the 
metaframe 
Contests over definitions of words are not just word 
games.  Real political outcomes are at stake.  If the 
public, or sufficient sections of it, can be persuaded 
that the state’s perspective on a given ‘war against 
terrorism’ is questionable, this might imply a 
weakening of support.  On the other hand, if the public 
can be persuaded the state is right, this helps mobilise 
support for transferring resources from welfare to 
security.  Language matters, and how the media use 
language matters.
134 
-  Philip Schlesinger, Graham Murdock and Philip 
Elliott, 1983 
In one respect, then, the rhetoric of the War on Terror metaframe is designed to 
be broad and ambiguous.  However, this does not necessarily facilitate multiple 
interpretations: the War on Terror metaframe is flexible enough to incorporate 
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new enemies or areas of policy – from immigration to foreign diplomacy – but 
deliberately restrictive enough to ensure its central narrative is relatively 
consistent.  The broad, populist rhetoric that allows for the metaframe’s 
application in a multitude of scenarios can also serve to restrict meaning.   
The rhetoric of the War on Terror is necessarily populist, as a metaframe can 
only exist and persist if it acquires popular acceptance and legitimacy.  Richard 
Jackson argues that such a frame must obtain a level of social consensus, which 
is impossible without the careful deployment of convincing rhetoric and 
supportive language.
135  ‘Consent’ is not being used here as a euphemism for 
‘support’: the protests that took place across Europe and in the US are 
testament to the large numbers of people who opposed the invasions for a 
variety of reasons, ranging from the legalistic (the US did not have a mandate 
from the international community as represented by the United Nations and 
NATO) to the ethical (those who objected to war as a fundamentally immoral 
action) to those who questioned its practical logic (the bombing of a poor and 
technologically inferior nation considered unlikely to increase the safety of the 
United States).  But though dissenting, protesters adopt the term nonetheless: in 
Lakoff’s analogy, they are thinking of the elephant even as they oppose it.   
The War on Terror metaframe is in one respect flexible and amorphous, but in 
another it is insidious and persistent.  Bush argued for the invasion of Iraq by 
conflating Saddam Hussein with the stateless terrorist organisation Al-Qaeda, 
adding Hussein’s Baathist party to a growing list of homogenised ‘terrorist’ 
enemies: 
We know that Iraq and the al Qaeda terrorist network share a common 
enemy – the United States of America.  We know that Iraq and al 
Qaeda have had high-level contacts that go back a decade.  Some al 
Qaeda leaders who fled Afghanistan went to Iraq… We’ve learned that 
Iraq has trained al Qaeda members in bomb-making and poisons and 
deadly gases.  And we know that after September the 11
th, Saddam 
Hussein’s regime gleefully celebrated the terrorist attacks on 
America.
136 
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The nature of this link is, however, deliberately ambiguous, allowing Bush to 
later refute the notion that his administration had ever tried to connect Saddam 
Hussein to September 11
th itself: 
We’ve had no evidence that Saddam Hussein was involved with 
September 11
th… What the vice president said is that he has been 
involved with al Qaeda… There’s no question that Saddam Hussein had 
al Qaeda ties.
137 
The language typified by the first quote is supportive of the metaframe – it 
acknowledges popularly-held fears and articulates policy decisions based on 
these fears by emphasising the threat of future terrorism.  It suggests 
connections between Saddam Hussein and al Qaeda, thereby reinforcing the War 
on Terror metaframe.  Yet the subsequent denial does not resolve the 
connection between Iraq and the War on Terror; the metaframe works through 
evocation and association and once a link is made it is difficult to eradicate, 
with attempts to do so diminished by their need to utilise the same frame.  
Michael Welch identifies several key categories of language used in such efforts 
to establish and justify the War on Terror metaframe: mystical, tough talk, 
blaming, fabrication, rumour and domination.
138  Individually each presents its 
own challenges to the listener seeking to cut through the rhetoric to engage with 
the content, but the task is made more difficult by their combined usage.
139  As 
demonstrated above, denial is the last straw for the rhetorician, either in the 
form of ‘interpretive denial’, in which ‘facts are not refuted but are given a 
different spin, thus altering the meaning’ or more blatant denial, such as Cheney 
insisting ‘I have not suggested there’s a connection between Iraq and 9/11’, 
despite quotes to the contrary.
140   
Most problematic of all is ‘empty language’, statements that in Welch’s 
definition ‘carry little meaning’.  Such statements, when inserted into political 
speech, are not merely irrelevances or distractions, but manipulative, 
distracting listeners ‘from examining the content of the [overall] message’.
141  
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Such statements are ‘tremendously broad and vague’, making them ‘virtually 
impossible to oppose’.  Renana Brooks suggests that such language allows the 
user to dominate discussion, using empty language to: 
conceal faulty generalisations; to ridicule viable alternatives; to 
attribute negative motivations to others, thus making them appear 
contemptible; and to rename and ‘reframe’ opposing viewpoints.
142  
This suggests that while the War on Terror metaframe is strategically vaguely 
defined and amorphous, its rhetoric also functions to delimit meaning and deny 
alternative interpretations.  The rhetoric is both broad enough to encompass 
multiple disparate components, while restrictive enough to serve particular 
political interests.  The mammoth USA Patriot Act - a contrived acronym 
standing for ‘Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools 
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism’ – demonstrates how redefinitions 
and branding help achieve this.  When this evocative acronym is contrasted with 
the legislation’s mass – three hundred and forty two pages, three hundred and 
fifty subject areas, forty federal agencies consulted and twenty one legal 
amendments – it becomes indicative of the way in which complex issues (in this 
case, complex legislation) are boiled down to instinctively-grasped but loosely-
defined concepts – in this case, patriotism.
143  A similar blend of easily-
comprehended shorthand symbolism and complicated, wide-reaching legislation 
is evident in the short-lived Operation TIPS (Terrorism Information and 
Prevention System) - another bill, Marilyn B. Young observes, ‘whose acronym 
must have preceded its full naming’.
144 
Even when the rhetoric appears clear and unequivocal, ambiguity is traceable.  
The ‘torture memos’ uncovered by Newsweek, in which Office of Legal Counsel 
lawyer John Woo re-defined torture, habeas corpus and other concepts integral 
to the War on Terror and the treatment of prisoners in ways that minimised US 
obligations under the Geneva convention, are perhaps the most infamous 
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examples of rhetorical manipulation in the War on Terror.
145  The memos took 
the word ‘torture’ and restricted its meaning: 
Physical pain amounting to torture must be equivalent in intensity to 
the pain accompanying serious physical injury, such as organ failure, 
impairment of bodily function, or even death.  For purely mental pain 
or suffering to amount to torture (under U.S. law), it must result in 
significant psychological harm of significant duration e.g. lasting 
months or even years.
146 
This retrospective definition, which prohibits only what it describes as ‘extreme 
acts’, is a repudiation of the Third 1949 Geneva Convention, where ‘any form of 
coercion’, including all forms of physical or mental torture, are forbidden 
against prisoners of war.
147  Furthermore, the Convention states, if a prisoner 
refuses to answer they ‘may not be threatened, insulted or exposed to 
unpleasant or disadvantageous treatment of any kind’.
148  Hence the need for the 
Bush legal team to invent a new designation, the ‘enemy combatant’, a category 
neither civilian nor military, imprisoned during war yet not a prisoner of war.  
Without this new category, as Philippe Sands Q.C. puts it:  
You’re either a warrior, subject to the rules of war and armed 
conflict, or you are a criminal subject to the rules of criminal justice.  
There is no middle ground, and there’s no legal black hole.
149 
While the declaration of war was not a contingent outcome of  September 11
th 
2001 – as previously discussed, alternative paths might have been chosen – once 
a war metaframe was evoked, the ‘enemy combatant’ definition offered a 
welcome loophole that allowed the war to retain a degree of legality while 
exempting itself from the widely agreed rules of warfare.  But the precise 
language of this forty-four page legal memo is still strategically ambiguous, with 
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phrases like ‘significant psychological harm’ difficult to empirically define due to 
the non-specific meaning of the word ‘significant’ in this context. 
The language used to perpetuate the War on Terror metaframe, then, is flexible 
enough to expand and contract as required, but strategically designed to delimit 
meaning.  The metaframe is both inclusive – everything is feasibly part of the 
War on Terror - and exclusive – alternative frames or interpretations are denied.  
This process of narrowing meaning to a singularly-defined core narrative while 
simultaneously incorporating ever-multiplying strands will be discussed in 
greater detail in chapter three; first I want to establish the reality-making effect 
of the War on Terror metaframe. 
1.5  ‘Things related and not’: The reality effect of language 
The word security is the act: the utterance is the 
primary reality.
150 
-  Ole Waever 
Human conflict begins and ends via talk and text.
151 
-  Daniel N. Nelson 
We conclude that the use by Ministers of phrases such 
as ‘war on terror’ and ‘arc of extremism’ is unhelpful 
and that such oversimplifications may lead to 
dangerous policy implications… We recommend that the 
government should not use this or similar language in 
future.
152 
-  House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee 
In the War on Terror, an infinite and vague ‘war’ was declared, and two 
invasions undertaken in its name, yet the connection between the conflicts only 
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exists in the rhetoric used to justify their existence.  This is tautological and 
self-fulfilling – the War on Terror exists because there is conflict in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, while there is fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan because the U.S. and 
its allies are fighting a War on Terror.  This section will scrutinise such circular 
logic by considering how causality is understood and acted upon in the War on 
Terror frame. 
Ole Waever offers an instructive starting point.  Writing in the mid-nineties, 
Waever conceives of ‘security’ – a much discussed concept in the years 
immediately following the Cold War – not as an indexical state of existence, but 
as a speech act: 
In this usage, security is not of interest as a sign that refers to 
something more real; the utterance itself is the act.  By saying it, 
something is done (as in betting, giving a promise, naming a ship).  By 
uttering ‘security’, a state-representative moves a particular 
development into a specific area, and thereby claims a special right to 
use whatever means are necessary to block it.
153 
Already, the strategic implications of such a speech act are apparent: 
In naming a certain development a security problem, the ‘state’ can 
claim a special right, one that will, in the final instance, always be 
defined by the state and its elites… By definition, something is a 
security problem when the elites declare it to be so.
154 
September 11
th, 2001 prompted a renewed public interest in notions of security; 
indeed, an entire new department of federal government, the Department of 
Homeland Security, was premised on securing the country against future 
instances of a newly-exposed threat.  As in Waever’s conceptualisation of 
‘security’ in the nineties, the War on Terror is not a descriptive label applied to 
an indexical phenomenon; it was summoned into existence by speechwriters and 
policymakers, not identified retroactively.  
As previously discussed, the War on Terror’s targets were not limited to those 
groups and individuals directly responsible for the attacks, as supported by 
Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld’s directive to ‘go massive… sweep it all up.  
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Things related and not’.
155  The creation of causal links became a feat of 
verbosity, and not the interpretation of gathered facts.  In an infamous display 
of dubious reasoning, Rumsfeld demonstrated the War on Terror’s self-fulfilling 
logic by stating that ‘the absence of evidence is not evidence of absence’.
156  
Rumsfeld revealed the tautological manner in which the Bush administration 
approached the search for culprits post-9/11; rather than search for evidence to 
prove a link, the onus was on others to prove that the supposed link did not 
exist, an inversion of the criminological tenet ‘innocent until proven guilty’.   
I. A. Richards points out that the labels ‘cause’ and ‘effect’ are also open to 
interpretation: 
There is a good deal of arbitrariness at several points which comes 
from the different purposes for which we need causal laws.  We 
decide, to suit these purposes, how we shall divide up events… [and] 
we distribute the titles of ‘cause’ and ‘effect’ as we please… We are 
especially arbitrary in picking out the cause from among the whole 
group, or context – or prior and subsequent events which hang 
together.
157 
As previously discussed, officials identified 9/11 as the undisputed ‘cause’, the 
War its necessary ‘effect’.  For Richard Jackson, this identification of 9/11 as 
the clear and unchallenged origin in essence allowed the administration to 
‘control the future’, in as much as the retaliatory state of war was made to 
appear inevitable and unquestionable.
158  The very notion of ‘pre-emption’ 
echoes this control: while the pre-emptive attack occurs first chronologically, it 
is framed as the ‘effect’ of an impending ‘cause’ that it is designed to prevent. 
Angelica Nuzzo observes the repercussions of positing war as an ‘allegedly 
necessary effect, or response to, the occurrence of events that, under the 
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designation terrorism, are regarded as primal “causes”’.
159  In the War on Terror, 
she concludes: 
It is the effect that first institutes the cause as cause.  The cause is 
individuated – or ‘posited’ – on the ground of the effect, not the other 
way around.  Hence, what appears as cause (terrorism) is in truth 
itself an effect; it is the true effect that follows from that which is 
instead presented as a subsequent and necessary effect (war).   
The ‘cause’ is premised on its ‘effect’, not vice versa.  Such retrospectively-
identified causality has been a feature of the War on Terror metaframe in 
various ways:  from the leaked Downing Street memos which suggested a wilful 
manipulation of ‘facts’ to suit pre-existing goals (‘the intelligence and facts 
were being fixed around the policy’ as Downing Street foreign policy aide 
Matthew Rycroft put it)
160; attempts to link Iraq to the US anthrax attacks in late 
2001
161 (when packages containing anthrax spores were posted to two senators 
and several media offices, killing five people – now believed to have been the 
work of non-Muslim American microbiologist Bruce Irvins);
162 and the 
aforementioned directive to ‘sweep it all up’.  The narrative of the War on 
Terror is flexible enough to suggest causal connections between events that 
research uncovers as exaggerated, misguided or false.  In the process, the 
discourse exerts its own causal influence over actual events.  Marc Howard Ross 
writes: 
Narratives play a causal role in the conflict process when they frame 
cognitions and emotions that structure and limit the actions 
individuals and groups consider as plausible.  In this process, 
narratives shape what constitutes evidence and how it is to be used… 
From this perspective, narratives do not force parties to take 
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particular action… but narratives may be crucial in limiting the range 
of choices that are considered.
163 
Richard Jackson draws a similar conclusion: 
The ‘war on terror’… is simultaneously a set of actual practices – 
wars, covert operations, agencies and institutions – and an 
accompanying series of assumptions, beliefs, justifications and 
narratives – it is an entire language or discourse.  At the most basic 
level, the practice of counter-terrorism is predicated on and 
determined by the language of counter-terrorism.
164 
For this reason, the film and television texts that dramatise and represent War 
on Terror-related subjects are of great importance to any attempt to understand 
and explain the actual socio-political situation. 
1.6  Conclusion     
The War on Terror is a rhetorical frame that confuses, subverts and obscures 
cause and effect for political purposes.  As a rhetorical frame it is created 
through all of its utterances; its narrative may have been initially scripted by the 
Bush administration, evoking 9/11 as an epochal schism, but it is reified and 
naturalised by the news media and other commentators.  Moreover, film and 
television texts participate in this process, with fiction-based War on Terror 
narratives sharing and supporting – co-constituting – the War on Terror 
discourse’s ‘reality’.  Chapter two will consider the ramifications of this 
conclusion. 
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2  The War on Terror is not taking place: War as 
information event 
 
Fiction is history… or it is nothing.  But is also more 
than that; it stands on firmer ground, being based on 
the reality of forms and the observation of social 
phenomena, whereas history is based on documents, 
and the reading of print and handwriting – on second-
hand impression.  Thus fiction is nearer truth.
165 
-  Joseph Conrad 
Dick Cheney’s a fine fellow.  He’s entitled to his own 
opinion.  He’s not entitled to his own facts.
166 
-  Joe Biden 
 
‘Truthiness’, Merriam-Webster’s ‘word of the year’ in 2006,
167 was coined by 
American satirist Stephen Colbert in the pilot episode of the popular The Colbert 
Report (Comedy Central, 2005 - present).  It skewers both the dependence on 
rhetorical conviction examined in chapter one, while also hinting towards the 
kind of ‘reality’ possessed by film or television: 
I will speak to you in plain, simple English.  And that brings us to 
tonight’s word: ‘truthiness’.  Now, sure some of the ‘word police’, the 
‘wordinistas’ over at Webster’s are gonna say, ‘hey, that’s not a 
word’.  Well anyone who knows me knows I’m no fan of dictionaries or 
reference books.  I don’t trust books.  They’re all fact, no heart.  And 
that’s exactly what’s pulling our country apart today.  Cause face it, 
folks; we are a divided nation… We are divided between those who 
think with their head, and those who know with their heart…  What 
about Iraq? If you think about it, maybe there are a few missing pieces 
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to the rationale for war.  But doesn’t taking Saddam out feel like the 
right thing?
168 
In interview, out of character, he elaborated on the concept behind the humour: 
It doesn’t seem to matter what the facts are.  It used to be, everyone 
was entitled to their own opinion, but not their own facts.  But that’s 
not the case anymore.  Facts matter not at all.  Perception is 
everything.  It’s certainty.
169 
The previous chapter concurred that in the War on Terror, perception is indeed 
more important that facts.  Subjectivity trumps objectivity in the rush to assign 
blame for 9/11, and war rhetoric flourishes regardless of arguments to the 
contrary.  Semantic play ousts intelligence gathering as the primary basis for 
foreign policy decisions.  Links fabricated in language become concretised by 
policy, and the ripples spread outwards to encompass a broad, amorphous range 
of constituent elements, some more widely accepted than others, but all 
integrated into the War on Terror at some level.  This chapter will consider the 
relationship between the rhetoric of the War and the film and television texts 
that report, represent or re-imagine its claims, establishing the ‘truthiness’ of 
film and television drama.  
It is important to acknowledge that ‘the War on Terror’ is more than the two 
actual-conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, as some critics of the Bush 
administration‘s foreign policy decisions have already suggested.  Michael Welch 
discusses what he considers the hidden victims of 9/11 and the War on Terror, 
from Arab-Americans subjected to racially-motivated violence, to the censorship 
of dissenters labelled unpatriotic if speaking out against the Bush White House.
170  
He draws no distinction between these acts of violence and those more obviously 
part of the War on Terror’s mandate, from the shock and awe bombing campaign 
used to ‘soften up’ Baghdad to the extraordinary rendition program used to 
‘outsource torture’ of detainees.  But we must go further: if we consider only 
actual violence and conflict carried out in connection with the War on Terror, 
we overlook the fact that, as a theoretically limitless state of war, it includes 
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not only already existing wars, but all potential wars to be carried out in its 
name.  If it is deemed necessary to attack another country identified as part of 
the so-called Axis of Evil - most likely Iran, although cross-border strikes in 
Pakistan and the recent decision to intervene in Libya also threaten further 
large-scale conflict in the region - then these possibilities are as much a part of 
the War on Terror as the two conflicts already underway.  This is not a 
distinction between ‘real’ wars and ‘fake’ wars, but between actual conflicts 
and potential conflicts that presently exist only theoretically, in war game 
scenarios and dossiers – imagined wars.  And once the projected and imaginary 
are incorporated into the state of war, it no longer makes sense to exclude more 
obviously fictional forms of warfare, such as the dramatic fictional warfare 
depicted on film and television.   
It follows that a war that relies upon rhetoric for its accepted existence finds 
expression in all of its manifestations, from the actual fighting between soldiers 
that takes place in the Afghanistan and Iraq wars, to the textual images of the 
War on Terror that reiterate and contextualise the actual world fighting as part 
of this larger, epochal ‘War’.  Richard Jackson writes that the language of the 
War on Terror is as constitutive of the ‘reality of counter-terrorism’ as the 
practices it seeks to normalise and reify.
171  The ‘War on Terror’ is comprised of 
all of its forms, from the military (e.g. the shock and awe bombing of Baghdad), 
to the political-rhetorical (e.g. the Bush administration’s ‘with us or against’ us 
dichotomy) to the narrated and dramatic.  The last category includes all film 
and television texts that connect themselves directly with some facet of the War 
on Terror: from World Trade Centre (Stone, 2006) and the films dramatising the 
terrorist attacks of September 11
th 2001; Syriana and multi-strand global 
network narratives that attempt to accurately portray the global 
interconnectedness that links together geopolitical cause and effect in complex 
ways; to films that depict the tribulations of the soldiers who fight the actual 
wars that War on Terror rhetoric seeks to combine.  The War on Terror is an 
amalgamation of various sources: a bomb blast, an episode of 24, an implied 
threat to Iran, the rendition of an ‘enemy combatant’, the film Redacted, and so 
on: all are part of its patchwork existence. 
                                         
171 Jackson, Writing the War on Terrorism, p. 2     64 
It is worth stating here that I do not mean to suggest that the deaths of civilians, 
soldiers, terrorists or ‘enemy combatants’ are directly comparable to the deaths 
of imaginary characters in television and film texts,
172 nor that the ‘spectatorial’ 
perspective is universally shared (the ‘breathtaking provincialism’ challenged by 
Sontag in Regarding the Pain of Others).
173  The point is instead that the 
narrative which connects these events, the labyrinthine maze of interconnected 
terror networks and coalitions, of instigating cause and retaliatory effect, does 
not possess a tangible reality of its own.  This chapter will use the writing of 
Jean Baudrillard and Paul Virilio, amongst others, to argue for film and 
television fiction’s particular importance to the War on Terror meta-frame, by 
emphasising the effects of modern communications technologies on twenty-first 
century warfare. 
2.1  ‘Just like a movie’: The imagination shift 
Airport ’77, Towering Inferno, The Fall of the House of 
Usher, Indiana Jones and the Last Crusade, The Texas 
Chainsaw Massacre, Escape from New York [and] 
Godzilla were all being shot on the one sound stage 
simultaneously.  And the world stopped to watch the 
spectacle…
174 
-  Dmetri Kakmi 
If there is any veracity to the claim that ‘the world changed’ on 9/11, and that 
we now exist in a post-9/11 world which is fundamentally different from the 
world we previously inhabited, it is only to the extent that a mental shift 
occurred in the way Americans and others in the West perceive their place in the 
global geopolitical climate.  Fear replaced complacency and perceptions were 
re-organised to make sense of the newly actualised threats of violence that 
international terrorism posed.  The 9/11 Commission Report specifically blames 
a failure to imagine such attacks for the unpreparedness of the intelligence 
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agencies on that day,
175 arguing that ‘imagination is not a gift usually associated 
with bureaucracies’.
176  By contrast, cultural philosophers such as Slavoj Zizek 
have suggested that the West did imagine the attacks, with alarming frequency, 
through cultural texts that foreshadowed and fantasised about such mass-
destruction – the Hollywood action film, and disaster films in particular.
177  
Director Robert Altman interpreted this resemblance as bearing some degree of 
responsibility for the attacks, asking: 
The movies set the pattern, and these people have copied the movies.  
Nobody would have thought to commit an atrocity like that unless 
they’d seen it in a movie… I just believe we created this atmosphere 
and taught them how to do it.
178 
Douglas Kellner paraphrased Altman’s concern by asking ‘Was Independence Day 
the template for 9/11?’
179  It is important to specify that the ‘likeness’ remarked 
upon in such examples is primarily visual – 9/11 looked like numerous disaster 
movies, but did not resemble them in other ways.
180  Independence Day 
(Emmerich, 1996) - a film in which technologically superior and inhuman 
attackers overwhelm the United States with unfathomable fire-power and 
without forewarning - bears little thematic relation to the terrorist acts of 2001, 
but with its repeated shots of urban buildings engulfed in flame, there is a visual 
parity of sorts.  This emphasis on the visual will re-emerge later in the chapter.   
The phrase ‘it was just like a movie’ was repeated numerous times in various 
iterations by witnesses and academic commentators alike.  Some, like Wheeler 
Winston Dixon, echo the Commission Report’s stress on the failure of 
imagination, characterising the comparison as inevitable, since most people 
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observing the attacks and subsequent collapse of the Twin Towers had ‘no other 
referent to fall back on in the face of such apocalyptic destruction’, as if the 
comparison was little more than a convenience.
181  I am more inclined towards 
interpretations which understand the comparison as seeking comfort in 
familiarity and exerting control over fears - the imagination of disaster written 
about in 1965 by Susan Sontag with regards to science fiction films of the 
period
182 and updated with regards to the attack by Claire Kahane: 
Even as this historical event unfolded, it was quickly recognised, 
placed in a familiar category, and given a local habitation and name: 
‘it’s just like a movie’, the newscasters blurted out, a remark echoed 
repeatedly that morning… Thus the actual reality before our eyes was 
almost immediately transformed into and by the virtual reality of 
Hollywood and made familiar, déjà vu.  In this assimilation, as we 
turned to the movies to orient us to the real disaster, the historical 
was confused with the fictional, and the event of 9/11 itself - familiar 
and unfamiliar, real and unreal - took on an uncanny ambiguity.
183 
For Kahane, this has greater significance: 
Indeed, our response to 9/11 made disturbingly clear how much our 
perceptual experience as well as our psychic life is filtered and 
managed through films we have seen, even experienced as films we 
have seen.
184 
The sudden censorship of certain films in the immediate aftermath of the 
terrorist attacks suggests that the entertainment industry was acutely aware of 
this similarity between entertainment fantasy and violent reality: for example, 
the planned climax to Men in Black II (Sonnenfeld, 2002) involved a battle 
between the secret agents and their alien enemy atop the twin towers, a scene 
that was hastily recalibrated and re-shot in the wake of the 9/11 attacks to take 
place in a less sensitive locale – an unspecified, generic rooftop.
185  Images of the 
Towers were digitally edited out of in-production or recently-completed films 
and television programmes, ranging from the teaser trailer for Spider-Man, 
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which originally showed a helicopter becoming entangled in a giant web spun 
between the two towers,
186 to such seemingly uncontroversial fare as Zoolander 
(Stiller, 2001), Serendipity (Chelsom, 2001) and People I Know (Algrant, 2002).
187  
New York-set television programmes like Friends (NBC, 1994 – 2004) and Sex and 
the City (HBO, 1998-2004) also removed the World Trade Center from view, the 
former changing the stock footage used to bridge its studio-filmed scenes, and 
the latter cutting location-shot scenes in which the Towers were visible.
188   
Texts that predated 9/11 were also considered potentially upsetting, and action 
was taken to minimise the risk of offence; for example, scheduled television 
screenings of films featuring scenes of urban destruction or terrorism plots, 
including the aforementioned Independence Day, as well as The Peacemaker 
(Leder, 1997) and The X-Files (Bowman, 1998), were cancelled.
189  Blockbuster 
Video, then the largest rental outlet in the U.S., applied highly visible yellow 
stickers to sections of its stock which read: 
In light of the acts of terrorism on September 11, 2001, please be 
advised this product contains scenes that may be considered 
disturbing for some viewers.
190 
Labeled films included Swordfish (Sena, 2001), The Point Men (Glen, 2001) and 
Ticker (Pyun, 2001).
191  Although a spokesperson for the company stated that the 
stickers were intended only for new releases which customers may not already 
be familiar with (‘They know Die Hard’ was the comparison offered),
192 certain 
stores apparently broadened it to other films deemed to contain sensitive 
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material, including The Siege (Zwick, 1998).
193  However, if the latter’s 
screenwriter Lawrence Wright is to be believed, the cautionary stance was 
unnecessary; in a 2007 interview, he claims his film was ‘the most rented movie 
in America after 9/11’.
194 
The apparent motive for such warnings and alterations was to avoid upsetting 
potential viewers who, it was felt, did not need reminders of the attacks in their 
entertainment products, an intention made explicit by producer Harvey 
Weinstein in relation to Serendipity: 
What people are feeling is this: we don’t want to be reminded in our 
entertainment of the disaster we went through.
195 
Some reminders were more pronounced than others: Big Trouble (Sonnenfeld, 
2002), in which terrorists smuggle an atomic bomb through lax airport security, 
was moved from December 2001 to an April 2002 release date, its producers 
presumably uncomfortable releasing a comedy that might indicate a failure on 
the part of the US for the success of the attacks.
196  Whatever the motive, the 
attempt to remove visual similarities or reminders of the event from film and 
television texts underscores the perceived congruity between violent reality and 
onscreen fiction. 
2.2  Bombs and butter(ed popcorn): Cinema and 
desubstantialised war 
Following the attacks, George W. Bush’s Deputy Chief of Staff Karl Rove met 
with filmmakers and other Hollywood figures, a meeting Douglas Kellner states 
was arranged in order to ‘discuss how they could aid in the war against 
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terrorism’.
197  Requests were made for supportive films that were not overtly 
propagandistic, but which celebrated the patriotism and heroism of the 
American armed forces, a request so resembling the relationship between 
cinema and war during World War 2, as exemplified in a US context by the Why 
We Fight films, that Michael Levine argues it proves 9/11 did little more than 
reinforce the ‘problematic relation between cinema and reality’, and that any 
claims of a ‘sea-change’ triggered by the attacks should therefore be 
dismissed.
198  Linked to this is the vehement criticism of films considered 
unsupportive or critical by right-wing figures such as Fox News anchor Bill 
O’Reilly, who reacted to the ‘vile’ Redacted and the ‘foolish’ Lions For Lambs by 
claiming that the films were ‘actually putting American service people at risk’, 
reserving particular ire for the former film’s financier Mark Cuban and 
concluding that ‘If even one American is killed because of this film, that is on 
Mark Cuban’.
199   
While the Rove-Hollywood meeting was intended to enlist support from the 
entertainment industry, so that pro-war messages could be perpetuated, what 
reports of this meeting rarely acknowledged at the time was that Hollywood was 
already contributing greatly to the waging of the War on Terror, through the 
close relationship that film has long held with warfare.   
Paul Virilio has written extensively on the relationship between war and cinema, 
specifically the ‘logistics of perception’ (the subtitle to War and Cinema).
200  He 
identifies a shared technological basis, with both military and cinematic 
technologies developing in unison.  This emphasis on perception is important to 
warfare in its most conventional form, with the large-scale battle between 
armies requiring strategic planning borne of an awareness of the battlefield, and 
a dependence on sight recognised as far back as Sun Tzu.  Virilio notes that with 
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the visualisation of the enemy comes the need to deceive the enemy, or as The 
Art of War succinctly understood it, ‘the way of war is a way of deception’.
201  
More recently, James Der Derian’s Virtuous War: Mapping the Military-
Industrial-Media-Entertainment Network updated President Eisenhower’s 
warning against allowing American policy to be dictated by the interests of the 
‘military-industrial complex’ to include the effects of the media by retracing the 
author’s: 
Travels in virtuality, where made-for-TV wars and Hollywood war 
movies blur, military war games and computer video games blend, 
mock disasters and real accidents collide, producing on screen a new 
configuration of virtual power.
202   
Der Derian focuses on the ways in which war and entertainment are combined 
through technological advancements: Bran Ferran, Disney’s former head 
Imagineer now provides technology and design to a range of clients including the 
US military, designing ‘the Disney Room’ on a naval command ship;
203 Viewpoint 
Datalabs, a company specialising in 3-D simulations, lease their services to 
military and entertainment industries alike, their product utilised in military 
simulations of fighter-plane maneuvers and the alien attack scenes in 
Independence Day and Star Trek Voyager (Paramount, 1995-2001) alike;
204 while 
at the University of Southern California forty million dollars was invested in 
setting up an Institute for Creative Technologies, a collaborative project 
between the Pentagon and Hollywood which would see ‘the best military 
gamers, computer graphic artists and entertainment executives’ gather to 
‘prepare for the next war’.
205  Der Derian also considers war-game scenarios 
conducted in the Nevada desert between US troops and fictional enemies 
including the Krasnovians, Sumarians or Hamchuks,
206 and simulated training 
exercises such as Exercise Internal Look ‘90, a war game designed to test how 
the military would respond to potential ‘real-world scenarios similar to those 
they may be expected to confront’, which used a then theoretical invasion of 
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Kuwait by Iraq less than a week before the actual invasion that triggered the 
first Gulf War.
207  These examples, Der Derian argues, contribute to the effect of 
‘clean[ing] up the political discourse as well as the battlefield’, by presenting a 
war scourged of its most unpleasant features: 
Fought in the same manner as they are represented, by real-time 
surveillance and TV ‘live-feeds’, virtuous wars promote a vision of 
bloodless, humanitarian, hygienic wars.
208 
It is worth noting that Der Derian’s study was published in 2001 prior to the 
September 11
th attacks, as some have suggested that the attacks constitute an 
un-ignorable ‘return of the real’.  Richard Wolin, for example, criticises 
academics including Noam Chomsky’s ‘self-flagellating’ condemnations of US 
imperialism, Susan Sontag’s ‘spectacularly maladroit attempt’ to refute the 
charge of cowardice directed at the hijackers, and the American Left in 
general’s ‘ideologically fossilised’ inability to renounce the ‘myth’ of pacifism.
209  
Wolin reserves particular scorn for the ‘rarified epistemological hair-splitting 
that dominated academic debate during 1980s and 1990s’, with Jean Baudrillard 
considered the worst culprit.
210  The targets of Wolin’s censure did not, however, 
abandon their positions in light of the September 11 attacks’ apparent ‘return of 
the real’.  Instead, they modified their positions where necessary, and 
emphasised the continued relevance of their conclusions.   
Slavoj Zizek, for example, points out that, while the horror of 9/11 was all too 
real to those directly affected by the attacks, for those observing through the 
media coverage (a group constituting the clear majority), the horror was both 
mediated and sterilised: 
While the number of victims - 3000 - is repeated all the time, it is 
surprising how little of the actual carnage we see - no dismembered 
bodies, no blood, no desperate faces of dying people…
211 
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Zizek links this to the notion of de-substantialised warfare first written about in 
the nineties: the first Gulf War concluded in one hundred hours; the intervention 
in Kosovo completed without a single US casualty and so on.
212  But the idea of a 
war ‘deprived of its substance’ seems at odds with the increasing number of 
soldiers killed or injured in Afghanistan and Iraq, with Zizek’s claims that: 
Just as we drink beer without alcohol or coffee without caffeine, we 
are now getting war deprived of its substance - a virtual war fought 
behind computer screens, a war experienced by its participants as a 
video game, a war with no casualties (on our side, at least)
213 
grimly contradicted by the escalating figures on websites like icasualties.org.  
Nonetheless, his point that technology-driven modern warfare lacks substance in 
the experience of the majority who witness it is as true of the Iraq and 
Afghanistan conflicts as it was for the first Gulf War or Kosovo.  Visualisation is 
again key: it is only through instantaneous, round-the-clock media coverage – 
the continuous relay of images and footage from the war’s epicenter to all 
connected corners of the globe, that remote viewers can lay claim to 
‘experiencing’ the war (at the level of ‘witness’).  Though still intensely real to 
those in its midst, the ratio of actual participants to distanced observers has 
been massively altered, the former reduced by advances in weapons technology 
such as unmanned attack drones, at the same time as the latter has increased 
vastly due to advances in communications technologies.  The ratio is now hugely 
weighted towards the observer, whereas in wars occurring before the invention 
of satellite transmission, the ratio would have been significantly different. 
Zizek suggests that people accept that America is in a real state of war, despite 
the fact that America is: 
Obviously not in a state of war, at least not in the old conventional 
sense of the term (for the great majority of people, daily life goes on, 
and war remains the exclusive business of state agencies): the very 
distinction between the state of war and the state of peace is thus 
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blurred; we are entering a time in which a state of peace itself can at 
the same time be a state of emergency.
214 
This blurring of war and peace, along with the blurring of actual and virtual, 
finds its counterpart in the actual changes made to the US military under 
Rumsfeld.  This transformation involved outsourcing numerous jobs previously 
kept ‘in-house’ – including catering, healthcare, and even some aspects of 
combat through the employment of mercenary firms, the largest of which, 
Blackwater, had an estimated 10,800 security forces deployed in Iraq in 2007.
215  
This follows Rumsfeld and Vice President Dick Cheney’s conservative vision of a 
military operating as an out-sourced capitalist enterprise, privatised as much as 
possible.  The focus, Cheney stated, should be on ‘war-fighting’, and ‘in all 
other cases, we should seek suppliers who can provide these non-core activities 
efficiently and effectively’.
216  The effect is what Naomi Klein describes as a 
McMilitary, resembling a ‘perilous package vacation’ rather than the horror of a 
war zone.
217  Contractors such as Halliburton make the experience for US soldiers 
as comfortable as possible, so that while soldiers continue to die regularly in 
Iraq and Afghanistan, those that survive spend their time in a home-from-home 
complete with McDonalds and Pizza Hut.  The effect is a military reduced to its 
core competencies, and even then its capacity to wage war is highly reliant upon 
privatised non-military support.  So a war that is not a war is fought by a military 
that is not fully military.  War ceases to be Clausewitz’s ‘continuation of state 
policy by other means’
218 and instead is organised under a business model - the 
disaster-capitalism complex that Klein warns against.   
The confusion of the actual and the virtual in the War on Terror echoes 
conclusions drawn by Jean Baudrillard with regards the first Gulf War,
219 in a 
series of provocative essays ostensibly denying its existence.  The proposition 
outlined in the title of ‘The Gulf War Will Not Take Place’ was only proven 
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incorrect by the subsequent conflict if he is interpreted as predicting that a 
show of force – a simulation of force – would sufficiently negate the need for the 
actual use of force.  But Baudrillard’s point was not necessarily that nothing 
would happen, only that what would occur would a) bear little resemblance to 
the predictions circulating at that time; and b) be experienced by the majority 
not as warfare but as an onscreen media event.  The model of traditional 
warfare would not be applicable to the Gulf conflict, and so the hysterical 
media-led speculative ‘Gulf War’, which emphasised the war-making capabilities 
of the US forces and imagined the battles to come, would never occur in the 
guise such speculation expected; in short, the potential Gulf War would not take 
place, though something else might (and indeed did).  Alternatively, a second 
possible interpretation is proposed by William Bogard: 
The Gulf War never happened.  That can mean: it just keeps 
happening… it just keeps being over, played out again and again in 
advance even in its execution, in endless war games, battlefield 
scenarios, casualty figures, incinerated bodies, lethal, murderous 
video, a great simulacrum of death.
220 
In this understanding, the war is preceded by its own simulation on television 
screens, in war games, and so on. 
Baudrillard published a second essay once the Gulf War had begun, continuing in 
what some, such as Christopher Norris, interpreted as a hopelessly contrary and 
stubborn vein, denying the existence of an event even as visual confirmation of 
said event was being witnessed through media reports.
221  What Baudrillard 
claims this time, however, is not that such reports were deceptive, but that 
what was witnessed was not to be automatically taken as confirmation of the 
‘real’, only its simulacrum – a term used by Baudrillard to identify a cultural 
symbol that no longer stands in relation to something else; a ‘real without origin 
or reality: a hyperreal’.
222  In this formulation, images replace reality.  In 
Baudrillard’s view, McKenzie Wark summarises: 
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The ‘evidence’ of the Gulf War taking place can also ‘prove’ the 
opposite.  That what took place is not a war at all, but something else 
– the spectacle of a massacre.  Or that the ‘place’ that the war ‘took’ 
for those of us who watched it on TV was an imaginary place, an 
orientalist fantasy of mad Arabs and imperial splendour.  The war took 
the space of our televisual imaginations.
223 
This is similar to the conclusions drawn in the previous chapter: that while there 
are undoubtedly conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, the frame used to combine 
and describe them as part of a ‘War on Terror’ has no tangible actuality, and 
originates in rhetoric.  Evidence of the conflicts does not confirm the War on 
Terror’s existence: at most, it confirms two separate conflicts that might be 
labeled ‘The Iraq War’ or ‘The Afghanistan War’, but for which other frames 
might also be legitimately applied.  The ‘War on Terror’ as a meaningful concept 
can be denied, even as apparent proof of its existence – in the form of casualty 
reports, bomb damage and so on – is accepted as genuine.   
Baudrillard reasoned that:  
While one fraction of the intellectuals and politicians… are 
wholeheartedly in favour of the war, and another fraction are against 
it from the bottom of their hearts… all are agreed on one point: this 
war exists, we have seen it.  There is no interrogation into the event 
itself or its reality…
224 
Baudrillard’s ‘stupid gamble’, described in a postscript as the attempt to 
‘demonstrate the impossibility of war just at the moment when it must take 
place’, is thereby argued to be less stupid than blindly accepting the veracity of 
something only indirectly witnessed.
225   
As Paul Patton reminds in his introduction to his 1995 translation, it should not 
be forgotten amidst Baudrillard’s talk of simulacra that ‘technological simulacra 
neither displace nor deter the violent reality of war, [but] have become an 
integral part of its operational procedures’.
226  The strategies of deception have 
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been fully integrated into the twenty-first century war model, in which the 
infosphere has joined the geosphere as a site of conflict.  The US bombing of the 
al-Jazeera offices in Qatar is a vivid example of the desire to control access to 
information, while the military tactic of Shock and Awe used in the aerial 
bombardment of Baghdad relies as much upon the dissemination of fear as it 
does actual damage.
227  Though actual destruction is a key element of the 
doctrine, it explicitly aims to remove the enemy’s will to fight by psychologically 
targeting civilians as well as military, spreading fear through self-consciously 
ostentatious displays of force, and not merely through force alone.  The authors 
indicate extensive precedence for such a strategy, finding inspiration in the 
German blitzkrieg, the US bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and in tactics 
advocated by, variously, Sun Tzu, the Romans, and Haitian rebels in the 1800s.
228  
The bombing of Baghdad arguably differs due to the key role played by 
technologies of instantaneous transmission, which relay events (and potentially 
their psychological impact) to audiences across the globe, and not just to 
proximate participants or the immediate populace.  The message is delivered 
through simultaneous news relay, the act existing primarily for its symbolic value 
as images rather than its actual destructive power.  This resembles the tactics of 
9/11 itself, a terrorist attack dependent on spectacle for its effects, the deaths 
of nearly three thousand Americans almost incidental to its symbolic power.   
In The Spirit of Terrorism, Baudrillard offered his own reaction to the supposed 
‘return of the real’ that Wolin inscribed in the September 11 attacks.  Whereas 
the first Gulf-war was a non-event masquerading as an event, Baudrillard argues 
that the 9/11 attacks represented the return of the type of global symbolic 
event that he claims were absent in the 1990s.
229  He makes a similar claim to 
Zizek, suggesting that the attacks were the fulfillment of Western fantasies.  He 
argues that ‘they did it, but we wished for it’, elaborating that ‘countless 
disaster movies bear witness to this fantasy’.
230  The ‘return of the real’, far 
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from being denied, is expanded upon and identified as key to terrorism’s modus 
operandi, ‘the tactic of the terrorist model to bring about an excess of reality’
231 
– a violent rejoinder to the detached state of desubstantialisation Zizek argued 
characterised modern life.  The attacks of 9/11, when considered from the 
Western perspective for which Baudrillard claims to speak, are thereby 
identified as monumental events at the opposite end of the spectrum from the 
non-event of the first Gulf War.
232  However, he goes on to state that ‘an excess 
of violence is not enough to open on to reality’, his reasoning being that the 
reality principle no longer exists in itself, but is now inextricably combined with 
fiction: 
In this case, then, the real is superadded to the image like a bonus of 
terror, like an additional frisson: not only is it terrifying, what is 
more, it is real.
233   
This prompts a further question from Baudrillard: 
How do things stand with the real event, then, if reality is everywhere 
infiltrated by images, virtuality and fiction?  In the present case, we 
thought we had seen (perhaps with a certain relief) a resurgence of 
the real, and of the violence of the real, in an allegedly virtual 
universe.  ‘There’s an end to all your talk about the virtual - this is 
something real!’… But does reality actually outstrip fiction?  If it 
seems to do so, this is because it has absorbed fiction’s energy, and 
has itself become fiction…
234 
Baudrillard is suggesting a blurring of the categories of reality and fiction.  This 
is symptomatic of the ‘informational event’, virtualised (and, importantly, 
visualised) through the speed of technological relay.  Baudrillard suggests that 
‘at a certain speed, the speed of information, things lose their sense’.
235  Paul 
Patton paraphrases: 
‘Real’ events lose their identity when they attain the velocity of real 
time information… In this sense, while televisual information claims to 
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provide immediate access to real events, in fact what it does is to 
produce informational events which stand in for the real, and which 
‘inform’ public opinion which in turn affects the course of subsequent 
events, both real and informational.  As consumers of mass media, we 
never experience the bare material event…
236 
Such informational events, ‘endemic to postmodern public life’, should be 
subject to constant scrutiny, an informational event always an ‘object of endless 
speculation, the site of total uncertainty’.
237  ‘9/11’, while in some sense a 
‘return of the real’ for Americans (and perhaps the West more broadly), is 
indicative of a reality fused with the simulated quality of the informational 
event through its instant broadcast and reception around the world.  As a site of 
total uncertainty, meeting cries of ‘9/11 changed everything’ with carefully 
applied cynicism is important, but it is only part of the impact such uncertainty 
has upon the rhetoric of 9/11 and the War on Terror.  As will be argued in 
subsequent chapters, the narrative forms of certain War on Terror texts - for 
example, those that depict multiple, complex, interconnected plot-strands, 
geographies and time zones - perpetuate this doubt and questioning, forcing any 
interested party to discover links and clues in order to comprehend the ‘big 
picture’. 
2.3  “The following takes place…” The reality effect of fiction 
Riveted to their TV screens… Americans saw an instant 
amalgamation of war movie, science-fiction epic, 
horror film, disaster flick, and documentary.  Their 
president saw it mainly as a war movie, which may 
have had more disastrous repercussions in coming 
months.
238 
-  David Sterritt and Mikita Brottman 
With less than one percent of American citizens now 
serving in Iraq and Afghanistan, films are one of the 
                                         
236 Patton ‘Introduction’, p. 10 
237 Baudrillard, ‘The Gulf War: Is It Really Taking Place?’, p. 41 
238 David Sterritt and Mikita Brottman, ‘A Reflection’ Senses of Cinema 17, Dec. 2001, accessed 
Jan. 2011. http://archive.sensesofcinema.com/contents/01/17/symposium/sterritt_brottman.html     79 
few ways to connect the other ninety nine percent of 
Americans to the reality of modern conflict.
239 
-  Paul Reickhoff, Newsweek 
While chapter four will frame this investigative imperative as part of a paranoid 
culture, such meaning-making is not the sole preserve of the conspiracy theorist.  
It is a vital part of the official arguments that brought the War on Terror into 
existence.  Few would continue to argue for the existence of Weapons of Mass 
Destruction in Iraq, or for a connection of any kind between Saddam Hussein and 
the September 11
th attacks, but before the talk of regional stabilisation, 
humanitarian intervention or pro-democracy regime change, Weapons of Mass 
Destruction and 9/11 culpability were the primary arguments behind an invasion 
of Iraq.  Lending credence to the Thomas theorem that whatever people 
perceive to be real will be real in its consequences,
240 compelling rhetoric took 
precedence over evidence, and a causal relationship was rhetorically 
established.   
It is interesting that while the Weapons of Mass Destruction were never located 
and most likely never existed, anti-terrorism agents in film and television 
uncover their existence and thwart devastating attacks frequently.  For 
example, Jack Bauer of 24 discovers a plot involving weapons of mass 
destruction – atomic bombs, nerve gas, deadly viruses – at least once a season.  
Does 24 not, therefore, offer a more accurate reflection of the aims and 
outcomes of the War on Terror’s official rhetoric than actual events?  The 
weapons of mass destruction in 24 are a Baudrillardean simulacrum: they are 
hyperreal, a sign without any corresponding signified reality.  If, as Baudrillard 
finally argued, the Gulf War did not take place because the conflict bore no 
resemblance to the war-model perpetuated by the media frenzy, the War on 
Terror, as defined by its creators, did take place, but only in the imaginary War 
on Terror fought onscreen by the protagonists of various film and television 
texts.   
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The virtual War on Terror fought in 24 and other texts has actual consequences.  
For example, US Brigadier General Patrick Finnegan approached the show’s 
creators to request they include a negative portrayal of torture to offset the 
frequency with which torture is unproblematically employed to yield 
unquestionably important and verifiable intelligence integral to stopping the 
terrorist threat in time.  That a high-level member of the military felt compelled 
to intervene was reportedly due to a behavioural change in new recruits to the 
intelligence agencies, whose propensity for violent interrogation was apparently 
traced to its positive portrayal in the popular show.
 241  While this claim of 
behavioural influence is highly debatable, and the effects of violent images on 
the temperament of their audience far from conclusive, what matters here is 
that the link was considered strong enough to warrant intervention from official 
military sources.  It is not the only example of this particular show’s apparent 
real-world influence: lead actor Kiefer Sutherland was also asked to give a talk 
at West Point, in the hope that a more reasoned weighing up of the dilemmas 
raised by torture, delivered out of character, may dissuade new recruits from 
emulating Jack Bauer’s unpleasant but successful actions.
242   
The frames discussed in chapter one influenced policy and behaviour - opting to 
identify the terrorist attacks of September 11
th 2001 as acts of war requiring 
retaliation was a linguistic choice that facilitated certain responses and actions 
while discouraging others.  In this formula, the utterance precedes the act; the 
definition summons its own reality.  As the discussion of framing previously 
established, the media reifies and naturalises cognitive frames, and is therefore 
a vital part of the process.  I am not extending this conclusion to claim that 24 
‘causes’ terrorism, or that films and television programmes – or the media more 
broadly - are ‘causing’ wars: the causality model is not appropriate.  Examples 
of Bauer-influenced torturers are offered as suggestive of a blurring between 
actual and fictional examples of the War on Terror, not to indicate the negative 
influence of screen-violence.  I am suggesting that the War on Terror’s rhetorical 
claims – that the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan are part of a single conflict; that 
terror is an appropriate enemy that can be defeated in battle; that Saddam 
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Hussein was in possession of Weapons of Mass Destruction that made his removal 
from power an urgent necessity – are more fully iterated in fiction than in 
actuality.  Furthermore, with modern warfare fought by many of its soldiers 
remotely on screens, and witnessed by the majority of those populations 
supposedly engaged in the war in the same fashion, it is directly comparable at a 
textual level to the fiction films and television programmes that depict 
terrorism, anti-terrorism, US wars in the middle-east and the like.  
2.4  Conclusion 
The role of simulation has been stated with matter-of-fact regularity in relation 
to the War on Terror, from allegations of ‘sexed-up’ dossiers to fabricated 
intelligence reports - specifically the ‘yellowcake’ argument (that Saddam 
Hussein had tried to purchase yellowcake uranium from Niger) later proven to 
have been premised on a falsified report.
243  This chapter has hopefully 
established that fakes and forgeries are not the only simulations that have 
helped structure (and produce) the War on Terror; the various screen texts that 
simulate, represent or premediate (whether through wholly imagined fictional 
scenarios or through fact-based recreation) its rhetorical claims are also 
integral.  
This thesis will henceforth, however, eschew the provocative stance of 
Baudrillard.  It will not deny actuality, but rather will continue to consider the 
ways in which language and frames dictate the interpretation of material 
events.  I hope that this chapter’s use of Baudrillard follows the suggestion of 
Douglas Kellner, reading Baudrillard as a kind of ‘science fiction, which 
anticipates the future by exaggerating present tendencies’,
244 with an element 
of pataphysics in his most outlandish arguments.  Despite such excesses, 
Baudrillard usefully highlights some of the salient characteristics of media-
saturated warfare – speed, instantaneity, a lack of material substance – which 
chimes with this thesis’s argument that representations in any medium – 
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whether political speech, factual television programming, or fiction texts – are 
constitutive of the War on Terror meta-frame. 
The remainder of this thesis will address particular features of these films and 
television programmes, from the understanding that the manner in which they 
contribute to the War on Terror frame matters a great deal.  When a sub-genre 
of films organise their narratives as a complex web of entangled causalities, this 
influences the War on Terror frame.  When a television show emphasises real-
time action over deliberation, this influences the War on Terror frame.  And 
when examples of both film and television evoke and mimic non-fiction 
conventions, this influences the War on Terror frame.  If the frame changes, so 
do perceptions; and if perceptions change, the range of permissible actions 
grows or contracts.  Film and television are not ‘reflecting’ reality in this model, 
nor are they exerting direct influence; they are enmeshed in wide-reaching 
frames and discourses, through which they transmit their influence diffusely. 83 
3  The multiple narratives of ‘9/11’ 
 
 
Before the events in New York and Washington could be 
grasped as history, they appeared only as chronology 
and narrative.
245 
-  James W. Carey 
 
In a media age of twenty-four hour dedicated news channels, innumerable 
websites offering reportage and commentary (of varying degrees of quality) and 
instantaneous live coverage of ‘breaking news’, the individual looking to 
traverse the network of global news events is necessarily versed in the multiple 
narrative news structure.  This multiplicity is, of course, not novel, but an 
intensification of existing tendencies: one long-standing precedent that operates 
similarly would be the newspaper front-page, which selects a variety of news-
narratives connected only by their proximate occurrence in time.  These are 
presented non-sequentially on a grid for the reader’s perusal, their 
comprehension relying upon an implicit understanding of the piecemeal, 
fragmented nature of news reportage.  In the case of ‘breaking news’ – the 
modern event that interrupts and demands attention as it happens, reported 
upon without the benefit of hindsight, perspective or contemplation – this 
fragmentation is increasingly visible within coverage of a single story.  In the 
case of September 11
th, 2001, the impact of plane-hitting-building was isolated 
and replayed countless times as the visual centre point - with one Australian 
network going so far as to reproduce the image as a ‘small animated icon 
permanently displayed in the corner of the screen, automatically resetting itself 
at the end of each momentary cycle’
246 – while numerous narrative frames were 
adopted to contextualise the attacks, and various alternative or tangential sub-
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narratives coalesced around the event.
247  The way the terrorist attacks of 
September 11, 2001 were broadcast, witnessed and ultimately understood 
crystallises some of the key factors involved in generating the complex network 
of multiple plots that together constitute the abstract ‘9/11’ - and, later, the 
‘War on Terror’.  This chapter will examine key depictions of 9/11 itself, as well 
as the portmanteau text represented by 11’9’’01, paying particular attention to 
the way multiple plot strands are combined in interconnected, networked 
narrative structures.  It will assess the ways in which multiple plot strands are 
established and organised in texts as diverse as the official Commission Report 
and a made-for-cable dramatisation of the hijacking of United Flight 93, and 
suggest some of the ideological ramifications of such a narrative structuring.  
3.1  Collective tragedy/individual victims 
We weren’t mourning an anonymous mass… we were 
mourning thousands of individuals.
248 
-  Paul Auster 
On September 11
th, 2001, there was an attempt to comprehend the event as it 
unfolded.  Before much was known for certain, multiple text lines ran along the 
margins of the screen on most news networks, often reporting nothing more than 
the lack of information to report and heavily dependent on speculation and the 
continual reiteration of key questions: was it a plane or a missile?  If a plane, 
was it a large passenger plane or something smaller? Was it deliberate or 
accidental?  If deliberate, who is responsible?  A moment-by-moment account of 
the events was assembled as quickly as modern telecommunication transmissions 
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would permit, the sense of witnessing history unfold ‘live’ an important part of 
9/11’s perceived uniqueness and the deep sense of shock it engendered.
249 
In the following days and weeks, attempts were made to narrate the individual 
‘stories’ of 9/11, including what Michael Schudson describes as the ‘haiku 
obituaries’ that ran in the New York Times.
250  These miniature articles, entitled 
‘Portraits of Grief’, were featured in the newspaper until December 31
st 2001, 
offering truncated tributes of those that perished, and thereby indicating the 
many life stories that found a common conclusion in the attacks.
251  One of the 
first dramatic features made about the attacks, Flight 93 (Markle, 2003) echoed 
this balance between a collective tragedy ‘timeline’ and brief individualisation 
of the victims.  The made-for-cable feature about the titular United Airlines 
flight, the fourth hijacked plane, and the only one which did not reach its 
intended destination, chronologically depicts the minutiae of events that 
occurred on the morning of the attacks - boarding, airport security, hijack 
preparations (for the terrorists) and the serving of breakfast (for the other 
passengers), with only one digression from the linear sequence (an 
uncharacteristic flashback motivated by Ziad Jarrah’s (Dominic Rains) 
recollection of his training using a cardboard replica of the cockpit).  Edits are 
made to show various authorities attempting to make sense of the morning’s 
confusion, including air traffic controllers and military commanders, but the 
main structuring device used to allow cuts away from the confines of the 
aeroplane is the phone-call.  This is partly understandable in terms of 
verisimilitude - the plane crashed with no survivors, and the black-box data and 
radio transmissions made by the pilots prior to the hijacking and by the terrorists 
afterwards offered only very limited empirical data about how events unfolded 
after take-off.  One of the few sources of information of unquestioned veracity 
are the telephone calls made by many of the passengers to family and loved 
ones, so the emphasis placed on these tearful goodbyes suggests a commitment 
on the part of the filmmakers to some degree of factual accuracy.  It also 
permits the narrative to spread outwards to incorporate aspects of the 
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passengers’ lives, as well as their deaths, though interestingly not all are 
afforded this level of attention.   
The plot focuses upon those passengers that managed to place calls to family 
members before their plane crashed, including Tom Burnett and Mark Bingham.  
Their stories are mined for their dramatic (or perhaps melodramatic) potential, 
while those without young children or expectant spouses are restricted to the 
shared tragedy of the hijack, and not the individual heartache that their death 
caused in further, undeveloped ‘storylines’.  The centrality of the family unit is 
reiterated in the nation-as-family metaphors frequently emphasised in 9/11 and 
War on Terror discourse, as identified by Deborah Cowen and Emily Gilbert 
amongst others.  For example, Bush’s reaction to criticisms that he did not 
express specific gratitude to Canada following 9/11 was to argue ‘I didn’t 
necessarily think it was important to praise a brother; after all, we’re talking 
about family’.
252  During the same period, legislature and rhetoric celebrating 
marriage and ‘safe and stable families’ flourished, leading Cowen and Gilbert to 
conclude that ‘since the initiation of the War on Terror, the private family 
stands at the center of US domestic and foreign policy’.
253  At a more general 
level, the very identification of a ‘homeland’ which requires specialised 
‘security’ shares Flight 93’s familial focus.  
As the weeks and months went by, further narrative angles were discovered: the 
New York Times’ periodical supplement ‘Science Times’ dedicated the entire 
content of its September 18
th, 2001 edition to articles dissecting different 
science-related stories connected to the attacks, from ‘the engineering task of 
clearing debris without risking the foundations of neighbouring buildings’ to 
‘how to make jet fuel safer’ and ‘the problems for blood banks of maintaining a 
blood supply’.
254  A single topic monopolised the news, but endless variations on 
the theme were explored – and continue to be explored at each anniversary.  
And, importantly, the breadth of the collective perceived to have been 
victimised by the attacks extended far further than those that lost their lives 
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and their immediate family.  The nation/family metaphor extended the ranks of 
the afflicted to the entire United States, with those that lost their lives 
subsumed into a unified American victim - despite the fact that citizens of at 
least fifty other countries died that day (including the United Kingdom, South 
Korea, India, Colombia, Australia and China; the global impact of 9/11 will be 
considered in greater detail later in the chapter).  To use Benedict Anderson’s 
terminology, the ‘imagined community’
255 of the nation-state was reinforced in 
the aftermath of 9/11, specifically through its metaphorical association with the 
smaller interconnected network of the family unit. 
3.2  ‘We have some planes’: The 9/11 plot(s) and the 9/11 
Commission Report(s) 
The shape of the attacks helped generate the aforementioned multiple network 
of ‘stories’: as opposed to a single bombing or hijacked aircraft, multiple 
hijackings and acts of violence were committed simultaneously, offering a range 
of particularities to be pored over and dissected in the media analysis that 
followed.  The 9/11 Commission Report demonstrates the difficulty in relaying 
the multiple ‘plotlines’ of the attacks.  The structure of its first chapter 
resembles a screenplay, with sub-chapter headings such as ‘Inside the Four 
Planes’ emphasising the simultaneous unfolding of four distinct ‘plots’, while its 
use of edits and cutaways between the developing storylines mirrors cinematic 
editing techniques.  Linking sentences such as ‘Hundreds of miles south west of 
Boston, at Dulles International Airport’ condense geographic distance to combine 
spatially disparate occurrences under the 9/11 ur-plot.
256  The report also 
suggests that the ‘grandiose original plan’ proposed by Khalid Sheik Mohammad 
would have been an even more elaborate network of attacks - ten hijackings: 
nine of which would crash into targets on both coasts - [including] 
those eventually hit on September 11 plus CIA and FBI headquarters, 
nuclear power plants and the tallest buildings in California and the 
State of Washington.  KSM himself was to land the tenth plane at a US 
airport and, after killing all adult male passengers on board and 
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alerting the media, deliver a speech excoriating US support for Israel, 
the Philippines and repressive governments in the Arab world.
257 
Whether Khalid Sheikh Mohammad’s ‘confession’ reveals an actual plot scaled 
down for reasons of practicality, the false product of questionable interrogation, 
or an invention of US intelligence hyperbolically speculating about how bad 
things could have been, the inclusion of this baroque hypothesis in the American 
government’s official verdict on the attacks reveals something about how a 
multiplicity of linked plots has become an accepted and understood 
characteristic of the attacks. 
The cross-cutting necessary to narrate the multifarious events of the day is made 
more apparent in The Illustrated 9/11 Commission Report, a graphic novel 
adaptation by Sid Jacobson and Ernie Colon.  Endorsed by the official report 
committee’s chair Thomas H. Kean and vice chair Lee H. Hamilton, who approve 
of the pictorial version’s accessibility and coherence in their foreword,
258 
Jacobson and Colon’s illustrated version utilises the organisational structure of 
the comic book to make clear the simultaneity that the official report struggles 
to convey.  The Illustrated Report uses the dividing lines of the comic frame to 
demarcate each of the unfolding plotlines, arranging the Commission Report’s 
chapter detailing the chronology of the hijackings into a series of channels 
plotted against the unfolding time (fig. 3.1).   
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Fig 3.1: The Illustrated 9/11 Commission Report 
The  gap  between  the  frames  (known  as  the  ‘gutter’)  unifies  the  separate 
plotlines in the mind of the reader through what Scott McCloud terms ‘closure’, 
which ‘allows us to connect these moments and mentally construct a continuous, 
unified reality’ out of ‘unconnected moments’.
259  This is not all that different in 
principle from the persistence of vision in the perception of cinema, whereby 
still frames are experienced as a moving image in the mind of the perceiver 
when projected at twenty-four frames per second. 
 
As well as the cross-cutting techniques used to edit between the different 
locales in the Commission Report, cinematic editing techniques were visible in 
the way in which television networks pieced together shots of the attacks: while 
there is relatively little footage of the first tower being struck due to its 
unexpectedness, by the time the second plane hit the South Tower, amateur and 
professional cameramen alike had their cameras trained on the unfolding news 
story.  Mike Chopra-Gant notes the news broadcasters’ use of ‘match-on-action’ 
editing, defined as ‘a standard device from the conventions of cinematic and 
televisual continuity editing, to establish a seamless cut from one image to 
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another’.
260  Three separate pieces of footage taken from different angles and 
distances and at different times, were spliced into a sequence to show the 
attacks from the best vantage points available, ‘making out of these 
fragmentary pieces of filmed historical data a more meaningful, coherent 
narrative whole’.
261  Chopra-Gant continues: 
The… collapsing of different perspectives together to produce a 
single, coherent narrative is, however, an example of the process of 
translating raw events into a discourse, a process that, on a larger 
scale, closely approximates the historiographical activity of 
contextualising key events within a wider array of social, political and 
economic forces.
262 (emphasis added) 
This emphasises the ideological effects of imposing a coherent, unified version 
of events even as the ‘plot lines’ multiply, allowing for the imposition of the 
various rhetorical frameworks examined in chapter one.  At the same time as the 
plotlines and perspectives multiply, there is an attempt to fix the event, to 
concretise its meaning by rendering it a comprehensible text, with a network 
aesthetic providing a potential model for connecting its myriad component 
parts.  
United 93 (Greengrass, 2006), a version of the same 9/11 sub-plot on which 
Flight 93 was based, illustrates well this tension between narrating a unified tale 
of national loss and trauma and teasing out individual plotlines from the mix.  
The early scenes take place at the airport prior to boarding and contain a 
deliberate accumulation of details depicting routine and habit, such as check-in 
procedures and aircraft refuelling.  Much as in Flight 93, the film’s dramatic 
power in its preliminary stages hinges upon evoking the ordinariness of the 
morning of September 11
th, 2001, creating tension for an audience well-versed in 
the ‘red-letter day’ significance of the date, and contrasting with the scenes of 
terror that follow.  The camera is constantly mobile, repositioning its frame 
frequently in an approximation of the observational documentary aesthetic – a 
performed unprepared, reactive posture, the use of which will be examined 
more thoroughly in chapters nine and ten.  In addition, the editing cuts from 
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conversations mid-sentence, suggesting an unbiased focus on diffuse, multiple 
subjects.  These fragmented conversations evoke numerous lives, each with its 
own particularities, but which are individually not sufficiently important for the 
story to linger over; instead it is their cumulative narrative that is emphasised.  
Such piecemeal organisation of the soundtrack is typical of the layered audio 
used throughout the film, the constant buzz of background noise suggesting both 
authenticity and immediacy, with its later crescendo used as a marker of 
mounting intensity and confusion.  Most importantly, the sonic layering is 
evocative of a communal group, united in the unfolding plot of 9/11, within 
which the voice (and by extension, personal plot) of the individual is incidental.  
As Kenneth M. Cameron writes with regards to the war film, ‘individuality 
disappears in statistics’;
263 in the context of United 93, it is the ‘united’ group 
onboard the flight that is foregrounded, rather than any constituent, statistical 
member of said group. 
The film’s promotional material, in comparison, seems self-consciously 
preoccupied with ensuring the individual tales of loss are paid attention to and 
not lost amongst the collective.  The DVD release has a separate memorial page 
for each passenger and crew member consisting of a photograph and a short 
biography that emphasises what made each special to those that mourn them.  
Some acknowledge the potential for memory to be distorted by grief; for 
example, Claudette Greene, who lost her father on Flight 93, admits: 
It is easy to elevate a lost loved one, creating a superhero from 
cherished memories. 
Regardless, the memorial page does precisely that; Don Greene was special, and 
the world should know why: 
Yet it is difficult for family and friends to think of anything negative 
about Don.  Claudette and her sister remember, now with fondness, 
how he always insisted on re-organising the dishwasher every time 
either one of them packed it! 
Others, however, explicitly align their subject with a larger community of 
victims/heroes: 
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Although they are definitely ‘heroes’, all the other victims who 
perished that  tragic day are also ‘heroes’ in my heart, as they gave 
the greatest sacrifice anyone could give and it should never, never be 
forgotten. 
The elevation of the individual to the status of ‘hero’ is achieved within the 
context of the collective - no differentiation is made between William Joseph 
Cashman’s heroic deeds, the subject of the above tribute, and the collective 
heroism displayed by his fellow passengers.  As such, United 93’s efforts to 
memorialise those who perished on the flight are multi-stranded, consisting of 
numerous individual stories combined into a singular plot. 
Another key DVD extra is a sixty-minute documentary entitled United 93: The 
Families and the Film (Solomon, 2006), in which a series of interviews with 
family members culminate in a private pre-screening of the completed film.  
Throughout the documentary, the families offer motives for their cooperation 
with the project, typically involving terms such as ‘legacy’, ‘tribute’ and 
‘memorial’.  For example, Lori Guadagno, sister of Richard Guadagno promises 
he ‘will not be an invisible passenger in this story’. 
However, within the film itself, many of the passengers are marginalised to the 
point of near-invisibility, in the interest of preserving a collective-focus - for 
example, no-one is formally introduced or named, so connecting the characters 
with their real-life referents becomes complicated and dependent on personal 
knowledge of the victims.  In this sense, the role of the aforementioned 
documentary is more than just an added-on ‘extra’; it informs the reading of the 
film itself when viewed on DVD, providing the necessary context for the viewer 
to identify individual passengers.  This exemplifies the intratextuality that 
Brookey and Westerfelhaus identify as integral to the DVD format: primary and 
secondary texts are not separated in time and space, but presented and 
consumed as part of the same package
264 (as opposed to intertextuality in which 
primary and secondary texts are ‘usually physically distinct from one another 
and are often read at different times’).
265  The way in which a text’s 
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technological platform affects its reading will be picked up in a more sustained 
analysis with regards the paratexts of 24 in chapter eight. 
Unlike Flight 93, the personal lives of individual passengers are not elaborated 
upon - phone calls made to loved ones are not cues to introduce fresh plotlines, 
but partially-heard, one-sided farewells that add to the film’s verisimilitude, but 
not to its load of sub-plots requiring narrative management.  However, other 
‘stories’ from outside the plane are included, such as the attempts of air traffic 
controllers in New York and Boston to hail the flight, the National Air Traffic 
Control Centre at Herndon’s struggles to coordinate their responses, the 
confusion at a military base in Rome, New York, over whether incoming reports 
are part of an ongoing training simulation or are ‘Real World’, and an 
observation tower south of Manhattan which relays information on the fate of 
American Airlines Flight 11 and United Airlines Flight 175, which hit the North 
Tower and South Tower respectively. However, the individuals featured in these 
various locations are largely depersonalised components of the larger plot, 
afforded little individual characterisation beyond the establishment of their 
professional role in the unfolding drama.  The network is evoked, but it is the 
overall impression of interconnected existence that is emphasised, not the 
individual participants. 
3.3  The ripple effect: 9/11 as global event 
We are all Americans.
266 
-  Le Monde, September 12
th 2001 
On the one hand, then, the news reportage of the September 11, 2001 attacks is 
premised upon multiplicity, a polyvocal reaction to a colossal act of violence 
that impacts upon many lives in different ways; on the other, these ‘stories’ are 
collated and labeled ‘9/11’, which suggests some degree of coherence and 
unification of experience.  Various ‘strands’ are threaded together: the events 
are composed into a chronology by news agencies, which is joined by official 
rhetoric (the focus of chapter one), and later by documentaries and fiction film 
and television texts.  While the examples discussed thus far have focused upon 
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American narratives, of vital importance is the global range of this network.  Le 
Monde’s September 12
th headline declared empathy and shared suffering, 
expanding the collective victim’s ranks to those outside the US.  Importantly, 
this unified global collective subsequently stands in opposition to a second global 
collective: al-Qaeda.   
Al-Qaeda is routinely characterised as a coherent terror network rooted to no 
single country, with members that span the globe – not just in Africa and the 
Middle East, but in sleeper cells lying dormant in Western cities.  There are 
logical policy advantages to framing the threat in this way – an organised enemy 
with a single, demonised, mastermind leader presents a defeatable target, 
whereas a diffuse plethora of unrelated threats overwhelms and potentially 
fosters defeatism – but it is a mischaracterisation.
267  There is also an 
irresolvable tension between emphasising the cross-border, planetary threat 
posed by Islamic terrorism, and identifying physical locations to target: al-Qaeda 
are framed as mobile and non-national in one-sense, but fundamentally 
connected to Afghanistan (and later Iraq) in another.   
Much has been written conceiving the simultaneous international broadcast of 
footage of the September 11
th, 2001 attacks and the profound impact such 
broadcasts made all across the globe.  For example, Bill Schaffer notes that ‘all 
free-to-air television stations in Australia switched their programming to 
coverage of the disaster’ for ‘up to forty-eight hours after the event’,
268 while 
the global scope of ‘9/11’s impact was itself incorporated into news-reports as 
another plot-strand in its own right: the ‘real-time global montage’ of initial 
reports editing between images of ‘ground zero’ in New York, celebrations from 
Palestinian refugees and ‘the stuttering images provided by video phones in 
Afghanistan’.
269  This simultaneous global broadcast, and the subsequent effect 
upon global-politics, exemplifies Douglas Kellner’s observation that, more than a 
revelation of American vulnerability or a demonstration of asymmetric warfare 
at its most devastatingly destructive, the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 
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showed ‘the fundamental interdependence of the world, dramatising how 
activities in one part of the world affected others’.
270  Kellner considers this to 
be the crucial characteristic of the 9/11 attacks, identifying international 
terrorism as the dark face of globalisation, the ‘defining reality of our time’.  He 
continues: 
9/11 was obviously a global event that dramatised an interconnected 
and conflicted networked society in which there is a constant 
worldwide flow of people, products, technologies, ideas and the like.  
9/11 could only be a mega-event in a global media world, a society of 
the spectacle in which the whole world is watching and participating 
in what Marshall McLuhan called a global village… Thus, 9/11 
dramatised the interconnected networked globe and the important 
role of the media in which individuals everywhere can simultaneously 
watch events of worldwide significance unfold and participate in the 
dramas of globalisation.
271 
In light of this global interconnectivity – global both in terms of the mediation of 
events in global media, and with regards the consequences for local political 
activities described in chapter one - it is interesting that one of the first 
cinematic responses to the attacks came in the form of a multi-director 
portmanteau film, a structure utilised in the past to arrange disparate-yet-
interlocking responses to complex socio-political issues in films like Far From 
Vietnam (1967) and Germany In Autumn (1978).  The portmanteau-film’s 
collaborative, multi-authored form allows for incoherent, polyglottal responses 
without supposing any firm collating narrative.  Rather, an artistic briefing or 
structural gimmick shared by each participant unifies the short constituent films 
as a collected whole.  Such a structure makes the portmanteau film well-suited 
to the articulation of complex issues: there is the opportunity to present 
incompatible perspectives, space to include oppositional voices that tackle a 
subject from conflicting angles.  This possibility may not always be realised – the 
contributors to Far From Vietnam were all members of the political left, with 
the perspectives all protesting American actions in Indochina in various ways – 
but the potential to contain oppositional points of view remains a key feature of 
the portmanteau form. 
                                         
270 Douglas Kellner, From 9/11 to Terror War, p. 44 
271 Ibid p. 41     96 
Although not directly ‘about’ the September 11
th, 2001 attacks or the ‘War on 
Terror’, one such film, the two-part anthology Ten Minutes Older (2002) utilises 
a metaphor broadly characteristic of the way the portmanteau film connects its 
component shorts.  Between each of its fourteen segments, made by filmmakers 
from three continents (though the emphasis in this example is firmly on 
renowned European filmmakers such as Jean-Luc Godard, Bernardo Bertolucci 
and Claire Denis, with Kaige Chen (China) the only non-European or North 
American participant) there is an inserted image of a flowing river, the ripples 
on its surface morphing into each auteur’s signature as a way to introduce their 
segment of film.  This ‘rippling’ effect - the influence that emanates from an 
event and connects those affected together - is less literally invoked in 11’9’’01, 
a collaboration conceived of and arranged by French producer Alain Brigand.  
Brigand describes 9/11’s ‘planetary echo’, the reverberations of which reached 
‘all corners of the globe’, as the source of his inspiration.
272  Across its 
constitutive short films, further ‘9/11’ plots are suggested, both additional tales 
of individual experience of the attacks (Claude LeLouch’s short in which a deaf 
couple argue, oblivious to the news unfolding on their television set; Sean Penn’s 
abstract tale of an aged widower still mourning his wife’s passing, too wrapped 
up in grief to notice the carnage right outside his window, even when the 
collapsing tower lets sunlight into his apartment for the first time) and further 
historical linkages (Shôhei Imamura’s obtuse World War 2 parable involving a 
snake-like soldier’s incarceration; the Ken Loach short discussed in chapter one, 
in which a survivor of the US-backed Chilean coup d’etat of 1973 writes a letter 
asking the American victims of 9/11 not to forget the suffering of others, 
drawing an explicit link between two infamous ‘September 11
th’s in history).  
The nationalities of the filmmakers involved is more diverse than in Ten Minutes 
Older, with filmmakers from Iran (Samira Makhmalbaf), France (LeLouch), Egypt 
(Youssef Chahine), Bosnia and Herzegovina (Danis Tanovic), Burkina Faso (Idrissa 
Ouedraogo), the United Kingdom (Ken Loach), Mexico (Alejandro Gonzalez 
Inarritu), Israel (Amos Gitai), India (Mira Nair), the United States (Sean Penn) 
and Japan (Shohei Imamura).  This cross-global collaboration is key, emphasised 
by a linking insert that, rather than the abstract flow of the river, returns to a 
map of the globe intersected with longitude and latitude lines - the planet 
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rendered as both mappable and interconnected.  The Eurocentrism – the 
‘paradigmatic perspective’ as defined by Ella Shohat and Robert Stam, ‘in which 
Europe is seen… as the world’s center of gravity’
273 – that was suggested by the 
Western bias of Ten Minutes Older’s participants is not entirely absent: the 
Mercator map is used, placing Europe in the centre and reflecting an imperial 
visual arrangement of the planet around its colonial hub, echoing the tendency 
recognized by Shohat and Stam to map the world ‘in a cartography that 
centralises and augments Europe’.
274  But there is nonetheless a clear effort to 
foreground themes of global interconnectivity in both the motif of the map and 
the range of filmmakers who take part.  The films all relate to the terrorist 
attacks on New York (some in more abstract fashion than others), and the 
multitude of ways the event impacts upon observers around the world evokes 
simplified chaos-theory - most popularly conceptualised as ‘the butterfly effect’, 
in which a butterfly beats its wings and unleashes a tornado thousands of miles 
away.
275  Here the collapse of two buildings in Manhattan engenders world-wide 
reactions and, rhetorically at least, ‘changes everything’ with regards to geo-
politics.
276  
3.4  Conclusion 
This chapter has identified a tension in the 9/11 metaframe – a component of 
the broader War on Terror metaframe – between multiple, individual, global 
‘plot’ strands and a singular, collective, American core narrative.  This is 
identifiable in early films (both made-for-cable and cinematic) depicting one 
‘strand’ of the 9/11 attacks, as well as in contemporary political rhetoric and in 
the official Commission Report.  The attacks on America were framed as attacks 
on the world; the victims were individual heroes, but the tragedy was 
collectively experienced; the myriad opinions, voices, strands and angles were 
dialogically intertwined, but a core narrative of innocence assaulted without 
warning quickly formed.   
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It is worth noting here that such frames are dynamic and historically situated, 
not immutable – for example, the united empathy encapsulated by Le Monde’s 
‘We are all Americans’ headline arguably began to wane soon after the attacks, 
in light of unpopular US actions.  The plethora of commentary and newly-
commissioned programming that surrounded the attacks’ tenth anniversary 
demonstrates the way the commemorative impulse has calcified with time, 
while also confirming the shifting parameters of the ‘9/11’ sub-frame; footage 
of body parts and accounts of falling bodies striking first responders in 9/11: The 
Fireman’s Story (Maxwell, 2011) are shocking not only in their content, but due 
to their being hithertofore absent from the popular accounts of the day’s events.  
9/11: The Falling Man (Singer, 2006) presents an earlier example of this flux, 
examining the way in which the iconic image referred to by the title – someone 
falling to their death from the burning Trade Centre – was absent from print in 
the immediate aftermath, but subsequently reacquired its place in the visual 
record.
277 
The art-house anthology discussed in the chapter’s final section displays 
similarities in form to the newspaper front page discussed at the beginning.  
Unlike the linear structure of the book page - and the novelistic cinematic text - 
the newspaper presents its plot lines all at once for the reader to select from 
and combine at their discretion.  Marshall McLuhan writes: 
[The book page] fosters a single tone and attitude between a writer, 
reader, subject, whereas the newspaper breaks up this linearity and 
singleness of tone and perspective, offering many book pages at the 
same moment.  The telegraph gave instantaneity to this picturesque 
news landscape, turned the news-sheet into a global photograph or 
world snapshot.
278 
Greg J. Smith makes a similar observation, characterising the newspaper as a 
‘time capsule comprised of hundreds of stories stitched together into a 
composite narrative’, and quoting from artist Nancy Chun, who describes the 
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newspaper front-page as a ‘daily map of the world’.
 279  Clearly editorial and 
pictorial elements - headlines, relative placement on the page, accompanying 
graphic or lack of - influence the way this ‘global photograph’ of ‘map of the 
world’ is understood, and direct the reader to what are considered the most 
important (or at least, most prominent) sections first.  But even if we follow the 
inferred path through the page, from main story (indicated by size of headline 
and central positioning) to those considered secondary, there is still arbitrariness 
to their collection.  The anthology film orders its segments as the linearity of 
film projection demands, but these segments do not interconnect in any 
coherent way and alternative orders seem possible; they exist in a network of 
potential connections.   
Chapter five will draw similarities with the internet’s hyperlink structure,
280 
while in chapter six, I will return to this notion to examine not the anthology 
film but a more mainstream and common narrative structure, the multi-strand 
global network narrative.  First however, I wish to consider a possible effect of 
the surfeit of information potentially generated by the network model – a model 
that generates links and connections between individual nodes.  When a surfeit 
of information ceases to be manageable and comprehensible, it instead tips into 
an ever-increasing centrifugal cycle, incorporating more and more ‘plotlines’ 
into its narrative.  While the network news and Commission Report examples 
incorporate multiple plotlines into a comprehensible narrative thread, the scale 
of the attacks also engenders responses in the opposite direction, with 
conspiracy theorists poring over every official report and statement to isolate 
discrepancies and spin elaborate fictions implicating the US government, the 
Russians, sinister defence contractors and countless others.  This is the network 
not as organisational feature, but as tangled trap - the web perceived by the 
paranoiac. 
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4  Paranoia, conspiracy and patternicity: Web as 
net #1 
 
In times of terror, when everyone is something of a 
conspirator, everybody will be in a situation where he 
has to play detective.
 281 
-  Walter Benjamin 
You can get people to swallow anything by intensifying 
the details.
282 
-  Ray Bradbury 
 
Conspiracy theories have a long lineage in American culture.  Peter Knight 
suggests that conspiracy is integrally woven into the very origins of the United 
States, arguing that: 
The Republic itself was founded amid fears and allegations on both 
sides, with the leaders of the American Revolution well schooled in 
discerning political intrigue and deception, a lesson they had learned 
from British politics.
283 
Knight and others suggest that the assassination of President Kennedy in 1963 
was the key event that triggered conspiracy’s move from a marginal position into 
a more general cultural form, becoming the ‘lingua franca of ordinary 
Americans’.
284  Over time, Knight argues, conspiracy has become ‘the default 
assumption in an age which has learned to distrust everything and everyone’.
285  
It is perhaps not surprising, then, that fears of conspiracy surfaced during the 
War on Terror, particularly when the sheer scale and complexity of its remit is 
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taken into consideration.  Figure 4.1 is a power-point slide designed on behalf of 
the US military to organise and ‘contain’ the complexity of the war in 
Afghanistan. 
 
Fig. 4.1: Powerpoint slide: ‘Afghanistan Stability/COIN Dynamics’ 
Upon seeing the slide, General Stanley McChrystal reportedly quipped ‘when we 
understand that slide, we’ll have won the war’.
286  Finding meaning amidst the 
ever-expanding web of complexity, it would appear, is the overriding imperative 
of more than just the conspiracy theorist.  This chapter will examine the role of 
conspiracy theories in the War on Terror, including the related issue of 
‘patternicity’: the identification of meaning in meaningless data.  It will argue 
that the War on Terror metaframe produces and perpetuates the atmosphere of 
fear alluded to by Benjamin, resulting in a detective impulse shared by 
audiences and filmmakers alike, which frames the conflict as a mystery to be 
solved. 
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4.1  9/11 conspiracy theories 
9/11 has inspired and drawn together a vast number of conspiracy theories.  One 
rumour, spread through email and the Web, claimed that no Jews had been 
killed in the attack, insinuating that Mossad was responsible for the attacks.
287  
Another suggested that financial traders had foreknowledge of the attack and 
engaged in seemingly-irregular dealing beforehand which became profitable 
soon after.  While trawling the internet would no doubt unearth countless 
sceptics offering implausible twists on any subject imaginable, the visibility of 
9/11 conspiracy theories and the relative seriousness with which they are 
narrated in the mainstream public sphere seems particularly high.
288  Indeed, the 
hugely successful documentary Fahrenheit 9/11 was premised around the 
uncovering of conspiratorial agendas in the Bush administration’s actions in the 
immediate aftermath of the attacks - arranging for Saudi nationals to be flown 
out of the country while all other flights were grounded, for example.  The film 
itself engendered its own sub-industry of documentaries attempting to debunk 
Moore’s claims, a further level of conspiracy in which Moore was argued to 
manipulate the truth for nefarious, self-serving ends.
289  
Even six years after the attacks, in the UK alone, BBC2 broadcast The Conspiracy 
Files: 9/11 - The Truth Behind The Third Tower (BBC2, 2007) which asked 
experts to evaluate the ’evidence’ that WTC 7 - a forty-seven story building in 
the World Trade Centre complex that also collapsed on September 11 - rather 
than being weakened by fires spread from the Twin Towers, was deliberately 
demolished by the government to conceal classified documents stored there.  
Channel 4, meanwhile, screened a program about a less labyrinthine plot - The 
9/11 Faker (Channel 4, 2007), detailing the story of Tania Head, who claimed to 
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be one of only nineteen people above the planes’ point of impact to escape the 
towers alive, but who was later exposed as a fraud.
290  Furthermore, hundreds of 
low budget documentaries are available online claiming one elaborate plot after 
another, with titles including 9/11: The Great Illusion (Humphrey, 2006), 9/11: 
In Plane Site (Lewis, 2004) and 9/11: The Greatest Lie Ever Sold (Hilder, 
2004).
291  These are not marginal texts either: Loose Change (Avery, 2006), a 
$6000 home-made film about 9/11 conspiracy theories was at one time the most 
popular video on Google Videos (the search engine’s video sharing site), with 
over ten million views by May 2006.
292  Interestingly, its makers Korey Rowe and 
Dylan Avery began Loose Change as a fictional screenplay ‘loosely based around 
us discovering that 9/11 was an inside job’, before they apparently became 
convinced by what they considered the overwhelming evidence their research 
unearthed.
293 
The urge to uncover a hidden truth relies upon a fundamental belief in the 
existence of secrets.  John Dean lists the ways that secrecy damages democracy 
in the United States: it is alienating, precludes public accountability, threatens 
liberty, negatively affects character, and encourages incompetence, amongst 
other detrimental effects.
294  Most troublingly, as John G. Cawelti and Bruce A. 
Rosenberg suggest in their study of the spy novel’s genesis and development in 
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, secrecy and clandestinity replace 
morality with pragmatism – the clandestine world cannot, due to its inherently 
secretive nature, be subject to public checks and measures, and ethical 
considerations thereby become secondary to questions such as ‘can it be done?’ 
and if so, ‘how?’.  Those that participate in clandestine activities come to 
believe that their actions are not subject to the same rules as the non-
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clandestine world, but are exempt due to the seriousness of their objectives.
295  
From Dick Cheney’s ‘go massive, sweep it all up, things connected and not’ 
directive, to the warning that US intelligence would have to operate on ‘the 
dark side’, hiding its activities from the American people (and its allies) in order 
to preserve operational security, secrecy has been a defining feature of the Bush 
administration’s response to the attacks of September 11
th, 2001.  To the 
conspiracy theorist’s file, already containing MK-ULTRA, TWA Flight 800, Lee 
Harvey Oswald, Watergate and Area 51, the Bush administration’s secrecy has 
added WMDs, The Carlisle Group and Ghost Planes, amongst others. 
4.2  Conspiracy culture and postmodernism 
The ubiquity of conspiracy culture has meant that attempts to debunk or 
disprove claims of hidden plots and secret connections have given way to 
attempts to understand and explain their attraction.  Psychological explanations 
- which, Knight suggests, usually assume ‘that people blame external causes for 
what are essentially internal, psychic problems, sometimes of a sexual nature’
296 
- are not sufficient to explaining the phenomenon at a more widespread social 
level.  Samuel Chase Cole, echoing Knight’s identification of conspiracy theories’ 
widened popularity from the 1960s onwards, suggests a correlation between 
conspiracy culture and postmodernism, arguing that the simultaneous growth of 
each is not coincidental, but that fears of conspiracy act as a paradoxical 
‘antidote’ to the terrifying un-grounding of postmodernism.
297 
Both conspiracy and postmodernism share a distrust and denial of the narratives 
that structure social existence.  However, this scepticism manifests itself 
differently: postmodernism refuses master narratives (a category to which the 
War on Terror metaframe arguably belongs), turning the stabilisation of meaning 
into an impossible goal, while conspiracy culture re-asserts new, baroquely 
elaborate plots in which, if we look beneath the surface, everything is 
connected.  The appeal of conspiracy culture, then, is the reassurance that 
order does exist, even if, paradoxically, the order is masked and/or sinister in 
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nature - better that than the meaningless abyss of postmodernism.  Where this 
pessimistic view of postmodernism casts established ‘truths’ (and the very 
possibility of ‘truth’ itself) in doubt, making everything ‘relational, debatable, 
elusive and precarious’, Cole identifies conspiracy’s remedial properties:  
everything becomes a sign, a clue, a piece of a larger puzzle… 
[reducing] everything to evidence and predetermined clues.  It 
literalises experience, seeing connections in coincidence, chance and 
accident.  It fixes identity, transforms the fluidity of postmodern 
theory into the foreordained scripts of conspiracy theory… In many 
ways this can become a comfortable notion since the contemporary 
world becomes explainable and explained, the postmodern malaise 
rationalised and understood.
298 
‘Putting the pieces together’, then, is the paranoid conspiracy theorist’s 
motivation.  However, the same imperative underpins the investigative 
journalist, the viewer of the network-narrative film or television text (as will be 
discussed in section six), and, as Walter Benjamin suggests, everyone living in a 
time characterised by terror.  Such assemblage is arguably integral to 
understanding any narrative, but there is a difference in degree: in these 
examples, meaning is only tenable through active investigation.   
Writing off conspiracy culture as delusional is therefore unhelpful.  Fredric 
Jameson identifies conspiracy as ‘the poor person’s cognitive mapping’, 
suggesting that the prevalence of conspiracy indicates an inability in many 
individuals to otherwise ‘make sense of their lives within the larger historical 
and socio-economic context’.  The unveiling of a secret web that conspiratorially 
links everything together provides a sense of location.
299  But, as Slavoj Zizek 
suggests, this is an insufficient explanation when presented with evidence of 
actual conspiracy.
300  Conspiracy theories are not purely paranoid or delusional, 
but responsive to the secrecy that characterises both War on Terror policy and, 
indeed, the terrorist attacks of September 11
th, 2001 themselves.  Where the 
viewer of a film like Syriana traces plot connections to formulate a coherent 
story (just as 9/11 news reports traced connections to produce a coherent, 
detailed chronology of causally-linked events), the conspiracy theorist 
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compulsively and actively seeks links on the assumption that the connections are 
there if you know where to look.  Surfaces are always deceptive, hence there is 
a preoccupation with subtext: strip away the outer façade and the truth will 
reveal itself - until, that is, the connections appear satisfactorily identified, at 
which point a further false layer presents itself to the conspiracy theorist’s eyes. 
To the paranoid conspiracy believer, the truth will always be partially obscured 
in an endless, recessionary process of skepticism and investigation, but at a 
certain level, the secrecy of the War on Terror engenders investigation at all 
levels from all affected by it. 
In the wake of ‘9/11’, the conspiracy theories multiplied, settling into two broad 
camps delineated by Knight: ‘Letting it Happen on Purpose’ (LIHOP) and ‘Making 
it Happen on Purpose’ (MIHOP), both stemming from the underlying assumption 
that: 
the Bush administration and/or oil companies had much to gain from 
the subsequent invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, and were looking for 
- perhaps even willing to engineer - a modern-day Pearl Harbour in 
order to gain support for their pre-existing war plans.
301 
The links to oil companies are a particularly popular link in the 9/11-War on 
Terror conspiracy chain – television mini-series such as Burn Up (BBC/Global 
Television, 2008) and State of Play (BBC, 2003) featured such a connection as 
part of their labyrinthine plots, while Syriana presents a similar argument in a 
more detailed fashion.  This economic, capitalist rationale for war – securing oil 
reserves and pipelines abroad – is argued to be motive enough to either 
orchestrate or allow an attack that would permit retaliatory force, in the 
process toppling uncooperative regimes and installing puppet governments that 
will act in ways favourable to Western interests. 
Naomi Klein notes that it is unlikely that any shadowy conspiracy exists in the 
fog-and-mirrors sense of Machiavellian trickery, citing as evidence the private 
writings of key members of the Bush administration, including George W. Bush, 
which evidence the same Manichean logic and unequivocal certainty in the 
sanctity of their decisions as their public statements.  Klein concludes that 
locating the truth hidden amongst the myriad plots is not about uncovering a 
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diabolical master plan or exposing Bush and his cabinet as disingenuous fiends, 
but about acknowledging the unfortunate truth in the aphorism ‘fortune favours 
the prepared’ - which here carries the unpleasant realisation that the military-
industrial complex has made war both profitable and favourable to the interests 
of its architects.
302 
4.3  Conspiracy and filmanthropy 
Multiple conspiracy plots are both engendered by and add to the escalating 
network of perspectives and plot-lines of the ‘War on Terror’ metaframe, acting 
as stark reminders of the secretive machinations of the military-industrial-
political complex.  Even if paranoid delusions are avoided, the diverse network 
of plots necessarily casts its interpreter in an investigative role, a position 
recognised by Walter Benjamin in past times of terror but remaining equally 
applicable in this new context.  The multi-strand narrative in film and television 
(e.g. Syriana), already suggested to be structurally emulating the newspaper 
layout in both content (‘ripped from the headlines’) and in layout (plots 
organised with varying attempts to convey simultaneity and multiplicity), seems 
also, then, to embody the impulse of revolutionary journalism as identified by 
Paul Virilio in The Vision Machine: 
Revolutionary journalism aims to enlighten public opinion, to make 
revelations, to delve behind deceptive appearances, to provide slowly 
but surely a convincing explanation for every mystery in keeping with 
the demands of a public full of examiners.
303 
This imperative is echoed by the number of War on Terror films given jargon-
based titles that frame their plots as part-exposé of a supposedly condemnable 
practice: for example, Stop Loss (Pierce, 2008) has Sergeant Brandon King (Ryan 
Phillipe) flee from the US army in protest at their ‘stop-loss’ practice of 
extending soldier deployment and sending them on additional tours of duty 
beyond the length of time agreed in their contracts, a function likened to a 
back-door draft both in the film and by John Kerry during his presidential 
campaign.
304  Other examples include Redacted (the censorship of images and 
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text, ostensibly for reasons of national security or mission integrity, but in De 
Palma’s film used to condemn the covering-up of American crime) and Rendition 
(the central plot-strand of which depicts a case of ‘extraordinary rendition’ - the 
practice of secretly seizing suspects and deporting them overseas for 
interrogation – a term that has been accused of euphemistically disguising its 
true nature, described by Jane Mayer as ‘Outsourcing Torture’).
305   If these films 
are indeed, to some degree, attempts to enlighten their audience by revealing 
the sinister truth masked by the neologisms and euphemisms that permeate War 
on Terror discourse, then they share with the paranoid conspiracy theorist a 
conviction that something is hidden, and can be unearthed if we question the 
rhetorical arch-narrative and disentangle the web of sub-narratives it masks. 
This explicitly political motive is integral to the concept of ‘filmanthropy’, 
practitioners of which have been instrumental in the making of many of the 
movies under discussion.  The term was coined by Internet mogul Ted Leonsis to 
describe his role in setting up a film production company, Agape, and producing 
Nanking (Gutentag and Sturman, 2007), a documentary about the Rape of 
Nanking.  It has been used to describe affluent individuals who, having found 
success in their business endeavours, spend money on political film projects.  
The nature of said films, often controversial and niche in appeal, means that 
profit is an unlikely motivation (though potential financial success is not entirely 
forgotten, as Leonsis’s ambitious claim that Nanking, ‘if marketed right, could 
be like a Passion of the Christ’ attests)
306. Instead, Leonsis suggests, the 
compulsion stems from a similar goal to that of the revolutionary journalist:  
It's where you can shed light on a big issue. You raise the money 
around your charity and make something that can drive people to 
understand an issue… It brings together philanthropy and 
understanding how media works. You're going to see a lot of people 
doing this because a studio probably wouldn't do a story like this.
307 
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Other figures tagged with the filmanthropist soubriquet include Jeff Skoll, 
founder of Ebay, whose Participant Productions has financed dozens of 
politically-conscious movies including An Inconvenient Truth,  Fast Food Nation 
(Linklater, 2006), Good Night, and Good Luck. and Chicago 10 (Morgen, 2007), as 
well as specifically War on Terror-related films such as Charlie Wilson’s War 
(Nichols, 2007), Syriana and Standard Operating Procedure; Charles Ferguson, 
the founder of Vermeer Technologies in 1994 and subsequently producer and 
director of Oscar-winning documentary No End In Sight; and Mark Cuban, whose 
role in the making of Redacted will be considered in the next section.  Skoll’s 
talk of ‘a double bottom line’, where making socially-conscious films that 
audiences both want to see and are affected by is essential, suggests the 
imperative to ‘make public’ that is shared by both investigative journalist and 
filmanthropist, who share with the old-fashioned political avant-garde a desire 
to address under-reported issues, but who deliberately do so within a 
mainstream filmmaking tradition, thereby reaching multiplex-goers as well as 
the politically active.  This expositional role is directly related to the conspiracy 
culture discussed by Knight et al; if secrecy is the primary facet of conspiracy, 
publicity is the prerequisite of democracy: 
Publicity depends on the idea of secrecy.  The power of the public is a 
power to unmask or reveal… When the public sphere provides our 
model for democracy, then, political action revolves around exposure, 
revelation.  Disclosing and making visible are synonyms for politics.
308 
Conspiracy culture, then, shares certain characteristics with revolutionary 
journalism and filmanthropy.  The principle difference is the motor driving its 
expositional imperative.  If filmanthropy and revolutionary journalism are 
ostensibly driven by political altruism and empirical accuracy, conspiracy culture 
is characterised by paranoia.  The former categories seek to establish a narrative 
by uncovering and making public the ‘truth’, while the latter scrutinises 
everything for its sub-text.  Key to all three is pattern recognition. 
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4.4  Pattern recognition 
We must find the terrorists in a world of noise.
309 
-  John Poindexter, Director of Total Information 
Awareness (TIA), US anti-terror research initiative 
I spread the map out on the dining room table… The 
dots where I’d found things looked like the stars in the 
universe.  I connected them, like an astrologer, and if 
you squinted your eyes like a Chinese person, it kind of 
looked like the word ‘fragile’.  Fragile.  What was 
fragile?… I erased and connected the dots a different 
way, to make ‘door’… I had the revelation that I could 
connect the dots to make ‘cyborg’ and ‘platypus’ and 
‘boobs’ and even Oskar’… I could connect them to 
make almost anything I wanted, which meant I wasn’t 
getting any closer to anything.
310 
-  From Extremely Loud and Incredibly Close, 
Jonathan Safran-Foer 
The paradoxical relationship between exposing great quantities of information 
(in the form of ‘stories’ - both news scoops based on a fresh snippet of 
information and narrated tales that structure multi-strand plots) and in the 
process obfuscating the truth was recognised forty years ago by Marshall 
McLuhan in Counterblast as the inevitable consequence of media saturation.  
‘Faced with information overload’, he wrote, ‘we have no alternative but 
pattern recognition’.
311  However, the above extract from Extremely Loud and 
Incredibly Close illustrates the possibility of assigning false meaning to 
observable patterns.  Safran-Foer’s novel narrates a young boy’s search for his 
missing father, who disappeared on the morning of 9/11 and is presumed dead.  
The discovery of buried items such as a coat hanger and an old pocket watch are 
clung on to by the young child as potentially vital clues, until the disheartening 
realisation that if you look hard enough you can find patterns to support any 
interpretation of said clues.  Michael Shermer offers a diagnostic term for such 
over-recognition of patterns: patternicity, or ‘the tendency to find meaningful 
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patterns in meaningless noise’.
312  In other contexts, other names are used to 
refer to similar mis-identifications: statisticians would call it a type I error (i.e. 
a false positive),
313 while neurologist Klaus Conrad coined the term ‘apophenia’ 
to describe the psychological process by which meaning is assigned to ‘random 
configurations’, such as the frequent reports of the face of Jesus being observed 
in the uneven browning of pieces of toast, the underside of jar lids, and other 
incongruous locations.
314 
William Gibson’s novel Pattern Recognition follows ‘cool-hunter’ Cayce, a brand 
expert who uses her instinctual understanding of which marketing campaigns are 
likely to work at an international level to advise various corporations.  Cayce - 
along with an unknown number of others - is fascinated by fragments of film that 
mysteriously appear online and are pored over by rapt followers, who debate 
their chronology, meaning, source and purpose.  Clues are sought in the obscure 
snippets, though what Cayce and her fellow obsessives expect to discover is 
unclear, to both reader and character.
315  As well as this obvious act of pattern 
recognition, the novel juxtaposes disparate events and icons, juxtapositions 
commented upon by Alex Links in his essay ‘Global War, Global Capital, and the 
Work of Art in William Gibson’s Pattern Recognition’: 
True to its title, Pattern Recognition makes no explicit claim to any 
kind of fundamental or deliberate causal connection between brand 
culture, the latest evolution of corporate culture into the global, and 
the twentieth century history of warfare.  They are, however, 
consistently juxtaposed to constitute a provisional, tentative 
argument.  This patterning without polemic is the novel’s attempt to 
offer a history that is not custodial and that recognises contingency.
316 
This, he continues, is specifically related to aspects of 9/11 and the War on 
Terror: 
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In particular, images of the World Trade Center disaster are twice 
juxtaposed with the Coca-Cola logo, arguably the most recognised 
brand on earth.  Rather than make any open claims about the 
connection between the attacks and the expansion of American global 
capital, the novel simply juxtaposes images of violence and of the 
expansion of capital over and over again, positing the recognizable 
pattern as a newly urgent question while refraining from claims of any 
kind of direct causality.
317 
The existence of the pattern is sufficiently evocative; speculating upon the 
nature of the link between elements within the pattern is refrained from.  The 
replacement of causal connections with associative connections echoes the 
conclusions of chapter one, in which the rhetoric of the metaframe was argued 
to conjure associative links.  Claims that ‘9/11’ was unique, unprecedented, 
unpreventable and cataclysmically devastating are countered, Gibson’s novel 
suggests, by the recognition of broader patterns of violence, which foreground 
historical commonalities and evoke past traumas.  Perhaps this non-committed 
form of interpretation is the one most closely suggested by the portmanteau 
films discussed in the previous chapter: inter-connections are minimal, yet we 
are encouraged to identify certain patterns and thematic similarities, without 
assigning any kind of concrete causality.   
Obviously, pattern recognition has applications in the waging of the War on 
Terror: the monitoring of signals by intelligence agencies such as the CIA and 
NSA is premised upon discovering patterns of terrorist activity amidst the 
vicissitudes of electronic communication.  This ‘chatter’ is filtered and 
scrutinised, in the hope that the pattern will reveal itself to the observant and 
trained interpreter.  Patrick Radden Keefe argues that the increasing 
dependence upon this type of electronic surveillance over human intelligence 
has been ongoing since the Carter administration, and has increased 
exponentially since the end of the Cold War.
318  But there is potential for 
manipulation; Keefe notes that:  
after spikes in terrorist chatter set off a series of alarms about 
impending terrorist strikes in various places around the world in 2003, 
some observers of the intelligence community speculated that Al 
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Qaeda was deliberately throwing out red herrings on frequencies they 
knew were being monitored by the NSA.
319 
The deployment of false information designed to frustrate an opponent’s ability 
to gather intelligence and interpret it accurately is, of course, not new.  What is 
new is the volume of information and the speed with which it is interpreted and 
acted upon.  When the expectation is near-instantaneous interpretation, 
computer algorithms and search tools replace human analysis, hence the 
privileging of pattern recognition over other forms of interpretive analysis.  The 
possibility of a genuine pattern not being identified in time provides constant 
pressure: data mining and filtering are extensive processes with scope for error, 
and the limitations in threat recognition and reporting procedures were one 
aspect of intelligence criticised in the 9/11 Commission Report.
320  Locating 
threats in ‘a world of noise’ requires specialised tools, which projects such as 
EELD (Evidence Extraction and Link Discovery) worked to develop as part of the 
Information Awareness Office at DARPA (Defence Advanced Research Projects 
Agency – the Department of Defence’s research and development wing).
321  Such 
projects originate in efforts to implement a Total Information Awareness (TIA) 
system, a system of pattern recognition so vast its data is measured in petabytes 
(one petabyte is equal to one million gigabytes).
322 
This form of meaning-making - surveying the entirety and looking for patterns - 
impacts upon causal relations in a number of ways.  The connections identified 
need not conform to any causal relationship, or even a sequential relationship; 
only their proximity and some identifiable (though vague) ‘meaning’ connects 
them.  Rather than A causing B, or even A preceding B, pattern recognition’s 
connective principle is tertium comparitonis - their comparable significance, 
which is not predetermined by any sequential logic.  Causality is therefore not 
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the only relational principle at work in War on Terror discourse.  In conspiracy 
theory, ‘everything is connected’ through a tangled, labyrinthine but 
theoretically plottable chain of cause and effect, but other meaningful 
connections are permitted; in patternicity, everything is connected, but the 
connections are associational rather than causal.   
4.5  Conclusion 
This chapter has argued that conspiracy theories inform War on Terror narratives 
to a far greater degree than their fringe status might suggest.  The act of making 
connections between disparate ‘clues’, in order to expose previously-hidden 
truths, informs the work of journalists, filmanthropists - even policy makers.  
When a link is argued to exist between Saddam Hussein and Osama bin Laden, 
premised on secret intelligence, the rhetoric resembles the associational logic of 
the conspiracy theorist, a logic that circumvents the need for absolute causal 
evidence. 
Mark Fenster suggests that it is not the geographic or historical scope of these 
associations that is of most fundamental importance to the conspiracy narrative, 
but ‘the breathtaking speed with which it moves from event to event and adds 
“fact” after “fact”’; in other words, its velocity.
323  The ability to instantly 
juxtapose and contrast ‘evidence’ at speed therefore makes the World Wide 
Web a natural conduit for conspiracy theory propagation, and the hyperlink a 
useful organisational feature.  The Web, Jodi Dean argues, is infused with the 
characteristics of conspiracy.  ‘Conspiracy’, she argues, ‘haunts our thinking 
about the Web’,
 detailing their similarities: the overabundance of information 
(the problem that necessitates pattern recognition), but also the ‘preoccupation 
with minutiae, evidence, documentation’ and their reliance on ‘odd, seemingly 
random links that have always resisted a reconciling closure or coherence’.
 324  It 
is the latter similarity that will frame chapter five. 
                                         
323 Michael Butter and Lisa Retterath, ‘From Alerting the World To Stabilising Its Own Community: 
The Shifting Cultural Work of the Loose Change Films’, Canadian Review of American Studies, 
40.1 (2010), p. 27 
324 Dean, ‘Webs of Conspiracy’, p. 63 115 
5  The Internet and the hyperlink: Web as net #2 
 
The ontology of the World Wide Web is more than 
simply a question of space, sites or pages; it is 
fundamentally concerned with links and motion.
325 
-  Rob Shields 
 
Vannevar Bush, then advisor to President Truman, is widely credited with 
conceiving in a crude fashion the World Wide Web.  Mark Levene argues that the 
memex machine, outlined in ‘As We May Think’, displays many of the hallmarks 
of the interconnected network par excellence, the Web: a ‘mechanised private 
file and library’ linked by ‘associative indexing’ whereby ‘any item may be 
caused at will to select immediately and automatically another’.
326  This 
navigation style was modelled by design on the cognitive patterns of the human 
brain, which ‘operates by association’.
327   
Paul Virilio notes that the later development of the internet has its origins in 
military-based technology.
328  Many, including Virilio, have used this connection 
to mount studies of the internet’s ongoing involvement in military-conflicts, 
coining or co-opting terms like ‘infosphere’ and ‘virtuous war’
329 to articulate 
the complexities of a conflict scenario in which the ‘user-interface’ has taken 
precedence over face-to-face combat – a virtual, information-based form of war.  
I instead aim to look at how the organisation of information on the Web has 
influenced the organisation of certain War on Terror narratives, culminating in a 
close textual analysis of Redacted.  Online, pattern recognition – identified in 
chapter four as an essential interpretive aid when digesting vast quantities of 
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information – has its functional equivalent in the form of search engines, used to 
navigate the vast stores of accessible information, with links premised on 
meaningful (and multiple) connections, as opposed to any single linear causality.   
The global component of the Web will also be discussed, particularly its 
potential effect on the perception of space and distance.  The Internet and 
World Wide Web have been privileged by numerous commentators as either 
facilitators of globalisation or metaphors for globalisation.  Globalisation’s 
deterritorialised ‘flows’ (to adopt Manuel Castell’s terminology)
330 have been 
argued to diminish the centrality of the nation state in global geo-politics, with 
the Web argued to either support (as part of a telecommunication network that 
allows instantaneous information exchange over vast distances) or reflect (the 
flawed utopian understanding of the Web as post-national and borderless) this in 
its architecture.  A global reach is clearly an aim of the Web (in that it has been 
proclaimed to be ‘World Wide’ since its birth) and a reality (in that it is used 
around the world, often to unite remote sources), but it is by no means 
democratic – inequalities in access, censorship, bandwidth etc create 
geographical disparities, for example.  Essentially, geography still matters.
331  
However, the way in which global space is experienced or understood is, I will 
argue, affected by digital navigation - in particular, the notion of distance.  The 
way network plots express this will be examined in chapter six but first I want to 
unpack the manner in which information is arranged and experienced on the 
Web.  Of particular interest is the way in which certain narratives have been 
influenced formally by the structural and aesthetic organisation of the hyperlink. 
5.1  Mapping the Web 
The term hypertext, coined in 1965 by Ted Nelson, referred to his understanding 
of a literature as a ‘system of interconnected writings’, in which associative 
links (for example, footnotes) refer to other connected writings, creating links 
that the reader must follow.
332  Janet H. Murray defines the hypertext as ‘a set 
of documents of any kind (images, text, charts, tables, video clips) connected to 
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one another by links’,
333 while Mark Levene loosely defines the term as ‘non-
sequential writing, organised as a network of nodes and links’.
334  The World 
Wide Web, then, is the hypertext writ large - or, more accurately, it is a 
compilation of numerous hypertexts due to its non-homogenous nature.  A web-
crawl experiment conducted in 1999 by researchers from Alta Vista, Compaq and 
IBM that analysed two hundred million nodes and one and a half billion links 
revealed that: 
Over seventy five percent of the time there is no directed path of 
links from one random web page to another.  When such a path exists, 
its average distance is sixteen clicks, and when an undirected path 
exists (I.e. one allowing backward traversal of links) its average 
distance is only seven clicks.
335 
The hypertext, then, is not an unstructured array of infinite interconnections; 
the available connections are myriad, but limited, and, like the newspaper front 
page discussed in chapter four, certain ‘routes’ through the information are 
encouraged over others.
336   
The hyperlink is the possible pathway that leads from one node to another.  
However, despite the use of spatial metaphors (sites, pathways etc), the 
geography of the web is not easily comparable to physical geography.
337  
Attempts to accurately ‘map’ the web are numerous and necessary 
incomplete;
338 Google, the most widely used Internet search engine, estimated 
the number of distinct web pages across the web to exceed one trillion in 2008, 
not including the ‘deep web’ - the information stored in databases and secure 
sites not directly accessible from a search engine but nonetheless 
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interconnected as part of the Web.
339  But scale is not the only limitation of 
attempts to map the Web.  Since websites do not possess any physical 
dimensions (aside from the literal space of the servers on which they operate), 
any ‘map’ is misrepresentative.  Visiting linked sites does not involve a ‘journey’ 
as such.  Any two sites connected by a hyperlink are brought immediately into 
apparent proximity, and getting from screen A to screen B could require fifty 
different hyperlink clicks or a single one depending on the route taken.   
The difficulty in mapping this structure stems from the spatial dimensions that 
are evoked by any cartographical representation.  Space is suggested, but there 
is no greater journey involved in visiting sites from across the globe, or held in 
different databases, or on widely different subjects, than there is visiting a 
neighbour’s blog page.  Levene writes: 
To map the web, a spatial model must be formulated, and although it 
is large in a physical sense, since it is spread out all over the world, it 
differs from a geographical map in several ways.  In cyberspace, the 
notion of distance in the traditional sense is non-existent.  Remotely 
distant physical sites may be just a few clicks away from each other in 
cyberspace, and one can often jump from one web site to another by 
a single click.
340   
So while space is not absent in the topology of the web, distance is.
341  I will 
return to this point in chapter seven to draw out certain similarities between the 
absence of distance in hyperlink-structured webs, and the editing together of 
disparate spaces in the global network narrative.
342   
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So despite the vast sprawl of the web, the proximate relationships between sites 
are never random – a hyperlink fixes a connection between two sites or two 
sections of a site, but the agency of the user dictates which links are followed, 
and the hyperlink itself will usually offer contextual information suggesting its 
destination site.  Structurally, then, the web offers myriad proximate 
relationships between sites, but at the point of navigation these are traversed 
according to cognitive patterning logic, rather than being spatially or causally 
contiguous. 
5.2  The hypertext novel 
The link is the first significant new form of punctuation 
to emerge in centuries.
343 
-  Steven Johnson 
The hypertext novel embodies this hyperlink structure in its form, but on a much 
smaller scale than the networked World Wide Web.  Hypertext novels are 
constructed from a number of screens, or nodes, that eschew the linearity of the 
conventional novel form for a non-linear structure that emphasises both 
connections (between screens) and fragmentation (by frustrating a totalising 
arch-narrative).  The polycentric form of these novels has clear similarities to 
postmodernism’s rejection of unified narratives, echoing Robert Stam’s 
characterisation of the hypertext more broadly as ‘fluid texts with multiple 
points of entry, as well as [an] openness to multiple temporalities and 
perspectives’.
344  But postmodernism alone does not sufficiently explain the 
particularities of the hypertext novels’ fragmented plotting; there is also an 
emphasis on repetition and circularity that suggests that more is being expressed 
than a simple rejection of unified narrative.  
The hypertext novel is written using computer-based programmes such as 
Storyspace and is read using an interface that mimics the hyperlink structure of 
the Web.  Victory Garden by Stuart Moulthrop, is a non-causal, non-sequential 
narrative set during the first Gulf War, in which the reader navigates their way 
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through story nodes by clicking on hyperlinks.  Its fragmented structure allows 
for and encourages multiple possible readings.  The possible paths through the 
narrative maze are not entirely random or limitless, however, as each story 
screen only offers a few possible next steps, limiting the novel’s possible 
configurations.  An example from Victory Garden will better illustrate a typical 
screen in the hypertext novel: 
Where Were You? 
Where were you when the news came? 
You might have been among the half million shipped out to 
Armageddon, in which case it was no news to you. 
Or perhaps like the rest of us you got caught looking.  Maybe it 
reached you on the air, down from the satellite, pulsing through the 
cable, all those male faces taut with excitement, with concern, with 
the rush of the big story. Did it catch you at your evening meal, a 
blast from decades past? 
How did it make you feel -- scared, depressed, elated, unreal? When 
History unfolded around you, did you see it as a poison flower (fucked, 
like the man say, down to its eternal root), or did it seem to you a 
fantastic firework, some gorgeous portent of the skies?  [hyperlinks 
for possible next steps underlined and in bold]
345 
Clicking on the ‘looking’ link, for example, would lead to this node: 
Thursday night, January 16, 1991.  Here is what the war looks like so 
far: 
Blowtorch flares from F-15 Strike Eagles burning above “a large 
airbase somewhere in Saudi Arabia”… Street maps of downtown 
Baghdad with an ID shot of Holliman, Arnett, or Shaw stuck on… Peter 
Jennings, automaton avunculus, looking like he could use a few 
minutes on the nod, which makes him seem almost human… Men in 
fatigues standing on hotel roofs trying to repeat the obvious while jets 
scream across the sky… Television as Radio: lots of reports coming in 
“Live on the Phone”… Gun camera footage from Libya a few years 
back: think of these shots as rushes… Ominous blue domes glowing 
against the night sky of Riyadh, architecture of the Apocalypse that’s 
really just the roof of an indoor pool… The President reading his war 
poem, invoking FDR, JFK, even the Great Communicator… 
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It’s a familiar feast, all fragments and repetition stuck together with a 
paste of groundless spec.  And of course it’s what we don’t see that 
counts.
346 
This second screen also suggests how the hyperlink structure is being used to 
manifest what Stuart Moulthrop seems to suggest is a particularly important Gulf 
War characteristic: like the war itself, the hyperlink structure builds a narrative 
that is ‘all fragments and repetition’, with some screens offering no further links 
and necessitating a return to the beginning or a ‘back-tracking’ through the 
screens to find a new path to explore.  Even if a screen does not result in a 
dead-end, most do not offer as many fresh possible links as these two examples, 
so while the route taken varies from reader to reader, the possibilities are not 
infinite.  That said, the back-tracking and repetition eventually yield to a 
through-path, suggesting a similar tension between a multitude of possible plots 
and a reiterated collective plot that grows more distinct with repetition, as that 
observed in the 9/11 narratives discussed in chapter three. 
However, this is not merely a fragmented or complexly organised narrative that 
must be pieced back together – unlike, say, the dual plotting of Memento 
(Nolan, 2000), in which one sequence of events unfolds in reverse, while another 
sequence is seen in chronological order.  This does not conform to conventional 
narrative structures, but can ultimately, retrospectively, be reorganised into a 
traditional cause-and-effect plot.
347  In the hypertext novel, working out a 
‘correct’ order that maps the unfolding of the Gulf War to specific events in the 
protagonists’ lives is not possible, due to the numerous paths that can be taken 
to bring them into contact.  Multiple and equally valid narratives are possible.  
The longer the hypertext is read, the more central the role of repetition 
becomes - the endless convolutions that result from continually traversing the 
narrative labyrinth will repeat certain nodes and potentially overlook others.   
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The hypertext is, as Robert Stam notes, ‘ultimately about “linking” in a world 
where everything is potentially “next to” everything else’,
348 an arrangement 
navigated in the hypertext novel by the hyperlink structure discussed above, and 
in the World Wide Web itself by navigational tools including the hyperlink and 
the search engine.  While opportunities for divergence are restricted to a limited 
number of hubs, there is an evocation of semantic freedom and reader/audience 
choice, but this freedom is mediated and partially ‘locked-in’ to pre-arranged 
patterns.   
5.3  The hyperlink film 
In her review of Don Roos’ Happy Endings (2005) – a multi-protagonist network 
film in the vein of near contemporaries like Crash (Haggis, 2004) and earlier 
examples such as the ensemble films of Robert Altman, Alissa Quart transposes 
the term ‘hypertext novel’ to film as ‘hyperlink cinema’.
349  The term is flawed 
in that cinema does not offer the same opportunities for interactivity, and so 
cannot be accurately said to emulate this fundamentally important feature of 
the hypertext novel;
350 however, if considered not as a navigational structure but 
as an aesthetic imitation of its associational connections, it does suggest the way 
that the multi-strand narrative form can undermine causality in favour of other 
meaningful relationships between events. 
Features of the hyperlink film, according to Quart, include a multiplicity of plots 
within a single film, a flexibility with temporal structures, and an ‘irremediably 
relativist’, non-hierarchical relationship between the interconnected plotlines.
351  
Referring specifically to Happy Endings, Quart attests: 
We are always one click away from a new life, a new story, and new 
meaning, all equally captivating but no better or worse than what we 
have just left behind.
352 
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This range of options, limited in the World Wide Web to a degree, and more 
severely curtailed by the hypertext novel, is difficult to reconcile with the 
linearity of cinematic projection, which necessarily fixes the filmic events in a 
set viewing order from which the viewer cannot deviate without willfully 
distorting the text (i.e. projecting reels out of order or playing DVD chapters in 
the wrong order).  Unlike the portmanteau anthology text, removing or altering 
the order of sections would disrupt their individual meaning.  However, Quart 
suggests another, less problematic characteristic of the hyperlink film: their 
engagement of the audience’s contemporary ‘information-processing 
proclivities’.
353   The hyperlink film depends upon the viewer utilising similar 
cognitive abilities as those necessary to surf the internet’s myriad data, without 
the experiences being directly analogous.  In the hyperlink film, the cognitive 
activities help the viewer understand what is shown, whereas in the Web or the 
hypertext novel, it is an active process of navigation.  The meaning of 
‘hyperlink’ in ‘hyperlink film’, then, is not one of user-agency or navigation, but 
one of interpretation and dialogism.  The viewer of Happy Endings cannot affect 
the route in the manner possible in the hypertext novel, but the term still 
provides insight into the relative meaning that is suggested between sub-plots.  
The hyperlink film is then, perhaps, motivated not be a postmodernist evasion of 
a unified narrative, nor an escape from the rigidity of pre-existing narrative 
forms, but an evocation of contemporary technologies that alter cognation and 
promise omniscience.  Like the conspiracy theorist, the viewer of such texts is 
presented with multiple events and characters, and is encouraged to spot the 
patterns that link them together. 
However, I would argue that Quart’s insistence on multiple, disparate-but-linked 
plots as integral to the hyperlink cinema structure is too restrictive.  The term is 
uncritically applied as a synonym for multi-strand network plots more generally.  
If it is to have a more precise and useful meaning, it is necessary to identify 
where it differs from or adds nuance to the multi-strand plot more generally.  
For this reason I will offer a reading of Redacted as hyperlink text, rather than a 
film like Syriana (which was described as such by influential US film critic Roger 
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Ebert and which I will subject to analysis in the next chapter).
354  Redacted does 
not offer multiple interconnected storylines, but does use a fragmented 
structure and contrasting aesthetics to narrate its central plot from a variety of 
perspectives, echoing the polyvocal potential of the hyperlink text (as well as 
the self-consciousness of modernism).  Its segmented structure evokes a diffuse 
point-of-view in-keeping with the multi-storyline characteristic of the War on 
Terror more generally; just as the multiple 9/11 storylines essentially coalesced 
around a rhetorically unified subject – the terrorist attacks of September 11
th, 
2001 – Redacted narrates its plot through a refracting prism of possible 
perspectives, suggesting a diverse polyvocal response to a single event.  
5.4  Case Study: Redacted 
Redacted was directed by Brian De Palma and financed by the entrepreneur Mark 
Cuban, billionaire owner of basketball team the Dallas Mavericks.  The film’s 
filmanthropist backer and jargon-based title fits the trend identified earlier 
regarding the investigative exposé titling of a number of War on Terror texts.  
The term ‘redaction’ refers to the removal of information, in this case the 
censorship of official military reports and the supposed covering up of criminal 
acts by US soldiers serving in Iraq.  The imperative to ‘restore’ the hidden truth 
has clear parallels with the paranoid aesthetic discussed in chapter four, while 
the fragmented, mosaic-like structure of its narrative demonstrates a 
particularly emphatic hyperlink organisation, one which is foregrounded in the 
text itself.  In an interview given at the time of the film’s release, De Palma 
described how observing his daughters’ online habits provided the impetus for 
the film’s conceptualisation, motivating its distinctive aesthetic: 
They look at little pieces of this and little pieces of that” he 
explained, “and that’s how they get their information.”
355   
The result, in the words of Peter Debruge is a ‘conceptual statement about the 
way sceptical twenty-first century audiences gather information to form their 
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own narratives’.
356  Stephanie Zacherek phrases a similar observation more 
broadly, tagging the film ‘a metaphor for the struggle to make sense out of 
chaos’.
357 
The film is divided into a series of scenes between which causal connections and 
chronological development can be assumed but not always easily confirmed.  
When pieced together, the plot is relatively simple: a group of soldiers stationed 
at a checkpoint in Samarra voice doubts over their mission and display growing 
fears that insurgents, potentially undetected amongst the Iraqi people who pass 
through the checkpoint everyday, will attack with IEDs (improvised explosive 
devices) - fears realised when an explosive kills their Sergeant during a routine 
patrol.  Two of the soldiers orchestrate an attack on a local household, 
ostensibly to exact revenge, though there is no suggestion that anyone in the 
family had any connection to the killing.  They rape the daughter and murder 
the entire family.  This is officially blamed on Shiite militia, though there is 
scepticism towards this reported version of events from both the extended 
family and local news reporters.  An inquiry is conducted, the results of which 
are heavily redacted and kept classified, while one soldier, a budding filmmaker 
who recorded the atrocity as part of an ongoing film project designed to get him 
into film school when his tour of duty concludes, is abducted and beheaded by 
Iraqi insurgents in a further layer of reprisal.
358   
Structurally, this plot is constructed from thirty-four segments of sixteen 
different aesthetic types: the aforementioned war diary by Angel Salazar; 
Barrage, a French art-house documentary; Arabic news (though not explicitly the 
case, it is presumably modelled on al-Jazeera); embedded video on a Islamist 
fundamentalist website; a CCTV security camera on the US military base camp; 
an embedded European journalist’s report on a US raid; a video message from 
the wife of one of the soldiers uploaded to ‘Just a Soldier’s Wife’, a blog 
presumably for spouses to leave messages for loved ones in the forces; the 
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recorded psychological evaluation of Angel Salazar; a video call between one 
soldier and his father; a CEN news report; an internet clip of the decapitation of 
Salazar; a YouTube-style video-sharing site; the recorded criminal investigation 
of Corporal McCoy; the recorded depositions of the two soldiers primarily 
responsible for the massacre (with rostrum shots of the redacted documents); a 
home video of McCoy and his wife; and, finally, a montage of (mostly) genuine 
photographs of dead and injured bodies.  Some segment styles appear only once 
(such as the ‘Just a Soldier’s Wife’ blog and the two-way video conversation), 
while others are returned to repeatedly (the War Diary and Barrage, for 
example).  Each is easily identifiable, sometimes through on-screen captioning 
or narrative content, but usually through coding of the image and sound to 
evoke a variety of aesthetic conventions.  For example, segments from Salazar’s 
War Diary are filmed as if with a hand-held camera, each opening and closing 
with crude digital editing effects - a ‘shattering’ of the image; sideways wipe 
accompanied by a fake ‘whoosh’ sound; a whirlpool effect spinning the image 
out of focus and so on.  Security footage has a grainy texture and is black and 
white, shot from a fixed, raised vantage point that occasionally means that the 
‘action’ is obscured; the video call divides the screen in two, showing both 
parties in a low-resolution image with slight delays between picture and sound 
to suggest an unreliable satellite link over a great distance; while Barrage is shot 
in high-resolution expensive film stock and accompanied by an incessant 
classical score.   
Other segments are more obviously coded to resemble a particular media 
source: the embedded journalist report adopts the shaky composure of on-the-
hoof reportage, shot with the familiar green hue of the camera’s night-vision 
mode; the CEN news report has the requisite professional, studio-bound 
steadiness, the appropriate props (news desk, suited anchor etc) and clear, 
bright lighting; while the YouTube segments occupy only a fraction of the shot, 
the majority of the image given over to convincing imitations of the comments, 
task bars and advertising that frame videos watched through such video-sharing 
platforms (figure 5.1).     127 
 
Figure: 5.1: YouTube-style segment in Redacted 
 
Such fidelity to media verisimilitude echoes Vincent DiGirolamo’s observation 
that evoking authenticity in film isn’t simply a matter of resembling the event 
being depicted, but resembling other films about the event.
359  Redacted echoes 
the aesthetics of the representational media through which we currently 
experience such ‘reality’ - which, as chapter one argued, is for the vast majority 
indirect and mediated through, amongst others, file sharing sits like YouTube or 
dedicated military weblogs such as Milblogging.com. 
This aesthetic range foregrounds the piecemeal accumulation of information 
observed by De Palma in his daughter’s surfing behaviour, while the editing 
together of such distinctive and divergent contextual frames evokes the wider 
web of informational sources available to the individual attempting to navigate 
their way towards the ‘Truth’.  The ordering of these segments initially appears 
strictly chronological - the plot moves sequentially from the patrol, to the death 
of Sergeant, to the rape/murder, to the investigation.  The security camera 
footage and deposition videos have time/date marker watermarks, confirming 
their chronological arrangement.  However, like the hypertext novels, other 
scenes resist easy insertion into a coherent chronology, suggesting that the 
structural logic of Redacted is closer to the associational meaning of the 
hyperlink, rather than the causal meaning of conventional narrative forms.  This 
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is clearest when looking at the scenes showing Corporal McCoy’s (Rob Devaney) 
growing sense of guilt and his decision to expose the massacre.  In this way, 
interactivity is represented, even if it cannot be literally performed. 
During the rape and murder, McCoy is shown first actively trying to prevent 
Flake (Patrick Carroll) and Rush (Daniel Stewart Sherman) from carrying out 
their violent intentions, before weakly acquiescing.  The video call to his father 
is the first sign of the mental turmoil this decision has thrown him into, though 
he is seemingly dissuaded from reporting on his fellow soldiers by his father, who 
pointedly remarks ‘we don’t need another Abu Ghraib’.  McCoy’s next 
appearance is only inferred - in the You-Tube clip in which a disguised 
whistleblower exposes the crime, though keeps most of the specifics vague to 
avoid detection.  The audience has no way of confirming it is McCoy, as the 
individual’s face is obscured and their voice digitally altered, but assumes so due 
to his previous expression of guilt.  The frame surrounding this embedded clip 
blurs out much of the surrounding text, so unlike the security camera footage, 
the exact time and date is not discernable, but the past tense phrasing – ‘when I 
was stationed in the Middle East…’ - identifies the scene as occurring after the 
tour of duty has concluded.  However, the following scene, captioned ‘The 
criminal investigation of Cpl. McCoy 08/22/06’, is again dated, positioning it 
only two months after the attacks.  The video deposition dates - the second and 
third of September - similarly conform to the chronology, but as these scenes 
take place on the military base in Samarra, it is difficult to know what to make 
of the YouTube scene.  A further complication occurs at the very end of the 
film, when the CEN report, placed in-between the ‘criminal investigation’ 
segment and the depositions, reports on the story, even naming Flake as the 
focus of the investigation.   
In the scene immediately following the depositions - another YouTube-emulating 
segment in which a young angry girl rants about ‘just’ punishment for Flake 
(allowing the girl’s surviving family to torture him to death) while drawing 
comparison with the My Lai massacre in Vietnam - confirms that the story has, at 
least partially, been made public.  Which makes the penultimate segment - the 
home video of McCoy and his wife celebrating his safe return in a bar with 
friends who insist he share ‘a war story’, prompting a tearful breakdown and 
confession which is ignored by the bar patrons, who applaud his ‘heroism’ -     129 
difficult to comprehend.  There are two possibilities: one in which the 
whistleblower video occurs chronologically after the home video; the other in 
which the time line is irreconcilable.  Neither reading can be confirmed with any 
degree of certainty.  Whether this discrepancy disturbs the chronology or 
destroys it entirely, it foregrounds a more general element of the film’s 
structure.   
Throughout the film, the sharp disruptions to spatial unity caused by each edit 
deny cohesiveness and emphasise distancing techniques familiar from other 
forms of political cinema: for example, the multiple diegesis and narrative 
intransitivity recalls Peter Wollen’s cardinal virtues of counter cinema.
360  With 
every edit, the spectator must reorient themselves in time and space, and while 
sometimes the ordering of scenes is made clear (with the date watermarks, for 
example), at other times it is not.  The film offers no coherent viewpoint in time 
or space - who is assembling these sources? When? - and once this abstraction is 
understood, other scenes in the film invite scrutiny.  For example, Barrage (the 
French documentary), appears to be being shot concurrently with Salazar’s war 
diary, but aside from one reference by Salazar to Flake’s shooting of a pregnant 
woman whose car fails to stop at the checkpoint, an incident featured in the 
preceding Barrage segment, there is no way to confirm that these events are 
simultaneously unfolding - the documentary film crew are not referred to by the 
soldiers in any of the other segments, nor are they caught on camera in Salazar’s 
war diary.  Barrage, then, could be seen as representational, rather than part of 
the narrative: it evokes the constant tensions experienced by soldiers manning 
checkpoints such as the one at which McCoy, Salazar and Flake are stationed, 
without specifically showing events that are concurrent with the other 
segments.  This has precedent in news broadcasting, in the way that stock 
images are reused to illustrate multiple stories, such as Katy Parry’s example of 
photographs of Iraqi soldiers surrendering in 1991 being used in the Daily Mail to 
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illustrate reports of deserting Iraqi troops in the early stage of the 2003 
invasion.
361   
It also, more pertinently, echoes the abstract nature of the hypertext novel, 
where certain screens are summoned by cognitive association rather than causal 
progression and subsequently cannot be fixed in time or space.  The ‘space’ in 
which these Barrage segments occur is not disputed in Redacted - they are 
situated in the shared space of the checkpoint - but, I would argue their 
chronological position is disputable.  Furthermore, the repetition inherent in 
reading the hypertext novel is echoed in these scenes by the recurring score 
than accompanies each Barrage segment, which mocks the pomposity of empty 
artistry while emphasising repetition: both the repetitiveness of daily life for the 
soldiers, and the repetitiveness of the segments themselves.  Furthermore, as a 
classical piece of music, a degree of timelessness is suggested, arguably 
supporting a reading that connects the scenes through cognitive association 
(Barrage presents ‘a day in the life of a soldier’, which provides background 
information, if not quite justification, for their subsequent callousness) rather 
than causality. 
A final characteristic of the hypertext novel is instructive in this reading of 
Redacted.  Sometimes, the hyperlinks offered do not link to other sections of 
the hypertext novel, but to outside sources - excursions into the wider web.  The 
diegesis is opened up to the ‘real’ or secondary texts outside its diegesis, for any 
number of possible readings and creating any number of possible effects: for 
example, supporting the narrative’s verisimilitude through allusion to non-
fictions; or to suggest connections to theory, such as the node in Victory Garden 
which consists only of an extended quote from Donna Haraway’s ‘A Cyborg 
Manifesto’ that emphasises the notion that ‘we are living through a movement 
from an organic, industrial society to a polymorphous, information system’, a 
belief that clearly informs the structure of the hypertext novel.
362 
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The final segment of Redacted is the aforementioned montage of actual 
photographs showing men, women and children killed during the War on Terror, 
which are introduced as ‘Collateral Damage’.  Or at least that is the insinuation:  
Susan Sontag would note there is little that can be unequivocally stated about 
images which are neither contextualised nor captioned;
363 although, as Judith 
Butler addresses in her response to Sontag,  
Even the most transparent of documentary images is framed, and 
framed for a purpose, carrying that purpose within its frame and 
implementing that purpose through the frame.  If we take such a 
purpose to be interpretive, then it would appear that the photograph 
still interprets the reality that it registers… After all, the photograph 
does not merely refer to the acts of atrocity but also builds and 
confirms these acts for those who might name them as such.
364 
A disagreement between producer Eamonn Bowles and De Palma allows the 
photographs’ authenticity to be visually identifiable; much to De Palma’s 
chagrin, Bowles cited ‘untenable’ legal and ethical problems with showing 
images of the dead Iraqis, and so, in a somewhat ironic move, redacted the 
montage to partially obscure their faces.
365  Thus, when the final photograph in 
the sequence is shown - a staged, but disturbingly believable, shot of the actress 
who played the raped and murdered victim Farah (Zahra Zubaidi), lying in 
grotesque mortis – the lack of censorship exposes the illusion, making clear the 
fakery and recasting the others in a more authentically ‘real’ light.  This final 
transgression of the film’s diegesis and style - shifting from fictionalised 
performance to directly inserted (though manipulated) images of the real-world 
- ends the film with a final array of links, ones that centrifugally point outwards 
to the wider political issues, rather than centripetally back in on the film itself.  
The photographs have no accompanying captioning, and it would not be 
surprising if some were images from previous acts of violence, unrelated to the 
presence of US troops in Iraq in 2006.  But confirming this suspicion is not 
necessary: by including these images, ungrounded as they are in verifiable time 
or space, the film confirms its associative arrangement.   
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5.5  Conclusion 
The twenty-first century War on Terror is the first 
Internet war.
366 
-  Richard Stengel 
Ken Provencher writes of Redacted: 
Viewers acquainted with Iraq War documentaries, soldier’s camcorder 
footage, milblogs, YouTube, Al Jazeera, Sky News and Jihadis’ 
websites are in a position to confirm just how well Redacted has 
simulated those forms… What is missing from most of those sites, 
however, is a critical context; there is always the sense that no 
matter how spectacular or passionate the on-screen images and 
words, they represent only a fragment of truth.  Redacted is just as 
fragmented and frustrating: instead of filtering the morass of the Iraq 
War through the mono-aural voice of pure documentary, it is multi-
vocal and multi-visual - the impression of truth at twenty-four points 
of view a second.
367 
It is this impression of polyphony and the connecting principle between segments 
that most closely resembles the hyperlink and hypertext structures discussed 
above.  As Provencher observes, the film’s fragmentation frustrates attempts to 
reconcile its sources into a singular narrative voice; in evoking a diffuse media 
environment of partial insights and conflicting opinion, Redacted emulates a 
broad information network of news channels, blogs, video sites and more.  Yet 
this is contained within and restricted by the feature film format, the film’s 
emphatic anti-war agenda only styled as if the product of multiple sources or 
threads.   
In Hamlet on the Holodeck, Janet H. Murray offers a prior example of one 
medium emulating another: 
Decades before the invention of the motion picture camera, the prose 
fiction of the nineteenth century began to experiment with filmic 
techniques.  We can catch glimpses of the coming cinema in Emily 
Bronte’s complex use of flashback, in Dickens’ cross-cutting between 
intersecting stories, and in Tolstoy’s battlefield panoramas that 
dissolve into close-up vignettes of individual soldiers.  Though still 
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bound to the printed page, storytellers were already striving toward 
juxtapositions that were easier to manage with images than with 
words.
368 
The influence of hyperlinks, the Internet and the World Wide Web on cinema 
seems to present a similar process: globalisation as filtered through War on 
Terror discourse seems too complex a subject to convey using existing cinematic 
forms, requiring a new means of organising and understanding multiple plots.  
‘The Victorians had writers like Dickens to ease them through the technological 
revolutions of the industrial age’ Steven Johnson writes, ‘writers who built 
novelistic maps of the threatening new territory and the social relations it 
produced’.  He argues that the interface – rather than the novel – is the modern 
equivalent, offering a structural map or model of social relations.
369  In a simlar 
vein, Lev Manovich posits the database as ‘the key form of cultural expression 
of… the computer age’ – a collection of ‘individual items, with every item 
possessing the same significance as any other’.
370  While Manovich’s database 
structure dispenses with narrative entirely (‘database and narrative are natural 
enemies’, as he puts it)
371 it is possible to see traces of its non-sequential 
organisation in the examples discussed in this chapter, from hypertext novels to 
hyperlink cinema. 
Like the Commission Report’s attempts to convey multiple simultaneous plots in 
prose, Redacted draws comparison with the hyperlink’s structuring of the World 
Wide Web in its multiple perspectives and the hidden complexity of the 
connecting principles between them.  Its resulting organisation is used to narrate 
a complex event for which a more straightforward structure would have been 
insufficient.  Richard Stengel observed of the War on Terror, shortly following 
the invasion of Afghanistan:  
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This war has so many strands and there are so many things going on at 
once, it defies more linear mediums like print and television.  The 
web is infinite in its depth and its breadth.
372 
In Redacted, the War on Terror is represented by a narrative structure that 
denies a singular source and position (regardless of the filmmaker’s own didactic 
politics, at a structural level, the film suggests multiple positions).  The 
connections between segments emphasise association and patterns over 
comprehensible and reconcilable causality.  The War on Terror is thereby 
narrated through an appropriate structural format.  It is worth stressing that this 
form is not reserved solely for War on Terror narratives; other subjects and 
stories can be narrated in similar ways.  However, I have argued that, for a 
number of reasons (the virtual component of modern warfare, the associational 
rhetoric of the War on Terror metaframe), the navigation of networks via 
hyperlinks is particularly suited to transcoding the particular characteristics of 
the War on Terror, such as multiplicity and interconnectedness.    
As stated previously, Quart’s definition of hyperlink cinema is significantly 
broader than the one I have used, identifying multiple plots as a cornerstone 
feature.  It is this broader category of films that the next chapter will address.  
While I have argued that a film like Redacted is a more useful example of the 
hyperlink model in film due to its associational structure and irreconcilable 
chronology, multi-strand network narratives also possess certain structural 
features that make them open to associational, pattern-based interpretation.  
Of course, the multi-strand network structure is not new, nor unique to War on 
Terror narratives.  It has, however, acquired fresh inflections in the last decade 
– the most notable of which I have termed the cinematic Global Network 
Narrative. 
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6   The Global Network Narrative: ‘Web’ as 
organisational structure 
 
It might be said of Americans that, though they possess 
space, they do not have a sense of distance.
373 
-  Jean Baudrillard 
War is God’s way of teaching Americans geography.
374 
-  Ambrose Bierce 
 
The previous chapter argued for a more specific meaning for the term ‘hyperlink 
cinema’, which has elsewhere been uncritically applied to any film narrative 
with multiple plot-lines.  If the term was to have any critical weight, it had to 
more closely acknowledge its origins, by highlighting the associations of the 
hyperlink itself: non-linear, associational, non-spatial links that evoke a spatial 
network of nodes and paths.  This chapter will identify a related style of 
narrative organisation which has been utilised in the telling of War on Terror 
stories; one in which non-linearity is not the key trait (though it is sometimes 
utilised), but spatially-distanced protagonists located in different places across 
the globe.  I will describe such films as Global Network Narratives (hereafter, 
GNN), but this is not a simple exercise in nomenclature: I will link this relatively 
new narrative structure to the particular difficulties in narrating the War on 
Terror, drawing examples from Babel and Syriana amongst others.  The GNN, I 
will argue, cinematically transcodes many of the tendencies that inform the War 
on Terror’s rhetoric, as well as the multi-plot interconnections discussed in the 
previous chapter.  I hope to demonstrate how the associational-connections of 
the hyperlink inform the way plots in the GNN are interlinked, with moments of 
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more direct interaction between protagonists giving dramatic shape to the tele-
influence that characterises the global networks of contemporary geo-politics. 
It should be acknowledged at the outset that other texts utilise similar 
structures and characteristics (intensively detailed plots; multiple objects (or 
angles) of inquiry) without containing overt connections to the War on Terror in 
their content: for example, Traffic (Soderburgh, 2000), in which the drugs trade 
is dramatised at multiple levels (production, distribution, prosecution, use) using 
characters in multiple locations, and Mammoth (Moodysson, 2009), which locates 
its plots in the Philippines, Thailand and the US, dramatising issues related to 
migrant labour and the inequality of international trade.  Perhaps it is therefore 
more consistently accurate to consider the use of multiple, global plots as 
transcoding issues of globalisation more broadly.  If this broader relationship is 
accepted, then the War on Terror, as the US’s definitive geo-political narrative 
of the last decade, and those narratives directly relating to aspects of it, 
arguably constitute the most prominent iteration of this congruency, with the 
War on Terror metaframe enveloping most popular attempts to survey the 
effects of globalisation more broadly.   
6.1  Multi-strand narratives 
The multi-strand narrative in its simplest guise consists of multiple plotlines 
which are revealed to be connected in some way.  Sometimes this connection is 
immediately apparent, other times it is revealed gradually.  Grand Hotel stars 
Greta Garbo, Wallace Beery, Joan Crawford, John Barrymore and Lionel 
Barrymore, as, respectively, a fading ballerina, a beleaguered businessman, a 
lovelorn typist, a cash-strapped Baron and a neurotic hypochondriac, whose 
storylines frequently overlap in a kind of network of acquaintances.  The film’s 
title indicates the spatial parameters of these plots, with the titular 
establishment housing all the characters, bringing them into regular contact with 
one another.  Robert Altman’s celebrated ensemble films similarly contain 
multiple plots within a restricted location: for example, Nashville’s (1975) 
country music denizens; the loosely related lives of Short Cuts’ (1993) Angelinos; 
up to the country-house politics of Gosford Park (2001).  Other examples of this 
use of a restricted locale upon which multiple plots are mapped include 
Magnolia (Anderson, 1999) (which, like Short Cuts, takes place in LA); the     137 
London-set protagonists of Love Actually (Curtis, 2003); and the violent 
interactions of those resident in Sin City (Rodriguez, Miller, Tarantino, 2005)’s 
titular vice-ridden metropolis.   
Charles Ramirez Berg names this particular type of multi-strand narrative the 
Polyphonic Plot, marked by multiple protagonists occupying a single location.  
Berg’s taxonomy identifies multiple other iterations of the multi-strand 
narrative: the Hub and Spoke Plot, in which a specific repeated event is 
returned to and shown to affect otherwise separate storylines in turn (for 
example, 11:14 (Marcks, 2003), Lantana (Lawrence, 2001) or Go (Liman, 1999)); 
the Daisy Chain Plot, typified by Slacker (Linklater, 1990) and The Red Violin 
(Girard, 1998), in which there is no central protagonist, but instead a series of 
plots presented one at a time in a continuous chain; and the Repeated Event 
Plot, in which a single action is seen from multiple perspectives - Rashomon 
(Kurasawa, 1950) is the obvious example though the form has been more 
recently seen in One Night at McCool’s (Zwart, 2001) and Last Days (Van Sant, 
2005).
 375   
Geoff King suggests an industrial motive for the growing popularity of 
complicated narrative structures, arguing that the American independent 
feature often utilises novelty in order to differentiate itself in a market crowded 
with more aggressively promoted studio features.
376  Michael Z. Newman partly 
agrees, claiming that ‘complexity of storytelling in the past two decades of 
American film is a function in large part of the increasing prominence of the 
independent cinema movement’.
377  However, such complexity is increasingly 
utilised in studio features such as the ‘Repeated Event Plot’ Vantage Point 
(Travis, 2008) – which narrates the apparent assassination of the US President, a 
terrorist bombing, and an attack on a nearby hotel, all of which occur near-
simultaneously - suggesting that product differentiation in the independent 
sector is only one possible factor.   
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King offers further explanations, including a commitment to a kind of 
verisimilitude (he suggests that the multi-strand narrative comes ‘at least 
relatively closer to the dense complexity of real life’),
 378 or the prevalence of 
certain themes, such as loneliness and alienation: 
Characters are separated from one another in their lives, in many 
instances, as are the narrative components they inhabit.  Where 
narrative strands are brought together, relationships can be 
established in some cases… if not in others.
379 
King identifies this correlation between thematic content and narrative design in 
Short Cuts, Happiness (Solondz, 1998) and Magnolia, but to this list could be 
added Crash, Happy Endings and The Ice Storm (Lee, 1997) amongst others.  The 
latter explanations have the advantage of portability across different filmmaking 
practices, rather than being unconvincingly identified as specifically the reserve 
of ‘independent’ film production.   
Berg also suggests a number of factors relating to the multi-plot narrative’s 
popularity, many of which chime with the preceding chapters: ‘the fragmenting 
postmodern condition and its revolt against master narratives’; ‘the branched 
experience of surfing the net’ and ‘hypertext linking that allows users to create 
a personalised sequence of disparate types of artefacts that might include text, 
image, video and sound’.
380  Along with the conspiracy culture discussed in 
chapter four, these elements have already been argued as indicative of the way 
the War on Terror’s spatial organisation effects causality, and will be elaborated 
upon further in the Syriana case study.   
Finally, Ben Dickinson suggests that such narratives are inherently suited to 
politically-minded plots, comparing Cradle Will Rock (Robbins, 1999), a multi-
strand narrative involving union strikes, artistic censorship and the McCarthy 
witch hunts, and The Last Samurai (Zwick, 2003), a mono-plotted film about an 
American soldier finding redemption in events loosely based on the samurai’s 
Satsuma Rebellion in the 1870s.  In Cradle Will Rock: 
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The consequences of individual action are always shown to be social, 
and narrative is shown to be the product of decisions by individuals 
and organisations.  Whereas Captain Algren’s choice to join the 
samurai ultimately only makes a difference to him… in Cradle Will 
Rock a personal decision can affect countless others and each effect is 
shown onscreen.
381 
By this understanding, the multi-strand narrative is generally premised on cause-
and-effect, but one in which both causes and effects are multiple and diffuse.  
The structure of Cradle Will Rock expresses the broad social effects engendered 
by individual and group actions in a way that a narrative centred on a sole 
protagonist cannot.  This complex causality is certainly suggested in films like 
Babel and Syriana, with the added complexity of plots taking place at different 
locations across the globe.   
6.2  The GNN Effect: The Global Network Narrative 
Two hundred years ago Oliver Goldsmith said that if 
every time a man fired a gun in England, someone was 
killed in China, we should never hear of it and no one 
would bother very much about it.  All that is changed.  
We should hear about that murdered Chinaman almost 
at once… There has been a complete revolution in our 
relation to distances… Our interests and our activities 
interpenetrate more and more.  We are all consciously 
or unconsciously adapting ourselves to a single common 
world.
382 
-  H.G. Wells, 1938 
In the Global Network Narrative, a number of largely separate stories are shown 
to be connected.  The key difference between the GNN and the more broadly 
defined multi-strand narrative structure is scale: the stage on which they take 
place is notably larger than the likes of Cradle Will Rock.  For example, Babel 
has four main plotlines: the shooting of an American tourist in Morocco that 
sparks an international diplomatic row; the two children responsible for the 
shooting - a non-malicious accident - trying to avoid arrest; a Mexican nanny who 
runs into problems at the Mexican/American border; and a deaf Japanese girl 
coming to terms with the death of her mother and the terrors of dating.  By the 
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end, connections are drawn between all the plots: the Mexican nanny works for 
the American tourist, while the Japanese girl’s father gifted the gun used in the 
shooting to his guide (the shooters’ father) when on a hunting trip.   
In Berg’s Polyphonic Plot category, single locations – as specific as a single hotel 
or country house, or as vast as a city like Los Angeles or London – were key to 
ensuring coincidental interactions between characters; essentially, characters 
had to meet if their otherwise separate plots were to link up.  Mikhail Bakhtin, 
in his analysis of Greek romance, writes: 
In any meeting the temporal marker (‘at one and the same time’) is 
inseparable from the spatial maker (‘in one and the same place’).
383 
The ‘inseparable unity of time and space markers’, necessary for a meeting to 
take place, is integral to the Polyphonic Plot structure.  By restricting plots 
spatially, the opportunities for time-space intersections are maximised.  
In Babel, however, subjects are not spatially proximate; the network evoked is 
more complex.   Connections between characters no longer depend upon the 
inseparability of the temporal and spatial markers; the intersection of two 
plotlines occurs at a distance.  The intersection of the plots dramatises not 
coincidence and proximate relations, but the interlocked global relations of the 
twenty-first century, in which advances in technology have created a ‘factitious 
topology in which all the surfaces of the globe are directly present to one 
another’,
384 a structure reminiscent of the hyperlink navigation of the World 
Wide Web.  Furthermore, by shifting the locus of connection from chance to 
intricate web, the GNN echoes the conspiracy culture discussed in chapter five; 
the expectation on the part of the audience is that, even if not immediately 
apparent, connections will be revealed that are to some degree causal.  While 
the characters are indeed revealed to all be connected to the shooting, the 
narrative is not a Hub and Spoke-style plot of the type identified by Berg: the 
Japanese-based plot is connected to the others only tenuously, with Chieko 
Wataya (Rinko Kikuchi)’s grief unaffected by the events in Morocco – it brings 
her into contact with the young policeman she propositions, but otherwise the 
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incidents are not causally-linked in any simple way.  Yet their proximate 
positioning in the narrative suggests the existence of meaningful relationships. 
Stanley Milgram’s small-world hypothesis, popularly referred to as the ‘six-
degrees of separation’ that links any two individuals on the planet,
385 is the 
defining paradigm, both in the GNN and frequently more generally in discussions 
of global connectivity.
386  ‘The phrase “small world”’, Milgram co-wrote with 
Jeffrey Travers, ‘suggests that social networks are in some sense tightly woven, 
full of unexpected strands linking individuals seemingly far removed from one 
another in physical or social space’.
387  Not all links are direct but there is 
assumed to be a series of intermediaries, who together form an associative chain 
connecting one individual to another.
388  This belief in a mappable route of 
connections between any two individuals may be factually disputable, but as a 
rhetorical framework it evokes the complexities of an interconnected globe in a 
schematic way that, like the conspiracy culture discussed in four, can offer a 
degree of comfort.  The small-world hypothesis reassures by positing order and 
structure as antidotal to chaos and Babelic cacophony.  Moreover, it is premised 
upon stressing commonalities over difference, an emphasis that, like the 
hyperlink-based navigational system of the World Wide Web, has a bearing on its 
conceptualisation of space, as will be explored shortly. 
Attempting to map Syriana’s convoluted web of intersecting plots, intertwined 
through both causality and chance, will make these points clearer.  There are 
four main plots in Syriana, with eight characters whose mobility and roles bring 
them into contact (directly or at a distance) with one another: Bennett Holiday 
(Jeffrey Wright), Bob Barnes (George Clooney), Bryan Woodman (Matt Damon), 
Prince Nasir Al-Subaai (Alexander Siddig), Dean Whiting (Christopher Plummer), 
Jimmy Pope (Chris Cooper), Wasim Khan (Mazhar Munir) and Prince Meshal Al-
Subaai (Akbar Kurtha).  Holiday, an attorney, investigates the possible 
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corruption that is holding up a merger between two oil companies – Connex and 
Killeen; Woodward, an energy analyst, takes a job as adviser to the likely heir to 
the throne of a Middle Eastern country with vast oil reserves; Wasim, a young 
Pakistani living in the Persian Gulf, is recruited by radical jihadis; and Barnes, a 
CIA agent, is cut off from the agency following a botched assassination in Beirut.   
The connections between the eight characters that occupy these plots are 
numerous, and increase in number throughout the film’s running time.  While 
the interconnections are dauntingly complex, certain techniques help reconcile 
the various plot strands, in the process underscoring the sense of an underlying, 
mappable order; as the plots converge there is increasing use of sound bridges 
that carry across edits, connecting disparate spaces aurally and emphasising 
global connectivity.  By linking two distant spaces in this way, a network 
structure is emphasised. Without providing a detailed synopsis running to several 
pages, it is difficult to fully explain all these connections in the order they 
occur; therefore, Stephen Mamber’s ‘narrative mapping’ methodology is useful.  
Mamber argues that visually mapping a narrative provides the ability ‘to unpack, 
to deconstruct, to resequence’,
389 making it a ‘useful tool for dealing with 
complexity, ambiguity, density and information overload’.
390  A possible 
narrative map of Syriana’s principal characters might look something like this: 
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Fig. 6.1: Selected character connections in Syriana 
To explain this more fully, I will look at the links emanating from and leading to 
the most connected of these eight characters, Dean Whiting. 
Whiting is first shown hiring Holiday to investigate the possible corruption which 
is jeopardising the potential merger.  He is introduced as the evidently wealthy 
and powerful head of a firm of corporate attorneys.  His next appearance is in 
the affluent surroundings of a private members club, at which he discusses the 
investigation briefly with Holiday.  Both these meetings occur in the United 
States.  His third appearance occurs in France, aboard Prince Meshal’s boat, 
where he offers to assist the prince in becoming Emir over his more qualified 
(but less co-operative) brother, Prince Nasir.  This influence bars Prince Nasir 
from seeing his father later in the film, preventing the progressive, liberal 
leader-in-waiting from being appointed, and instead ensuring that the country 
remains governed by a US-friendly puppet.  His final scenes are instigated by 
Barnes, who learns through a loyal insider that Whiting was behind the order to 
assassinate Prince Nasir in Beirut, an order that Barnes would have carried out 
had he not been kidnapped and tortured by an old contact.  Whiting is woken by 
his security firm advising that an alarm has been tripped, which on inspection is 
shown to be due to an open, unlocked door.  Upon this discovery, Barnes calls 
and arranges to meet Whiting at a café, where he threatens to kill him if 
anything happens to his wife and son.   
Holiday 
 
Whiting  Wasim 
Woodman 
Meshal 
Nasir 
Barnes 
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Whiting then, is the closest the film has to a conspiratorial architect: he heads 
the law firm investigating the Connex-Killeen merger; he tries to use Barnes to 
assassinate Prince Nasir and he engineers the appointment of Nasir’s brother 
Mashal as the new Emir.  As well as direct connections to Barnes, Nasir, Holiday 
and Mashal, connections can be drawn to Woodward (employed by Nasir, they 
discuss Whiting’s nefarious influence over Meshal) and Pope (who works for 
Connex).  Even Wasim, whose story involves far fewer meetings and 
intersections than the plots involving the other characters, is linked to Whiting: 
the deal struck by Prince Nasir with the Chinese, the deal which denied Connex 
a lucrative contract and necessitated the merger, is the catalyst behind 
Whiting’s plot to kill Nasir and install Meshal as Emir.  After losing the contract, 
Connex fires all of its immigrant workers in the Persian Gulf – a work force that 
included Wasim and his father.  The frustration of poverty and unemployment 
are shown to be instrumental in the jihadi’s recruitment process, with the offer 
of food and support used to tempt Wasim to the school, and eventually, to his 
death in an act of terrorism.  So all characters in Syriana are, at most, two steps 
removed from Whiting, with the majority able to be linked in a single, direct 
line.  However, these connections, while complicatedly causal (such as the link 
between Whiting and Wasim), do not evidence some grand Machiavellian plot 
orchestrated by Whiting; his role has multiple links to others, but he is not a 
conspirator in the omniscient sense discussed in chapter four.  He is just one 
particularly well-connected node in the complicated network the film evokes.   
Because multiple lines of connection exist, the route between any two 
characters - for example, Holiday to Pope - can vary.  A direct route exists - 
Holiday meets with Pope in his corruption investigation – but one involving 
considerably more characters and intersections can also be traced – Holiday is 
hired by Whiting, who arranges the assassination of Nasir, who employs 
Woodman, who meets Barnes in a lift, who delivers the rocket launcher the 
jihadi recruiter shows Wasim, who is fired from Connex, who employ Pope.  As 
previously suggested, such a network is evocative of Milgram’s small-world 
hypothesis, while the multiple routes between characters are suggestive of the 
direct and indirect connections between nodes linked through the World Wide 
Web discussed in chapter five.     145 
It is worth noting that the above elucidation of Whiting’s interconnections, and 
the accompanying map of Syriana’s principal links, in some ways misrepresents 
the film’s structure as it is experienced during viewing, a potential limitation of 
the narrative mapping methodology proposed by Mamber.  A casual viewer does 
not take notes, and is not expected to view the text several times in order to 
clarify their hypotheses.
391  Treating the interconnections with absolute clarity is 
antithetical to the experience of watching the film, during which the 
connections seem deliberately unclear and designed to confuse.  What is evoked 
is the impression of a traceable (but hidden and complex) mass of 
interconnections, and not a firm revelation of the interconnections themselves.  
No single character has the objective, contextual perspective necessary to 
understand or explain it all; only the audience is in a position to spot the 
patterns, even if the complexity of the plot complicates the task. 
Some of these connections are not causal, but coincidental: the scene in which 
Barnes, Woodward and Nasir all occupy the same lift in Beirut is the clearest 
example of this.  While Barnes’ presence in Beirut is causally motivated by a 
direct connection to Nasir, the meeting in the lift is purely accidental.  It is 
interesting that the narrative, while fragmented and spread across multiple 
plots, is chronological and linear throughout, with only one exception.  At the 
conclusion, in which Barnes and Nasir’s paths cross for the second time, a 
flashback is shown of their original, chance meeting in the lift, a repetition that 
serves to emphasise the film’s most obviously accidental and coincidental 
meeting, imbuing it with a degree of prophetic meaning.  This meaning relates 
to Nasir’s moment of associative recognition; his cognitive retrieval of the prior 
event from memory suggests an associative indexing that temporarily interrupts 
the film’s linearity.  The two events are connected by Nasir’s recollection, not 
by their position in a causal chain.  It is an associative connection rather than a 
linear link, and is reminiscent of the organisation of plots in the hypertext novels 
discussed in chapter five.   
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6.3  Globo-Cop: US-centrism 
The more multifaceted and multilayered the picture of 
power…the more global it becomes.
392 
-  Peter Berglez     
A single voice ends nothing and resolves nothing.  Two 
voices is minimum for life, the minimum for 
existence.
393 
-  Mikhail Bakhtin 
According to the foregoing analysis, the canvas is larger and the connections less 
dependent upon physically proximate meetings in the GNN, reflecting the 
perceived geo-political effects of globalisation.  Peter Berglez has linked the 
perceived interconnectedness of globalisation with changes in journalistic 
practice thus: 
If globalisation is defined by ongoing relations between regions and 
peoples, generated by capital, trade, human mobility and technology, 
then global journalism ought to be the kind of journalistic practice 
which ‘makes it into an everyday routine to investigate how people 
and their actions, practices, problems, life conditions etc. in different 
parts of the world are interrelated’.
394 
Continuing the observation made in an earlier chapter that the War on Terror’s 
multi-form structure bears comparison to journalistic practice more generally, 
the GNN resembles this increasingly global form of journalism.  ‘Global 
journalism’, Berglez surmises, ‘concerns the journalistic representation of 
complex relations’.
395  This necessitates an altered cognitive process, one 
capable of comprehending vast complexities of hidden links, delayed cause and 
effect relationships, and pattern recognition, and capable of subsequently 
formulating an understanding of how ‘practices, processes and problems in 
different parts of the world affect each other, are interlocked, or share 
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commonalities’.
396  Berglez thereby identifies complexity – inherent to the 
conspiracy discourse discussed in chapter four – as crucial to attempts to survey 
the globe in news reportage.  The networked plots in a film like Babel, the very 
title of which foregrounds its engagement with polyvocal exchange, are 
therefore necessarily complicated: it is the structural form required to convey 
the ‘increasing connectedness, boundarylessness and mobility in the world’.
397   
Efforts to dramatise a global web have been identified in other, non networked 
texts: Andrew deWaard collates Syriana et al under the category ‘Global Social 
Problem Films’, or GSPs, alongside films like Blood Diamond and Munich 
(Spielberg, 2005), the contents of which share a preoccupation with the global 
‘web-of-life’ which ‘creates an expectation within the viewer for unforeseen 
relations and causal connections among the film’s disparate characters’.
398  
Steven Thomas, meanwhile, identifies a ‘globalisation thriller’ sub-genre that 
includes The International (Tykwer, 2009) and the most recent James Bond film, 
Quantum Of Solace (Foster, 2008),
399 while Kirsten Emiko McAllister writes of the 
‘geopolitical complicity drama’, in which ‘the role of democratic Western 
countries in geopolitical crises’ is the particular emphasis (cited examples 
include The Constant Gardner and, once again, Syriana).
400  None of these 
categorisations satisfactorily identifies the specific properties that I argue 
distinguish the GNN (associative indexing, multi-plots set across the globe, 
indirect connections) as a specific sub-category, but DeWaard, Thomas and 
McAllister’s work does help evidence a wider thematic preoccupation with these 
issues, in addition to the structural preoccupation currently under discussion.   
The 9/11 Commission Report articulated its own politically-charged version of 
the interconnected globe when it stated that ‘the American homeland is the 
planet’.
401  The imperial undertones of such a proclamation may prompt 
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discomfort, but in context the conclusion aimed at revising security priorities, 
rather than declaring all-encompassing sovereignty.  America, it was decided, 
could no longer concentrate its defence spending on missile systems and the 
like, since protecting its borders from a conventional long-range attack seemed 
no longer as likely as the type of attack suffered on September 11
th, 2001.   
Despite the practical motivation behind such a statement, it broadly echoes 
debates surrounding US national security and foreign policy that originated long 
before September 11
th.  ‘Reluctant Sherrif’,
402 ‘globocop’,
403 or, as Trey Parker 
and Matt Stone satirically put it, Team America: World Police (2004), are all, 
with varying degrees of seriousness, versions of the reorientation of America’s 
hegemonic position in international relations following the end of the Cold War.  
No longer occupied with fighting the influx of communism and holding its super-
power rival in a deterrent-based stalemate, commentators suggested new roles 
for the United States, many of which hinged upon utilising America’s unrivalled 
power to act judiciously and forcefully when called upon, a debate tested by a 
series of foreign interventions in the nineties.  The key concepts evoked in such 
discussions go further back still, to the Monroe Doctrine of 1823 (the 
proclamation by President James Monroe that any interference by European 
powers would be considered acts of aggression and met with intervention by the 
United States), and to the opposing foreign policy ideologies of Presidents 
Woodrow Wilson (Wilsonian Idealism – intervention as a way to spread ethnic 
self-determination and ‘freedom’) and Andrew Jackson (an isolationist 
privileging of domestic security and prosperity which treats prospective foreign 
intervention with caution) which continue to be evoked to characterise 
subsequent Presidential attitudes.
404  Where the ‘the American homeland is the 
planet’ statement conceptually differs is in its homogenising of the globe into a 
facet of America’s homeland, as opposed to suggesting a governing role for the 
US within the international arena.  The conclusion not only emphasises 
America’s pre-eminence in global politics, but renders the rest of the world 
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little more than a series of venues or provinces for America to battle its foes - 
the world is not only America’s homeland to defend, but America’s battleground 
on which to fight.  In this way it resembles long-standing arguments equating 
globalisation with American hegemony.  G. John Ikenberry notes that the fact 
that ‘American hegemony and economic globalisation are connected is not 
surprising’, since ‘economic relationships always bear the imprint of powerful 
states’,
405 but Alex Callinicos argues that there is an observable intensification of 
negative readings of this relationship in the last decade: 
The experience of the administration of George W. Bush, whose 
leading figures made no bones about their aim of entrenching US 
global primacy and their disdain for the constraints imposed by 
international institutions and coalition-building, has greatly reinforced 
the widespread perception of globalisation as a technique of American 
imperial rule.
406 
A film like Traitor (Nachmanoff, 2008) is typical of the way certain War on 
Terror narratives in film and television embed this perspective.  Traitor is not a 
GNN, but it takes place across a similarly broad global canvas; it follows only a 
small number of characters, who are all connected in a single plot that contains 
several branches, as opposed to multiple plots that are woven together.  Two 
FBI agents (Guy Pearce and Neal McDonough) pursue a terrorist suspect across 
the globe, unaware that the man in question, Samir Horn (Don Cheadle) is an 
undercover CIA agent, whose handler (Jeff Daniels) has kept all record of the 
operation hidden from others in the agency to ensure his cover is not blown.  
Samir uses the trust of a terrorist cell middleman (Said Taghmaoui) to infiltrate 
a group planning a large scale attack on American soil: the simultaneous 
explosion of fifty Greyhound buses across the American heartland.  During the 
film, the characters travel the globe: scenes are set in Sudan, France, the 
United Kingdom, the United States, Canada, and Yemen amongst others.  Yet 
the result is not a broad global cross-section, but an international thriller 
resembling the globe-trotting adventures of James Bond, Ethan Hunt and any 
number of American action heroes, suggesting the persistence of generic forms; 
just as certain films about Vietnam were seen to transplant World War 2-style 
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plots to a new setting (for example, The Green Berets (Kellogg and Wayne, 
1968), certain War on Terror texts simply adopt pre-existing narrative forms and 
convert them to a contemporary context.  In Traitor, the focus is squarely on 
the American FBI agents and the American CIA agents (even the Sudanese-born 
Horn, whose original nationality is used to provide an element of suspense early 
on when it is not clear to which side he is loyal, is later repeatedly defined by 
his American nationality and his service to his country).  The only non-Americans 
are the members of the terrorist cell - indicating that diversity and polyphony 
are not the film’s main aims.  A broad international network is evoked 
thematically in the extensive destinations, but these are merely locations for 
Americans to conduct their business. 
The multiple, spatially separated plots of the GNN offer a potential alternative 
to the US-centrism of a film like Traitor by imitating polyphonic dialogue in the 
Bakhtinian sense.  According to A.M. Sidorkin: 
For Bakhtin, truth is not a statement, a sentence or a phrase.  
Instead, truth is a number of mutually addressed albeit contradictory 
and logically inconsistent statements.  Truth needs multitude of 
bearing voices [sic].  It cannot be held within a single mind; it also 
cannot be expressed with a ‘single mouth’.  The polyphonic truth 
requires many simultaneous voices.
407 
This is not Bakhtin’s way of saying that knowledge is built up through shared 
information, each voice offering its own partial truth from which the larger truth 
is assembled.   It is: 
The fact of mutual addressivity, of engagement, and of commitments 
to the context of real-life event, that distinguishes truth from 
untruth.
408 
This polyphonic truth has its literary equivalent in the likes of Fyodor 
Dostoevsky, in which a narrative is constructed:  
not as the whole of a single consciousness, absorbing other 
consciousnesses as objects into itself, but as a whole formed by the 
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interaction of several consciousnesses, none of which entirely 
becomes an object for the other.
409 
The GNN, with its global settings and multiple plots, would seem the perfect 
vehicle for a cinematic manifestation of polyphonic literature, by allowing a 
semblance of multiple perspectives engaging dialectically.
410   
Despite the multi-plot structure’s potential for dramatised polyphony, however, 
the privileging of an US-centric perspective in the GNN is often no less obvious 
than in Traitor.  The three storylines of Lions for Lambs, for example, take 
place on both US coasts and in the mountains of Northern Afghanistan, but all 
speaking roles are American, and the differences evoked are ones of political 
opinion or profession, not nationality.  Berg defines the polyphonic-plot by the 
existence of multiple characters, ‘each of whom has an individual goal… none of 
[which is] the featured goal of the film, the narrative’s organising principle’.
411  
Both Lions for Lambs and Syriana are consistent with this trait; while certain 
characters are foregrounded, they do not entirely monopolise the screen time or 
singly dictate the overall plot.
412  However, if we consider Gerald Prince’s 
definition of the polyphonic ensemble-network film as ‘characterised by the 
interaction of several voices, consciousnesses, or world views, none of which 
unifies or is superior to (has more authority than) the others’,
413 Syriana, like 
Lions for Lambs, undermines its polyphony by emphasising its American 
characters over the others.  Its plots take place in Lebanon, Spain, France, Saudi 
Arabia, Switzerland and various locations in the United States, but despite these 
sundry settings, the overall focus is American: Matt Damon, Jeffrey Wright and 
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George Clooney share top-billing and the lion’s share of the screen time as an 
American energy-analyst, an American attorney and an American CIA agent 
respectively.  These are the only characters with back-stories largely unrelated 
to the main narrative, included to imply character depth rather than necessary 
plot information: Damon’s estrangement from his wife following the accidental 
death of their son; Wright’s relationship with his alcoholic father; Clooney’s 
troubled relationship with his ex-wife and son (the radicalized Pakistani youth 
Wasim (Munir) has several scenes with his father, who dreams of the mountains 
back home, but these are part of his storyline – his frustrations in the Persian 
Gulf are what lead him to the jihadist recruiters).  Other key characters - 
Alexander Siddig’s Arab leader, Mark Strong’s Lebanese torturer, Mazhar Munir’s 
radicalised Pakistani youth - are all to some degree defined by their relationship 
to particular Americans - Siddig to Damon, Strong to Clooney - or to America in 
general as a perceived oppressor, such as Wasim’s final act of terrorism against 
an American ship, which closely resembles the attack upon the USS Cole in 2000.  
Syriana’s US-centrism, partially disguised by its multiple-plot structure 
populated by numerous non-US characters is evident nonetheless in its US-bias. 
6.4  Space and place in the GNN 
The text of geography is not an innocent one.
414 
-  Shaun Irlam 
GNNs, as has already been suggested, feature storylines spread over a broad 
geography.  Lina Khatib’s study of cinematic depictions of the Middle East uses 
the Foucaultian logic that space and place are intricately implicated in power 
dynamics to examine the way US films code Middle Eastern spaces and places, 
concluding that ‘films can create space as well as deny it’.
415  By this logic, 
neither place nor space is fixed, but are cultural constructions, the meanings of 
which – borrowing from Henri Lefebvre – are ‘based on the social power 
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structure of the culture representing those meanings’.
416  In this formulation, 
space is ‘made up’ – socially produced, with ‘place’ a: 
particular form of space, one that is created through acts of naming 
as well as the distinctive activities and imaginings associated with 
particular social spaces.
417 
The coding of both space and place in the GNN is principally achieved through 
the concerted effects of mise en scene.  For example, Rendition narrates plots 
in Chicago, Washington D.C. and an unnamed North African country.  A 
coordinated colour palette is employed to ensure that the three places are 
easily distinguishable: Chicago is shot in warm, autumnal colours, Washington in 
blues and chrome, and North Africa in dusty browns and yellows.  These visually 
distinct colour schemes offer a short-hand delineation of place, allowing the 
viewer to swiftly reorient themselves each time an edit switches events from 
one location to another.  The sudden changes are made more easily 
comprehensible by the recognisable pattern that associates certain colours – as 
well as props, sounds and so on – with specific narrative threads.   
Editing in classical Hollywood practice has, of course, always been in part a 
method of eliding space and time.  However, in the GNN the distances that are 
being elided are not the journey up a flight of stairs or the movement through a 
doorway (to cite two of the more common continuity editing practices), but an 
elision of thousands of miles.  These separate places, although coded as distinct 
from one another, are brought into sequential contact by the editing.  In fact, 
scenes of travel are uncommon in the GNN format – even in Rendition, the very 
plot and title of which hinge upon the practice of secretly transporting prisoners 
around the world for detainment and alleged torture (a practice that itself 
demonstrates the global vectors of the War on Terror).  Despite the titular flight 
being integral to the plot, no scenes take place aboard the aeroplane (though 
this is arguably designed to evoke the disorientation experienced by sensory-
deprived captives, for whom the distances travelled would be difficult to 
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gauge).
418  Like the hyperlink’s instantaneous shift from one network node to 
another, the global network narrative makes transitions from place to place 
instantaneously, making distant places appear adjacent.  
These characteristics recall observations made in 1947 by the Russian filmmaker 
Vsevolod Pudovkin in his article ‘The Global Film’.  In particular, the implied 
omniscience offered by the camera’s traversal of the planet was traced to the 
combination of distant elements through montage rather than the apparatus 
itself: 
Actually, the camera lens never saw more than did the human eye; it 
was the creative unification on the screen of all that the camera could 
see in many scattered places - throughout the world, if you wished, 
and at any time - constructed into a vision as single and convincing as 
a landscape or portrait, that gave this picture of the true relationships 
of phenomena.  Before film existed no eye could see this, just as 
without the telescope no one saw the satellites or Jupiter, or as no 
one saw living cells before the existence of the electronic 
microscope.
419 
The combination of spatially-diverse plots, then, draws upon this capacity for 
cinema to collate multifarious places (or in the global network narrative, plots), 
and impose an ordered structure.  The difference, it seems, is that a ‘vision as 
single and convincing as a landscape or portrait’ is no longer the primary goal, 
but has been replaced by an evocation of the polyglottal. 
6.5  Distance 
Immanuel Kant wrote over 200 years ago that we are 
‘unavoidably side by side’… Since Kant, our mutual 
interconnectedness and vulnerability have grown 
rapidly…  In our world, it is not only the violent 
exception that links people together across borders; 
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the very nature of everyday problems and processes 
join people in multiple ways.
420  
-  David Held 
From now on speed is less useful in terms of getting 
around easily than in terms of seeing and conceiving 
more or less clearly.
421 
-  Paul Virilio 
The globe, I have argued, is not homogenised by the GNN.  The world is depicted 
as consisting of interlocking cultures, societies, individuals, and geographical 
spaces which retain their differences from one another.  Geography is preserved 
in the GNN, and with it current geo-political power dynamics.  What is absent, 
rather than separate places or spaces, is the impression of distance.  
Marshall McLuhan offered an early formulation of a technology-facilitated, 
distance-less world in the ‘global village’ that would ‘heighten human awareness 
of responsibility to an intense degree’,
 422 but his is by no means the extent of 
such debate.  ‘The world is flat’ according to Thomas Friedman;
423 the ‘death of 
distance’ will herald global peace suggests Frances Cairncross;
424 while 
economist Richard O’Brien is one of a number of thinkers to have declared the 
‘end of geography’.
425  These particular arguments are problematic at best, with 
Vincent Mosco criticising the common conflation of distance and geography – the 
former the ‘time it takes to get from one place to another’, the latter 
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representative of ‘the place itself’.
426  But they serve here to indicate the ways 
in which modern communication technology’s ability to connect spatially 
distance nodes instantaneously has been characterised as fundamentally altering 
geo-politics.  The connectivity they permit fosters telesthesia, or ‘perception at 
a distance’, which McKenzie Wark argues creates a ‘virtual geography’, in which 
things are not ‘bounded by rules of proximity, of “being there”’.
427  Wark 
recognises the lengthy history of the telesthetic effect, identifying the 
telescope, the telegraph, the telephone, television and telecommunications as 
instrumental in its development,
428 though the exponential growth of 
technological innovation in these and related fields makes the process of 
increasing importance.   
The GNNs follow a telesthetic organisational logic, based not on the physical 
movement of bodies through space, but on the virtual vectors of media 
technology.  Telesthesia is evoked by the editing together of disparate places, in 
a manner reminiscent of the attempts to map the World Wide Web discussed in 
chapter five (in which ‘space’ is no more than a convenient metaphor for 
contemplating the non-spatial ‘cyberspace’).  Clicking on a hyperlink appears to 
move the user from one virtual ‘place’ to another instantaneously, linking two 
dynamic pages which appear illusorily static on-screen; in a similar fashion, the 
GNN conjoins two geographically distant spaces through its editing, fixing a 
‘static’ identity on the spaces through visual short-hand, rather than 
acknowledging their ideological-construction.   
Paul Virilio notes the connection between visual observation and control in 
warfare by detailing the development of visual apparatus and the advantages 
they afforded in battle scenarios – from the advantage gained by finding high 
ground, to the telescope, to the satellite, sight is valued as a powerful form of 
control.
429  Michel Foucault similarly recognised the ability for sight to imprison 
and control, his notion of Jeremy Bentham’s panopticon as sociological 
                                         
426 Vincent Mosco, ‘Webs of Myth and Power: Connectivity and the New Computer Technopolis’ in 
Herman and Suriss (eds.) The World Wide Web and Contemporary Cultural Theory, p. 40 
427 McKenzie Wark, Virtual Geography: Living With Global Media Events (Indianapolis, IN: Indiana 
University Press, 1994), p. xvii 
428 Ibid, p. 43 
429 Virilio, War and Cinema     157 
metaphor premised on the subjugating effect of the unequal gaze.
430  The 
panoptical vision of the GNN, when anchored around a particularly Western 
perspective, seems to be an extension of this power dynamic.  It is telling that 
the roots of the Bush doctrine that drives the War on Terror are traceable to a 
document entitled Joint Vision 2020, written by the United States Department of 
Defense and released in May 2000.  In the report, the United States military 
mission is described as ‘full-spectrum dominance’, meaning the capability to 
defeat any adversary (multiple adversaries where necessary) by controlling ‘any 
situation across the range of military operations’, using metaphors of light (and, 
by extension, sight) to describe the proposed military supremacy.
431  Speed, 
immediacy and instantaneity are consciously evoked, themes which will be 
returned to in greater detail in later chapters. 
6.6  Conclusion 
The War on Terror is fundamentally ‘multiple’, a conclusion argued for in 
chapter three through discussion of the 9/11 attacks themselves and in chapter 
four by the conspiracy theories that surround it.  The interpretation of multiple 
plots depends upon particular types of cognitive activity, which chapter five 
argued draws upon information-processing skills utilised in hyperlink navigation.  
An emphasis is placed upon connections and links, an investigative imperative 
informed by a culture of conspiracy, underpinned by the suspicion that 
‘everything is connected’.  As a result of these factors, multiplicity and 
interconnectedness emerge as the key themes informing many of the first filmic 
narratives to depict the War on Terror directly, a group of films I have 
collectively termed Global Network Narratives.   
While Web-based hyperlink navigation has been argued to strongly inform the 
formation and interpretation of these narrative structures, another kind of 
media text, as yet unacknowledged in this thesis, also shares certain formal 
similarities with the GNN.  The British mini-series Traffik (Channel 4, 1989), the 
aforementioned US film adaptation of which arguably inaugurated the cinematic 
trend toward such narratives in the noughties, displays all the previously 
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identified hallmarks of the GNN, in particular multiple plots (a Pakistani poppy 
farmer becomes a drug lord’s chauffeur to feed his family; a politician in charge 
of British drug policy discovers his daughter is a heroin addict; and the wife of a 
German drug dealer attempts to restart his business following his arrest), which 
are edited between without the connections being immediately obvious or 
directly causal.  The characters are located in multiple global locations (United 
Kingdom, Germany, Pakistan) and the different locations are visually coded – 
something which Stephen Soderbergh’s film adaptation took further by applying 
coloured filters, so that a deep yellow hue was used for all scenes set in one 
part of the world, a washed-out blue for another and so on.
432   
Traffik’s writer, David Simon, said of the series’ structure:  
When you jump frequently between different countries and cultures… 
the world becomes smaller and more connected.  We realise that all 
our actions have consequences.
433 
That Traffik precedes the GNN in this conceptual realisation by a decade is 
suggestive.  It further diminishes the uniqueness of the GNN, and helps cast the 
War on Terror as one of many ‘global events’ dramatised through globally diffuse 
networks of cause and effect, as opposed to the unique, totemic event that its 
rhetoric argues for.  Secondly, and more interestingly, it suggests that television 
serials or mini-series lend themselves more comfortably to multi-thread 
narratives such as these.  With their large casts and rhizomatic plotlines, in 
which characters are connected in complex ways that complicate causal 
relations, the GNN therefore has more than a passing resemblance to the 
television serial, the primary focus of the next two chapters.   
Chapter seven will begin this exploration of the television War on Terror text by 
discussing 24.  In the process, I will shift attention from the spatially-multiple 
plots prevalent in the GNN, to a consideration of temporally-multiple plots, in 
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which spatial diversity is secondary to synchronicity, simultaneity and ‘liveness’.  
Jose Braganca De Miranda writes: 
Network media have created a new culture that is profoundly altering 
the millennial structure that articulated proximity with distance. For 
many, what now prevails is ‘immediacy’, the ‘time of the real’ or 
‘direct time’.
434 
Because of this apparent correlation, the emphasis in chapter seven will move 
from one vector– space – to its counterpart – time, using a ‘real-time’ text as its 
conduit. 
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7  ‘Events occur in real time’: The chronotopes of 
24  
 
Whilst the temporal organisation of the War on Terror has been addressed in the 
previous chapters to some extent (specifically the simultaneous unfolding of 
multiple, geographically separate plots in the Global Network Narrative), the 
emphasis has thus far been primarily on the spatial component of such 
narratives; how they organise space and evoke global networks.  Utilising Mikhail 
Bakhtin’s concept of the chronotope, I now intend to re-establish the equal 
importance of time in narrative organisation.  The chronotope is useful precisely 
because it privileges neither space nor time, but recognises their inseparability.  
The chronotope, Bakhtin writes is where ‘time… thickens, takes on flesh, 
becomes artistically viable; likewise, space becomes charged and responsible to 
the movements of time, plot and history’.
435  It is this combination of spatial and 
temporal vectors that makes time ‘palpable and visible’ and space ‘concrete’ 
and communicable.    
This chapter will move discussion beyond cinematic texts to focus upon the long-
running television serial 24.  Care will be taken to ensure that media specificity 
is not ignored or homogenised: film and television will not be uncritically 
conflated.  However, just as the associative organisation of the World Wide Web 
hyperlink was eventually incorporated into a discussion of multiple-plot films, 
over the next two chapters I intend to demonstrate how conclusions drawn from 
a study of the television sequential series can shed light on the narrative 
organisation of the cinematic Global Network Narrative.  In this way, it follows 
John Caldwell amongst others, in questioning assumed ‘essential differences’ 
between film and television.
436  
While illustrations of Bakhtin’s ‘chronotope’ can be provided by any and all texts 
to an extent, Sue Vice suggests that some texts present more fruitful objects of 
study than others - for example, texts which ‘adopt one of the forms where 
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relations between time and space are especially clear’.
437  24’s most prominent 
stylistic markers – particularly the digital clock motif and the split-screen – 
identify it as such a text.  Vice also observes that, while it is the 
interrelationship between time and space that constitutes the chronotope, one 
can take precedence over the other; for example, in ‘idyllic, pastoral 
chronotopes, space holds sway over time’.
438  In 24, by contrast, time arguably 
takes precedence over space.   
As Martin Flanagan notes, the ‘chronotope’ is a loosely-defined concept; even 
within Bakhtin’s own writing the term is ambiguously defined and conceptually 
fluid.  It is prone, Flanagan writes, to: 
mutation between three apparently distinct categories of meaning.  
The first sense… [demarcates] stable generic forms which are 
classified according to methods of representing time and space, such 
as the ‘folkloric chronotope’.  Secondly, the term can signify a more 
localised rendering of time and space within the diegesis.  Bakhtin 
refers to elements that fall into this second category as ‘chronotopic 
motifs’; for example, the motifs of ‘meeting’ or ‘the road’.
439 
The chronotopic arrangements that will be discussed in chapters eight and nine – 
the chronotope of clock-time, the chronotope of coexistence represented by the 
split-screen image, and the chronotope of meeting – largely occupy these two 
categories as either motifs (split-screen, meeting), or generic forms of a sort 
(the ‘real-time’ of clock-time).  The third category of meaning is a ‘chronotopic 
element in reading’: 
Here, B contends that the representational elements of the text 
emerge ‘[o]ut of the actual chronotopes of our world’.  It would thus 
seem possible to theorize a chronotope of reception, or at least a way 
in which real and represented time/space configurations are linked 
via the operations of chronotopes.
440 
This third essentially characterises the approach of these chapters in toto, which 
aim to identify not only the structural forms of the narratives under discussion, 
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but to establish connections to wider trends: modernity, technological progress 
and popular political rhetoric, for example.  In this chapter, this third way of 
interpreting Bakhtin’s concept will be used to suggest how the chronotopes of 24 
intersect with wider socio-historical context in which the text is produced and 
viewed.   
Flanagan notes Bakhtin’s own efforts to clarify the term in Forms of Chronotope 
in the Novel, defining it in the ‘Concluding Remarks’ as ‘the organizing centres 
for the fundamental narrative events of the novel […], the place where the knots 
of the narrative are tied and untied’.  In this expansion, Flanagan concludes: 
The integral role played by the chronotope within all levels of the text 
is underlined: chronotopes not only link disparate parts of narrative 
material together and play a part in the way in which we experience 
the text, but provide the very “ground essential for the showing-forth, 
the representability of events”.  Without chronotopes there would 
presumably be no narrative; for they make possible the combination 
of temporal and spatial co-ordinates that make narrative events 
“visible… [and] concrete, makes them take on flesh, causes blood to 
flow through their veins.”
441 
The conclusion ‘without chronotopes there would presumably be no narrative’ is 
important: if a narrative occupies and represents both space and time (which in 
audio-visual dramas like these, they always must do – even if that space and 
time is abstracted for narrative purposes), it utilises chronotopes.  But the 
ubiquity of the chronotope should not render it invisible – while all 
representations of space and time are necessarily chronotopic (the term itself 
literally translating as ‘time-space’), certain generic forms and motifs hold 
particular interest. 
7.1  24 and time 
With its first season airing in the United States a matter of weeks after the 
September 11
th attacks, and subsequent seasons dramatising contemporary 
political issues by promising storylines ‘ripped from today’s headlines’,
442 the 
relationship between 24 and the War on Terror metaframe is particularly close.  
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The real and the fictional have been frequently blurred in discussions of the 
show: in addition to the examples from chapter two - the depiction of torture 
cited by US Brigadier General Patrick Finnegan as an influential factor in the rise 
of prisoner abuse by American interrogators; star Kiefer Sutherland lecturing 
recruits at West Point on the subject of forceful coercion - former Justice 
Department lawyer John Yoo, author of the so-called ‘torture memos’, 
referenced the show’s fictional hero, CTU agent Jack Bauer, in his book War By 
Other Means, in order to paint a hypothetical ‘ticking-bomb’ scenario that would 
help argue for the use of torture.
443  QC Philippe Sands, meanwhile, claims that 
Bauer was a key inspiration in early ‘brainstorming meetings’ conducted by 
military officials at Guantanamo in September 2002.
444  Clearly 24 possesses 
surplus cultural meaning that extends beyond that of a simple entertainment 
product – it is consciously being cited as precedent in real-world legal arguments 
with potentially major ramifications in the Yoo example, and influencing 
interrogation protocols in the latter Guantanamo Bay example.
445  Likewise, the 
Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia blurs actual and virtual anti-terrorism, 
between ‘television and the Constitution’ when he asks ‘Jack Bauer saved Los 
Angeles… He saved hundreds of thousands of lives… Are you going to convict Jack 
Bauer?’
446  The logical response would be to point out the fictional nature of both 
threat and saviour in Scalia’s example, but regardless, the citing of 24 in a legal 
statement makes clear the show’s potential rhetorical value. 
Less controversially, 24 can be considered a central text in the first wave of War 
on Terror narratives due to its huge popularity, both critically and with 
audiences.  Lasting eight seasons, its success proved long-term, and spanned the 
entire political period in which ‘War on Terror’ rhetoric flourished.  Its 
representations and emphases have not been static, but have evolved over the 
seasons, with different emphases at different times.  For example, in season two 
(the first full season written after the September 11
th, 2001 attacks) the threat 
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comes from Middle Eastern terrorists, which Paul Woolf points out ‘coincided 
with the build-up to the predominantly Anglo-American invasion of Iraq and the 
ensuing conflict’.
447  By season five, the threat is the President himself, who 
knowingly puts the country at risk in order to start a conflict that would secure 
American oil interests in the Middle East – a shift that mimics the ever 
decreasing popularity of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan as well as the MIHOP 
(Making It Happen on Purpose) conspiracy theories discussed in chapter four.  
However, throughout its eight seasons, its narrative organisation of time has 
remained consistent.   
24 foregrounds its preoccupation with time in its title.  As Daniel Chamberlain 
and Scott Ruston observe, it is unusual for a mainstream American drama to 
make no reference to its content – whether it be the show’s main location (The 
West Wing [NBC, 1999-2006], E.R.[NBC, 1994-2009]), or its characters (The 
Sopranos [HBO, 1999-2007], House [Fox, 2004 – present]).
448  Even examples of 
more oblique titles which deviate from this tendency, such as Northern Exposure 
(CBS, 1990-1995) or Six Feet Under (HBO, 2001-2005), still give some indication 
of content (a New York doctor’s relocation to an eccentric Alaskan town and a 
family-run funeral parlour respectively).  Chamberlain and Ruston remark: 
Notably the show is not named CTU or Agent Bauer or any other 
subject, location or organisation-type name…[In 24] the emphasis of 
the title is on the narrative structure, the events of one day told one 
hour at a time.
449 
Immediate parallels with the rhetoric of the terrorist attacks of September 11
th, 
2001 suggest themselves.  Chapter one demonstrated how the abstraction ‘9/11’ 
came to signify those events, since the multiple, geographically-diverse nature 
of the attacks made a location-based signifier inappropriate.  Ina Rae Hark draws 
out the comparison: 
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This day was soon rendered numerically in many media reports: 9/11.  
In a somewhat similar fashion, the multiple terrorist operations in the 
Fox show all occur during one single day...
450 
The emphasis on time rather than location, character or content is echoed by 
the name of the company set up to produce the show: Real Time Productions.
451   
24, then, privileges time over place in its title, a privilege that extends into the 
opening moments of the first season: 
It begins with little flashes and fragments, quickly collecting into a 
bigger picture.  A sound strikes up: a clipped, rhythmic, repeated 
blip, like an electronic alarm clock chiming out seconds of time.  A 
pulse of yellow light follows: single dashes flashing and forming into 
an LCD whole, into a display of multiple, digital ‘8’s… [T]he style and 
type of the digits on display is precisely expressive of one of 24’s chief 
preoccupations: the ubiquitous presence of the digital clock and 
associated forms of technology; their possibilities and limitations; our 
reliance on computers to mark and inform our daily duties…
452 
From these opening seconds onwards, the programme emphasises its temporal 
organisation and key thematic concerns.  Further reminders of the show’s 
preoccupation with time occur throughout: the first dialogue spoken in every 
episode (after the obligatory ‘Previously on 24...’ reminder montage) is a voice-
over from star Kiefer Sutherland stating the temporal parameters for the 
impending episode (‘The following takes place between…’); the ‘ubiquitous’ 
digital clock recurs multiple times in each episode, leading into and out of every 
advert break and opening and closing each episode, even appearing during 
scenes on occasion.  In addition, a four-way split-screen is frequently used in 
conjunction with the digital clock motif following an advert break; the four 
screens appear in time with the aforementioned metronomic electronic pulse, 
visually punctuating each passing second and often appearing on screen in a 
clockwise movement (fig. 7.1). 
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Fig. 7.1: Clock-time in 24 
The clockwise appearance of the images visually mimics the hands of an 
analogue clock, while the central digital clock ticks off the seconds as they pass.   
From these examples it should be clear that 24 is not simply privileging ‘time’ in 
general as a metaphysical concept, but a particular formulation of time: clock-
time.  This is the first of 24’s distinct chronotopes – space and action is 
continuously subject to the mechanical and uniform progression of the seconds, 
minutes and hours that make up its twenty-four hours of plot, and such an 
arrangement is historically and socially significant.  Lest 24’s depiction of time 
appear matter-of-fact and natural, it is worth examining the genesis of – and 
alternatives to – clock time, in order to confirm its constructedness as a social 
concept rather than an essential, natural phenomenon. 
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7.2  The chronotope of clock-time 
In Empires of Time, Anthony Aveni acknowledges the links between the way 
time is measured and segmented in modern society and natural occurrences – a 
day relating to the time take for the earth to complete a full rotation, a year 
the time taken for the earth to rotate the sun (or, in pre-heliocentric cultures, 
the time take for heavenly bodies to complete their movement across the 
skies).
453  However, he also identifies the various fictions that simplify and 
organise such apparently planetary rhythms – for example, the fact that an 
actual solar year (the exact time taken for the earth to orbit the sun) is, on 
average, not a precise three-hundred and sixty-five days, but the less neat 
365.2422 days.
454  By noting the viability of alternative calendars in a Western 
context – for example, the three hundred and sixty-four day ‘World Calendar’ 
considered by the United Nations (which would make every January 1
st a Sunday, 
every February 1
st a Wednesday  and so on),
455 or the short-lived French 
Revolutionary calendar introduced in France in 1792 and used for fourteen years 
until Napoleon announced a return to the Gregorian system
456 – the 
constructedness of these apparently-essential divisions of time becomes clearer 
still.   
More pertinent to the current discussion of 24 and ‘real time’ are the smaller, 
constituent units that each day is split into.  Aveni states that ‘The minute and 
the second… are total figments of our imagination’.  Unlike the year and the 
month, which have at least some basis in nature (the year in the rotation of the 
earth around the sun; the month in the lunar cycle), these smaller units of time 
do not correspond with any external phenomena.
457  They are practical divisions 
that render time usable in certain ways.  Such an observation effectively 
disputes the essentiality of time as dividable into regular, uniform and well-
defined units.  Aveni cites the occasional need to add a second to official 
timekeeping records as evidence of natural time’s irregularity: if one were to 
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listen to an atomic clock counting off the seconds, Aveni suggests we would 
‘note days, like 31 December 1987, when an 86,401
st second was added, for now 
even the once supposed constancy of the rate of the earth’s rotation, the very 
day itself, has become anachronistic’.
458  These leap-seconds are necessary 
since, while atomic clocks boast phenomenally high levels of accuracy (if left 
running for thirty million years, the FOCS-1 in Switzerland would deviate only 
one second),
459 the earth’s rotation is not absolutely constant.  Such closely 
measured and divided time is therefore culturally-projected, rather than natural 
or essential.  In planetary time as in life, ‘running like clockwork’ is a 
manufactured, modern imposition, rather than a natural state.  
However, time is still experienced as regular by those living in modern societies, 
the universal synchronisation of experience advantageous to urbanisation, 
transport and industry.  Aveni notes how various early forms of time-keeping – 
such as gravity clocks (i.e. sand timers) and sundials – were of limited use when 
used to regulate labour: the former start out fast then start to run more slowly, 
the latter ‘do not keep equal hours because the shadow lengthens more rapidly 
in late afternoon’.
460  Furthermore: 
The hours drift in different parts of the year and in different 
locations…  Should people who work different shifts of different 
lengths be given the same pay?  Why should one person be required to 
start work earlier than another?  Or stay later?  Is it possible to adopt 
a reliable system of uniform hours?
461 
The answer to such questions came in the form of a ‘public time system’, 
developed and implemented by the late Middle Ages: a ‘work clock’ that ‘slowly 
began to dominate life’.
462  This method of marking time ‘was automated and 
unnatural; it was based on reason’.
463  In effect, time was abstracted and 
regimented to meet the demands of labour organisation. Such labour-led 
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organisation of time arguably reaches its apotheosis with the publication of 
Frederick W. Taylor’s The Principles of Scientific Management, which Ursula K. 
Heise describes as offering ‘a plan for the rationalisation and acceleration of 
industrial work by splitting it into small components of motion and determining 
the standard time for each’.
464  As nations became industrialised, the work clock 
expanded to encompass the nation, and when international trade and colonial 
expansion knitted together previously-separate locations across the globe, the 
‘work-clock’ became an international product, and standardised time was 
adopted on a near-universal level.
465  Stephen Kern cites July 1
st, 1913 as a key 
date in this development; the date of the first time signal transmitted around 
the world, which caused the ‘independence of local times… to collapse’.
466 
Once implemented and organized, World Standard Time divides and demarcates 
space, fulfilling the role of the chronotope: space is dissected by time.  Time 
zones, for example, hereafter function as a global reminder of the 
constructedness of clock-time, simplifying the process of adjusting clocks to fit 
new surroundings by dividing the planet into strips of shared time.  Ian R. Batsky 
concludes: 
Standard time… helps the citizen who telephones long distance, tunes 
to a TV station in a nearby city, dates a legal document, and travels 
between cities and towns.  Standard time has become our culture’s 
time.
467 [Emphasis added] 
It should now be clear that the term ‘real-time’ in the everyday sense (the sense 
in which it is used in 24, for example) equates to ‘clock time’; furthermore, 
there is nothing ‘real’ about clock-time as such, in so much as there is nothing 
essential or natural about the way in which modern societies ‘keep’ time.  While 
‘the hold the clock has upon Westerners cannot be understated’ (Aveni suggests 
the National Association of Watch and Clock collectors’ motto – ‘Time rules life’ 
– is a profound statement on modern society),
468 it is important to comprehend 
                                         
464 Ursula K. Heise, Chronoschisms: Time, Narrative and Postmodernism (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1997), p. 34 
465 Ibid, pp. 33-4 
466 Stephen Kern, The Culture of Time and Space 1880-1918 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1983), p. 14 
467 Ian R. Batsky, ‘The Adoption of Standard Time’ Technology and Culture 30.1 (1989), p. 27 
468 Aveni, Empires of Time, pp. 158-9     170 
both its artificiality, and the fact that its apparent necessity within modernity is 
fundamentally tied to industry and labour.  Workers may all be ‘regimented 
under the empires of time’, but the ‘time’ in question is not the natural, varying 
time of seasons changing or planetary rotations, but the so-called ‘real-time’ of 
the clock that counts down the seconds, minutes and hours of each day.  Randall 
Stevenson notes that soon the ‘ritual of “clocking-in” and “clocking-out” came 
to establish the beginning and end of each day’s work, the clock now exactly 
controlling each entry to and exit from the workplace’.
469 
24’s emphasis on the passing of clock-time and its links with labour is most 
apparent in the show’s efforts to present a complete ‘day’ of plot-time, a ‘day’ 
carefully divided into seconds, minutes and hours (the latter corresponding with 
the length of an episode), in which the time represented onscreen is equitable 
to the time experienced by the characters.  Each season consists of twenty-four 
episodes, with each leading directly and without interruption into the next.  
Together, the episodes combine to narrate the apparently complete events of a 
single twenty-four hour period.  While efforts are made to ensure the impression 
of ‘real-time’ (i.e. atomised clock-time) is as convincing as possible, it is 
necessarily illusory.  Each episode lasts around forty-two minutes, the rest of the 
hour taken up by scheduled advert breaks included during the show’s 
transmission.  In an echo of clock-time’s origins in markets, industry and 
commerce, the makers of 24 anticipate this concession to advertising by having 
the action ‘continue’ during each break, with missing minutes incorporated into 
the episode to give the impression that, even if the television network must 
intermittently pause the programme to bolster advertising revenue, the show’s 
characters never stop.  So while one section of narrative may conclude at, for 
example, 12:12:49, the next recommences at 12:17:12.  The effect, Slavoj Zizek 
suggests, is the illusion of: 
a live transmission [being] interrupted.  It is as if the continuity of 
action is so urgent that it cannot even be interrupted for 
advertisements.
470 
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With DVD box sets an increasingly popular way for viewers to watch television 
programmes, however, the illusion becomes somewhat strained – without the 
adverts, the plot lurches forward through time at regular intervals.  Similarly, 
the first two seasons were screened in the UK by the BBC, where they also 
proceeded without interruption.  However, the effect aimed for is that one 
minute of screen-time is equal to one minute of plot-time.  The plot unfolds 
chronologically and linearly, and, other than the aforementioned gaps dictated 
by advertising, no overt elliptical edits constrict the action.  As Jacqueline Furby 
puts it, ‘the exact time of the story action is therefore equal to the time it takes 
to view that action’.
471   
Furby goes on to define the terms screen-time, story-time and plot-time, 
distinctions worth reiterating here.  Screen-time refers literally to the amount of 
time taken to watch the text – in a feature film usually between eighty minutes 
and several hours.  Since the duration of an episode of 24 depends on the 
method of viewing – approximately forty-two minutes if watched from DVD or on 
the BBC, one hour when watched with advert breaks – I will add another 
categorical term to the taxonomy: broadcast-time.  So, the screen-time of an 
episode of 24 is forty two minutes, but the broadcast-time is one hour.
472   
Plot-time and story-time relate to the events depicted on screen.  The ‘story’ is 
the overall sequence of events represented, narrated or alluded to, while the 
‘plot’ is the sequence of events as ordered in the text itself; story-time and 
plot-time therefore refer to the duration of each of these respective 
continuums.  In 24, the plot-time, broadcast-time and story-time are designed to 
appear equal, though the latter is extended through back-story – for example, 
the first season’s story extends back to the mid-1990s, when Jack Bauer killed 
Victor Drazen’s family in the Balkans, prompting the revenge attempts that 
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dominate the plot-time.  In other texts, the distinction between the categories 
is clearer.  To use a GNN example discussed in the previous chapter, Babel’s 
story-time is several years, going back as far as the death of Chieko’s mother.  
The plot-time, by contrast, is only a matter of days, and its screen-time is one 
hundred and forty three minutes (broadcast screen-time does not apply to this 
cinematic text – unless, of course, the film is cut for television transmission, a 
possibility which underscores the potential similarities between televisual and 
cinematic texts that will be elaborated on in future chapters).  Furthermore, 
while story-time is a chronological sequence of events, plot-time can be 
temporally-manipulated: time can be expanded or condensed, events can be 
repeated, and the order of events can be switched.  While 24 eschews any 
obvious temporal manipulation of this sort, the importance of this distinction 
will become apparent when discussing other 24-related texts in chapter eight. 
7.3  Deadlines and duration: Time as a vector 
“I have to get Salazar in that chopper, in the air, in the 
next sixty seconds, or a hundred thousand people will 
die!” 
-  Jack Bauer, Season 3, (5pm-6pm) 
Jacqueline Furby notes examples of 24’s disguised manipulation of time, such as 
the impression of ‘multiplied time’ created by the presentation of ‘a variety of 
plotlines’ unfolding at once,
473 and the ease with which the characters 
apparently travel from place to place.
474  Despite these manipulations, she 
argues that time ‘feels real in that it has many characteristics in common with 
how we experience time as members of modern Western society, and how we 
feel the pressure of time in our everyday lives’.
475  The overall effect, she 
concludes, is that time in 24 appears: 
Hyper-real rather than real.  It is like the time we experience 
everyday in our relationship to external clock-time, but speeded up 
and multiplied.
476 
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For Furby, the pressure of time-running-out resembles an exaggerated version of 
the way time is experienced in contemporary society; the aforementioned 
‘clock-time’ where time is ‘somehow “owned” by the clock’.
477  But this needs 
qualification: while the standardised and structured time of modernity is indeed 
reflected in 24’s ‘real-time’, clock-time chronotope, it is a peculiarly tenseless 
iteration of clock-time based on duration and deadlines. 
When Paul Virilio claims that ‘the organisation of calendars and the 
measurement of time (clocks) have… presided over a vast chronopolitical 
regulation of human societies’,
478 the suggestion is that modern daily existence is 
structured and organised by temporal segmentation.  John Postill considers the 
relationship between social order and the organisation of time in similar terms: 
Clock and calendar time (CCT) is one of the West’s most successful 
exports.  It may not make the world go round, but it regulates 
(directly or indirectly) the daily rounds of most people, artifacts and 
representations across the world.  It is the invisible hand of market, 
state and civil society alike…
479 
The ‘perennial need of modern people to coordinate their actions with others 
within and across time-zones’ influences the actions and activities of 
individuals.
480  We act according to the time of day: meals are split into time-
specific periods (breakfast, lunch, dinner), we wake in the morning, sleep at 
night, relax in the evening, and so on.  Most importantly, in this scenario, we 
work during the day, with our daily labour subject to numerous other deadlines 
and ritualised routine.  Obviously these examples are not absolute, fixed or 
universal, but they are generally accepted as the norm. 
Time in 24, in comparison, is peculiarly fluid: the clock is omnipresent and 
compels the action, but the emphasis is on deadlines based on duration rather 
than specific times of day invested with particular meaning.  Attacks must be 
thwarted within the hour; nuclear meltdowns must be averted within twenty 
minutes; technicians have a maximum of two minutes to re-position satellites, 
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and so on.  In this sense, 24 echoes classical Hollywood narratives; as David 
Bordwell notes, ‘appointments and deadlines have long served to organise a 
film’s overall time scheme’.
481  Screenwriters use the term ‘ticking clock’ to 
describe certain techniques used to ratchet tension in the final act, usually by 
emphasising urgent impending deadlines.  24 amplifies this convention by making 
its deadlines constant and pervasive.   
But although 24’s protagonists are ruled by the ‘glare of liquid crystal’,
482 with 
specific times asserted and re-asserted through the regularly-appearing on-
screen digital clock, particular times lack particular cultural inscription.  Its 
protagonists do not eat or sleep or relax: whether 4:00am or 6:00pm (the show, 
oddly, does not use the twenty-four hour clock due to concerns that it might 
confuse American audiences)
483 the only directive is the fight against terror 
threats.  In 24, time is a vector: it has both duration and direction (sagittal and 
chronological) but does not carry further structured social significance.  
Completing a task in a set time period is essential – for example in season four, 
episode seventeen, when Jack must locate and retrieve the ‘nuclear football’ (a 
briefcase containing all of the United States’ military codes) from the wreckage 
of the downed Air Force One before the terrorists do – but the task could as 
easily take place in the dead of night as the middle of the day (as it happens, 
this particular challenge occurs between eleven pm and midnight).  Even the 
start and end times of each season eschew any obvious pattern: while five of the 
eight seasons begin between 6:00am and 8:00am, the others start at midnight 
(season one), 1:00pm (season three) and 4:00pm (season eight).  The implication 
is that threats can begin and end at any time of day: the terrorists are not 
working recognisable shift patterns.  In this respect, 24’s format mimics the 
pervasive rhetoric of the War on Terror as a whole - danger permeates every 
second of the day, ensuring that threats and conspiracies are feared all the 
time.  Furthermore, it draws upon clock-time’s origins in the organisation of 
labour: the professionals of 24 are always working, always active and responsive 
to the demands of the ticking clock. 
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Moreover, 24 demonstrates its preoccupation with artificial, atomistic units 
(seconds, minutes, hours), as opposed to natural-time, by frequently making 
night and day indistinguishable.  While, in keeping with the ‘real-time’ conceit, 
day progresses into night and night into day over the course of a full season, the 
progression is infrequently acknowledged: 24’s mise-en-scène is usually 
dominated by the artificial light of windowless government facilities and 
underground hide-outs, night and day indistinguishable under phosphorescent 
bulbs.  In effect, both 3pm and 3am, for example, are rendered equivalent 
through dark interiors and deadline-based activities. 
7.4  The perpetual present 
“You better shoot me or help me but decide now!” 
-  Jack Bauer, Season one (3am - 4am) 
While the frequent appearance of the clock in 24 makes constant reference to 
specific times (even if these specific times matter only in so much as they relate 
to impending deadlines), it is notable that no further temporal markers are 
offered.  The very first season specified the date only as ‘the day of the 
California Presidential primaries’, with no month or year.  Subsequent seasons 
are similarly non-specific in their year, with each season referred to as Day 2, 
Day 3 and so on.  Furthermore, a season inevitably spans more than one calendar 
day – for example, if its first episode identifies the time as 4:00pm (as is the 
case in the final season, Day 8), then the plot-time will pass midnight by the end 
of the eighth episode and enter a new calendar day.  Yet the twenty-four 
episodes are together labeled ‘Day 8’.  A ‘day’ in 24, therefore, is simply 
twenty-four consecutive hours – a vector of fixed length untethered to particular 
beginning or end points.  While the minutes and hours are marked incessantly, 
the programme does not register the passing of calenderial days as precisely – or 
indeed, at all.  This is a definitively modern definition of a ‘day’ – a unit no 
longer premised on the movements of the sun, only on the mechanical passing of 
atomised, measured time. 
In attempts to fix dates to 24’s narrative, websites such as 24.wikia.com have 
compiled carefully cross-referenced timelines using ‘clues’ in the programme – 
for example, the existence of the United States Department of Homeland     176 
Security in President David Palmer’s administration in the second season dates it 
to after the terrorist attacks of September 11
th, 2001 (the department of 
Homeland Security was established in November 2002), while a poster of 
Coldplay’s debut album ‘Parachutes’ in Kim Bauer’s room in season one would 
date the first season to late 2001 (roughly in line with its transmission date).
484  
These act as markers by which other events can be dated – if Day 1 takes place 
in mid-2001, then Day 2 must take place in 2003 (we are informed that the first 
two seasons are separated by approximately eighteen months of story-time), and 
so on – a process that would date the final season to circa 2017.  But these are 
tentative conjectures based on miniscule evidence; in general, the seasons of 24 
are not given a specific year or month.  Like the individual time-pressured tasks, 
each twenty-four hour period as covered by a season is a vector; it does not 
correspond to a particular, recognised date.   
24’s creators confirm this.  When a journalist visiting the set pointed out that 
the phone displays in CTU claim the date to be 23
rd January, 2012, the show’s 
executive producer responded:  
“They’re technically correct, but they’re emotionally and narratively 
incorrect, so they get to argue by putting it on the phone”, executive 
producer Howard Gordon says, referring to the show’s chronologically 
obsessed set designers… Katz adds, “At a certain point we’d added up 
the years that spanned the series, but we’re not really doing a show in 
the future.  We’re in the perpetual now.”  The last word on the 
subject comes from the show’s Emmy-winning director/producer Jon 
Cassar, who points out, “We avoid dates.  You’ll never see a date on 
our show ever.”
485 
This insistence on an absence of dates recalls John McTaggart’s influential 
categories of time – the A-series and the B-series.  Without delving too deeply 
into McTaggart’s argument, the two formulations of time can be summarised 
thus.  Concepts such as ‘past’, ‘present’ and ‘future’ belong to the A-series – 
they depend upon an understanding of time as a flow in which events that are 
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future become present, and then become past.
486  Time in the A-series is thus 
subjective: as I write now, 1941 is seventy years in the past, while 2111 is one 
hundred years in the future.  To McTaggart, at the time of writing in 1908, both 
1941 and 2111 were future, while a future generation will consider both 1941 
and 2111 to be past.  However, by using dates to exemplify the A-series, I am 
already necessarily adopting the B-series. 
The B-series organizes events in terms of being ‘earlier’ or ‘later’ in relation to 
one another.
487  1940 is earlier than 2110; this fact is independent of any 
individual subjectivity.   The B-series expresses the relationship between the 
two events as an equation of sorts, and as such, in the B-series, neither 1940 nor 
2110 is ‘past’, or ‘present’, or ‘future’.  They are simply earlier or later than 
one another.  Even if I introduce my own moment of writing, 2010, all three 
dates remain tenseless in the B-series – 1940 is earlier than 2010, while 2110 is 
later.  Now is not a moment that is reconcilable in the tenseless B-series without 
recourse to the tensed A-series. 
McTaggart used these distinctive categories of time to argue the existence of an 
impossible paradox: every event must exemplify all three stages of the A-series – 
pastness, presentness and futurity – but since no event can be all three at once, 
the A-series – and therefore time itself – does not exist.
488  I am not interested in 
debating the validity of McTaggart’s logic; I evoke the A- and B- series with more 
modest aims.  I wish to suggest that, since 24 is dateless, it exists only in the A-
series of past, present and future, which produces certain ideological effects.  
By existing so forcefully in the present tense – with urgent deadlines in the 
(rapidly encroaching) future and concluded events firmly in the past, 24 
privileges the present over all else, producing a subjective, ahistorical, and, to 
borrow a term from Fredric Jameson, ‘depthless’ formulation of time.   
It should be acknowledged that, as a fiction, 24 is not, however, strictly subject 
to the rules of the A- and B-series of time outlined by McTaggart, a distinction 
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that potentially troubles the conclusion above.  As Gregory Currie observes, 
McTaggart himself noted this objection: 
The objection is based on the claim that fictional time series possess 
B- but not A-series properties: I cannot judge the events of a fiction to 
be past, present or future, but I can say that one of them occurred 
before the other.  McTaggert replies, first, that fictions are non-
existents and so not in time at all, for only what exists can be in time.  
He then acknowledges that we can contemplate the events of a 
fiction ‘as if they really happened’, but says that if we do so 
contemplate them, we must contemplate them as located in the A as 
well as in the B series.
489   
So although we understand the events of a fiction like 24 to, overall, be ordered 
in the B-series of time (episode four occurs before episode fourteen but after 
episode two), at the moment of viewing we experience them as if they are 
occurring in the A-series.  As well as occurring in the perpetual now, the fiction 
is experienced by the viewer in their perceptual now.  So 24’s events and 
episodes are relative to one another, but as the fiction is at great pains to 
stress, they are also relative to the experiential present: a voiceover from star 
Keifer Sutherland which introduced each episode of the first season included the 
words (or slight variations thereof):   
Right now, terrorists are planning to assassinate a presidential 
candidate.  My wife and daughter have been kidnapped…and people 
that I work with may be involved in both.  I’m Federal Agent Jack 
Bauer, and today is the longest day of my life. [emphasis added] 
Each subsequent season of 24 similarly begins in what is identified as the 
present, just as each second of the show takes place in the ‘relentless present 
tense’.  The only reference to the past tense in the above introduction (‘my wife 
and daughter have been kidnapped’) is used to emphasise the ongoing nature of 
the threat – they have been kidnapped, and remain that way; now Jack must 
save them.  The programme is designed to resemble a constant stream of 
‘nows’, which each episode resumes week-on-week.  As each episode concludes 
with a cliffhanger designed to lure its audience back the following week, the 
episode which follows, by continuing immediately and without interruption after 
the conclusion of the last, invariably begins in media res.  The action is always 
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already underway, the clock always already ticking and the threat always 
already looming large.  This goes for both scenes within an episode, and for the 
relationship between one episode and the next. 
Individual scenes are also usually already underway when the narrative alights 
upon them, supporting the previously outlined illusion that ‘time continues’ for 
the characters and their various plights/missions/plots regardless of whether the 
audience is witnessing them.  When an edit shifts from one location to another, 
the new scene is not interpreted as parallel (the sideways move implied by 
classical cross-cutting editing) but as consecutive – only the use of split-screen 
indicates parallel, simultaneous action.  In effect, a switch from one location to 
another in 24 does not quite evoke simultaneity, since the forward progression 
of time, symbolised by the seconds whose passing is routinely marked by the 
digital clock display, is never paused or rewound; the relationship between one 
scene and the next is not ‘meanwhile’, but ‘then’.  In Visible Fictions, John Ellis 
described the soap opera as a ‘slow history always in the immediate present’.
490  
24 is similarly endlessly ‘present’, but its sense of time never runs slow – nor 
does it stop, skip or reverse its direction. 
Ellis also observes how broadcast television more generally suggests its own 
sense of existing in the perpetual present: 
Broadcast TV declares itself as being in the present tense… The tight 
scheduling that is favoured by most large broadcast operations means 
that an audience wanting to see a particular programme had to be 
present at a very precise time, or they miss it.  This increases the 
sense that broadcast TV is of the specific present moment.  In 
addition, unlike cinema, the signal comes from elsewhere and can be 
sent live… The broadcast signal is always available during almost all 
normal waking hours.  It is ever-present.
491 
The ever-presence of the television signal fosters a certain relationship between 
text and viewer that is distinct from that of cinema-goer and film, continuing as 
it does ‘whether a particular set is turned on or not’.
492  In effect, the TV event 
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is always ‘just there’.
493  24’s in medias res scenes share this sense of being ‘just 
there’ – they appear to continue even when, as previously noted, the programme 
itself makes way for advertising.
494 
This is suggestive of Misha Kavka and Amy West’s work on the temporality of 
reality television.  Kavka and West write: 
Dates are anathema to Reality TV.  As markers of historical time, 
dates have a distancing, objectifying effect.  Instead of dates and 
years, Reality TV counts hours, minutes and seconds, setting 
participants against deadlines, insisting on time in its smallest 
parameters.
495 
Time in reality television, they argue, is regimented but ahistorical – ‘a 
performance of the present linked with a decontextualising of the past’.
496  It 
operates on its own vector-based deadlines (one week to complete a task; two 
episodes until a contestant is knocked out of the competition; an indeterminate 
amount of time to turn a failing enterprise around) without reference to 
historical time.  Kavka and West imply that, where historical-time distances the 
viewer, the ‘perpetual now’ of television invites closeness.  This suggests a 
further political effect of the ‘perpetual now’ in 24 – events are not only urgent, 
but proximate.  The proceedings are without date, and therefore resist 
becoming dated; the threat is eternally contemporary.   
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Kavka and West proceed to relate this to more general conceptualisations of 
television, such as Stephen Heath’s ‘now this-ness’,
497 implying that ahistorical 
time is a particularly televisual temporal register.  They conclude that reality 
television’s ahistorical time ‘creates immediacy by resuscitating the feeling of 
“liveness” inherent in the medium of television’.
498  This sense of live-ness will 
be returned to in chapter nine. 
7.5  ‘Elsewhere on 24…’: 24’s split screen as chronotopes of 
coexistence 
In addition to the clock motif, 24’s other key visual motif is its use of ‘split-
screen’, which I identify as a single frame with internal divisions – multiple 
boxed images within a fixed frame (namely that of the viewing device itself, e.g. 
the television).  Split-screen is utilised consistently to create a specific 
arrangement of time and space, one which visualises simultaneous coexistence.  
This is a less omnipresent chronotope than the clock-time chronotope – it is a 
chronotopic motif that occurs at frequent intervals, rather than a constant 
chronotope of genre as in the case of clock-based ‘real-time’ – but one used 
extensively and consistently.  Through the separation of the screen into multiple 
boxes, the viewer finds him or her self observing multiple locations at once, and 
understands these events to be occurring simultaneously.  Some have 
interpreted this as exemplary of John Caldwell’s notion of ‘videographic 
televisuality’, with Daniel Chamberlain and Scott Ruston writing: 
Often in the four and five frame sequences, two of the frames show 
the same scene… from different camera angles…, an arrangement that 
offers little additional narrational or character information, instead 
serving only to emphasise the extreme videographic style of the 
programme.
499 
In this formulation, the splitting of the screen into multiple images is aesthetic 
rather than structural, and unequivocally televisual.   
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Peacock argues, however, that split-screen is integral to the show’s format, 
taking issue with Rob White’s suggestion in Sight and Sound that ‘the visual 
techniques in 24 – particularly the use of split-screen – are purely functional, 
subservient to the onward rush of the story’:
500 
The technique does more than contribute to the ‘rush’ of the story: it 
is the story… The use of split screen allows 24 to connect disparate 
spaces, places and characters in the same frame, at the same time.  
This effect reinforces the sense of the scenarios’ simultaneity.  It 
bolsters the programme’s use of real-time, declaring that all these 
events are happening at precisely the same time, are happening 
now…
501 
The real-time narrative conceit and the split-screen aesthetic motif are in this 
reading inseparable, together creating the illusion of simultaneity and 
multiplicity.  Both co-constitute a particular chronotopic arrangement: the ‘real-
time’ narrative implies non-reversible, linear clock-time, while the split-screen 
images implies multiple synchronous places adhering to said clock-time, with all 
events unfolding simultaneously.  While the GNN evoked a similar simultaneity of 
plots without recourse to split-screens, 24’s ‘onward rush’ and serial 
fragmentation necessitates more frequent reminders of the story’s always co-
existent multiple ‘nows’, which the plot selects from and foregrounds at various 
moments.  The phenomenological awareness of myriad, parallel and 
simultaneous ‘nows’ is, Stephanie Marriott suggests, an awareness produced by 
instantaneous communication and transmission: 
By making it possible to ‘be in two places at once’, electronic 
communication allowed its participants to experience reality as a 
multiplicity of disparate events, each of which was unfolding in a 
present moment which was simultaneous with the now of their own 
private time.
502 
Echoing familiar arguments surrounding technology’s ability, in tandem with the 
ideological influence of globalisation, to constrict distance and bring far-flung 
locations into the immediate proximity of the individual without incurring a 
journey, Marriott states that: 
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The capacity of electronic communication to render the distant 
proximate - to bring what is beyond the boundaries of my perceptual 
field into my immediate vicinity - is dependent on two interrelated 
factors.  The first of these has to do with the speed of transmission.  
Electronic forms of communication are instantaneous or near-
instantaneous.
503 
She concludes: 
Machines could not, however, deliver instantaneity were the world 
not the way it is and were we not to experience it the way we do.  
Instantaneity - coincidence of transmission and reception - is 
predicated, in turn, on simultaneity.  Put simply, all localities co-exist 
in the same present moment; all elsewheres are at once. 
504 
An important distinction is being made.  This is not simply the familiar 
lament/celebration of the ‘death of distance’ – to Marriott, it is not so important 
that all places are brought into the same experiential space, but that we are 
made aware that all ‘elsewheres’ unfold simultaneously.  The split-screen of 24 
allows multiple ‘elsewheres’ to be displayed together, all visible in the viewer’s 
phenomenological ‘now’.   
The instantaneity of electronic telecommunications facilitates this awareness of 
the interconnectedness of the planet: 
It is just precisely this simultaneity of elsewheres which permits the 
complex connectivity which the instantaneity of electronic interaction 
brings in its wake.  By switching on my computer, television or radio, 
by calling someone on a phone, I can instantly avail myself of an 
interaction with one of an apparent infinity of other localities, each of 
them transpiring precisely in tandem with my own.
505 
At a global level, this awareness is manifest in various understandings of 
globalisation, Marriott quoting Stephen Kern’s argument that we conceive of the 
modern world: 
                                         
503 Ibid, p. 27 
504 Ibid, p. 27 
505 Ibid, p. 30     184 
As an apparently endless series of simultaneous elsewheres whose 
unfolding events may impinge upon and affect to a greater or lesser 
degree what is transpiring in our own locales.
506   
The phantom capital of global markets and the displacement of production – 
companies no longer tethered in space but free to establish themselves 
wherever in the world offers the greatest incentives – are examples of the way 
in which instantaneous communication allows spatially-distant, and once 
temporally-distant, ‘elsewheres’ to exert influence remotely, increasing what 
Donald Janelle terms ‘human extensibility’.
507 
Marriott is careful not to suggest that electronic communication produces 
simultaneity, only that it enables its perception. ‘Always and at all moments’, 
she writes, ‘innumerable sequences of events are transpiring in places remote 
from our own, whether we are aware of them or not’.
508  24’s split-screen 
visualises this by showing two or more (remote) places at once, evoking 
apparently simultaneous ‘elsewheres’.   
There is, however, a tension between the split-screen’s evocation of multiple 
synchronous ‘elsewheres’ and the efforts made to appear structurally ‘real-
time’.  The former visualises simultaneity, while the latter is forcefully focused 
on the ‘and then-ness’ of sequence.  The sequential and the simultaneous are 
two distinct (though compatible) temporal arrangements, which are toggled 
between in 24.  The use of split-screen following the gaps left for advertising 
breaks – where the various contemporaneous plots are displayed together, 
constitutes a narrative ‘knot’, a chronotope of coexistence.  Rather than forcing 
time to effectively ‘stand still’ as we shift back and forth between 
contemporaneous action, 24 uses the split-screen to punctuate the constantly 
progressing chronological sequence of events, providing small moments in which 
to take stock of the various parallel occurrences, without interrupting the 
continually unfolding clock-based real-time. 
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By comparing the consistency of 24’s use of split-screen to another, aesthetically 
similar text, the peculiarity of such a singular tie between technique and effect 
reveals itself.  Conversations With Other Women (Canosa, 2005) narrates its plot 
– a man and a woman meet at a wedding and sleep together – entirely in split-
screen.  The frame is bisected, with each principle character, for the most part, 
occupying one half of the image.  Since they spend much of the film in 
conversation with one another, this echoes the long-standing use of split-screen 
to show both sides of a telephone conversation (dating back as early as Are You 
There? (Williamson, 1902)), except in this case both parties occupy the same 
proximate environment.
509  However, the divided frame has other uses: it is also 
used to display flashbacks (to their first meeting), or possibly misremembrances 
(they dispute each other’s recalled versions of events).  There is also the 
possibility that the younger versions of the leads seen in these sections are 
actually contemporaneous comparative characters (since the actors playing the 
younger versions of the leads also appear in the background at the wedding).  So 
already there is ambiguity in the film’s use of split-screen – it is not always clear 
whether it displays illustrative action unfolding simultaneously, earlier events, 
or distorted and subjective projections.  Furthermore, the split-screen is used 
variously to: visualise a character’s imagination (when the female character 
guesses that the male’s girlfriend is a stripper the right side of the screen duly 
shows a stripper); create ironic juxtapositions that are difficult to assign a 
chronological order; illustrate self-confessed fictions told by one character to 
the other; echo/repeat actions (the two sides of the screen dropping slightly out 
of sync in a kind of temporal stutter); or display alternative responses to a single 
exchange (suggesting a multiplicity of possible timelines).  The split-screen is 
used to show past events, simultaneous events, events yet to occur, events that 
may never occur, and so on.   
Split-screen in 24 by comparison, is indicative of only one temporal 
arrangement: simultaneity.  The only exception to this is a shot at the end of 
the first season in which an image of Jack Bauer’s wife Teri, a shot first featured 
much earlier in the season, is shown in a box next to Jack as he grieves over her 
dead body.  That this exceptional arrangement was reserved for a sole moment 
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of extreme grief from the central character, and was never again repeated in 
the seven seasons that followed, affirms its unusualness: generally speaking, a 
split-screen in 24 will display either multiple angles on the same event, or 
simultaneously-unfolding events that are spatially separate.  Despite 
Conversations With Other Women lasting only eighty  minutes (compared with 
over one hundred hours of 24), it experiments with the different combinations 
that split-screen makes possible, emphasising the rigidity of 24’s split-screen 
usage by comparison.   
7.6  “A delay of a few moments might destroy the hopes of a 
lifetime”: Split-screen, real-time and urgency 
“I don’t have time to ask nicely.” 
-  Jack Bauer, Season six (4pm-5pm) 
As previously asserted, using split-screen to consistently display simultaneous 
action in the perpetual present helps to emphasise 24’s ‘real-time’ (i.e. clock-
time) progression.  This engenders a sense of urgency that leaves little space for 
context or contemplation.  Slavoj Zizek suggests that this produces certain 
ethical effects pertinent to the War on Terror: 
The pressure of events is so overbearing, the stakes are so high, that 
they necessitate a suspension of ordinary ethical concerns.
510 
Specifically, urgency is routinely evoked in arguments that justify the use of 
torture – both in 24 and in actuality.
511  Jack Bauer’s threat to a suspect – quoted 
above - iterates an argument familiarly used to advocate the legitimacy of 
torture as an interrogation technique: that the ends justify the means, and that 
intelligence must be gathered as swiftly as possible.
512  Long-term considerations 
are forgotten, immediate results taking priority over ethical consequences.  
Jane Mayer quotes the following from a report made by the Intelligence Science 
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Board, an advisory panel to the U.S. intelligence community which discussed 24 
directly: 
The characters do not have the time to reflect upon, much less to 
utilise, what real professionals know to be the ‘science and art’ of 
‘educing information.’ They want results.  Now.  The public thinks the 
same way.
513 
This urgency is also embedded in the fast-paced progression of the programme 
as a whole; if the plot of 24 is to progress satisfactorily before the end of each 
episode, actions must be enacted swiftly.  The narrative works to its own 
deadline (the episode) while dramatising the deadlines of its protagonists.  
Interestingly, the anxiety that such perpetual urgency potentially engenders has 
long been noted; for example, Kern notes how George Beard’s 1881 study 
American Nervousness blamed ‘the perfection of clocks and the invention of 
watches for causing nervousness wherein “a delay of a few moments might 
destroy the hopes of a lifetime”’.
514 
In a less alarmist sense, the need to coordinate and organise space swiftly and in 
accordance with clock-time characterises not only 24’s chronotopic use of split-
screen, but the use of multi-frame displays in non-fictional settings.  Caroline 
Crosser looks closely at one-such technology in the military, conducting a 
qualitative study of the 1
st Cavalry Division’s usage of a new ‘command and 
control’, or C2, technology named Command Post of the Future (CPOF) during 
deployment in Baghdad between April 2004 and April 2005.  CPOF is designed to 
allow for ‘all facets of operation – logistical, doctrinal, strategic, training, 
technological and organizational… to be altered to reflect their environment’ in 
real-time.  To do so, CPOF draws together information from the Army Battle 
Command System (ABCS) ‘in a format that allows the easy comprehension, 
manipulation and communication of information of all kinds regarding the 
battlespace’.
515  The key characteristic of the CPOF system of interest to the 
current discussion is the manner in which the information is presented to its 
analyst users.  Every connected workstation uses three flat-screen monitors, 
each with a specific function.  One screen displays the battlespace as a three-
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dimensional simulation, another displays satellite mapping of the area amongst 
other things, while the third is a ‘shared view area, where collaborative planning 
and the dissemination of the commander’s intent take place’.
516  The entire 
system is designed to overcome what Crosser identifies as ‘the key problem 
encountered by the modern military’: the vast amounts of information available 
in the network-centric conflict space.  Systems like CPOF attempt to corral and 
manage the information, and it is interesting that they use simultaneous 
multiple-screen displays to do so.  Clearly, the presence of multiple display units 
in the setup is distinct from 24, which splits a single screen into multiple, mobile 
sections, but both depend upon spatially organising multiple images and 
information for their user/viewer. 
    
Fig. 7.2: Command Post of the Future workstation 
 
Fig. 7.3: Command Post of the Future screenshot 
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In a similar way, 24’s split-screen acts at one level as an organisational tool, 
necessary to successfully manage its multiple and simultaneous plots, characters 
and points of view.  24 similarly divides and multiplies its screen to represent 
multiple synchronous spaces.  This echoes the discussion of the role ‘information 
overload’ plays in conspiracy culture – the impression of excess connections and 
patterns can engender suspicion and paranoia in the user/viewer.  24 plays on 
this paranoia to augment its plots, based as they are in elaborate conspiracies 
and nefarious schemes, but ultimately the split-screen image reassures by 
making the elaborate plots visually manageable.  The same logic arguably 
motivated the creation of windows-based interfaces for PCs; a more common 
example than CPOF but one that shares the same goals of rendering multiple 
sets of data and multiple tasks understandable through segregated visual 
representation.  As James Poniewozik observed in Time shortly after the first 
season aired: 
Like Web pages or the headline "crawls" on cable-news screens, the 
[split-screen] device is a visual metaphor for busyness, implying that 
the program is too bursting with action for one screen to contain. It's 
drama for the age of information overload.
517 
CPOF’s set-up suggests that the primary advantage of split or multiple screen 
displays is the increased quantity of information that can be displayed at any 
one time.  CPOF’s multiple-screens, like 24’s split-screen or PC windows, can 
provide multiple perspectives or types of information simultaneously.  Multiple 
screens in CPOF are therefore symptomatic of the real-time reactions necessary 
to wage war according to the technologically-advanced twenty-first century 
model.  The multiple-images of both CPOF and 24 alike are motivated by a real-
time component – the immediacy necessary for the military to respond 
effectively (and near-instantaneously) to dynamic threats in the case of CPOF, 
and the narrative/aesthetic evocation of ‘real-time’ in the case of 24. 
7.7  Conclusion: 9/11’s attack on clock-time 
The conquest of time and space…, alternating with the 
embrace of global war as a continuation of the 
dominance of the global market, are written into the 
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form and content of 24... Time is submitted to the 
rigors of the clock, similar to that of the global 
markets, with their tightly run periods of trading.  
Narrative space is broken up into quadruple pieces [by 
the use of split-screen], similar to the global flow of 
capital both across the world and through the four 
major stock markets of New York, Tokyo, Frankfurt and 
London.  Narrative flow thus expresses the flow of 
capital.
518 
-  Daniel Broe 
In ‘Fox and Its Friends: Global Commodification and the New Cold War’, Daniel 
Broe foregrounds the association between a regimented formulation of time (and 
a preoccupation with deadlines in the drama) and global industry.  Featuring the 
clock and its time-sensitive constraints so heavily as structuring device, motif 
and plot point, and combining it in the narrative with ‘the aggressively militarist 
actions of the protagonist’ dramatises a specific congruency, Broe argues, 
between finance and conflict, ‘the very structure of Murdoch’s News 
Corporation… written into its media products even as those products act on the 
public consciousness to promote this new symbiosis between global markets and 
global warfare’.
519  Broe thus explicitly links 24’s ‘real-time’ narrative with the 
existence and perpetuation of the Military-Industrial-Entertainment Complex 
discussed in chapter one.  However, we do not need to claim such a strong link 
(Broe’s allegations are open to charges of paranoia of the type discussed in 
chapter four) to recognise the connections between the programme’s clock-time 
chronotopic organisation and concepts already argued to be integral to War on 
Terror rhetoric, and modernity more generally, particularly multiplicity, 
simultaneity and urgency.   
As a broadcaster, Fox invoke and reify regulated and standardised clock-time 
with every transmission, the television schedule exerting its own social, 
organisational influence.  But there are, of course, occasions when normal 
programming is interrupted – when the temporal organisation of the schedule is 
disrupted and replaced by something unplanned.  The suspension of ‘normal 
programming’ on September 11
th, 2001 is one such example.  Though their 
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impact relied upon instantaneous broadcast (the attacks occurred in ‘real-time’ 
in the sense that they were witnessed by millions around the world at the 
moment of occurrence via television signals), the attacks were in another sense, 
an attack on clock-time itself.  I hope in this conclusion to indicate how 24’s 
chronotope of clock-time can be read as responsive to this perceived injury, 
while also returning to the ‘chronotope of reception’ referenced at the outset. 
The chronotope of clock time stresses continuity over interruption, and is 
fundamentally based on a sense of simultaneity, in that it is standardised and 
universal.  But chronotopes in narratives are not independently formed; they are 
responsive to the socio-historical climate in which they are evoked.  Julianne 
Pidduck writes: 
Bakhtin’s chronotope connects spatio-temporal forms of genre and 
narrative with the historical contexts where the work is produced and 
read.
520 
The correlation between split-screen motifs and modern technologies (from the 
Windows-based PC to the US military’s CPOF) suggests one such connection 
between chronotope and context in 24.  The ‘perpetual now’ is, at least 
partially, a product of the telecommunication technologies that link together 
space and make the individual acutely aware of the myriad simultaneous 
‘elsewheres’ that are underway at precisely the same time.   
A similar comparison is offered by Torin Monahan, who argues 24 is symbolic of a 
growing awareness of global coexistence: 
The structure of the show as a real-time twenty four hour day 
effectively symbolises the non-stop, just-in-time production models of 
economic globalisation, but with an added emphasis on the need for 
constant self-sacrificing labour and responsibility.  The future of the 
world depends on it.
521 
This non-stop, unrelenting pace is comparable to the anxiety and urgency 
discussed previously.  In globalisation, Toby Miller and Geoffrey Lawrence write 
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‘time is manipulated in concert with the interests of global capital, space is torn 
asunder’, emphasising the economic basis of globalisation as a world-shaping 
force, as well as its origins in imperialism.
522  Economic markets do not sleep – 
when Wall Street closes, the Nikkei opens, and vice versa.  Time is no longer 
valued for its unifying capabilities – the ‘shared’ time of the nation is replaced 
by the onward rush of perpetual global exchange.   
Except, of course, Wall Street can ‘sleep’.  The New York Stock Exchange stayed 
closed on the day of the terrorist attacks of 2001, and did not resume trading 
until six days later.
523  The act of terrorism was very much an attack on industry, 
trade and transport (the choice of New York target – the World Trade Center – 
and method of attack – passenger planes – substantiate this), which were also 
identified as the main factors contributing to clock-time’s introduction in the 
nineteenth century.  Furthermore, the aforementioned suspension of television 
schedules, dropped so that broadcasts could be focused on the unfolding news, 
further disrupted the impression of time as regular and progressive: in 
broadcasting, times of day no longer corresponded to anything other than the 
‘breaking news’ of the attacks, during which single moments (particularly the 
impact of the second plane) were repeated over and over.  Shortly after the 
attacks, Bill Schaffer wrote: 
From now on, it seemed, time could no longer be adequately 
measured by the neutral ticking of a clock, but only by the compulsive 
reviewing of the unthinkable.
524 
If industry initiated and continues to depend upon standardised clock-time, 
terrorism of the kind directed at the United States in September 2001, by 
attacking industry, attacks clock-time.  It interrupted capital by targeting the 
financial heart of the US in New York, while simultaneously striking a symbolic 
blow by leveling the World Trade Centre’s twin towers, which represented 
capitalist expansion and prosperity in addition to their functional role in the 
city’s economics.  It is therefore not surprising that one of the many slurs 
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directed at the Muslim faith in the aftermath of the attack was to label its 
practitioners backwards and pre-modern. 
It would be a mistake to interpret 24’s chronotopes as a direct and conscious 
response to these events – for one, the first half of its first season was already 
written, filmed and scheduled prior to September 11
th, 2001.  But it is 
nonetheless of note that, following an event during which ‘time stood still’ in 
the words of onlookers; which aggressively challenged (at least initially) the US’s 
sense of manifest destiny (the ideological component of historical US clock-time 
that emphasises ceaseless forward progression); which inserted a violent caesura 
in the perpetual trade of Wall Street and the regimented schedules of broadcast 
television; that a programme in which intensely-urgent plots involving the 
apprehension and punishment of terrorists in swift, apparently real-time fashion, 
earned plaudits and viewers.  24’s chronotopic arrangement reasserts the 
familiar, progressive clock-time that was temporarily traumatised by ‘9/11’ 
(even now, the event symbolically stands outwith historical time when evoked 
without its full calendar date), by extension framing terrorism as something that 
can be managed, organised – even diarised to an extent – and, ultimately 
controlled.  Yet at the same time, its dramatic power stems from the notion 
that threats are omnipresent, terrorism a sinister counterpart to the perpetual 
trade of global economics. 194 
8  ‘Previously on 24’: Continuity, platform and 
paratext 
 
With the importance of clock-time to 24 and modernity established and 
interrogated, this chapter will expand the field of enquiry on two fronts.  First, 
it will use 24 to consider television narratives more broadly, analysing how 
continuity and complexity are organised.  The way that the television sequential 
series arranges and manages its plots will be examined, in order to demonstrate 
traits such as fragmentation, interruption, and deadline-based installments.  
Secondly, the chapter will incorporate audio-visual texts that lie outside the 
television serial drama discussed thus far.  Such paratexts (to quote Jonathan 
Gray’s adaptation of Gerard Genette’s literary terminology)
525 will be considered 
accompaniments to the main text – neither necessarily primary nor secondary, 
but co-constituents of its brand.  I will outline the ways in which such paratexts 
attempt to evoke the ‘real-time’ chronotope, despite more limited durations (as 
short as one minute per episode).   
Finally, one particular chronotopic motif will be examined in detail, one taken 
from Bakhtin’s own writing: the chronotope of meeting.  I will propose a 
dynamic relationship between a narrative’s platform (i.e. the medium for which 
it is designed – for example, internet, DVD, television, mobile phone, and so on), 
and its ability to evoke global plotlines, with global plots and an impression of 
‘real-time’ incompatible in a sequential series like 24, but oddly possible in one 
of its paratexts: 24: Redemption.  Technology is thus the chapter’s organising 
theme in two senses: the co-temporality of modern telecommunication 
technologies will continue to inform the analysis, but will be joined by a 
consideration of the technology on which texts are produced and consumed. 
8.1  Serial/series, episode/fragment 
For the purposes of this chapter, I will define the television series as episodic, 
and the serial as a continuous narrative presented in installments.  Glen Creeber 
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argues that traditionally this distinction was clear, but hybrid narrative forms 
have increasingly led to many television dramas sharing characteristics of 
both.
526  For this reason, the term ‘sequential series’ will be used to best evoke 
this combination of constituent episodic narrative arcs and a consistent, 
continuous thread.  The effect of a hybrid mix of the episodic and the 
installment-based in narrating an ongoing conflict will be expanded upon shortly.   
The quantity of ‘War on Terror’-related television dramas is notable,
527 far 
outnumbering cinematic examples in the years immediately following the 
terrorist attacks of September 11
th, 2001 and the start of the wars in Afghanistan 
and Iraq.  Creeber suggests that complex historical or political topics are 
perhaps more effectively narrated by the serial television drama than the 
feature film, the format inherently better suited to multifaceted subject 
matter.  Television drama, Creeber argues, offers ‘possibilities that cinema or 
theatre simply cannot’,
528 citing examples such as Roots (ABC, 1977) and 
Holocaust (NBC, 1978).
529  Creeber goes on to suggest that it is their longer 
duration (compared to a single film) that allow for ‘large and difficult narratives 
that [cover] huge areas of both space and time’.
530  He highlights the increased 
opportunities for narrative complexity by comparing the aforementioned 
examples – Roots and Holocaust – with similarly-themed films (Amistad 
(Spielberg, 1997) and Schindler’s List (Spielberg, 1993) respectively).  Of the 
former comparison, Creeber writes: 
While the expansive narrative arc of Roots crosses multiple 
generations, Amistad centres its storyline around one event… [This] 
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risks misrepresenting history at the expense of finding and 
foregrounding a central moral imperative.  While a similar framework 
is discernable in Roots as a whole…, it could be argued that its 
multigenerational narrative structure offers a more complex and 
pluralistic reading of history than could ever be matched by 
Spielberg’s true, but exceptional storyline.
531 
A similar War on Terror related example might be to compare Over There, a 
2005 sequential series set in Iraq (making it the first television drama to depict 
an ongoing conflict), with Iraq-war-based feature-film narratives, such as Home 
of the Brave (Winkler, 2006), Stop Loss, The Hurt Locker (Bigelow, 2008) or 
American Soldiers (Furie, 2005).  The main plotlines of these films include: a 
badly injured soldier struggling to readjust to life with a prosthetic limb (Home 
of the Brave); a soldier on leave going AWOL (Stop Loss); the constant fear of 
IEDs and the judgement calls made daily by bomb disposal teams (The Hurt 
Locker); and the similarly fraught danger experienced on patrol in the streets of 
Baghdad (American Soldiers).  Over There manages to feature all of these plot 
lines in its thirteen episode run, spreading their impact across its main cast of 
characters: Bo (Josh Henderson) loses his leg in an IED explosion during the first 
episode and spends the rest of the series trying to become proficient enough 
with his prosthetic leg to re-enlist; ‘Mrs B’ (Nicki Lynn Aycox) exploits a brief 
return Stateside to temporarily go AWOL; a young orphan’s chess set is mistaken 
for an IED and destroyed by a tank, prompting much pontificating on the many 
young, innocent casualties of war; and finally, most episodes involve at least one 
intense gunfight (though nothing quite on the scale of American Soldiers’ near-
constant battles).  The thirteen part sequential series Over There, then, is able 
to dramatise a far greater variety of Iraq-war events, offering a pluralistic 
reading of the war, rather than the ‘exceptional’ storylines of the individual 
feature film, which must choose, and therefore necessarily privilege, a single 
aspect, promoting it above all other angles or perspectives.   
It is not only the quantity and complexity of plots that the television sequential 
series can include which potentially distinguishes it from the feature film; the 
episodic structure and the combination of individual, self-contained incidents 
with longer, over-arching plot-lines also frame the narrative content in 
particular ways.  The episodic, self-contained plots of Over There arguably 
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provide a false sense of conclusion to particular aspects of war.  Many of the 
episode titles alone point towards this: ‘Roadblock’, ‘The Prisoner’, 
‘Embedded’, ‘Spoils of War’, ‘Orphans’, ‘Weapons of Mass Destruction’.  Self-
contained incident follows self-contained incident; for example, the experience 
of manning a roadblock is dealt with in a complete narrative arc in ‘Roadblock’, 
the interrogation of captured insurgents similarly concluded in ‘The Prisoner’ 
and the fate of Iraqi civilian children given screen time only in ‘Orphans’.  The 
suicide bomber in ‘Mission Accomplished’ is decontextualised – no connections 
are made between that episode’s narrative arc (the guarding of a make-shift 
prison) and the other examples, and consequentially no causal relationship is 
traceable.  The suicide bomber is separated from the war’s other episodic 
events, and as a result, context is ignored.  If we compare this again to the GNN, 
the effect on causality is made clearer: while Syriana overloads the viewer with 
interconnections, giving the impression that countless causal relationships exist 
even if they are too complicated to be fully comprehended, Over There presents 
thirteen tales of the war in Iraq, linked only by character and location.  The GNN 
can make geo-political interconnections its raison d’etre and explicitly 
dramatise intertwined global existence, having secured the attention of its 
audience for its full running time; by comparison, the sequential series must 
allow for interruptions.  Both the GNN and the television sequential series 
manage multiple plots, but whereas the former explores the knots of connection 
that bind its nodes together, the latter segregates its plots and consequently 
undermines the links between its individual narrative events.   
However, other films structure their narratives in a manner comparable to Over 
There.  For example, the aforementioned The Hurt Locker is arguably similarly 
‘episodic’, its 131 minutes split, approximately, into seven distinct sections: a 
prologue in which Staff Sergeant Matt Thompson (Guy Pearce) is killed while 
defusing an IED, five episodes depicting events from Sergeant First Class William 
James (Jeremy Renner)’s tour of duty, and an epilogue detailing his awkward 
return home and decision to re-enlist.  The five days each have their own 
miniature plot: an altercation with private contractors that leads to a protracted 
stand-off with an Iraqi sniper; the hunt for a missing Iraqi child; a failed attempt 
to diffuse a reluctant suicide bomber’s explosive vest, and so on.  Douglas 
Cunningham argues that ‘each of the five days depicted deliberately offers little     198 
in the way of active narrative causality’.
532  The set-pieces therefore arguably 
constitute episodes (as in Over There) rather than installments in a causal plot.  
To return to Over There, while each of the episodic events is exceptional, in 
that they occur only once in a season, the programme nonetheless foregrounds 
consistency and repetition.  While the GNN can place its characters across the 
globe without confusion, the television serial/series risks alienating the 
returning viewer if it does not include enough recurring recognisable elements.  
This is usually a combination of spatial and temporal elements: characters, time-
frame and location.  So Over There’s pilot episode introduces a cast of 
characters that will be remained with, more or less consistently, throughout.  Its 
episodes take place over a relatively narrow time period and are emphatically 
restricted to the same core, key locations – Iraq, the US homeland and a German 
hospital for injured veterans.  Very few programmes spread their characters and 
plots over a consistently broad geographic space; even those with international 
interests are usually anchored by one or two primary locations: the White House 
in The West Wing, CTU in 24 and so on.  Generally, a sequential series’ 
characters are spatially proximate and temporally synchronous. 
Despite such consistencies, John Caughie notes that fragmentation remains 
characteristic of most television narratives: 
The probability - or even possibility - of interruption [draws] 
television’s narrative form towards an organisation around segments, 
little dramas which sustain their own interest within the narrative 
world, rather than towards the economy of causality in which 
sequences are linked in a chain of cause and effect, and in which 
missing a causal link – through inattention or interruption – can be 
fatal to the coherence of the narrative.
533 
As previously discussed, such segmentation is easily recognisable in Over There 
but the same process occurs in 24.  The individual tasks and challenges that are 
posed and which must be completed or achieved within a specific timeframe are 
the mini-narrative fragments that together constitute the larger mission.  So, 
although there are strong serial links between installments, there are individual 
                                         
532 Douglas Cunningham, ‘Explosive Structure: Fragmenting the New Modernist War Narrative in 
The Hurt Locker’, Cineaction, 81 (2010), p. 2 
533 John Caughie, Edge Of Darkness (London: British Film Institute, 2007), p. 52     199 
events within each hour that are given a complete arc all the way to their 
conclusion.  For example, in episode seven of season four, nuclear reactors are 
sabotaged and CTU systems analyst Edgar Stiles (Louis Lombardi) single-handedly 
stabilises them, his task well-defined and (largely) completed by the end of the 
episode.  While six of the reactors do not stabilise immediately, fulfilling the 
role of cliff-hanger with which each episode concludes, otherwise the particular 
task and narrative fragment is complete.   
When placed within the larger narrative arc, this can have the effect of further 
defying logic in an already far-fetched narrative.  Episode eight of the same 
season sees a CTU mole frame an innocent analyst, Sarah Gavin (Lana Parrillia); 
she is tortured (the standard tool utilised by 24 when time is short, which it 
inevitably is), before further information exonerates her at the end of the 
episode.  After a one-episode absence (in which she ‘recovers’ from her ordeal 
in the CTU hospital), and following a swift apology and a compensatory pay-rise, 
the character is back at her desk continuing her job, the issue resolved.  Even 
grief is contained: Chloe (Mary Lynn Rajskub) is distraught when Edgar dies in a 
biological attack on CTU (season five, episode twelve), but a stern talking to 
from Jack Bauer ensures she is back to work within the hour, focused once again 
on the relentless ‘now’ of the continuing terrorist attacks.   
Such implausibility is even more pronounced in the programme’s tangential plots 
– those ostensibly separate from the central terrorist threat.  For example, 
Chloe’s attempts in season three to covertly look after a baby while working in 
CTU: the incident and the questions raised – to whom does the baby belong? Why 
is she in Chloe’s care? How will this connect to the plot to release biological 
weapons in the United States? – are given conclusive answers shortly after – the 
baby belongs to field agent Chase Edmunds (James Badge Dale); he has asked 
Chloe to look after her so that his girlfriend (and Jack’s daughter) Kim (Elisha 
Cuthbert) doesn’t find out he has a child; and it does not connect with the 
terrorist plot in any way.  However, the fact that, in 24, a baby is the source of 
tension and mystery is indicative of the paranoid conspiracy logic in which 
anything and everything is a potential node in the conspiracy’s sinister web.  Jay 
David Boulter suggests this is itself an effect of real-time news coverage, which 
‘demands that everything must be fitted into the larger narrative’, with events     200 
outwith or uncontained by the master-narrative constituting ‘a source of 
anxiety’.
534 
Some fragmentations in the sequential series are platform-related, the 
consequence of television production methods in the US.  Episodes are conceived 
and written by a team of writers, not a sole individual who pens the story arc 
from beginning to end.  Early episodes are often completed before decisions 
have been made regarding the conclusion of the season as a whole.  For this 
reason, there can be an element of improvisation in the overall plot progression.  
This is most apparent in 24 when considering the threats posed in each season.  
In all eight seasons, the threat is not singular or consistent for the full twenty-
four hours; a miniature climax or resolution is usually achieved, at which point a 
new enemy emerges.  In the first season, the split is particularly pronounced due 
to the uncertainty surrounding the programme’s re-commission; only twelve 
episodes were initially made, and it was then up to the network to decide 
whether to continue with the series.  For this reason, the first twelve episodes 
of season one were designed to have a degree of completeness – albeit with 
loose-ends and cliffhangers to resolve should the show get its hoped-for renewal.   
However, subsequent seasons, written with the assurance that all twenty-four 
episodes would be aired, have similar splits.  For example, season five, consists 
of three roughly distinct acts each with their own principal antagonists.  The 
first section (roughly episodes one to five) involves Jack Bauer attempting to 
clear his name when forced out of hiding and framed for a series of murders (in 
which terrorist James Nathanson [Geraint Wyn Davies] and White House Chief of 
Staff Walt Cummings [John Allen Nelson] are his main foes).  For the second 
(roughly episodes five to fifteen), the main enemy switches to Russian 
separatists Vladimir Bierko (Julian Sands) and Ivan Erwich (Mark Sheppard), and 
Jack must prevent their impending series of attacks.  Finally, the third reveals 
President Charles Logan (Gregory Itzen), former CTU agent Christopher 
Henderson (Peter Weller) and Jack’s brother Graem (Paul McCrane) as the 
ultimate villains; Bauer’s main task in this final section is to reveal the full 
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extent of the conspiracy, and the main threat a final assault from the terrorists 
involving a Russian nuclear submarine. 
Unlike Over There, which undermines causality through its episodic structure, 
synchronous events in 24 are given a false sense of causality.  Mid-way through 
season six, several leads are being chased without any firm causal connection 
linking them together.  By episode eleven, CTU are simultaneously tracking the 
movements of Dmitri Gredenko (Rade Šerbedžija, a Cold War general who has 
been orchestrating many of the attacks), Jack Bauer’s father Philip Bauer (James 
Cromwell, who is trying to cover up his involvement in the nerve-gas plot of 
season five), ex-President Charles Logan (disgraced following his role in a plot to 
secure American oil interests which involved the assassination of a former 
President), and Abu Fayed (Adoni Maropis, a terrorist cell leader from an 
unspecified Middle Eastern country who is, unbeknownst to him, being used in 
Gredenko’s scheme), among others.  Meanwhile, a tangential plot to assassinate 
President Wayne Palmer (DB Woodside) and Hamri al-Assad (Alexander Siddig, 
the reformist leader of the aforementioned Middle Eastern nation, earlier 
framed by Fayed) is underway, led by Deputy Chief of Staff Reed Pollock (Chad 
Lowe), in a misguided attempt to instill Vice President Noah Daniels (Powers 
Boothe) as President so that a controversial national security plan can be 
enacted.  This, Pollack and his co-conspirators believe, is the only way to 
protect America since the milquetoast Palmer lacks the courage to do so. 
No single architect controls these figures – each operates according to individual 
agendas, with little to do with one another aside from the coincidence of their 
actions.  As one plot is thwarted, another emerges, and not necessarily as a 
causal consequence of what occurred prior.  For example, if Fayed is stopped, 
Gredenko, Philip Bauer and Pollack remain; each operates independently.  As 
well as echoing the organisation of al-Qaeda (a cell-based network of loosely 
connected groups falsely homogenised by members of the group and Western 
figures alike), this is indicative of a more general tendency in 24 (and, as argued 
in previous chapters, War on Terror rhetoric more widely) to present the 
sequential and co-existent as networked and contingent. 
Therefore, unlike the GNN, which weaves disparate plots into a gradually-
revealed patterned network, the duration of such mini-narratives in 24 are     202 
restricted to only a fraction of the programme’s overall running time.  The story 
of Bryan Woodman’s business relationship with Prince Nasir Al-Subaai in Syriana, 
for example, is returned to repeatedly throughout the film’s two hour screen-
time; the story of Sarah Gavin’s wrongful arrest in 24, by contrast, is a minor 
event in the season’s overall plot, one with localised importance and short-term 
resolution.  Like Over There, 24’s narrative is segmented, allowing for the built-
in interruptions of television noted by Caughie.  
On the one hand this would appear self-evident – 24 is, after all, a television 
programme and not a film, and so might naturally be expected to share closer 
affinities with other television rather than cinematic texts like Syriana.  
However, 24’s identity as ‘television’ is challenged by the brand’s infiltration of 
multiple media, generating an increasing number of 24 paratexts.  When a brand 
spans online content, DVD box-sets, feature length releases and so on, yet 
retains elements of the same chronotopic arrangements in all its forms, the 
question of platform specificity must be addressed. 
8.2  Transmedia storytelling: ‘Other’ 24s 
Comparing the multi-part television sequential series with the multi-plot Global 
Network Narrative implies that the chronotopes of certain War on Terror texts 
are partly influenced by their platform – whether cinematic, televisual or audio-
visual paratexts of another variety.  The cinematic GNN is global, convoluted 
and difficult to comprehend in its totality; the real-time sequential series 24 is 
elaborate, but fragmented and always comprehensible.   
Up to this point, the 24 I have been referring to, and on which the majority of 
writing about 24 has been focused, has been the twenty-four part television 
drama.  It is important to note, however, that 24 is not a sealed text existing in 
a single form.  Its vast success has allowed the Fox network and creator Jon 
Cassar to develop the concept into a wider franchise, with numerous constituent 
manifestations.  These include predictable merchandise such as action figures 
and trading cards, and not so obvious examples such as the 24: The Series 
Stimulation energy drink.  DVD, console and board games are also available, 
while a glut of official comic strips and novels add to the adventures of the 
show’s protagonists.  All of these examples inform the 24 brand, but of more     203 
interest are the numerous other audio-visual, narrative-based 24 paratexts.  
These include: Day Zero, a series of animations available online; The Rookie, a 
short series of live-action webisodes; the Day 6 Debrief, a short ten minute 
epilogue to the sixth season, shown online and included in the region one DVD 
release; short prequels made to trail the then-upcoming seasons four, five and 
six; 24: Conspiracy, a mobile-phone based live-action mini-series sent as media 
files to subscribing Vodafone users; and 24: Redemption, a feature-length 
episode/film screened between the sixth and seventh seasons. 
Most of these alter the real-time structure in particular ways necessitated by 
their respective platforms.  For example, the Conspiracy mobisodes, created by 
Fox in conjunction with Vodafone and designed to be transmitted to and 
watched on the small dimensions of a mobile phone screen, are only one minute 
in duration each.  Each individual episode is still nominally real-time: one 
minute of screen-time is equivalent to one-minute of plot-time.  However, 
unlike the main programme, ellipses occur between episodes.  While it is not 
inconceivable that a series of twenty-four one-minute episodes could each begin 
immediately after the last to produce twenty-four minutes of plot- and screen-
time, it would severely delimit the opportunity for drama and conspiratorial plot 
developments of the kind favoured by 24 i.e investigations, chases, torture and 
so on. 
Day Zero adopts a different technique in adapting the real-time conceit to its 
platform limitations.  An animated prequel to the first season featuring the 
characters of Jack Bauer, Nina Myers (the CTU mole unmasked in the first 
season), George Mason, and Tony Almeida amongst others, its six episodes were 
made available to watch online following the end of season six (though have 
subsequently been removed, replaced by The Rookie).  Its low-budget, crude 
animation makes scenes of movement laborious, so ellipses are built in to each 
episode to edit out uneventful movement in a more conventionally classical 
manner.  As a result, the plot-time is greater than the screen-time: for example, 
the first episode’s screen-time lasts a couple of minutes, while its plot is 
supposed to take place over a ten minute period, the depicted events taking 
place over a longer period than the animation’s actual duration.       204 
The Rookie is made by many of the same production team as the main 
programme but focuses on a different selection of government agents and their 
separate attempts to thwart various terrorist plots.  The first two seasons, like 
Day Zero, are not structured to appear as real-time, with the amount of story-
time covered by each two to three minutes of screen-time varying between 
three and thirty minutes.  Its third season was extended from three episodes to 
six, each of longer duration, and with an extended running time, the need to 
constrict action is lessened, allowing The Rookie to adopt a version of real-time.  
However, there is still ‘missing’ action: its total plot-time is one hour, while its 
total screen time is around thirty minutes due to the gaps which occur between 
its episodes (like in Conspiracy).  The individual episodes appear real-time (with 
the exception of the final episode, in which screen-time is uncharacteristically 
longer than the plot-time), but without the strict seriality of the series, skipping 
several minutes of story-time between each episode so that the end of one 
episode does not lead directly and without pause into the next. 
However, despite these alterations, all of these examples remain clearly marked 
and understood as part of the same ‘extended universe’ as the main series in a 
number of ways: continued plot (the Debrief); casting (Kiefer Sutherland voices 
Jack in Day Zero); aesthetic elements, including the show’s distinct colour 
scheme and soundtrack (The Rookie); or allusions to events tangential but 
connected to the plots of the main series (judging by references made to the 
kidnapping of Secretary Heller and his daughter Audrey Raines, the events of 24: 
Conspiracy take place alongside season four, the season whose broadcast it was 
released to coincide with).  In addition, while the real-time illusion may be 
weakened or absent, time is still paramount in all of these versions of 24.  In all 
the 24 media, allusions are made to a restricted time-frame, their episodes 
contained within, at most, a twenty-four hour period.  The pressures of clock-
time are still regularly evoked: episode one of Day Zero takes place between 
10:17 and 10:27 p.m., and Jack and Tony have three minutes in which to escape 
a compromised safe-house that has been wired to explode; the six episodes of 
The Rookie: Extraction cover different durations of plot time but are given 
equally precise clock-times (for example, episode 1 begins at 5:00pm and 
finishes at 5:04pm).  These paratextual examples simply employ a greater 
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demonstrated, are also present in the main 24 sequential series.  There is no 
essential difference between the gaps that exist between episodes of Conspiracy 
or The Rookie (in which the plot continues to advance) and the advert breaks of 
the main series; the difference is rather a matter of degree.  Similarly, the 
editing of unnecessary action in Day Zero for the purposes of moving characters 
from one location to another without animating the entire journey is a more 
obvious example of the editing down of travel observed by Furby in the main 
programme.   
Carlos Alberto Scolari argues that this variety of texts makes 24 an example of 
‘transmedia storytelling’,
535 a term coined by Henry Jenkins.  Jenkins defines a 
‘transmedia story’ as one ‘told across multiple media’, where: 
Each medium does what it does best – so that a story might be 
introduced in a film, expanded through television, novels, and comics, 
and its world might be explored and experienced through game play.  
Each franchise entry needs to be self-contained enough to enable 
autonomous consumption.  That is, you don’t need to have seen the 
film to enjoy the game and vice-versa.
536 
The latter point is important: I do not wish to suggest that these 24 texts are 
essential narrative appendages to the main series, without which the 24 viewer 
does not receive a ‘complete’ story.  Rather, I characterise these texts as valid 
extensions of the 24 narrative, available for interested parties to explore and 
enjoy, without involving any major digression from the main sequential series 
text’s plot or style.  In the words of Scolari, 24’s multiple texts constitute a 
‘complex semiotic device for generating multiple implicit (trans)media 
consumers’, who can either encounter individual texts ‘without taking into 
account the total geography of this world’, or as ‘open door to the 24 narrative 
universe’.
537  Whether experienced at entry level or in conjunction with the 
series (between seasons or episodes), these texts self-consciously evoke, and are 
therefore made comprehensible in relation to, the clock-time chronotope of the 
sequential series. 
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These secondary 24s are given a variety of labels by Scolari depending upon their 
position and relationship to the main serial, which he places at the centre of the 
24 narrative sphere.  Possible expansions include ‘interstitial microstories’ which 
‘enrich the diegetic world by expanding the period between the seasons’ and 
‘have a close relationship with the macrostory’ (for example, the Day 6 
Debrief);
538 ‘parallel stories’ such as 24: Conspiracy, in which another story 
unfolds alongside the main story - a ‘spin-off’ of sorts;
539 and ‘peripheral stories’ 
which ‘can be considered more or less distant satellites of the macrostory’ (The 
Rookie would fall into this category).
540  These categories help to delineate the 
variety of narrative forms that exist in the 24 universe, which, despite their 
disparities, cohere and interrelate unproblematically.   
Elided time, then, has always been a factor in 24’s real-time format, and these 
multi-platform variations simply develop the series’ narrative slight-of-hand in 
ways that better suit the immediate needs of their platform – whether that be 
DVD extras, online content or phone-based mobisodes.  Each example balances 
the demands of remaining faithful to the show’s distinctive real-time chronotope 
and making concessions to the capabilities of their respective media, as well as 
the expectations of their audience – even if full one-hour episodes of 24: 
Conspiracy were possible, it is debatable how many fans would wish to 
experience them on such a small screen.   
Studying these additional 24 texts also confirms ‘real-time’ as not only a 
narrative structure, but as an aesthetic ambition.  It is clear that organising 
plots to appear real-time in the main series is at least partly architectural, as it 
places certain demands upon what plots can be included and how they unfold (as 
will be explored in further detail shortly with regards to global travel in 24).  
The real-time conceit organises the sequential-series precisely; each episode 
must begin immediately after the conclusion of the last, and must wind up 
precisely one-hour of plot-time later, and its ellipses must occur at precise 
moments dictated by advert breaks.  The Rookie, Conspiracy, Day Zero and so on 
do not share these structural designs, yet retain the evocation of real-time as an 
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aesthetic ambition.  They do more than simply reproduce the show’s branding.  
Through the onscreen clock motif, time-based deadlines, split-screen and so on, 
these additional 24 narratives evoke the more fully-realised real-time illusion of 
the sequential-series, and while they may not be chronotopically comparable in 
terms of structure, they are thematically consistent. 
8.3  24: Redemption 
In 2007, the twelve thousand members of the Writer’s Guild of America refused 
to work over a dispute regarding the monetary relationship between large 
studios and the writers they employ.  In anticipation, some films were hurried 
into production,
541 while others were put on hold until the strike was resolved.  
Online commentators have cited the strike as an explanation for poor scripts 
being rushed before cameras before they were ready,
542 but the perceived effect 
on film production was largely speculative and subjective: as Pamela McClintock 
and Michael Fleming wrote in Variety, ‘unlike in television… the natural cycle of 
making movies means studios have had ample time to prepare for a walkout’.
543 
As McClintock and Fleming insinuate, the effect upon television was more 
concrete.  Due to the aforementioned production-model in which scripts for 
later episodes are not yet written when the series begins, the strike forced 
delays and adjustments for a number of high profile shows: most opted to cut 
their season short,
544 while others were halted entirely or postponed until after 
the industrial action was resolved.
545  24 falls into the latter category, 
presumably due to the damage that would be done to the real-time format were 
a several-month long schism to interrupt the ‘day’.  The gap instead was 
partially filled by the first television-based digression from the main-season 
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format, a feature-length (broadcast screen-time: two hours, actual screen time: 
eighty-nine minutes in its original cut) special entitled 24: Redemption, which 
takes plot points that would otherwise have been covered in the first episodes of 
the new season.  As well as keeping the franchise in the public eye during its 
enforced hiatus, the feature also acted as a prequel to the delayed season 
seven, a larger-scale version of the trend started in season four to preview the 
upcoming season with a short preparatory snippet of the upcoming storylines. 
Towards the beginning of Redemption, the familiar voice of Kiefer Sutherland 
delivers the line which introduces every new season of the show and on which 
we have already dwelled upon at length: ‘Events occur in real time’.  While this 
has been shown to be an illusory fiction in all the main seasons, with hidden 
ellipses throughout, Redemption’s claims to real-time are particularly tenuous.  
Several minutes of screen-time have already elapsed by this point, showing the 
brutal initiation of a young child soldier into the army of Redemption’s main 
villain, a US-funded General planning a coup in the fictional African country of 
Sangala.  These scenes are markedly not real-time, shifting from day (in the 
opening minute when Colonel Ike Dubaku walks through his camp, monitoring 
the training of captured children) to night (for the initiation ceremony itself) 
abruptly in a single edit.  The screen then goes dark, and the familiar flicker of 
the show’s phosphorescent logo sputters piecemeal into view, followed by the 
temporal parameters (‘the following takes place between 3:00 p.m. and 5:00 
p.m.’) and the aforementioned ‘Events occur in real time’ message.  When the 
next scene begins, it is day again (3:00 p.m. in fact), and a day or two appear to 
have elapsed.
546  This concession to classical editing techniques sets up one of 
the main plot-strands efficiently, but to do so with brevity requires a 
postponement of the real-time structure.  Other stylistic elements remain 
consistent and ensure, however, that the opening appears closely connected to 
the series up to this point, despite the huge change in location: short-hand 
motifs symbolising African militia violence – 4 x 4 trucks, the AK-47 – establish a 
scenario far different from any thus far confronted, but one of the first sounds 
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heard is a mobile phone ringing, which when answered initiates Redemption’s 
first split-screen conversation. 
The compression of time, typical of classical narrative structures, preempts 
what creator Jon Cassar reportedly had planned for the structure of the long-
mooted feature film version that has thus far proved logistically impossible.
547  
The intention, he states:  
Is to do an hour that sets it up where you can go around the world and 
set up a story in normal film time, and probably the last hour will be 
in real time.
548 
More recent interviews conducted with Keifer Sutherland following the 
conclusion of the eighth and final season suggest that the plan has since altered 
slightly.  Sutherland has been quoted as saying that the film ‘would lose the 
real-time aspect’ entirely, to permit the writers greater freedom to constrict 
and expand time when necessary.
549  As a ‘two hour representation of a twenty-
four hour day’,
550 the film version of 24 would therefore abandon its structural 
emulation of real-time.  In both Cassar and Sutherland’s descriptions, the 
proposed alterations to the format align the potential film closer to conventional 
classical Hollywood narrative structures, and further from the television text’s 
original concept – though it is likely that, as with the other 24 narratives 
outlined above, the pressures of real-time will still be consciously evoked 
through various stylistic trademarks, such as the on-screen digital clock and 
split-screens displaying simultaneous action. 
Interestingly, as well as the intended adjustment of the real-time format for the 
film, Cassar mentions going ‘around the world’, another deviation from the norm 
found in Redemption.
 551  As well as the Jack-in-Sangala plot, a second plot 
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strand takes place on the other side of the Atlantic, in Washington D.C. on the 
day of the new President’s inauguration.  Allusions are also made to story-
elements understood to have occurred between the end of season six (and its 
aforementioned Debrief) and the opening of Redemption, namely how Bauer 
came to find himself on the other side of the world working in an orphanage.  
Reference is made to a subpoena that will eventually require him to return to 
the US in time for the start of season seven.  The subpoena is to force Bauer to 
stand trial for the numerous acts of torture committed against detainees, and 
has pursued Bauer ‘across three continents’, with specific reference made to 
India as one of his hiding places. 
The internationalisation of Jack Bauer’s adventures is not completely 
unprecedented, but ventures out-with US borders have previously been 
restricted in four main ways.  The most obvious and lengthy journey away from 
US soil in the main seasons involved the pursuit of drug czar Ramon Salazar into 
Mexico in season three.  While scenes of travel are frequently abbreviated in the 
main series, as noted by Furby, too great a constriction would damage the 
credibility of the real-time illusion.  Therefore, this international movement is 
to a neighbouring country, to a compound located just over the border, 
minimising the amount of plot-time (and therefore screen-time) spent on board 
an aircraft, time which the writers fill with various plane-based challenges for 
Bauer to deal with during transit.   
The second way international scenes are managed in the main series is to have 
these incidents take place between seasons, such as Jack’s abduction by the 
Chinese authorities following a botched raid on the Chinese embassy in which 
the Chinese ambassador is killed.  Season five ends with Jack being dragged 
aboard a tanker bound for China, and season six opens with his arrival back in 
the United States by plane twenty months later.  The third example is similar: 
the opening scene of season two takes place in Seoul, South Korea, where a man 
is tortured to provide information on the impending attacks.  With his disclosure 
that the attacks are about to begin, the plot moves to Los Angeles and remains 
there for the rest of the season.  This resembles the prequel paratexts that 
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preceded the fourth, fifth and sixth season – a miniature preparatory prologue, 
rather than a separate plot strand as such.   
Lastly, international scenes are framed within conversations shown through 
video-conferencing windows, in which one party remains located in Los Angeles.  
The way in which technology representatively constricts space, will be returned 
to shortly. 
It is interesting, then, that Redemption’s two-hours of broadcast screen-time 
permit a greater global range than the twenty-four hours of broadcast screen-
time covered by a single season of the main series, which always localises its 
plots.  To understand why, it is worth examining the centrality of ‘meetings’ to 
24’s narrative. 
8.4  Global 24, mobile phones and the chronotope of meeting 
24, in all its forms, is constructed around various meetings, usually involving 
Jack Bauer.  Characters clandestinely plot together in darkened rooms, chase 
each other through cities, torture one another in holding cells, hide from each 
other behind conveniently located objects, shoot at each other from said hiding 
places, and so on.  For these meetings to take place, both bodies must be 
broadly in the same place at the same time, with plot-progressing events in 24’s 
action-adventure format – the defusing of a bomb, the eliciting of intelligence 
through torture, the capture of a suspect – requiring physical presence of both 
parties at the same place and at the same time.  Since this is not always 
feasible, the mobile phone plays a central role in 24’s narratives, allowing 
interaction at a distance.  It is rare for an episode of 24 not to feature 
prominently some kind of mobile communication technology, used variously as 
prop and plot device.  The counter-terrorism depicted in the show time-
sensitive, and the urgent transmission of information from one place or person 
to another is one of the show’s defining characteristics, with mobile phones the 
most direct technology available in most circumstances.  
It pays to be specific about the particular type of mobile devices featured in the 
show.  The characters invariably use PDAs (Personal Digital Assistant) or 
Smartphones, i.e. mobile devices with more advanced processing capabilities     212 
than a standard phone handset, running on simplified computer operating 
systems.  While there are a number of advantages to this detail, both to the 
production (the programme has had multiple product placement deals, including 
contracts with telecommunication companies keen to exhibit their top-of-the-
range models)
552 and to the plot (the increased functionality allows handsets to, 
at various times, detonate bombs, act as GPS trackers, and interface with 
satellites), it also means that the phone itself is shown to operate on a form of 
split-screen display – schematics are downloaded, satellite images are patched 
through, and live surveillance feeds are streamed, each in separate windows.  
Within the diegesis, 24 emphasises the need to organise information in multi-
image displays, echoing the conclusion drawn in chapter eight with regards 
CPOF, and embedding a further example of split-screen visual segmentation.  
The representation echoes that which is represented; 24’s use of split-screen 
mimics contemporary information technologies more broadly. 
The connective power of the telephone feeds back into the sense of the 
‘perpetual present’ discussed in chapter seven.  With the invention and 
widespread use of the landline, commentators in the early 1900s recognised the 
monumental impact the technology would have over not only spatial relations 
(bringing individuals at a distance from one another into verbal contact), but 
also temporal: 
The effect of the telephone on the past and present was recognised at 
once – it eliminated the preservation of the past in letters and 
expanded the spatial range of the present… The historian Herbert 
Casson… noted that ‘with the use of the telephone had come a new 
habit of mind.  The slow and sluggish mood has been sloughed off… 
life has become more tense, alert, vivid…’
553 
Furthermore, the telephone, Kern writes, made it possible, in a sense, to be in 
two places at the same time: 
It allowed people to talk to one another across great distances, to 
think about what others were feeling and to respond at once without 
the time to reflect afforded by written communication.  Business and 
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personal exchanges suddenly became instantaneous instead of 
protracted and sequential.
554 
Mobile telephony adds another element to this transformation – what Joseph A. 
Tighe argues is its innate ability to transcend space and time.  Tighe interprets 
the contemporary ubiquity of the mobile phone through a Foucaultian lens, 
emphasising the potential to imprison by blurring the boundary between private 
and public space and thereby lock its users into a system of perpetual 
accountability.  ‘Accountability’, Tighe writes, ‘is given through knowledge of 
individuals in space and time’, and the mobile phone permits perpetual contact 
regardless of the constraints of either.
555  A shift occurs, Tighe argues: the ability 
to contact anyone at anytime mutates into the expectation that one should be 
able to do so.  This is contrasted with the rigidity of the mobile’s forebear: while 
the landline is fixed in space (and time, as the call will only reach its intended 
target if they are proximate at the exact moment that the call is placed), the 
mobile ‘breaks apart the reference of synchronous vocal communications and 
the spatial contexts of the interlocutors’.  Conceptually speaking, ‘the cellular 
phone is a non-spatial-referential communicative technology’.  For this reason: 
Cellular phone calls are decidedly not calls from place to place, but 
from person to person.  The cellular phone is a refinement of 
accountability, a way of rendering individuals accountable no matter 
where they are in space.
556 
It is this quality that Tighe likens to Foucault’s concept of the Panopticon; the 
mobile phone ensures that neither time nor space affects an individual’s reach-
ability. 
In 24, the unreliability of mobile telephony places the protagonists in jeopardy 
on numerous occasions (through loss of signal or depleted battery charge, for 
example).  But more generally the technology constitutes the connective link 
between disparate characters.  The perpetual accountability suggested by Tighe 
relates to the programme’s depiction of time as a vector: attempts to contact 
characters are unaffected by the time of day or the character’s location.  
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However, while the cellular phone alters the nature of the individual’s position 
in time and space, it does not eradicate their importance: 
The cellular phone makes definite space and time by rendering the 
individual always locatable through disciplinary practice.  In terms of 
space, the cellular phone functions as ‘enclosure’… i.e. a cell.  With 
respect to time, the cellular phone allows for a technology of time 
that renders the individual always accountable as an individual within 
a multiplicity.
557 
Of course, one can ignore a call or switch off a mobile phone, so perhaps ‘always 
accountable’ is an overstatement.  Nonetheless, mobile telephony etiquette 
means one is expected to answer calls unless there is good reason not to.  
Furthermore, Tighe’s thesis gains support from 24’s drama, in which answering a 
call literally makes an individual locatable via advanced tracking devices that 
use global satellite positioning (GSP) to ‘lock-on’ to the device’s (and therefore 
its user’s) position. 
Steven Peacock explicitly connects the preponderance of mobile phones in the 
24 universe with its use of split-screen: 
With directness and immediacy, the telephone connects the 
characters aurally as, for the viewer, the split-screen connects them 
through space, visually.
558 
The split-screen distorts and rearranges space visually, bringing separate places 
into spatial proximity.  ‘Real-time’ disrupts ‘real-space’, the frame 
deconstructed and recomposed but the suggestion of clock-time always 
consistent.  Black masking separates the images, a literal gap that stands in for 
the gap between locations, evoking distance and separation while still bringing 
the images into proximate contact with one another.  These dark borders box 
space in order to emphasise synchronous time.  If, as Tighe suggests, the mobile 
phone encloses its user in a cell of accountability unaffected by spatial 
parameters, this ‘cell’ is visually echoed by the split-screen’s constriction of the 
frame around the conversing character. 
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While these mobile phone exchanges ensure that characters can be contacted 
and put in communication with one another when necessary, the requirements 
of an action-oriented show such as 24 means that, in addition to being 
accountable, the individual must then be in a position to act; hence the inability 
for the show to cover the same global breadth as the GNN without sacrificing its 
real-time conceit.  Where the GNN explicitly dramatises the web of 
interconnectedness, foregrounding nodes and links, 24 is essentially working 
mono-directionally towards a dramatic resolution.  The show is avowedly linear 
and chronological, and its multiple plots and characters are always in service to 
its central strand: the protection of the United States from terrorist attack.  So 
although the individual within the multiplicity is made perpetually accountable 
through the mobile phone, they cannot remain geographically separate from 
others if they are to influence the outcome of events directly.   
To use Stephanie Marriott’s terminology, the show requires mediated encounters 
(i.e. those conducted via technological means at a distance) to, at some stage, 
become canonical.  In a canonical encounter: 
Space (the set of relations between relevant objects and individuals) 
is fundamentally linked to place (the arena in which these relations 
are structured), so that all the relevant physical relationships 
between conversational participants, and between those participants 
and the objects around them, are constrained by the boundaries of 
the locale in which they find themselves.  Two or more people in the 
same place thus loosely share a set of spatial relations to their 
immediate environment and to each other.
559 
The show’s real-time conceit makes this impossible if the plots are spread over 
too large a geographic distance.  So if, for example, the plot of the paratext 
Redemption had been used as the opening episode of season seven as intended, 
it would presumably have required considerable alteration.  The time taken to 
travel from the west coast of the United States of America to any point in Africa 
is considerable,
560 so moving a character from one to the other would be 
prohibitively lengthy, unless abandoning the real-time conceit entirely.  
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Redemption avoids this problem by keeping its plot strands separate throughout, 
with the African-set characters (including Bauer) not interacting directly with 
the Washington-set characters (other than a single conversation via satellite 
phone), and as a result, the connections between the two strands are left 
unresolved and vague.  This is in stark comparison to the main television show, 
which promises to eventually connect everything, solving every mystery in the 
process; sometimes only an episode or two after questions are first posed, 
sometimes left hanging, to be picked up and resolved in subsequent seasons.  
This is partly due to Redemption’s prequel status – though largely stand-alone in 
its plotting, several characters are included seemingly in order to prepare 
viewers for their presence in the seventh season, rather than because they are 
essential to the events of Redemption specifically.  While characters like Carl 
Benton (Robert Carlyle) exhaust their role in the 24 universe by the plot’s 
conclusion (unequivocally so following his death by landmine), others, such as 
the shadowy businessman and weapons contractor Jonas Hodges (Jon Voight) and 
the new President and First Gentleman (Cherry Jones and Colm Feore 
respectively) receive little more than brief introductions.  Their roles in the 
events of Redemption are either unclear (in the case of Hodges) or yet to exist 
(in the case of the President), but are subsequently explored in greater detail in 
the seventh full season due to the exhaustive efforts of Bauer.  However, I would 
argue that the vagueness of Redemption is more than just an effort to prompt 
interest in the forthcoming full season, but is an effect of its platform.  To do 
so, I wish to return once again to the Global Network Narrative. 
As previously discussed, having 24’s hero Jack Bauer become embroiled in 
international affairs is a clear break from the domestic anti-terrorist activities 
dealt with in the main series.  Even the examples of previous international 
ventures were framed always in relation to the risk they posed to the United 
States homeland - such as the pursuit of the Salazars into Mexico in order to 
intercept the exchange of deadly biological weapon that threatens the US.  
Redemption has Jack choose to intervene in a conflict occurring on the opposite 
side of the world from his erstwhile home of Los Angeles, a conflict which poses 
no significant threat to American safety (even the evacuation of embassy staff 
successfully occurs without loss of life).  While season seven subsequently turns 
the Sangala-coup into a matter of domestic security by having Colonel Ike     217 
Dubaku lead an unlikely assault on the US infrastructure in an attempt to force 
the newly-elected President to cancel the intended invasion of Sangala, during 
Redemption the connection between Sangala and the United States is 
diplomatic, not militaristic.  While the incumbent President is faced with her 
first foreign policy decision in Washington, it is not a time-pressured threat of 
the kind which 24 usually forces its Presidential characters to contend with.  No 
final conclusion is required by the end of the (twenty-four hour) day. 
There are strong similarities here to the GNN cinematic narrative.  Where 
Syriana confounded easy comprehension with its labyrinthine plot-connections, 
and Babel left some of its stories unresolved and the inter-connections loose, 
Redemption follows suit by beginning and ending with its characters separated 
by thousands of miles, without any clear answers as to how they are all 
eventually to be connected.  Due to its commitment to retaining the real-time 
conceit, 24 can only allude to the complexity of global networks if it keeps its 
plotlines apart for the entirety of its narrative run – a problem in a twenty-four 
part sequential series but less so in a two-hour special.  As in the GNNs, the 
disparate locations are made proximate through editing (and, in the case of 24, 
split-screen), but the characteristics of each separate space are not lost; the 
editing does not destroy geographical distinction.  The aforementioned motifs 
used to symbolise ‘Western African state at war’ – AK-47s, 4 x 4 trucks – starkly 
contrast with the equivalent representational motifs of bureaucratic Washington 
– tailored suits, limousines and background secret-service agents.  Colour is 
similarly juxtaposed – steel, blue, grey Washington against earthy, yellow, brown 
Sangala – and while both plot strands take place during daylight hours, the low-
light of early-morning Washington is clearly distinct from the bright sun 
illuminating the Sangala scenes. 
I would argue that only by adopting the narrative organisation of the GNN can 24 
evoke the vast net of global interconnectedness I suggest is central to rhetorical 
formulations of the War on Terror more broadly.  In the main series and its 
various internet and mobile-based paratexts, the real-time concept places 
limitations on its geographic scope,
561 which Redemption is able to expand upon, 
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but only by sacrificing the narrative clarity that the series otherwise strives 
towards.  Since it cannot solve every puzzle in just two hours of plot-time, it 
leaves certain questions relating to the links between one continent and another 
(the US and Africa) unanswered (which the subsequent season then resumes).  
The global network, then, is necessarily incomprehensible in its myriad 
interconnections, whereas the main programme’s depiction of domestic anti-
terrorism agencies is comfortingly simple – in retrospect, at least, all the pieces 
fit and the threat is averted.  In Redemption, we are given clues that suggest 
connections exist - connections that may potentially threaten the United States – 
but the pieces do not fit, at least not yet. 
This potentially contradicts Creeber’s suggestion that the television drama can 
more effectively represent complex, multifaceted events due to its longer 
duration.  The cinematic GNN can make the complexity of global socio-politics 
its principle theme, as can Redemption.  24 can (and indeed does) explore the 
various plot strands in greater detail in the following season, but in doing so it 
loses the sense of global complexity: international politics become domestic, 
and the complex global network boils down to one man’s city-based attempts to 
thwart the terrorist enemy. 
8.5  Conclusion 
‘Real-time’ was discussed in the previous chapter as both an articulation of 
artificial ‘clock-time’ and as a structural component of 24’s narrative, which 
engendered particular effects (such as the suggestion of a ‘perpetual now’ shorn 
of historical context).  Despite the necessary dilution or loss of the real-time 
structure in the 24 paratexts, elements of ‘real-time’ are retained through a 
continued thematic and stylistic emphasis on time and duration.  The ‘real-time’ 
illusion is no longer as convincing, but it remains present as an aesthetic 
ambition: immediacy, instantaneity and so on are not simply by-products of 
technology and the core show’s structural conceit, but are evoked aesthetically, 
a conclusion important to the next chapter’s discussion of cinema’s mimicry of 
live transmission and technology-facilitated instantaneity. 
The second conclusion drawn from this chapter is equally important to the 
aforementioned task: while chapter seven concentrated on specifically televisual     219 
tropes and traits, this chapter acts as a conduit, bringing together conclusions 
drawn from analysis of a television text and conclusions drawn from the 
cinematic Global Network Narrative together.  The various media manifestations 
of 24 illustrate how vastly different narrative structures told through vastly 
different media platforms retain similarities by embedding the core narrative’s 
chronotopes – in this case, clock-based real-time narration – in the paratext’s 
aesthetic.  Particular narrative forms have particular ideological effects and 
shape the subject matter in particular ways, but there is arguably a growing 
hybridity, in which different media ‘learn’ from one another.  The case study of 
24: Redemption exemplifies the way that the structural demands of a particular 
media platform can necessitate particular organisations of time and space – 
specifically, proximate and clear connections in the real-time sequential series, 
compared with disparate and obscured connections in the two-hour feature – but 
that similarities can be traced across different platforms. 
In ‘24 and Twenty-First Century Quality Television’, Scott Ruston and Daniel 
Chamberlain compare 24’s split-screen image to television news and sportscasts, 
both of which ‘use the split screen to emphasise simultaneity of experience, 
whether during a crucial point of the game, or to unite geographically distant 
guests of a news programme’.
562  24, they argue, adopts ‘the visual markers of 
live television’
563 without actually being ‘live’ in the way that a football match 
or news bulletin is.
564  Its sense of liveness is evoked through its aesthetic design; 
for example, a freely-moving, hand-held camera follows the movement of 
characters, giving an impression of spontaneity and unpredictability.
565  Liveness 
in 24 is ‘a set of communicative mechanisms… an effect, rather than a concrete 
question of time and space’.
566  24: 
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Performs immediacy in ways which are not ontologically given but 
which have devolved, rather, from the communicative imperatives of 
the [television] medium.
567 
Chapters nine and ten will consider how such ‘communicative mechanisms’ 
operate in a range of texts drawn from across multiple platforms, examining the 
way in which ‘liveness’ is evoked, crafting a visual and aural aesthetic modeled 
at least partially on the unpredictability of ‘raw footage’.  
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9  Raw footage, performance and non-fiction 
 
The air war started with a split-screen war of images: 
in one box, a desolate Kabul seen through a night-scope 
camera lens, in grainy-green pixels except for the 
occasional white arc of anti-aircraft fire… In the other, 
a rotating cast of characters, beginning with President 
Bush…  On the one side we witnessed images of 
embodied resolve in high resolution; on the other, night 
time shadows with nobody in sight.
568 
-  James Der Derian  
Life imitates art, but so do documentaries.
569 
-  Jeffrey Chown 
This is a war where the best footage is all shot by the 
people on the ground; either the insurgents shoot 
footage or the American troops shoot footage, and 
that’s probably also influenced the way people depict 
the war.
570 
-  Nick Broomfield 
 
A terrorist plot unfolds onscreen, captured on a shaky, hand-held camera.  A 
clock appears in the lower part of the screen, the metallic sound of its seconds 
ticking over emphasising the immediacy of the unfolding drama.  As the familiar 
voice of Keifer Sutherland bemoans the unreliability of intermittent cell-phone 
coverage, the screen contracts.  The space around it fills first with blackness, 
then with other images: multiple aircraft have been hijacked, and are 
approaching their grim destinations miles apart but concurrent in time.  Later 
another split screen emphasises the full scale of this terrifying plot: four targets, 
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three already in smouldering ruin and one endangered.  The summary displays 
many of the hallmarks of an episode of 24, but it is not an episode of 24. 
The text described is 9/11: The Flight That Fought Back (Goodison, 2005), a 
documentary covering one strand of the terrorist attacks of September 11
th 
2001, with tangential reference to the day’s wider events.  The film features 
talking-head interviews with the families of United 93 passengers, who perished 
when their plane was crashed into a field in Pennsylvania, after what is 
popularly understood to have been a selfless act of insurrection.  Interviews are 
combined with other familiar documentary stylistics: a contextualising voice-
over, historical source material (in this case the inclusion of actual sound 
recordings from the cockpit of the hijacked flight) and clips taken from 
contemporaneous news reports.  Additionally, acted and scripted 
‘reconstructions’ feature heavily, dramatising scenes for which no visual record 
remain.  The external images of the plane are computer generated, and the 
majority of the action shown is a best-guess speculation of the unknowable final 
moments on the flight.   
This combination of documentary and drama conventions is hardly unique, but 
the explicit evocation of a particular television fiction – the star persona of 
Keifer Sutherland; split-screen; an onscreen, audible, digital clock – is more 
unusual.  24 was only four series old when The Flight That Fought Back 
premiered in the US on the fourth anniversary of ‘9/11’.  Yet for the makers of 
The Flight That Fought Back, this was the preferred template for narrating a 
real event; its factual claims viewed through the prism of a specific fiction’s 
aesthetic.  These ‘interpretive cues’, Mike Chopra-Gant suggests, are a 
deliberate frame designed to organise the filmmakers’ ‘preferred reading of the 
film’.
571  The components of this preferred reading are only one of the questions 
this chapter hopes to address.  More broadly, The Flight That Fought Back’s 
merging of actuality and recreation, the evocation of television fiction alongside 
claims to documentation and verisimilitude, represents important wider trends 
in War on Terror narratives. 
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In the previous chapters, structural strategies were characterised as aesthetic 
choices rather than inherent characteristics of particular media.  The 24-
mimicry of The Flight That Fought Back suggests that such aesthetic choices 
eventually become naturalised ways with which to narrate and organise 
particular types of plots, regardless of their relation to actual events.
572  The 
final chapters will identify and provide evidence for one such example: the 
frequency with which a performed ‘raw footage’ aesthetic is adopted in audio-
visual depictions of the War on Terror, with the term ‘raw’ describing footage 
that appears free from editorial intervention or manipulation; that has been 
spontaneously captured as fully as the situation permits.  Note that I say that it 
‘appears’ this way, not that it is that way: as I will shortly argue, this effect can 
be staged and performed in addition to being, in some cases, a situational 
necessity.  I will begin by identifying ‘caught-on-camera’ citizen journalist 
footage in news reports of 9/11, and suggest a corresponding emphasis on 
unprepared reactions in observational documentaries, before chapter ten 
considers the implications of a performed pseudo-footage aesthetic in fiction 
texts.  Throughout I will argue that the evocation of ‘raw footage’ does more 
than influence the visual aesthetic; it involves a structural impact as well. 
This chapter will begin with a brief history of the visual documenter in war.  This 
will re-introduce the influence of particular technologies on narrative form, with 
the quantity and immediacy of roughshod reports – often transmitted live - 
shown to frame the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan in particular ways.  I will then 
briefly examine the body of documentaries made about the subject, drawing 
upon more detailed research into the documentary boom to sketch key trends.  
A case study of The War Tapes will expand upon the most pertinent of the 
trends, involving the observational embedded filmmaker, which will lead to a 
more theoretical consideration of the implications and associations of ‘caught-
on-tape’ footage.  From this, a ‘raw-footage aesthetic’ will be identified and 
defined, characterised as reactive and unprepared, but also suggestive of 
authenticity.  The raw-footage aesthetic downplays the constructedness of 
filmmaking and emphatically and self-consciously defines itself as unscripted, 
uncontrolled and unmanipulated. 
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Frequently I will use the term ‘visual documenter’ to refer to the camera-
operator, a deliberately ambiguous term intended to be applicable to all of the 
various types of ‘cameraman’ as touched upon in his chapter.  When necessary, 
the particular type of visual documenter will be specified, whether that be 
freelance documentary filmmaker, network photojournalist, amateur civilian or 
the self-documenting subject.  But this chapter will ultimately argue that, at an 
aesthetic level, there is hybridity between these categories, and therefore their 
distinctiveness from one another is, for the most part, less important than their 
similarities.   
9.1  The visual documenter at war 
The role of the cameraman in war dates back as far as the Spanish-American War 
of 1898; that of the photographer to the Crimean War of 1854-5; and that of the 
written documenter considerably further still.  The relationship between the 
military and journalism is always dynamic, the level of co-operation and trust 
shifting over time, and varying according to the nature of the conflict in 
question: protests over the Vietnam War are routinely claimed to have been 
considerably strengthened by the shock engendered by uncensored images sent 
home by cameramen in the field;
573 the intervention in Bosnia in the mid-nineties 
by a US-led NATO is frequently associated with ‘the CNN effect’, the imperative 
to act in a given situation influenced by the coverage afforded it by news 
outlets.
574  In one example, distaste and outrage hasten the withdrawal of 
troops; in the other, those same emotional responses are used to help justify 
their deployment.  Tracing the vicissitudes of the fluctuating relationship 
between the military and journalists far exceeds the abilities of this thesis.  
However, several issues, lifted from the work of others, will help to 
contextualise the proposed move from a composed, glossy textual style in news 
reports of the first Gulf War, to what I will call a ‘raw footage’ aesthetic visible 
in coverage of the War on Terror. 
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Paul Virilio notes that in the Great War of 1914-18, the photojournalist was 
distrusted by the military establishment: 
Vaguely lumped in the same category as spies, civilian filmmakers and 
photographers were generally kept out of military zones.
575 
The job of documentation was left to illustrators and engravers, and the 
fictionalisation and embellishment that partially shaped their work is an early 
indicator of the themes that will be explored in the next chapter.  This distrust 
of photojournalism stems from an awareness on the military establishment’s 
part of the strategic advantage visual surveillance affords; visual documents 
outwith the control of the strategists and generals were potentially dangerous, 
or at the very least not to be encouraged as they could potentially aid the 
enemy.  By the Second World War, however, the roles were altered, and the 
visual documenter was incorporated into the military effort.  Filmmakers like 
John Ford, though not strictly speaking journalists as such, lent their abilities: 
From on board a freighter, Ford meticulously filmed the approaches 
and defences of all the major Eastern ports… Among other things, 
what Ford would retain of his military career were those almost- 
anthropomorphic camera movements that anticipated the optical 
scanning of video surveillance.
576 
The observation from Virilio concerning the influence of this role on Ford’s later 
work pre-empts the next chapter’s conclusion: that an aesthetic originating in 
documentary practice (of a sort) has influenced depictions of the War on Terror 
more broadly, its connotations carrying particular ideological power.  But 
although the detached surveillance style suggested in the above passage has its 
War on Terror counterpart in the closed-circuit television aesthetic discussed 
earlier in relation to Redacted, the aesthetic I am currently concerned with is 
much less composed and much more subjectively personal. 
Moving on to the American war in Vietnam, the visual documenter’s role in the 
war zone changed again.  Virilio identifies the censorial attitude prompted by 
the media’s perceived role in ‘losing’ the war: 
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Photographers, the group who had contributed so much to the Allied 
victory against the Nazis, were soon to precipitate America’s defeat in 
Vietnam… [And] once the military twigged that photographers, 
steeped in the traditions of the documentary, now lost wars, image 
hunters were once again removed from combat zones.
577 
This censorial reaction originates in a fear of the power contained within the 
image.  For examples of this fear’s manifestation in the War on Terror, one need 
only consider the photographs of the torture at Abu Ghraib, the US government’s 
reaction to their being made public suggesting awareness of the threat posed by 
a visual record.   
While international journalists were permitted during the first Gulf War in 1991, 
their ability to report was similarly censored.  The distrust of unyoked reporters 
was strong enough for CNN’s chief correspondent Peter Arnett to be labelled in 
some quarters as an Iraqi sympathiser, and President George HW Bush was 
reportedly angered that attempts to demonise Saddam Hussein were undercut 
every time a US network aired footage of Hussein amiably meeting with Western 
hostages.
578  This charge was particularly frequent when it came to those 
stationed in Baghdad, since their presence was necessarily authorised by the 
Iraqi government, leaving such reporters open to charges of concession and 
manipulation.   
Ironically, the other frequent charge levied at Gulf War coverage was its 
unquestioning adoption of the official version of events provided by politicians 
and the military.  Philip Taylor remarks how reporters on the ground in Iraq 
frequently relied upon news stories coming through on the wire that they simply 
regurgitated for the camera, recycling it as news borne of their own volition.
579  
This was partly due to the restrictions placed on reporting.  While news teams 
covering the Gulf War broadcast audio-visual material live around the world, the 
content of that footage was carefully managed.  The regulatory efforts of the US 
Department of Defense intensified as technologies of live transmission became 
more powerful, widespread and portable.  There was no longer a delay of days 
and weeks as reports were filed or photographs shipped back home from the 
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battlefield; footage could be sent unfiltered from the frontline, which posed 
new challenges to the military’s press corp.  The Annex Foxtrot memo which 
circulated in 1990 spelt out the US military’s policy.  Written by chief Public 
Affairs Officer Captain Ron Wildermuth, one frequently reported rule stated that 
‘News media representatives will be escorted at all times.  Repeat, at all 
times’.
580  The New York Times noted: 
The Gulf War marked this century’s first major conflict where the 
policy was to confine reporters to escorted pools that sharply 
curtailed when and how they could talk to the troops.
581 
For those that agreed to its conditions, the arrangement allowed for 
aesthetically-attractive image-making, so long as the results were favourable to 
the military’s preferred representation.  At times, the images were closer to a 
cinematic frame of reference than a televisual one: 
The Gulf War looked very different from an ordinary news event.  In 
part, this was because of the unusual sense of power conveyed by the 
images - the armour surging forward, the F-15E thrusting into the air 
with afterburners glowing, the sixteen-inch guns of the battleship 
Wisconsin belching fire.  But there was something else distinctive 
about many of these images: they were beautiful.
582  
This composed beauty, I will suggest, is less characteristic fifteen years later, 
though the resemblance between news footage and contemporaneous fiction 
arguably remains in an altered form.  Where the above description of the 1991 
Gulf War news coverage evokes the spectacle of a film like Top Gun (Scott, 
1986), which made a similar exhibition of military hardware via stylised action 
shots, I will argue in this chapter and the next that depictions of the War on 
Terror in news media, television and cinema emphasise ‘rawness’. 
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As well as the obligatory escorts, press pools were established that dictated 
which reporters could work when and where.  While this method of information 
control has been labelled propagandist and a victory for the military in its 
‘battle’ against the media (during this period the two are frequently 
characterised as foes, not allies), the majority of commentators also note that 
the media happily acquiesced, lobbying perhaps for preferential access, but 
honouring and adhering to the restrictive framework set out for them, ‘keen to 
cooperate with the hands that fed them with their tit-bits of vital 
information’.
583  When the war was over, there was no deluge of reporters, freed 
from gag orders, ready to admonish the military’s clampdown on their profession 
and unveil the ‘True Story’.  I mention this so as not to falsely simplify the 
relationship between the military and the media as binary and oppositional at 
this stage.  However, the way in which the media were effectively managed in 
the Gulf War has relevance to the tactics employed the second time the US 
invaded countries in the Middle East. 
By the time the US military entered Afghanistan in 2001, the method of news 
control had shifted tactics from exclusion to inclusion.  In a bid to regulate 
journalistic output at least partially, journalists were now ‘embedded’ with 
troops.  The guidelines issued by the Department of Defense specified that: 
These embedded media will live, work and travel as part of the units 
with which they are embedded to facilitate maximum, in-depth 
coverage of U.S. forces in combat and related operations.
584 
The logic, according to Chown, is that pairing a reporter with specific soldiers, 
whose names, faces and personalities the journalist would learn and remember, 
would result in a more sympathetic, or at the very least empathetic, portrayal of 
the conflict.
585  Embedding placed reporters in the midst of action alongside 
those fighting the war.  Bill Katovsky and Timothy Carlson comment: 
Embedded reporters ate, lived, traveled and slept with the troops.  
They choked on the same sandstorm grit and carried the same 
mandatory gas mask and chem. suits.  They dined on the same MREs 
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(Meals Ready to Eat), and bounced along the same rutted desert 
tracks.  They faced the same enemy fire.
586 
This threat is important: with an increased number of journalists in the midst of 
the fighting, risks to them also increased.  John Higgins and Alison Romano 
estimate that journalist deaths in Iraq surpassed those of the whole of World 
War 2 by 2008,
587 while Katovsky and Carlson claim that ‘statistically, journalists 
were ten times more likely to die than the 250,000 American and British 
soldiers’.
588   
The visual record of such death and destruction also reached its audience 
substantially faster than in World War 2; transmission technologies had 
superseded those used even in the first Gulf War many times over, and if 
‘liveness’ was a key trope in coverage of the first war in Iraq, it was even more 
so the second time around.  This instantaneity allows, like the GNN’s multiple 
plotlines, coverage of the world now, simultaneously experienced in multiple 
locations (the ‘here’ of the viewer watching at home and the ‘there’ of the flak-
jacket-wearing embedded reporter).  The embedded visual documenter, closer 
to the front line than press pooling or outright exclusion would allow, and keen 
to stress their presence alongside those doing the fighting, is strategically placed 
to privilege such live, perilous up-close-and-personal immediacy. 
The visual documenter in the War on Terror’s battlefield is identified, therefore, 
as imperiled by the situation and responsive to instantaneously unfolding events.  
Composure is challenged: carefully organised reports are destabilised by 
potential jeopardy and situational unpredictability.  It is irrelevant whether this 
danger is genuine in each individual report; similarly, the actual ratio of reports 
actually transmitted live compared to those pre-recorded, a ratio that a 
quantitative study could calculate,
589 similarly has no bearing on the point at 
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hand.  What is relevant is that a live, imperiled and reactive aesthetic gains 
visibility in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, partly as a result of technological 
advances and partly due to alterations to the military’s organisation of media 
personnel.   
To explain the way a practical, organisational decision (i.e. embedding) effects 
the War on Terror aesthetic more generally it is worth re-considering a second 
form of embedding, one discussed at length in previous chapters: that of placing 
one frame (or more) within another.  News reports frequently utilise multiple 
displays to cover a story: a studio will often feature banks of display units and 
monitors that dominate the set dressing, while a typical report might include a 
shot in which the studio-bound anchor converses with a field reporter in 
Kandahar, Baghdad, Peshwar or other commonly-visited locations through a 
video link-up.  The word ‘live’ is usually emphatically printed on the screen 
during such exchanges, emphasising that both the trusted anchor and the 
intrepid war correspondent are communicating across vast distances, and that 
we are witnessing the exchange as it happens.  The creation of this sense of 
liveness is more than just technological, and indicated by more than just the 
superimposed ‘live’ stamp.  Other aesthetic elements connoting ‘liveness’ 
include: a corrupted data feed from the satellite link-up leading to a breakdown 
in image fidelity; time delays that punctuate long-distance verbal exchanges; or 
the sight of a still and unresponsive reporter unable to hear the anchor when the 
audio connection is lost.   
While this type of news report is often actually live – transmitted and broadcast 
via satellite near-instantaneously at the moment of recording – other visual 
documenters do not proffer their footage so immediately. Their recordings will 
not be consumed until much later, after being shaped in the edit suite in 
preparation for feature-length broadcast or theatrical release, yet with their 
‘rawness’ strategically preserved to some extent in the finished article.  The 
type of visual documenter to which I refer is the documentary filmmaker. 
                                                                                                                             
journalism: Cable TV’  (2004), accessed May 2011. http://stateofthemedia.org/2004/cable-tv-
intro/content-analysis/)     231 
9.2  The War on Terror documentary  
With camcorders on the battlefield and both sides using 
the Internet, the Iraq war has become the first ‘digital’ 
war.
590 
-  Jeffrey Chown 
Thanks to the ubiquity of the web-cam, sky-jackings 
take place in real time.
591 
-  Lee Rodney 
Susan Carruthers, author of several articles on the War on Terror documentary, 
comments upon their numbers and possible motives: 
Dissatisfied with mainstream media and frustrated by an 
administration intent on curtailing the war’s visual record, many 
independent filmmakers have been drawn to Iraq.  The result: a 
significant corpus of documentary films.
592 
As well as aligning the feature documentary with the investigative journalism 
role discussed in relation to conspiracy culture in chapter four, this quote 
reintroduces the curtailing of journalistic imperatives, a professional 
infringement whose historical precedents have just been considered.  Carruthers 
identifies several strands specifically about the Iraq War, although with 
conclusions relevant to documentary films about the wars in Afghanistan and 
other War-on-Terror related events, and identifies particular ‘waves’ as 
prominent at different stages.  The first is the immersed and observational, as 
seen in early documentaries such as Iraq in Fragments (Longley, 2006) and 
Gunner Palace (Epperlein and Tucker, 2004).
593  Such ‘verité portraits of 
occupation, soldiering, and sensitively drawn cameos of Iraqi life’
594 became 
restrictively dangerous following the troop surge in 2007; as a result, a second 
wave comes to the fore, in which ‘flies on the wall are replaced by a procession 
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of talking heads’, with Iraq itself ‘largely rendered through archival footage’: 
such films include No End In Sight and Taxi to the Dark Side (Gibney, 2007).
595  In 
these, the tone is no longer detached and observational, but frequently 
accusational, partial or polemical.  The third strand Carruthers identifies a year 
later is the returning veteran documentary, for which she uses the examples of 
Body of War (Donohue and Spiro, 2007) and Lioness (McLagan and Sommers, 
2008).
596  The first of these ‘waves’ is the most relevant to this chapter’s 
interest in an observational documentary aesthetic, while the second resonates 
with the style of The Flight That Fought Back as discussed earlier.  The third is 
less immediately helpful, as it refers primarily to a shift in topic rather than a 
shift in style.   
Within 9/11-related documentary, one of the most discussed texts is 9/11 
(Hanlon, Klug, Naudet and Naudet, 2002), billed in its opening titles as ‘An eye-
witness account of one of the most defining moments of our time’.  In 
September 2001, the Naudet brothers were filming an observational 
documentary about Manhattan’s Engine 7/Ladder 1 company of the New York 
Fire Department.  In the film’s voice-overs and interviews, they discuss their 
search for a suitably compelling narrative around which to structure their film, 
with the probation period of rookie Tony Benetatos offering the most possibility.  
However, the lack of drama is a source of frustration: as they film the minutia of 
life in the fire house with only routine call-outs to break up the footage of 
Benetatos preparing meals (a job reserved for rookies), they voice their 
impatience and hope for something dramatic to turn their ‘great cooking show’ 
into something more memorable.  On one-such callout – a possible gas leak – 
they record, by chance, American Airlines flight eleven crashing in to the North 
Tower of the World Trade Centre, one of only a handful of videos taken of the 
first plane’s impact.  One of the brothers, Jules, is then able to accompany fire-
fighters into the lobby of the North Tower, resulting in the only known footage 
of the building’s interior shortly before its collapse, while the other gets caught 
in the vast dust cloud caused by the South Tower’s collapse as he tries to 
approach the World Trade Centre to find his younger brother.  What had been 
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planned as an observational documentary about a professional place of work 
became, quite accidentally, an observational documentary about the terrorist 
attacks of September 11
th, 2001.  The lack of preparedness is evident in much of 
the footage shot following the sudden shift in focus: for Jules, a shaky camera, a 
lack of audio clarity due to the absence of on-person microphones, and eddying 
spins and turns as he tries to film all of the carnage that surrounds him; for 
Gedeon, the complete visual obstruction following the tower’s collapse, and the 
sight of his hand optimistically trying to wipe away the thick dust coating the 
lens so as to continue documenting the destruction. 
There is an amateurish quality about the resulting footage – uncomposed, 
incomplete and lacking clarity.  Not that the Naudet brothers are themselves 
amateurs: the sibling filmmakers had already completed one full-length 
documentary, Hope, Gloves and Redemption (1999) at the time of the attacks.  
However, ‘amateurish’ is being used as a stylistic descriptor, not a category 
designating a particular level of filmmaking experience; the footage of 9/11 is 
amateurish, but not amateur.  Like the imperilled, ‘live’, embedded reporter, 
the volatility of the situation they find themselves reporting on strips away their 
composure and leaves them responsive rather than proactive.   
Lee Rodney suggests it is the coverage of September 11
th, 2001 in news and in 
documentaries like 9/11 that subsequently played the greatest role in shaping 
coverage of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq that followed; specifically the 
emphasis on the chaotic and uncomposed: 
The prevalence of ‘amateur’ video footage in much of what now 
stands of 9/11 certainly influenced how the invasion of Iraq was 
subsequently presented in 2003.  The emphasis on ‘real life’ confusion 
as conveyed in the jerky, vertiginous sequences, dirty lenses and 
hysterical commentary that came through in the camcorder tapes of 
the World Trade Centre collapse gave new life to the old form of the 
eye-witness account.
597 
The non-professional witness, called upon so frequently to voice their reactions 
to the attacks and to provide visual documentation of an event for which 
professional news teams were understandably unprepared, become the War on 
Terror’s primary visual paradigm.  Rodney continues: 
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The introduction of the embedded journalist in Iraq and the excessive 
focus on twenty-four hour coverage also emphasised real-time 
information and appeared ‘unedited’.
598 
Of course, both 9/11 and the prepared reports submitted by embeds in Iraq and 
Afghanistan are, naturally, extensively edited prior to broadcast/release.  I now 
want to turn my attention to a relatively recent development in journalism, 
which is frequently considered more transparent and authentic than the reports 
proffered by professionals and documentaries like 9/11, regardless of how ‘raw’ 
they are made to appear: the citizen journalist. 
9.3  DIY journalism 
Like most of the structural, aesthetic and historical trends visible in War on 
Terror narratives discussed in this thesis, the citizen journalist is not a post-9/11 
invention; for instance, the fear of a loss of authority for traditional news 
outlets has been a source of concern in the published news world since long 
before al-Qaeda became a house-hold name.  However, the citizen-journalist 
nonetheless carries special meaning in the current context, his/her ubiquity 
particularly noticeable during the period in which the War on Terror rhetoric 
flourished.  While Stuart Allan identifies early examples of what would come to 
be termed ‘citizen journalism’ as far back as 1989,
599 September 11
th, 2001 is 
usually identified as a key date in its development.  In a report written for the 
Pew Internet and American Life Project, Lee Rainie, Susannah Fox and Mary 
Madden state that:  
Do-it-yourself journalism has been a staple of Internet activity for 
years and the terrorist attacks gave new prominence to the 
phenomenon... With the eyes of the world focused on a small number 
of related events, many stepped into the role of amateur journalist, 
seeking out sources and sometimes assembling these ideas for 
others.
600 
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The citizen journalist is here explicitly linked to the centrality of the ‘eye-
witness’ more widely in contemporary news reports.  Stephanie Marriott notes 
that, on September 11
th, 2001, NBC aired its first telephone interview with an 
eyewitness only fifteen seconds into their breaking news coverage, with five 
more featuring in the fifteen minutes that followed (a pattern observable across 
networks),
601 and the trend is more recently observable in the BBC’s tendency to 
augment its online reports with a catalogue of ‘eyewitness accounts’, as seen 
following the 2011 Japanese earthquake,
602 and the suicide bombing at 
Domodedovo airport in Moscow.
603  Claiming to witness an event first-hand 
carries, Stuart Allan and Barbie Zelizer note, a certain kind of ‘discursive 
authority’.
604  ‘Eyewitnessing’, Zelizer writes elsewhere, ‘is thought to offer a 
kind of proof that is different from that provided by other types of reportorial 
chronicles’, namely ‘an ability to account subjectively for the events, actions or 
practices seen with one’s own eyes’.
605  This appeal has long been cultivated by 
war correspondents ‘on the frontlines’, and is now increasingly evidenced by the 
actions of the citizen-journalist. 
The citizen journalist is troubled less by fact-checking, impartiality or context; 
instead, their authority comes exclusively from presence at the scene, from the 
speed with which they translate their version of the events into an online 
narrative.  Not that reports are restricted solely to online sources; television 
networks in the US and elsewhere accepted and encouraged footage from such 
non-professional sources and actively sought eye-witness accounts, incorporating 
them into their reports alongside more conventionally presented segments.  The 
eye-witness visual documenter had featured in the narrating of previous events: 
Richard Sambrook (amongst others) identifies Abraham Zapruder’s accidental 
filming of the assassination of President John F. Kennedy in 1963 as the trend’s 
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key predecessor,
606 while the videotape footage of Los Angelean police beating 
Rodney King in 1991 is identified by Dan Gilmour as another key instance.
607  But 
by 2001 the technology facilitated it to a far greater degree – a rise that 
continued as cameras became smaller, more ubiquitous, and capable of higher 
picture quality.
608  By 2004, coverage of the Asian tsunami was initially 
illustrated almost solely by mobile phone video clips taken by those in afflicted 
countries (at least until professional news teams arrived to document the rescue 
and recovery efforts), making it the ‘decisive moment’ when ‘citizen journalism 
became a prominent feature on the journalistic landscape’ in many histories of 
the trend.
609  Other key instances include the terrorist attacks in London in 2005, 
following which the BBC received more than one thousand photographs, twenty 
videos, four thousand text messages and twenty thousands emails, many of 
which were incorporated into the news coverage;
610 pilot Chesley Sullenberger’s 
successful landing of his Airbus 320 in the Hudson, first reported – with pictures – 
through the social network Twitter, whose users broke the news seconds after 
the landing, thereby scooping the professional news outlets; and Shohaib Athar’s 
accidental real-time tweeting of the Navy Seal raid that killed Osama Bin Laden 
in Abbottabad.
611 
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Fig. 9.1: Hudson landing, Janis Krums via Twitter, 15
th Jan 2009 
When it comes to video footage, the ubiquity of recording equipment permits a 
certain level of polished professionalism to creep into even the most modestly-
recorded clip; post-shoot, easily and cheaply available editing software such as 
Windows Movie Maker (for PCs), iMovie (for Macs), as well as slightly more 
expensive examples like Adobe Premier and Final Cut Pro (both of which are 
used by professional editors and broadcasters as well as by non-professional 
consumers), permit a degree of polish to be applied very quickly.  However, as 
Amy West observes, whether filmed by a professional embed using state of the 
art, lightweight equipment, or a citizen-journalist using store-bought consumer 
products such as mobile phones or digital cameras/camcorders, a relatively 
rough aesthetic aids its apparent veracity and verisimilitude: 
[Caught-on-tape] events such as these cannot be predicted, pre-
planned or staged – thus they cannot be faked.  But this assertion of 
the unfakability of content is not enough.  Without a correlative 
promise of a truthful medium, this putative reality is as suspect as 
that of any other represented event.  This is why the flag of 
amateurism is waved so high in the field of caught-on-tape television.  
The self-evident non-professionalism of footage screened under the 
caught-on-tape banner certifies that the represented event is not 
staged, because both the technology utilised and operator controlling     238 
it lack the sophistication to fake.  Thus amateur image production is 
coded as transparent.
612  
So, far from a restrictive compromise, such an aesthetic is ideologically 
powerful, a stamp of authenticity and transparency which is actively sought 
after, hence the drive to simulate or replicate its ‘rawness’.  West goes on to 
note how visual and aural clarity is exchanged for authenticity: 
Compromises in audio and visual pleasure which this mode of 
production may entail are traded off against a heightened feeling of 
the real – a trade audiences are more than willing to make.  The poor 
quality of caught-on-tape footage thus becomes a marker of realness 
because it signals certain circumstances of production.  The co-
incidence of unpredictable content and unprocessed medium adds up 
to a powerful and pervasive sense of the real.
613 
The poor quality of such footage can be indicative of unavoidable limitations (of 
technology, of situation, of production), but in those cases where more 
composed and polished footage is potentially attainable, the adoption of an 
amateurish aesthetic has to be understood as an artistic choice, rather than a 
circumstantial compromise.   
9.4  Collage and self-documentation 
To return to 9/11, it is important not to emphasise only its ‘caught-on-tape’ 
footage.  As James Kendrick notes, ‘for all the immediacy of 9/11, it still bears 
the hallmarks of a constructed film’.
614  As well as the footage shot by the 
Naudet brothers, numerous additions are made: a voice-over from former fire-
fighter, co-director and actor James Hanlon; talking-head interviews; a non-
diegetic musical score (which, as Kendrick notes, ‘is clearly intended to guide 
the viewer’s emotional experience’);
615 sound bridges linking multiple video clips 
together; rostrum stills; onscreen captions; an aural montage of 
contemporaneous news reports commenting upon the attacks; digital 
manipulation of the image (footage is slowed down, paused, and later 
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repeated); and additional, secondary source footage, used to provide angles on 
events that the brothers’ perspectives could not offer.  The editing itself is also 
far from unobtrusive; the majority of shots last only a few seconds at a time, 
dissecting the raw footage and undermining the supposed transparency that the 
documentary otherwise ostensibly foregrounds.  With such conscious 
manipulation of the image, and with so much artistic intervention evident in the 
film, 9/11 is typical of the way that a semblance of un-manipulated ‘rawness’ is 
often evoked within an otherwise composed framework. 
102 Minutes That Changed America (edited by Seth Skundrick, 2008) evokes this 
tension more subtly by dispensing with many of the traditional documentary 
ingredients used to piece together 9/11’s narrative.  It consists of an elaborate 
collage of video clips taken from over one hundred sources, which narrates in 
‘real-time’ (i.e. the atomised, chronological clock-time identified in chapter 
seven) the one hundred and two minutes from the first plane crash to the 
towers’ collapse.  Like The Flight That Fought Back, there are echoes of 24’s 
temporal organisation: a digital clock appears on screen regularly in the format 
‘00:00:00:00am’ – chronicling events down to the last hundredth of a second.  
No contextual voiceover explains the on-screen visuals; captions occasionally 
note the location of the individual responsible for each clip but not their 
identity.  The opening title card identifies them only as ‘eyewitnesses who 
grabbed their cameras to record an unfolding event that became history’; 
otherwise it is difficult to discern whether they are examples of non-professional 
members of the public, filmmakers like the Naudet brothers or news-team B-
roll.  The clips all exist on the same aesthetic plane, some more composed than 
others but all of comparable technical quality.  Sometimes sound helps mark the 
distinction: one high-angle view of the towers is accompanied by a voice 
conducting a ‘mic check for the newscopter’, while others are sound tracked by 
the distressed sounds of families in their living rooms.  In practice, sounds 
frequently bridge two different clips, indicating that the image and the audio 
have been separated, the latter later recombined with the former in a way that 
aids continuity.  The end credits list forty-one individual contributors, followed 
by ‘Additional archive courtesy of ARD German TV, ABCNews Videosource, BBC 
Motion Gallery, CNN Imagesource, Global Imageworks, LLC, NY1, WABC Radio     240 
770, WABC-TV, WCBS Newsradio 880, WNYW-TV/FOX 5’.  Telling them apart is 
not an easy task. 
Similarly complex in its construction is the presentation of raw footage in 
Combat Diary: The Marines of Lima Company (Epstein, 2006).  The film mixes 
observational footage of the titular Company engaged in various activities; self-
recorded video clips of the soldiers in Iraq; and retrospective talking head 
interviews with many of the Marines.  As Sgt. Steve Hicks states during the film, 
‘Everybody had a camera, and if they didn’t… by the time you left they did 
(sic)’.  Director Michael Epstein uses these clips, marked by their low-resolution 
and haphazard framing, to construct a narrative of the ‘hardest-hit’ Company in 
Iraq (Lima took fifty-nine casualties during their tour of Al Anbar in 2005, 
twenty-three of which were fatal).  But the incorporation of low quality, 
‘authentic’ images is, as in 9/11, contained within a professionally-constructed 
framework: 
The camera footage… is still subject to the mediation of a professional 
video editor.  The lighting and composition may have a rough edge, 
but the overall narrative structure and sequencing are far beyond the 
amateur.
616 
More recently, Iraq and Afghanistan veterans were invited to direct and produce 
a season of films as part of an initiative entitled Operation in Their Boots.  The 
participants were chosen on the basis of their filmmaking aptitude, as well as 
their experience in the military, and their filmmaking skills were honed in a 
‘bootcamp’ designed to impart key skills and enhance an understanding of 
various documentary filmmaking conventions.  Reporting on the project, 
Alexandra Zavis of the L.A. Times suggests the project arose from a need to 
counter the distorted representations of such issues by ‘civilian’ filmmakers: 
For years they have cringed at Hollywood’s portrayals of the Iraq and 
Afghan wars.  And don’t get them started on the inaccuracies in the 
Oscar-nominated film The Hurt Locker.  Now, five veterans have been 
offered a chance to make their own documentaries about the 
consequences of the wars for them and those around them.
617  
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The five veterans chosen to take part each tackle a different under- or mis-
represented subject pertaining to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, from PTSD 
(post-traumatic stress disorder), to substance abuse, to the particular challenges 
that face Muslim American soldiers.  Most topics are tackled from a personal 
standpoint: for example, Marine veteran Chris Mandia – now a playwright and 
screenwriter – examines ‘the transitional journey American service members 
make when they go from the battlefield to a college campus’ while attending 
the University of Southern California.
618  The project’s press release states the 
overall aims clearly: 
For the first time, soldiers who have felt and seen the ravages of 
war… will have the opportunity to tell their war stories unfiltered. 
[emphasis added]
619  
There is no acknowledgement of the apparent tension between the stated aim of 
presenting an ‘unfiltered’ perspective, and lengthy training sessions with 
mentors including Robert Greenwald,
620 designed to ensure that the finished 
products are of a sufficiently-high quality ‘fit for the silver screen’.
621 
Chown explicitly compares documentary examples to their online video clip 
equivalents: 
It is instructive to compare these works to the less polished, amateur 
footage that is easily available on YouTube and its growing number of 
competitors.  The material ranges from a simple, thirty second clip of 
an IED explosion caught by a soldier out on patrol to more carefully 
edited polemical pieces designed to present pointed commentary.  In 
this area, documentary representations of the Iraq war are furthest 
from the Vietnam template and, in effect, offer a new visual 
paradigm that is more subjective, spontaneous and unfiltered than 
previous media.
622 
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While I partially agree with the above statement, I think the distinction is not as 
clear-cut as is suggested here.  Reuters also posted footage online during the 
wars, which was deliberately left ‘raw’ – without commentary or final edition – 
while MSNBC.com streamed: 
A webcam of the Baghdad skyline as the city was bombed [and] 
reported significant number of viewers simply leaving the sites open 
all day on their work computers.  In removing some of broadcast 
journalism’s usual packaging, such forms of coverage appealed as a 
step beyond immediate news to become, at least in appearance, 
unmediated or unfiltered news.
623 
I would also argue that the online clip posted by the DIY novice is frequently 
heavily manipulated or edited: the number of videos uploaded to sites such as 
YouTube (as well as smaller, subject-specific equivalents such as 
militaryvideos.net) that feature a soundtrack of classical music, hip-hop, heavy 
metal or jingoistic, patriotic country and western (to name only the most 
prevalent genres and styles) testify to the contextual framing practices engaged 
in by even those filmmakers with the most limited resources.  The new visual 
paradigm the latter online visual documenters offer, then, may appear more 
subjective, spontaneous and unfiltered, but that is not to say that these 
documents are more subjective, spontaneous or unfiltered.  And neither are 
their network news equivalents; as Donald Matheson and Stuart Allan note, 
‘technologies of immediacy, while removing some news packaging, [do] not 
remove newsroom control’.
624     
The visual documenter, then, whether imperiled embed, documentary 
filmmaker, or citizen journalist, is characterised as unprepared and caught-off-
guard, but this visual paradigm is largely independent of the mode of 
production, performed by professional news teams, online filmmakers and self-
documenting soldiers alike.  Such an aesthetic connotes mobility, 
responsiveness, transparency and, most importantly, authenticity.  This 
authenticity replaces composed professionalism as the primary claim to 
authority.  To reiterate what should be already clear, however, I do not wish to 
claim this as universal.  It is not the only way in which visual documents of the 
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wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have been shaped, and alternatives exist.  The 
composed composition continues to play a strong visual role in both news reports 
and documentaries about the War on Terror’s military conflicts, and, as will be 
discussed in chapter ten, a second trend originating in high-spec military 
technology influences its documentary and fiction narratives in a different, but 
compatible, way.  However, I will argue that the raw footage aesthetic, in 
addition to being prevalent in documentary, news reports and online blogs, is 
particularly influential in the organisation of fictional narratives.  I use the word 
organisation deliberately: as I wish to now argue, the performance is not solely 
visual; it is structural.   
9.5  ‘Caught on camera’: Skeptism towards 9/11 
The perspective from which Naudet filmed the strike 
was so perfect that it cannot have been a coincidence. 
The only reasonable conclusion to draw is that the 
location was chosen in advance, with all that implies by 
way of foreknowledge… they also had the EXTREME 
COINCIDENCE OF FILMING the first plane strike while 
being called for a fake gaz odor alarm [sic].
625 
-  ‘Social Democracy Now’     
The status of caught-on-tape moments - however 
diverse their subject matter - is that of crisis… 
Accidents and aberrations…stake their claim in the 
domain of the real by asserting their status as 
unpremeditated.
626 
-  Amy West 
What the texts under discussion apparently share is their status as unprepared 
reactions, responsive to events out-with the filmmakers’ manipulative abilities.  
In ‘caught-on-tape’ footage, Amy West writes: 
The object of capture is a moment of crisis… [and] because the 
incident is unforeseeable, the circumstances of capture can be 
characterised as inadvertent, meaning that the recorded moment 
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arises out of a critical coincidence of rolling camera and spontaneous 
or aberrant incident.  Notions of entrapment and containment offered 
by the term ‘caught’ are delusory.  In fact this model of audiovisual 
capture is one in which both pro-filmic event and the mechanisms of 
its capture are spontaneous, aberrant, random or inadvertent.
627 
As discussed previously, this condition impacts upon the appearance of such 
footage - shaky camera angles, poor sound, and the low-resolution of inferior 
recording equipment are typical hallmarks.  But it also considerably affects the 
structure of the narratives, with, for example, ‘dead time’ often included to 
emphasise the transparent and untainted recording of events as-they-happen.  
Additionally, ellipses of action are employed differently than they would in a 
more classically organised narrative, with important moments often ‘missed’.  
Where a controlled, professional documentary (or narrative of any kind), might 
seek to edit out anything deemed inessential in order to privilege moments of 
action or drama, the raw footage aesthetic – belatedly responding to 
unforeseeable events – may ignore, or even subvert, such an arrangement.  In 
fact, if the footage that is ‘caught-on-tape’ is deemed too serendipitous, the 
circumstances of its filming too fortuitous, or its coverage too extensive and 
‘professional’, it can arouse suspicion.  The above quote from ‘Social Democracy 
Now’, the online identity of a cynical commentator convinced that the Naudet 
brothers’ film is phony, echoes the conspiracy culture logic discussed in chapter 
four, but a closer look at one of the sources of this allegation ties the paranoid 
presumption more closely to the aesthetic under discussion.   
The source in question is a blogger by the name of Leslie Raphael, who 
responded to the Naudets’ footage with extreme scepticism and compiled a 
sixty-five point list of what he/she terms the many ‘conveniences’ contained in 
a single sequence lasting around two minutes.
628  These include: the peculiar 
allegation that a filmmaker in the process of shooting a documentary would not 
necessarily have had his equipment on his person at that exact moment, and 
therefore the presence of a camera at all is suspicious; the circular logic that, if 
the film was part of a conspiracy, a cover story would be required, and a 
documentary about a fire-house is the perfect smokescreen; and the paranoid 
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claim that the fact that the battery was charged and filming had already started 
is evidence of pre-warning.  This acute mistrust characterises Raphael as an 
example of the online conspiracy theorist, one who seems to be aiming to 
convince through the quantity of allegations rather than their individual 
plausibility.  Raphael concludes the list:  
If just one of these circumstances had not applied, this film might 
easily not exist; how likely is it that every one applied, not one went 
wrong, and that not one other person in Manhattan managed even one 
single piece of luck, to produce even an off-centre, blurred 
monochrome photograph of the event, let alone perfect colour film of 
it?  A unique film might be credible – if it had faults – or conversely, a 
perfect film, if we had others less perfect to compare with it – if not 
quite as imperfect as the Hlava film.  How likely is it that this 
photographer achieved both uniqueness and perfection?
629 
We are not required to entertain this statement as credible;
630 I instead include 
Raphael’s contentions to highlight the suspicion that overly ‘professional’ quality 
can arouse, and the scepticism possible when confronted with too-complete a 
caught-on-camera record.  Most of Raphael’s other sixty one ‘conveniences’ 
relate either to the filmmaker’s expedient location (no traffic or pedestrians 
blocking the shot; facing away from the sun; in line with the plane’s final 
approach) or the suspiciously high quality (the lack of zoom; the lack of 
conversation at the moment the plane flies overhead, which allows its engine 
noise to be picked up by the microphone).  But, to return to the question of 
structure, one more allegation is worth considering: 
He would want to leave out all the flight but the last few seconds - 
the rest of the flight would be an irrelevance or a distraction, and 
only the impact needs to be captured; he films only the last two 
seconds.
631 
This introduces the issue of elided action; by apparently conforming too closely 
to classical editing’s economy of duration, the film’s authenticity is questioned.  
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To elaborate further on this structural effect, I want to turn away from the 
Naudet’s 9/11 documentary to one filmed during the US-led invasion of Iraq. 
9.6  The War Tapes 
When The War Tapes’s director Deborah Scranton was offered accreditation as 
an embedded journalist with the C Company of the New Hampshire Army 
Reserve, she declined, instead providing ten soldiers in the Company with video 
cameras and asking them to document both the tour and their readjustment to 
civilian life upon their return.  Editor Steve James spent a year piecing together 
the eight-hundred hours of raw footage the soldiers sent back to Scranton, with 
three soldiers foregrounded in the finished result.  Like the other documentaries 
discussed thus far, significant artistic interventions are made, often to subtly 
support the ‘raw’ aesthetic – for example, the military-jargon that flows second-
nature from the soldiers’ mouths is explained and defined through onscreen 
captions, explaining the meaning of abbreviations like IED, RPG and VBIED 
without interrupting their dialogue.
632  
Identities are blurred from the outset; professional soldiers are transformed 
through the technological apparatus given to them into amateur cameramen.
633  
Chown notes how their professional role is altered by their use of cameras, 
creating a dual identity that even the embedded journalist cannot emulate: 
Early on in the film, one of the videographers questions a sergeant 
about their mission.  He responds ‘I’m not supposed to talk to the 
media’.  The interviewer responds, ‘What do you mean?  I’m not the 
media’.  But of course, he is.
634 
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Moreover, these soldiers are, like the Naudet brothers, self-documenting 
subjects, characters in a narrative compiled from their own recordings.  There 
are some differences in the set-up compared to 9/11 – the documentary is 
premised on presence in a war zone and the consequential likelihood of drama 
and conflict, as opposed to the sudden unexpectedness of the Naudet’s caught-
on-tape moment.  But while the set-up may involve a degree of expectation, 
unexpectedness and unpreparedness are still key features.  The shocking 
detonation of an improvised roadside explosive; the eruption of gunfire; the 
unpredictable approach of a vehicle towards a roadblock – such events in Iraq or 
Afghanistan may be statistically more likely than the flight of a passenger plane 
into a New York skyscraper, but they are nonetheless individually uncontrollable 
and sudden.  As a result, pivotal moments are missed by The War Tapes 
cameras.  Arguably the most dramatic incident in the film (or at least, the one 
that is dwelt upon and provokes the most emotional response) is the death of an 
Iraqi woman crossing the road in front of an SUV convoy.  Trained not to slow 
down so as not to risk ambush, protocol dictates the SUVs increase their speed, 
striking the woman and killing her.  It is only afterwards that they are able to 
satisfactorily ascertain that she was not a threat, with the soldiers offering 
various accounts: the body was ‘in pieces’ recalls one; another explains how 
they then ‘had to get her out of the road’, then corrects his statement to ‘get 
what was left of her out of the road’; while a third proffers the less graphic 
observation ‘I remember looking down and seeing crumbled cookies’, 
underscoring the innocent intentions of her attempt to cross the road – a biscuit 
delivery that results in her death.  These accounts are delivered at the side of 
the road shortly afterwards; the death is not caught on film, and the soldiers 
can only react to it on-camera after the event has concluded.  The event itself is 
absent, undocumented, and rendered only through verbal recreations.  Rather 
than evidence a flaw in the caught-on-camera aesthetic, however, the fact that, 
often, things are not caught-on-camera, serves to underscore the authenticity in 
a way more likely to discourage the conspiracy-minded scrutiny of paranoid 
online commentators like Leslie Raphael.   
So the raw aesthetic is evoked through more than image quality; caesuras and 
elisions also emphasise immediacy and responsiveness.  However, there is still a     248 
kind of pleasure in completeness, as observed in an example of DIY self-
documentation discussed by Chown: 
An officer in charge of training soldiers for deployment related the 
following story: a friend and former student of his called from a 
hospital in Iraq just after surviving a highway IED explosion.  Despite 
being wounded, the soldier was quite ‘jacked up’.  He excitedly 
explained a camcorder on his vehicle had been rolling when they were 
hit, but more importantly, the vehicle behind them also had a 
camcorder running.  This presented unexplored possibilities.  He 
would now be able to edit the two angles together to show the 
explosion in all its glory. The same night, just after leaving the 
hospital, he proudly emailed the edited footage to his former 
trainer.
635 
Again, this illustrates the widespread availability of the technology required to 
self-edit raw footage, and the speed with which the finished product can be 
made ready for viewing.  Chown identifies literary precedents to this self-
documentation, citing Ernest Hemingway’s participation in World War 1 as a way 
of acquiring ‘the experiences that would be the grist of his modernist writing’, 
concluding that ‘in postmodern Iraq, the camcorder has replaced the pen’.
636   
The speed with which such footage can be edited and presented online is 
crucial.  Whether actually transmitted live (in the case of uncomposed live 
reports on news channels) or screened considerably later (in the case of the 
documentary examples), the unprepared, reactive composition is, as has 
previously been discussed, a performance that emphasises raw footage over 
professional codes, and the illusion is translated to the viewing experience.  One 
key implication is worth reintroducing here: the lack of time for reflection.  
Philip Taylor notes how, in the first Gulf War, ‘the sheer speed of the 
communications technology… eroded our capacity to reflect, interpret, sift’.
637  
As a result, journalistic standards are seen to ‘slip’, the imperative simply ‘to 
get the story on the air, no matter how dubious or uncorroborated it is’.
638  
While this is predominantly an issue of technology and broadcast – the 
theatrically-released documentary cannot be said to rush its footage into the 
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public domain, and has time (if not always necessarily the inclination) to 
adequately contextualise and substantiate its assertions – there is, however, a 
correlating issue: the amount of time the viewer of such material is given to 
reflect or interpret what they see.  Whether caught-up in the extensively 
documented rush of history-in-the-making (in the 9/11 footage) or missing 
integral events entirely (in The War Tapes), the momentum of the raw footage 
aesthetic encourages breathlessness, the viewer is left as unprepared as the 
filmmaker either is or purports to be, and is forced into a comparable responsive 
position.  Again, this is not merely a matter of visual parity; it plays an 
organisational role in structuring a narrative and the viewer’s relationship 
towards it. 
9.7  Conclusion: The Flight That Fought Back 
To conclude, I want to reconsider the text with which I introduced the chapter: 
The Flight That Fought Back.  This chapter has taken care to stress the hybridity 
and mutual exchange between different registers, codes, conventions and 
practices (particularly in the assertion that factual reports are performative), a 
conclusion I now wish to frame using a text in which the performance of 
‘exchange’ is more overt, while also setting up the next chapter’s interest in 
texts from the other end of the spectrum; not factual texts emulating fiction, 
but fictional texts emulating factual ones. 
‘Caught on tape’ is evidently not being evoked in The Flight That Fought Back as 
an illusion; the film is not attempting to ‘fool’ its audience into thinking they 
are witnessing something they are not.  At least not wholly; although an on-
screen caption appears to identify the use of authentic recordings, the acted or 
recreated dialogue used elsewhere is recorded and processed to match – low 
quality, background noise etc.  But this does not appear to be malicious or 
misleading: The Flight That Fought Back does not purport to show visual proofs 
of its events, and neither the computer-generated scenes of the aircraft from 
the outside, nor the acted and scripted scenes that take place inside the 
aircraft, seem intended as anything other than illustrative.  Yet it evokes the 
raw aesthetic nonetheless.  A hand-held camera moves as if from a passenger’s 
visual perspective, and when the insurrection begins, its shakiness increases 
dramatically.  This could be interpreted as an expressive use of mise-en-scene –     250 
the destabilisation of the image matching the destabilisation of the situation on 
the plane.  But it more closely resembles the in-the-moment camerawork of the 
reactive visual documenter discussed at length in this chapter, despite The 
Flight That Fought Back being both scripted and acted. 
The use of recreation in documentary was given renewed popular legitimacy, 
Steve Anderson claims, by the success of Errol Morris’s The Thin Blue Line 
(1988), which ‘revived once scorned strategies of recreation and simulation in 
historical documentaries’, and in the process aggravated ‘already precarious 
connections between the real world and systems of representation’.
639  This led 
to a ‘renewed critical attention to such ideas as “performativity”’ which in turn: 
‘necessitated a revision of Bill Nichol’s venerable taxonomy of documentary 
modes’.
640  Nichols himself wrote of the ‘turn’ in 1994: 
Reenactments came to be denounced as fabrications in the days of 
observational cinema; then, more recently, filmmakers resurrected 
them as a legitimate way to address what is not available for 
representation in the here and now.
641 
The issue with re-enactment, Nichol states, is that it produces an extra layer of 
simulation – the figures we watch onscreen are ‘ghosts or simulacra of others 
who have already acted out their parts’.  He continues: 
Spoken testimony came to be seen as an antidote for the ‘body too 
many’ problem of re-enactment (the bodies of those in the re-
enactments were ‘extras’, never matching the historical bodies they 
represented).  Social actors, witnesses, could speak now about what 
they know of historical events.  The indexical image authenticates 
testimony now about what happened then.
642 
In The Flight That Fought Back, these spoken testimonies come from family and 
loved ones, but also the voices of those whose parts are being re-enacted 
onscreen through the various telephone and cockpit recordings. 
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The notion of performativity recalls the writing of Vivian Sobchack, amongst 
others, who offers the reminder that ‘a “documentary” is not a thing, but a 
subjective relationship to a cinematic object’.
643  The documentary relationship 
only becomes such when it is received as one by its audience, who use 
knowledge of past documentary experiences to understand the present text.  It 
is for this reason that a blatantly imaginative recreation of events (in The Flight 
That Fought Back) can be taken as a form of actuality-filmmaking – more 
mediated than a traditional observational documentary mode, but a form of 
actuality filmmaking nonetheless; it looks and feels enough like actuality 
filmmaking to warrant the label.   
Alisa Lebow notes that this is indicative of a more general inability to define 
documentary absolutely and in terms of its relation to ‘reality’: 
Tellingly, theorists more often proffer inevitably flawed descriptions 
of what documentary film is not (not fiction, not acted, not scripted) 
than of what it may actually be.  I say ‘flawed’ because many, if not 
most, documentaries do contain scripted sequence, do employ or 
engage (perhaps non-professional) actors and acting, and partake, at 
the very least, in the narrative imperative (telling stories) no less than 
do fiction films…
644 
The Flight That Fought Back, first compared to the fictional 24, is therefore, in 
Lebow’s formulation, merely a documentary in which the scripting, acting and 
fictionalisation is more readily apparent than in less overtly mediated 
documentary examples (such as 9/11 or The War Tapes).  That is not to say that 
the comparison to 24 is mistaken or unhelpful.  Rather, it suggests that, while 
The Flight That Fought Back repackages elements of 24 to build excitement in 
its narrative progression, 24 borrows from the documentary (and the raw footage 
aesthetic prevalent in visual documents of the War on Terror more broadly) to 
lend authenticity to its spectacle.  
Stephanie Marriott, borrowing terminology from John Lyons, discusses live 
television’s ‘experiential mode’, analysing various examples of live broadcast – 
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from sporting events to morning breakfast shows to the ‘breaking-news’ 
coverage of 9/11 itself – to demonstrate the way voiceover commentary serves 
to frame events in relation to the ‘here-and-now’.  Predictions and recaps 
surround a core vocabulary designed to emphasise the present moment – for 
example, a nature programme in which the presenter ‘reiterates the liveness 
and the nowness of the image’ multiple times: ‘we’re back live now’; ‘there are 
four’; ‘as you can see’ and so on.
645  Marriott links this to ‘static’ and ‘dynamic’ 
ways of talking about time – the A- and B-series of time discussed in chapter 
seven: 
Viewed dynamically, the relation of events to each other shifts as the 
speaker enters into an ever-new now-moment.  The notion of dynamic 
time can… be usefully understood with reference to the notion of the 
phenomenological now… All our encounters with the world necessarily 
take place at this now-moment: just as the place where I am can only, 
under any set of circumstances, be here, so the moment is always 
now… 
The Flight That Fought Back presents its recreations in a similar fashion, with 
Kiefer Sutherland’s voice over similarly presenting footage as if it were in the 
process of unfolding.  For example, when introducing actual recordings of the 
flight’s final moments, he announces ‘this is the actual recording of what is 
happening in the cockpit’, rather than ‘this is an actual recording of what 
happened’.  In this way, the film’s performed rawness evokes the experiential 
mode of live broadcast, even if its actual means of production and transmission 
are unequivocally non-live.  Like 24 and the Global Network Narrative, this 
fosters a sense of the ‘perpetual present’, which has been previously argued to 
detach the present moment from both historical context and subsequent causal 
effects. 
Performed rawness brings depicted events into the phenomenological vicinity of 
the viewer, both spatially and temporally.  Events are made immediate, here 
and now.  Earlier in the chapter, the prevalence of a raw, unprepared aesthetic 
was linked partially to the process of ‘embedding’ journalists with military units, 
a process premised on the assumption that sharing certain experiences with the 
soldiers would foster a greater degree of empathy in the reporters.  While the 
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film undermines the effect by intercutting its dramatic reenactments with real 
talking-head interviews, which break the momentum considerably at the 
climax,
646 the rawness and liveness of The Flight That Fought Back nonetheless 
enhances expected sympathies with the flight’s victims.  When this same effect 
is used in films focused on soldiers, it would therefore appear to engender 
empathy for a US militaristic perspective – the audience embedded with troops 
figuratively just as journalists have been literally.  Because the rawness of such 
footage suggests the unmediated capture of events as-they-happen, it also 
suggests an unmediated impartiality, thereby obscuring the underlying ideology – 
which, in Flight That Fought Back is emphatically militaristic.  At the climax, 
family members state matter-of-factly their loved ones’ capacity for violence if 
deemed necessary: for example, Phil Bradshaw, husband of flight attendant 
Sandra Bradshaw warns ‘you make Sandy mad you better look out, cause she was 
a little tornado – she could hit hard’, while Paula Nacke says of her brother Joey 
Nacke ‘he was very aggressive’.  Most emphatically violent is Jeremy Glick’s wife 
Lyzbeth, who says of her husband: ‘I can imagine Jeremy snapping a neck 
quicker than you would believe, then just beating the guy till he was beyond 
dead’.  In this account, united defiance through violently-achieved self-
determination defines the deceased, just as it characterised justifications for 
the War on Terror more broadly. 
Chapter ten will expand upon this chapter’s conclusions – namely the tendency 
towards a raw-footage aesthetic in a broad range of media representations of 
the War on Terror, from milblogs to network news reports, theatrically-released 
documentaries to footage ‘caught-on-tape’ by citizen journalists; an aesthetic 
that presents itself as an un-manipulated recording of events as-they-happen, as 
opposed to staged and controlled production.  Unpreparedness, danger, and a 
semblance of ‘liveness’ will be identified as influential in the appearance and 
structure of certain fiction films and television serials, suggesting the raw-
footage aesthetic is more than a journalistic or documentary trend; it is a 
widely-encountered visual paradigm with particular ideological connotations. 
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10 Pseudo-footage in fiction 
 
I did documentary footage of the soldiers [sic].  I was 
interviewing them and I was collecting soldier-made 
videos, then we wrote a script and then I traditionally 
filmed it as one would.  Traditional film, 35 millimeter.  
Most of the movie is a movie.
647 
-  Kimberly Peirce on Stop Loss 
The Iraq war ushered in the video phone as the 
standard of television war reporting rather than the 
exception; visual immediacy ruled supreme.
648 
-  Andrew Hoskins 
 
Stop Loss opens with onscreen text identifying it as ‘episode 312’.  A sideways 
wipe replaces the black background with footage typical of the raw-footage 
aesthetic discussed in the previous chapter: the colours are over-saturated, the 
camera unsteady, there is dirt on the lens and frequent zooms cause loss of 
focus (fig. 10.1).  Text scrolls along the bottom in the same serif font as before, 
stating ‘The Men of Shadow 3 Going the Fuck Home’, while the images provide a 
collage of patrol footage, barrack-based leisure, photographs of guns and 
tattoos, and the central characters singing a patriotic song with an acoustic 
guitar.  This then segues directly into a scene set at a checkpoint in Tikrit 
manned by Sgt. Brandon King (Ryan Phillipe) and his men, shot on 35mm film 
(fig. 10.2).   
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Fig. 10.1 Raw-footage aesthetic in Stop Loss  
 
Fig. 10.2: 35mm film stock in Stop Loss 
This ‘home-movie’ aesthetic is returned to at regular intervals later in the film: 
following a firefight that injures and kills several US soldiers, a hip-hop sound-
tracked sequence ‘in loving memory of our fallen brothers’ pays tribute 
deceased characters, editing the staged scenes together with what appears to 
be stock battle footage (fig. 10.3).  Later still, a compilation of such material is 
watched by the characters while on leave, sound-tracked by the heavy riffs of 
metal band Drowning Pool, whose song Bodies (the key lyric of which is ‘let the 
bodies hit the floor’) is popular in both War on Terror narratives and amongst 
actual soldiers: the song is featured in the documentaries Soundtrack to War 
(Gittoes, 2006), Fahrenheit 9/11, the mini-series Generation Kill and even a US 
commercial for the Marine Corp (available on YouTube); more worryingly, it was 
used as part of the interrogation of Guantanamo Bay detainee Mohamedou Ould     256 
Slahi, played at high volume for long periods to instill disorientation and fear.
649  
Most of the footage used in these segments is clearly performed for the camera, 
particularly when one or more of the film’s lead actors – Phillipe, Joseph 
Gordon-Levitt, Channing Tatum – is visible in the shot.  Yet other segments so 
closely mimic actual combat footage as to be near indistinguishable (it is unclear 
whether actual footage was utilised – in one interview, director Kimberley Pierce 
states ‘everything was staged’
650, while in another she claims to have 
incorporated actual soldier videos in the opening).
651  To further complicate the 
distinction, Stop Loss started out as a documentary, before director Kimberly 
Pierce decided to change approach and tackle the subject matter – the retention 
of soldiers by way of a clause in their contract that allows them to be re-
deployed indefinitely in a time of war – in a fictional mode instead.  While, in 
Pierce’s words, the majority of the movie ‘is a movie’ – shot on high quality film 
in a conventional manner – the raw-footage aesthetic plays a central role in the 
film’s visual style. 
 
Fig. 10.3: Pseudo-stock battle footage in Stop Loss 
Raw footage – staged or otherwise – is frequently incorporated into 
conventionally-filmed fictional War on Terror narratives.  Examples from both 
television and film will shortly be used to evidence this, before introducing two 
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additional components of the proposed War on Terror aesthetic – military 
technology and surveillance – and suggesting their ideological similarities to 
issues of ‘rawness’.  It will conclude by examining the tension between attempts 
to evoke subjective, immediate, raw experience, and the evocation of a 
broader, detached geopolitical overview, via a reading of the film Rendition.  
10.1 Pseudo-documentary/pseudo-footage: defining terms 
Before we proceed, it is important to clarify the relevant terminology.  Terms 
such as ‘mockumentary’ or ‘fake documentary’ carry unwanted connotations – a 
comedic or satirical tone in the former and subterfuge in the latter – so will be 
avoided, though work carried out in these areas will be useful in summarising 
the field.
652  As Alisa Lebow notes, ‘mocking is only one possible stance that the 
fake documentary can take’.
653  It can, she suggests, alternatively ‘copy, mimic, 
gimmick, play with, scorn, ridicule, invert, reverse, repeat, ironise, satirise, 
affirm, subvert, pervert, covert, translate, and exceed documentary style’.
654  
Furthermore, the particular variant I am focused on, incorporating the raw-
footage aesthetic, is not solely documentary.  For this reason, I will adjust the 
categories accordingly.  The broad encompass suggested by the aforementioned 
terms will be narrowed and corrected by opting instead for the term ‘pseudo-
documentary’.  When discussing the raw-footage variant – i.e. those that evoke 
the ‘raw’ style specifically typical of professional War on Terror news reports, 
citizen journalism and observational documentary – I will employ the term 
‘pseudo-footage’. 
Another distinction is necessary, to identify those works that, like Stop Loss, 
incorporate small sections of such material within otherwise conventionally-
filmed narratives, and those that sustain the effect over their entire duration, 
like Septem8er Tapes (Johnston, 2004) and .wmd (Holroyd, 2009), both of which 
will be discussed later in the chapter.  Therefore, in addition to ‘pseudo-
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documentary’ and ‘pseudo-footage’, I will later introduce the term ‘pseudo-
found-footage’. 
Pseudo-documentary in any of its guises is not an invention of twenty-first 
century film and television makers, nor is it utilised solely in the telling of these 
particular kinds of stories: for example, Jane Roscoe and Craig Hight identify 
sixty one such texts predating 9/11 which they roughly categorise as parodies, 
hoaxes or deconstructions.
655  It is notable, however, that many films that have 
adopted the style wholly – for example, Cloverfield or Diary of the Dead 
(Romero, 2007) - or in part – The Dark Knight, Monsters (Edwards, 2010) – since 
2001 have been interpreted as allegories for the War on Terror and its 
ancillaries, in part due to the connotations of their use of pseudo-footage.
656  For 
example, Richard Matthews connects The Dark Knight and others to 9/11 and 
the War on Terror, arguing that: 
These blockbusters… mobilise the sights and sounds of the millenium’s 
newscasts to inject immediacy into their pulp subject matter.
657 
Matthews explicitly identifies their mimicry of the conventions of news media, 
and the sense of immediacy that they evoke, as evidence of an allegorical 
relationship to contemporary concerns regarding terrorism. 
Gary D. Rhodes and John Parris Springer question the categorical separation, by 
filmmakers, critics and audiences alike, of non-fiction filmmaking from fiction, 
observing how non-fiction and fiction filmmaking developed side by side, with 
‘frequent intermingling’ a ‘persistent tendency in cinema from its very 
beginning’.
658  From this they conclude that: 
As a visual medium based upon a photographic representation of the 
world, the cinema has always been uniquely suited to such 
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ambiguities regarding the fictional and factual status of its 
representations.
659 
They go on to cite ‘the rise of the docudrama, the self-reflexive documentary 
and the mockumentary’ as signalling ‘the breakdown of the stable critical 
dichotomy which had for so long kept fiction narrative and documentary film in 
separate analytical boxes’.
660  Essentially, they suggest the two categories have 
always been less mutually exclusive than is generally assumed, and that this 
assumption is challenged by new hybrid categories that patently draw upon both 
traditions, with precedents in popular fiction films: the use of voiceover 
narration in Dr Strangelove or: How I Learned To Stop Worrying and Love the 
Bomb (Kubrick, 1964); the intertitles in Raging Bull (Scorsese, 1980); the talking 
head interviews in Reds (Beatty, 1981); and the March of Time pastiche in 
Citizen Kane (Welles, 1941).   
I will shortly analyse scenes and/or episodes from Vantage Point, Over There 
and In the Valley of Elah, all of which adopt a pseudo-documentary or pseudo-
footage aesthetic in whole or in part, but do not make an overt claim that the 
content is ‘actual’.  Events may carry similarities to actual events (particularly 
In the Valley of Elah, which is based on an article that first appeared in Playboy 
about the true-life murder of Iraq veteran Richard T. Davis),
661 but they are 
nonetheless scripted and acted.  Regardless, they visually resemble some of the 
aforementioned conventions of the raw-footage aesthetic.  But they do so 
without any trace of deception or manipulation - the audience is not hoodwinked 
into thinking that what they are shown is raw footage, only that it looks like raw 
footage.  The lack of deceit is partly due to production (audiences are likely to 
recognise actors such as Tommy Lee Jones, Charlize Theron, Sigourney Weaver 
and William Hurt) and partly due to presentation.  Jane Roscoe writes of the 
‘mock-documentary’ Man Bites Dog (Belvaux, Bonzel and Poelvoorde, 1992): 
While audiences are encouraged to (although it is not assumed they 
will) enter into a documentary mode of engagement when viewing 
Man Bites Dog, this is not to say that viewers are duped into thinking 
that this is a real documentary.  Rather, the film attempts to position 
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viewers as though they were watching a documentary.  It is not only 
that documentaries make certain claims concerning their ability to 
gain direct access to the real, but that viewers also have expectations 
of documentary which are brought to any particular viewing 
context.
662 
The important factor is the ‘subjective relationship’ fostered between text and 
viewer, to paraphrase the definition of ‘documentary’ quoted earlier from 
Sobchack.  Not that this relationship – what Lipkin et al call the ‘contract set up 
between producer and audience’
663 – is always open and clear.  Examples of 
fictions that attempt to pass themselves off as ‘real’ documents are plentiful, 
though one interesting example from the early stages of the visual 
documentation of war is worth quoting.  Robert Fyne writes that in the First 
World War, the fictional and the factual were being regularly combined, and the 
boundaries between the categories were frequently difficult to discern.  Some 
resulting footage or photographs were ‘forgeries’ treated as genuine, as 
exemplified by the DW Griffith-directed Hearts of the World (1918), which 
supplemented genuine front-line footage with staged reenactments: 
Never lax in his zeal, Griffiths made ‘war front’ documentaries with 
British troops going ‘over the top’ in such manageable geographic 
settings as Scotland.  No one noticed the falsification at the time, and 
the footage is still used repeatedly in television documentaries and on 
covers of ‘historical’ publications.  Apparently the images proved too 
convincing to be rejected, long after their fraudulent nature had been 
exposed.
664 
In this example, the fiction comes to possess its own sense of actuality even 
when its inauthentic origins are laid bare.  However, while the more 
hermeneutically-consistent examples (those that extend their illusion over their 
entirety rather than restricting it to certain scenes or episodes) may confuse 
some viewers into accepting their verisimilitude as genuine, this is not 
necessarily the primary goal or effect of the pseudo-footage form. 
One component seemingly borrowed from actual documentary practice is the 
extensive use of handheld cameras.  Rhodes and Springer trace this not to early 
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actuality filmmaking, but to what they identify as a ‘prophetic’ shot in Citizen 
Kane that precedes widespread comparable practice in documentary form.  
When the titular character is filmed over a fence by unscrupulously invasive 
proto-paparazzi, the performed ‘reality’ of a hand-held camera ‘liberated’ from 
the tripod signals: 
the beginning of a contemporary dialogue between non-fiction and 
fiction cinema.  This dialogue flowers in the films of later decades in 
which the presence of handheld cameras becomes a signifier of a 
‘real’ moment captured on film, even when that moment has been 
completely staged and scripted.
665 
The use of handheld camera is therefore highly coded.  It is not merely a means 
of facilitating certain shots, or a way to increase visual mobility: it is a coded 
signifier connoting authenticity and reality.  Lipkin et al. translate the 
relationship between actual and invented when mediated through such codes 
into semiotic terms as follows: 
Hybridity depends upon indexical icons, re-creations that bear close, 
motivated resemblances to the real and to representations of the 
real.
666 
It is the resemblance to ‘representations of the real’ (not to the ‘real’ itself) 
that is of most interest.  Classical Hollywood filmmaking frequently aims for a 
certain degree of verisimilitude in its fabrications, but these are not judged as 
anything other than absorbing fictions.  It is the emulation of aesthetic codes 
associated with the factual narratives of documentary and related actuality-
filmmaking that bestows a semblance of ‘actuality’ to hand-held camera 
footage.  Geoff King links this to more widely adopted techniques in 
independent American filmmaking: 
Unsteady hand-held camerawork, inexact framing, restricted views 
and sudden zooms are among devices that can be used to create an 
impression that the filmmaker is capturing events as they unfold, 
unpredictably before the camera – as is often the case, for practical 
reasons, in the world of documentary or newsreel – rather than that 
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the events have been planned in advance and carefully staged for the 
camera.
667 
There is something near-paradoxical about such an effect: by deliberately 
drawing attention to the artificiality and constructedness of the image (through 
overt reference to the mode of capture), these techniques conversely code the 
results as less constructed than those texts that carefully disguise editorial 
intervention through subtle editing conventions. 
Jane Roscoe notes that this association between certain conventions and 
‘reality’ is not inherent in the form: 
Documentary has developed a repertoire of specialised codes and 
conventions to promote and reinforce its claims of objectivity, access 
to the real and truthfulness.  These have now become so familiar as to 
seem ‘natural’ and unconstructed themselves.
668 
Chapter nine argued that such codes and conventions in the context of the War 
on Terror often derive from the supposed status of ‘raw footage’.  I now wish to 
offer examples of these conventions at work in three different fiction texts. 
10.2 Over There, Vantage Point and In the Valley of Elah 
Over There, the Iraq War-drama discussed in chapter eight, has a relatively 
consistent visual aesthetic across its thirteen episodes: a glossy, composed style 
common to expensive US cable television shows, shot on 16mm film with 
relatively steady camera movements, and colour correction to aid clarity.
669  
There is an exception to these emphases in episode five, ‘Embedded’, in which 
the squad is assigned a reporter who they initially distrust.  By the end of the 
subsequent episode, ‘It’s Alright Ma I’m Only Bleeding’, following an act of 
bravery from the reporter that results in his abduction and beheading by 
insurgents, their opinions have been substantially altered, and they salute his 
sacrifice at a makeshift funeral.  Throughout the episode, the image switches 
between the rich, cinematic quality typical of the show in general (fig. 10.4), 
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and a grainy, poor quality image and unsteady framing designed to emulate 
roughshod TV journalism of the kind discussed in chapter nine (fig. 10.5).   
 
Fig. 10.4: Embedded journalist in Over There 
 
Fig. 10.5: Raw footage aesthetic in Over There 
To proffer a second example, this time from cinema, Vantage Point depicts an 
elaborate terrorist attack involving the apparent assassination of the President 
of the USA (William Hurt) and the bombing of a busy plaza in Salamanca, Spain.  
The plot is narrated from the various ‘vantage points’ of a series of embedded 
narrators, the complete plot pieced together from each of their perspectives: 
the television news producer (Sigourney Weaver) covering the event (whose 
Global News Network is abbreviated, incidentally, to GNN…); a Secret Service 
agent (Dennis Quaid); the terrorist leader (Said Taghmaoui); the President (who     264 
it transpires is safe, his body double taking the bullet); a Spanish police officer 
(Eduardo Noriega) and, importantly, a US tourist (Forest Whitaker) filming with 
his hand-held camcorder.  Sections of the latter’s video are inserted throughout, 
the shaky framing, muted colours, time markers and sudden zooms/pans of the 
former (fig. 10.6) contrasting starkly with the steady cinematography of the rest 
of the film (fig. 10.7). 
 
Fig. 10.6: Pseudo-camcorder footage in Vantage Point 
 
Fig. 10.7: Amateur cameraman in Vantage Point 
Following the explosion, the professional news team is shown struggling to ‘see’ 
the big picture, scouring their banks of monitors for clues as to what has just 
happened; by the end, they are deliberately misleading the public by spreading 
a cover story that hides the full extent of the conspiracy.  Their professional 
cameraman, initially appearing only inept, is later revealed to be criminal     265 
(though his exact role in the terrorist attack remains vague).  The non-
professional observer, by contrast, is able to help ‘solve’ the puzzle; his 
accidental recording of a key moment in the attack proves crucial to unraveling 
the mystery.  The footage is filmed with the necessary verisimilitude, the shaky 
composure and awkward framing connoting authenticity and trustworthiness.   
Both of these examples adopt a similar aesthetic to the visual documents 
discussed in chapter nine.  In both, the correlation between narrative 
proposition and visual design is overt: an episode about an embedded journalist 
mimics the visual conventions of embeds (and their martyr/execution video 
counterpart); while film scenes showing a tourist filming on his personal 
camcorder are rendered in the style of a personal camcorder wielded by a non-
professional cameraman.  Vantage Point’s structure points to a further 
correlation between the visual form and the narrative premise: its plot segments 
each begin at midday, with numerous shots of clock faces or electronic displays 
used to establish the repeated time.  When one ‘vantage point’ concludes, the 
segment rewinds.  It does not simply start again; the footage begins to reverse, 
the scenes running backwards at speed to return the plot time to its starting 
point.  This allusion to video recording technology implicitly focalises the film 
through Howard Lewis, the US tourist, and by extension, his raw-footage 
recording.  The film is rewound, the events replayed until a satisfactory 
understanding of chronology and causality is established, just as the characters 
themselves rewind and replay the accidental videotape in order to piece 
together the ‘Big Picture’.  Later in the film one of the terrorists mocks 
perceived American arrogance, specifically their inability to ‘imagine a world in 
which they’re not always one step ahead’.  Vantage Point’s structure suggests 
that not being one-step ahead is irrelevant; the act of bearing witness, 
accompanied by a real-time, conscientious response, can ensure America victory 
regardless.  If compared directly to the apologetic narrative of The 9/11 
Commission Report discussed in chapter one, Vantage Point comes across as 
wish-fulfillment: a complex, labyrinthine, multi-pronged terrorist attack may not 
be thwarted entirely, but its full terror is contained, its perpetrators captured, 
and the death toll kept relatively low.  Despite its ensemble cast, this resolution 
is largely the work of two men: the diligent and determined US government-
employed professional law enforcer (whose demeanour and actions bear a     266 
certain similarity to Jack Bauer) and the accidental cameraman whose tape can 
be scrutinised until the truth becomes clear.  And the film’s very structure 
echoes that scrutiny, rewinding and replaying events until the chronology is 
clear. 
In In the Valley of Elah, pseudo-footage is ostensibly captured not by a 
camcorder, but a mobile phone.  When his son is murdered outside a US military 
base following a tour of Iraq, Hank Deerfield (Tommy Lee Jones) is confused and 
suspicious.  A retired military detective, Deerfield conducts his own investigation 
into his son’s death, trying to piece together a satisfactory narrative that 
explains why and how it happened.  Central to this search is a short video on a 
mobile phone, taken by his son while on patrol in Iraq.  Deciphering the murky, 
low-resolution visuals becomes an obsession, the contents of the video resisting 
decoding.  While Deerfield seeks out contextual evidence through interviews 
with members of his son’s squadron and others who might have last seen him 
alive, the film’s structure begins to resemble an investigative journalist’s 
report.
670  Visually, however, the characteristically artistic and composed 
cinematography from Roger Deakins confers it with an aesthetic common to 
glossy, star-studded, Hollywood drama - with the exception of the mobile phone 
clip, which returns at irregular intervals, haunting the narrative as it haunts the 
protagonist, frustrating the audience as it frustrates the investigation.  At times 
the clip is embedded, a screen-within-a-screen (fig. 10.8); at other times it 
expands to fill the frame (fig. 10.9), its poor quality contrasting greatly with the 
classically composed scenes that contain it (fig. 10.10).   
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Fig. 10.8: Embedded screen in In the Valley of Elah 
 
Fig. 10.9: Visual distortion in In the Valley of Elah 
 
Fig. 10.10: Hank Deerfield investigates his son’s death     268 
Its centrality – both visually and as plot device – invites scrutiny.  Information is 
not yielded readily by the image; it must be carefully extracted and explained.  
Its ambiguity yields the possibility of incorrect interpretations: Deerfield 
believes his son innocent, and it is only when it is explained to him what he (and 
the audience) have been looking at all along that he realises his mistake.  Far 
from innocent, his son’s involvement in prisoner abuse is brought to light, his 
cruel mocking of his victims earning him the nickname ‘Doc’ (he asked them 
where it hurt before pressing on their injuries).  Furthermore, in an incident 
echoing that depicted (or more accurately, not depicted) in The War Tapes, 
Deerfield discovers his son was responsible for the death of a young child when 
he refuses to stop the vehicle he is driving for fear of ambush.  Like The War 
Tapes, this incident is missing from the record, rendered only through unclear 
snippets and contextual testimony.  Unlike The War Tapes, however, there are 
no practical reasons why such a scene is absent from In the Valley of Elah; 
should the filmmakers have wished, the event could have been staged for the 
camera and included in the plot directly.  It is instead omitted for narrative 
purposes: the mystery it poses is integral to the central investigation.  This is 
confirmed by a climactic staging of the events depicted in the video, shot this 
time in the same visual register as the rest of the film: clean and complete, the 
video clip’s meaning finally unlocked.  Additionally, the absence emulates the 
structural elisions of the unprepared raw footage aesthetic; furthermore, it 
downplays the loss of Arabic life while emphasising the traumatic effect such an 
incident has on the American perpetrator and his/her family.  The structural 
effects of an unprepared and responsive documentary style are utilised in a 
fiction film to help engender a US-centric ideological perspective – the war cast 
as a predominantly American tragedy.
671   
During the first Gulf War, military footage of guided missiles hitting their targets 
(or, more frequently than the feted accuracy of the weapons should have 
allowed for, missing their targets) was similarly visually obscure.  While 
technologically advanced, the resolution of such black and white images was 
poor, and explanations were necessary: 
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This footage was more difficult for the untrained eye to decipher than 
the night-vision footage from CNN, so Schwarzkopf necessarily served 
as interpreter, helping the media ‘see’ what had occurred.
672 
This anecdote marks the moment when, Keith Solomon concludes, ‘war and 
cinema became the same thing’.
673  Solomon’s comparison is to night-vision CNN 
footage, but the embedded journalist report or low-quality mobile-phone clip 
are framed in a similar fashion.  As in In the Valley of Elah, there is a need for 
contextual information: while actual newscasters parrot the phrase ‘what we are 
seeing here is…’, offering a responsive interpretation of footage deemed unable 
to carry its own explicit meaning, the fictional character of Hank Deerfield 
engages in textual analysis of his own, scouring the mobile phone’s screen for 
answers in an approximation of the conspiracy culture logic discussed in chapter 
four: if we look hard enough, the film promises, the truth will emerge. 
In In the Valley of Elah – as in Vantage Point and the ‘Embedded’ and ‘It’s 
Alright Ma’ episodes of Over There – such footage is contained within a more 
traditionally organised and visualised narrative format.  Other texts sustain the 
mimicry for their full duration.  The rest of the examples I will use will be 
sustained pseudo-footage texts of the ‘found-footage’ variety.  By ‘found 
footage’, I refer to those fiction texts that most closely cultivate the raw-
footage aesthetic, in support of a central plot-conceit – that the text is made 
from footage recovered following a bombing, abduction or other such event, and 
which is being presented in its original state with minimal editorial intervention.  
In the last decade, such a style is far from rare,
674 but has particular nuance in 
the independent feature Septem8er Tapes.  
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10.3 Septem8er Tapes 
The less polished the film, the more credible it will be 
found.
675 
-  Stella Bruzzi 
A little over a week after the third anniversary of September 11
th, 2001, trade 
journal Variety reported upon a forthcoming Afghanistan-set drama that had 
premiered at the Sundance film festival earlier in the year.  The article 
suggested that by the time it reached US cinemas, Septem8er Tapes would have 
been re-edited from its Sundance cut, with additional footage re-inserted that 
had allegedly previously been confiscated by the US government.  ‘Whether 
there’s some truth to that’, they suggest, ‘or it’s pure marketing chutzpah… [the 
film] is so craftily made that most viewers with no prior knowledge of the film 
would accept it as a documentary.  For this sort of project that’s certainly a 
compliment’.
676 
The illusion has certainly convinced some viewers of its documentary status, as 
angry message board reviews attest:  
The movie was completely misleading… The claims made on the 
outside of the DVD box was overt fraud to take this fabricated death 
of a Journalist and present it as factual (sic)… I alerted the Video 
store that the movie should be removed from their "Documentary" 
section and be placed in the War-drama area for quasi fictional 
accounts of actual events.
677 
While I would not want to argue that such a hostile reaction is commonplace 
without any kind of quantitative audience data (nor call for the installation of 
‘quasi fictional accounts of actual events’ sections in video stores so as not to 
potentially upset or mislead future renters) the sense of indignant outrage 
voiced by these few but vocal viewers, and the many online threads that begin 
by asking ‘was this real?’ – seeking clarification even after watching – is 
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testament to the film’s close emulation of documentary conventions, and those 
of non-fiction recording more broadly.
678   
The confiscation of Septem8er Tapes footage has been reported elsewhere in 
greater detail: 
Shot using hand-held digital video recorders, the film has the look and 
feel of a real documentary.  Take away the context of the cinema and 
it would be quite easy to believe the film’s conceit that the tapes 
were found by Northern Alliance troops somewhere near the Afghani-
Pakistani border.  Harsh sunlight, washed out backgrounds and 
pixelated edges are part of digital video’s aesthetic, and one that is 
perfectly suited for this film.  So much so that the Defence 
Department deemed it necessary, when the crew returned to the 
United States, to hold their footage for five months for examination.  
Even now, Christian Johnston, the director, has yet to recover about 
eight hours of footage.
679   
While objective proof verifying this claim is lacking, the fact that it is plausible 
and accepted is sufficient to the present argument: the appropriation of such 
tropes and codes in Septem8er Tapes is either convincing enough to fool the US 
Department of Defence, or convincing enough to fool audiences into accepting 
such a scenario as credible. 
Despite this aura of actuality, the film is in fact an acted and scripted fiction.  
American filmmaker Don Larson (George Calil) travels to Afghanistan on the first 
anniversary of 9/11 to film an investigative documentary.  He is fired upon, 
arrested and imprisoned, and eventually caught up in a battle in the Tora Bora 
mountains in which he swaps his camera for an automatic weapon, and is killed 
during the fighting.  These final scenes are shot in the style of the genre of 
computer game known as the ‘first-person shooter’ in which a player navigates a 
virtual environment from the viewpoint of their avatar, with their weapon 
typically visible in the bottom part of the frame and breathing and gunfire 
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dominating the soundtrack.  His motive for conducting such a dangerous pursuit 
is revealed to be a mixture of grief and revenge: it transpires that an audio tape 
he is frequently seen listening to is the last phone call his wife made to him 
before her plane hit the World Trade Centre.  These audio tapes perform a 
similar narrative role as visual footage does in In the Valley of Elah.  At the 
beginning of the film, onscreen captions claim the completed film was made 
from eight tapes recovered from Northern Alliance soldiers in Afghanistan.  To 
support this, the film is structured with the fragmented omissions typical of the 
raw footage aesthetic – there is missing time between segments, in which 
unseen events occur. 
While a work of fiction, the director has been keen to stress the film’s 
verisimilitude.  The film was at least partially filmed on location in Kabul (an 
extremely dangerous place for a Western film crew to be in 2003/4), with the 
sound of live ammunition apparently audible.
680  Since the Department of 
Defence could not (or would not) support or endorse the film, the filmmakers 
reportedly approached ‘Kabul‘s version of Don Corleone’, who provided them 
with vehicles, Northern Alliance soldiers, AK-47s and RPGs.
681  Whether the 
Department of Defence was subsequently fooled by the illusion or not, the film 
is consciously identified by its blurring of a factual aesthetic with a fictional 
content. 
Like the pseudo-documentary more generally, the film borrows ‘generic cues 
derived from documentary’s project of “representing reality”’.
682  Gerd Bayer 
argues that such cues: 
make the production side of filming visible, thereby creating in their 
viewers a conscious awareness that they are indeed watching a film, 
that is, a constructed reality.  This flaunting of a film’s artifice 
ironically heightens the sense that what is witnessed must indeed be a 
genuine document, since it is not so much represented; but rather, 
presented.
683 
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As previously suggested, something seemingly contradictory occurs: such films 
emphasise their constructedness, and in doing so, downplay their artificiality.  
Bayer continues: 
The presentational characteristics of mockumentaries include a range 
of stylistic features: frontal camera shots in which the equipment, 
and, most frequently, unstable camera moves that aim to emphasise 
the un-staged and spontaneous filming process.  As a result, the 
viewers are drawn into the cinematic narrative.
684 
This is, essentially, the power of a ‘caught-on-tape’ aesthetic as discussed in the 
previous chapter; the sense of ‘live’ and unprepared responsiveness produces a 
breathless responsiveness in the viewer.  In 9/11 and The War Tapes, the rough 
actuality was corralled into shape by professional filmmakers, who sought to 
retain the immediacy and authenticity of the raw footage but framed it with a 
conventional documentary structure.  The pseudo-footage aesthetic in fiction 
film, by contrast, displays ‘ostentatiously flawed material’ displaying the 
‘perfect faultiness that actual documentary cannot have’.
685  Its performed 
aesthetic is built through a combination of: hand-held camerawork; digital 
camcorder quality; sudden edits; long, uninterrupted takes; direct to camera 
address; lack of focus; poor framing; obstructed audio, and other indicators of 
raw footage as discussed in the last chapter.  Together, these create an 
‘implication of authority’ drawn from apparent authenticity.  The invisible 
cameraman also contributes to the sense of performed immediacy, the spectator 
sharing their technologically-mediated point of view, placed in the midst of 
events as an observer.  Events unfold ‘in front of our eyes’, and we appear to 
experience them simultaneously with the characters.  In pseudo-footage, the 
cameraman is part of the diagesis; by extension, so is the audience’s vantage 
point. 
10.4 Military technology and surveillance 
The pseudo-footage aesthetic has thus far been discussed only in one subjective 
form i.e. hand-held recording devices – whether mobile phones, personal 
camcorders or more advanced equipment – assigned to or aligned with an 
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individual (or combination of individuals’) perspective.  The plots of the pseudo-
footage examples discussed so far are thus all duly centered on the fate of their 
recording characters.  However, not all such raw footage (pseudo or otherwise) 
is solely subjectively sourced.  There is an objective equivalent in the 
impersonal, disinterested and technologically-mediated recordings of high-spec 
military technology.  Related to this is a form of recording that combines 
subjective and objective modes, namely surveillance recordings.   
Where the raw-footage aesthetic as currently defined foregrounds its means of 
capture so as to suggest spontaneity, unpreparedness and authenticity, the 
objective component fetishises its technological mode of capture: from missile-
view shots of air strikes hitting their targets with precision, to aerial observation 
images taken by satellites.  Such images were more frequently used to illustrate 
news reports during the first Gulf War, when first-hand footage was more 
difficult for news teams to come by, but they continue to play an important role 
in comprising the War on Terror’s visual paradigm. 
Like the subjective raw-footage aesthetic, the visual characteristics of this 
proposed military aesthetic are performable and can be evoked and recreated.  
Body Of Lies emulates high-tech satellite technologies on a number of occasions 
(fig. 10.11), even designing the DVD menu screen in the same style (fig. 10.12). 
 
Fig. 10.11: Overhead surveillance in Body of Lies     275 
 
Fig. 10.12: Body of Lies DVD menu 
Sometimes its use within the film is motivated by the plot: the lead characters 
are CIA agents, one of whom, Roger Ferris (Leonardo DiCaprio) spends time 
undercover whilst other intelligence agents observe his movements remotely 
using overhead satellites.  This is shown to be of limited use when Ferris is 
kidnapped by a terrorist cell who, aware that they are under constant 
observation, stage an elaborate act of counter-subterfuge, stirring up a dust 
cloud that shields them from the satellite’s cameras and allows them to send out 
multiple decoys.  Nonetheless, the satellite is an extensively used intelligence 
tool, a core component of the depicted counter-terrorism activities.  Once Ferris 
is captured, the film emulates raw footage in the depiction of his hostage video 
(fig. 13), with poor lighting, grainy texture and time markers, evidencing the 
way these various types of ‘footage’ often work in combination. 
 
Fig. 10.13: Hostage video in Body of Lies     276 
In addition to these plot-motivated examples, the overhead tracking shot is used 
in scene transitions (fig. 10.14); a more mechanical, technologically-mediated 
example of the classical editing convention of establishing a wide space before 
closing in on the protagonists that occupy it.  This suggests the ease with which 
such technology permits users to view distant spaces and pick out individuals 
from the crowd (essentially, the same cognitive process of pattern recognition 
discussed elsewhere in the thesis).  When introducing Washington, Langley, 
Amsterdam, Amman and other destinations, the aerial shot is at an angle, 
moving into the space gradually.  When introducing Iraq, however, the angle is 
immediately overhead.  This is not stylistically identical to the diagetic satellite 
example in fig. 10.11 – lacking the grid references and filmed on a richer 
cinematic stock – but the birds-eye angle aligns it closely with the 
aforementioned technologies, suggesting the ‘enemy territory’ is constant 
scrutiny – though the distance is so great that identifying anything other than the 
municipal layout of the city seems impossible, again pointing towards the 
limitations of such intelligence gathering.  Such connotations may become less 
distinct in future, with Google Maps allowing anyone to view cached versions of 
such images for anywhere on the planet (fig. 10.15), but in the context of Body 
of Lies, the connection between overhead establishing shots and espionage is 
more than plausible. 
 
Fig. 10.14: Overhead tracking shot in Body of Lies     277 
 
Fig. 10.15: Map of Samarra, Google Maps 
Like Stop Loss, Body of Lies is otherwise shot in a conventional style. However, 
extended pseudo-surveillance examples in the vein of Septem8er Tapes exist 
also, notably wmd., in which scenes are styled as if edited together from 
multiple sources.  wmd. opens with a title card claiming that ‘in 2007 a 
collection of surveillance tapes, CCTV, and hidden camera footage was sent to 
us anonymously’, with ‘the past year has been spent piecing their story 
together’.  The film is immediately framed in a pseudo-‘found-footage’ fashion, 
the narrative opening with a claim of authenticity similar to that which 
introduced Septem8er Tapes.  Like the similarly-presented Redacted, the 
filmmaker is not present in the narrative as a character: the film, though overtly 
constructed, is thus without any specified author.  The plot fragments together 
detail events leading up to the abduction of British MI6 desk officer Alex Morgan 
(Simon Lenagan) by unknown persons in April 2003.  The various sections 
resemble: home video footage of Morgan with his wife and child; surreptitiously 
placed button-hole cameras (indicated by their low angle and the masking that 
obscures the edges of the frame); CCTV footage (complete with date and time 
marker in the top left of the frame); and surveillance organised by an unknown 
intelligence agency.  In the latter, the line of sight is often obscured, with 
sudden zooms and pans occasionally losing sight of their subject, while the 
dialogue is made tinny to resemble sounds picked up by a long-range microphone     278 
- aurally complimenting the rawness of the visuals. wmd. thus encompasses  
many of the modes under discussion: subjective self-documentation; the 
objective and impassive mechanical surveillance of the CCTV cameras; and 
anonymously performed but subjective surveillance.   
The reasons behind Morgan’s abduction involve his tenacious refusal to accept 
the official reasons for the UK and the US invading Iraq.  The infamous dossier 
used to ‘prove’ the existence of weapons of mass destruction is, with a little 
investigation, revealed by the fictional Morgan to be false, and the insinuation is 
that willful ignorance from all levels of the decision-making hierarchy allowed it 
to be quoted as fact and used to justify military action.  Furthermore, although 
the charge is not firmly made, his disappearance implies that not only were 
authorities turning a blind eye; they broke the law in order to maintain the 
illusion.  The mixed aesthetic outlined above, then, is more than simply visual: it 
is congruous with the narrative content (the secrecy and implied ‘seeing is 
believing’ logic that allows the false satellite images to be passed for genuine 
dramatises the same tension between the fictional and the real at the heart of 
false actuality filmmaking - both are ‘real’ only if they claim to be), and the 
structure (like The War Tapes and Septem8er Tapes, moments are missed - the 
‘panoptical web’ of visual surveillance is extensive, but not omnipresent).  
The performed lack of composition and unprepared reactivity suggest similarities 
between wmd.’s surveillance aesthetic (which combines the subjective and the 
objective) and the subjective pseudo-footage of Septem8er Tapes.  But there 
are important differences: the images of the former purportedly come from 
multiple cameras, including several fixed in position (predominantly CCTV), 
rather than limited but mobile sources.  Secondly, as previously suggested, many 
of these fixed cameras suggest inadvertent technological capture rather than 
motivated attempts to document.  The CCTV shots say more about the ubiquity 
of such recording devices in the UK than about the intelligence agencies’ ability 
to spy on one man; presumably, an incomplete but extensive record of any 
individual would be possible with access to every CCTV camera.  However, the 
important shared characteristic is, like the previous raw-footage examples, its 
‘caught on tape’ characterisation.  Unpredictability, uncontrollability and the 
capriciousness of the live moment are evoked, but contained within a fictional 
narrative that makes its way towards a dramatic conclusion.  There is a     279 
reassurance of sorts offered by these texts: while we may well inhabit an 
unpredictable, ‘real-time’ world filled with threats, they suggest familiar 
dramatic structures exist beneath the apparent chaos.  This mixed aesthetic, 
evoking military technology, surveillance, news reports, documentary 
filmmaking and other visual documentations (to varying degrees in different 
texts) frames narrative itself as an accumulative process of data interpretation – 
or, to revisit a concept from chapter four, pattern recognition.  The aesthetic 
might be fragmented or diffuse, but it yields to familiar dramatic content. 
10.5 Background reality & persuasive power 
In addition to faked home videos and scenes of surveillance, actual news footage 
is used in wmd. to contextualise plot developments.  This is a common 
technique in various War on Terror texts: for example, Fair Game (Liman, 2011), 
about the leaking of CIA agent Valerie Plame’s name by White House officials, 
interjects its based-on-actual-events drama with contemporaneous footage from 
C-SPAN (a cable channel dedicated to broadcasting governmental affairs, in 
much the way BBC Parliament does in the UK) and news reports from the period 
in which the film is set (2002-03).  Similarly, A Few Days in September 
(Amigorena, 2006) concludes its fictional thriller narrative – concerning a French 
secret service agent protecting a CIA agent’s children from a mysterious assassin 
– with footage of the second plane hitting the World Trade Center, casting the 
preceding plot in a newly political light, as a dramatisation of the ‘Letting It 
Happen on Purpose’ conspiracy hypothesis discussed in chapter four (it is implied 
that the CIA were aware of the impending attacks).  Green Zone (Greengrass, 
2010), meanwhile, is one of many films to employ footage of the infamous 
‘Mission Accomplished’ speech, conducted by President Bush aboard the USS 
Abraham Lincoln in May 2003, for purposes of irony, the announcement of 
victory in Iraq laughably premature in retrospect.  Chapter nine discussed the 
use of such secondary sources in the documentary 9/11: footage gleaned from 
news reports helps ‘fill in the gaps’, bridging the caesuras that would otherwise 
punctuate the documentary.  When such footage is included in an otherwise 
fictionalised text, however, there is an additional effect.  The text is no longer 
‘acting’ real; the actual and the invented are being combined.       280 
The inclusion of actuality footage in an otherwise fictional film or television text 
is, like so many of the observations made in this thesis, not an invention of the 
War on Terror.  Virilio writes about early incorporations of the actual into the 
invented: 
scraps of news film lying about the cutting-room floor were no longer 
systematically swept-up…  These began to be seen as ‘viewing 
matter‘, recyclable within the film industry itself.  Once that 
happened background reality resurfaced, with blazing fires, storms, 
cataclysms, assassination attempts, crowd scenes… but above all, a 
mountain of material of military origin.
686 
In addition to ‘bombings and magnificent shipwrecks’, combatants became: 
chance extras whose ultimate talent was to reveal to astute members 
of the audience how impoverished the performances and special 
effects of the period piece really were; as though military or other 
facts gave themselves up more generously to the sleepwalker’s eyes 
of automatic cameras, or to the curiosity of unskilled photographers, 
than to the masterly contrivances of the top professionals, the elite of 
career filmmakers.
687 
The use of actuality footage in fictional contexts was expedient and pragmatic – 
staging epic battle scenes for the camera is a costly and logistically complicated 
process – but also an aid to verisimilitude.  Interestingly, even here, unmediated 
‘footage’ (as opposed to ‘filming’, which implies a greater degree of 
composition and intent) was considered a virtue, the subjective ‘curiosity of 
unskilled photographers’ and the objective ‘sleepwalker’s eyes of automatic 
cameras’ both highly praised.  But we cannot assume the same motives are 
necessarily at work in more recent, War-on-Terror texts.  As numerous examples 
have shown, the aesthetic through which the ‘reality’ of the War on Terror is 
presented is frequently incomplete, visually unimpressive and capable of being 
mimicked closely by the conscientious fiction filmmaker, so recreation is not a 
prohibitively complicated task.  Verisimilitude and pragmatism are still possible 
motives, but with computer-generated effects relatively cheap (in that they no 
longer require the astronomical budgets reserved only for the biggest of 
blockbusters, but have spread to more modestly priced products) and no longer 
‘impoverished’ in the way they once were, there is presumably another reason 
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why we have yet to see a meticulous computer-modelled reconstruction of the 
World Trade Centre collapse in all its explosive and morbid detail.  It also 
arguably evades responsibility for producing any further representation, via an 
implied reverence towards an event that is left to ‘speak for itself’.   
Some have explained this with reference to Theodor Adorno’s dictum against 
poetry after Auschwitz and the comparative position expressed by Claude 
Lanzmann’s Shoah (1985), eliding 9/11 with the Holocaust and claiming it 
similarly ‘unrepresentable’.  ‘Fiction is a transgression’ Lanzmann wrote of his 
nine-hour Holocaust documentary, stating his belief that ‘there are some things 
that cannot and should not be represented’.
688  A contemporary mainstream 
articulation of this opinion is ‘too soon!’, the charge of impropriety levelled at 
those that tackle controversial, traumatic subjects before the perceived 
appropriate interval.  But 9/11 and War on Terror fictions are numerous, and the 
incorporation of actuality clips in lieu of representative fabrications is reserved 
only for specific moments.   
Most films that feature the terrorist attacks of September 11
th 2001 in their 
narratives utilise actual news coverage rather than recreations, often, as Mike 
Chopra-Gant notes, by using television sets within the diegesis – reflecting the 
way the event was first experienced by the majority of those who witnessed it.  
Chopra-Gant suggests this is simply a ‘way of asserting the authenticity of their 
(fictionalised) accounts of the event’,
689 though the manner in which interloping 
reality enhances a fiction’s authenticity requires further examination.  Lipkin et 
al offer one compelling explanation which they label the ‘persuasive power’ 
gained from a proximity to the real.  By placing their fabrications alongside 
actuality, filmmakers tacitly argue ‘that it is both logical and emotionally valid 
to associate cinematic proximity with moral truth’.
690  Actuality and invention 
are thereby symbolically aligned for rhetorical purposes, ‘background reality’ a 
creative blurring of tense, mode of address and subjectivity.  More broadly, the 
raw-footage aesthetic arguably engenders a similar effect, imbuing fiction with a 
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‘persuasive power’ it may otherwise lack by entwining it at a presentational 
level with conventions adopted from elsewhere. 
10.6 Conclusion: Rendition 
Garrett Stewart has argued that attempts to mimic such technological and 
journalistic tropes in narrative cinema has a profound effect on the 
representation of the War on Terror, arguing that ‘the most salient formal 
feature’ of most such films – namely ‘the blanketing of plot by a thick quilt of 
digital mediation’ – has resulted in ‘battle fatigue’ at a stylistic level.
691  The 
performed rawness identified here, in Stewart’s reading, is ‘not just a stylistic 
tic but a political symptom’.  He argues that, in films such as Body of War and 
Redacted, ‘critique dissipates into technique’, their visual construction 
subsuming any potential political content: 
These narratives can only project a visual ‘look’ where the graininess 
of the image, infrared or video, must stand in for the true grittiness of 
the mission.  Without clear lines drawn in the sand, there is only dust 
on the nervous handheld lens.
692 
I wish to close the chapter by suggesting that the raw footage aesthetic can and 
does influence political readings of certain War on Terror texts, using Rendition 
as final case study.  Rendition is an example of the GNN discussed in chapter six, 
with ‘four of five short stories’ (as director Gavin Hood describes its structure on 
the DVD’s director’s commentary) taking place in multiple locations around the 
world.  It begins with Egyptian-American chemical engineer Anwar El-Ibrahimi 
(Omar Metwally) receiving a missed call to his mobile phone as he leaves a 
conference in South Africa to return home to Chicago.  The call is purportedly 
from a terrorist group whose communications are being monitored, and although 
the evidence is circumstantial at best, it is enough to warrant his arrest and 
questioning under US anti-terror laws.  Upon landing in the US he is abducted 
from the airport and flown in shackles to ‘North Africa’ (there is ambiguity as to 
whether this is an unnamed country in the Maghreb or a fictional country called 
‘North Africa’); an example of the controversial practice of ‘extraordinary 
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rendition’ from which the film takes its name (echoing the argument made in 
chapter four concerning the exposé role of many War on Terror texts).  Multiple 
plots circle the central act of rendition: the attempts made by Anwar’s wife 
Isabella (Reese Witherspoon) to locate her husband, assisted by Alan Smith 
(Peter Saarsgard), an old school friend working as a senator’s aide; the 
interrogation itself, led by the North African security chief Abassi Fawal (Yigal 
Naor), and observed by inexperienced CIA analyst Douglas Freeman (Jake 
Gyllenhall), suddenly promoted when the previous agent in charge is killed in a 
suicide bombing in a busy square; and the tentative romance between Fawal’s 
daughter Fatima (Zineb Oukach) and Khalid (Moa Khouas), whose mosque 
promotes jihad.   
Embedded pseudo-footage is used on two occasions: the first is a news report 
that interrupts a conversation between Fawal and Freeman.  A news reporter 
announces the discovery of a short video tape taken by a tourist shortly before 
the explosion that appears to show two individuals confronting one another, 
their behaviour indicating their involvement in the attack (fig. 10.16).  Later, 
the clip is shown a second time, the background figures now enlarged and 
circled so as to make them more visible, with Fawal trying to discern their 
identity from its grainy image; he frustratedly gives up and declares it ‘useless’ 
(fig. 10.17).  Like In the Valley of Elah, the central investigation hinges upon the 
interpretation of a distorted and poorly-recorded piece of footage.  Unlike In the 
Valley of Elah, the meaning of the clip resists decoding by its investigators (both 
Fawal and Freeman, and, by extension, the audience), allowing for a narrative 
twist in the final act. 
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Fig. 10.16: News report in Rendition 
 
Fig. 10.17: Pseudo-raw footage in Rendition 
As argued in chapter six, edits in the GNN usually suggest ‘meanwhile’; multiple 
plot lines are juxtaposed and contrasted, spatially separate but temporally 
concurrent.  Rendition features three main locations – Chicago, Washington and 
North Africa.  Temporal simultaneity is assumed since there is no reason to think 
otherwise, until it is revealed that the Fatima and Khalid strand has already 
taken place at an early point in the plot-time.  They are the figures in the 
background of the tourist video, Fatima pleading with Khalid, while Khalid 
(whose brother, it transpires, was tortured to death in police custody), tries to 
exact his revenge on her father.  In this way, Rendition subverts the 
expectations of the GNN format: rather than acting as a point of convergence,     285 
the conclusion creates a new, insurmountable divide between characters.  A 
causal relationship between the various events is affirmed, but not the one that 
the preceding scenes worked to suggest. 
Fatima, Freeman and Fawal inhabit the same space – the unnamed North African 
city – but not at the same time – the two plots occur five days apart.  The film 
disguises this disjunction throughout the earlier stages in various ways, including 
a seemingly realistic depiction of time zones applied consistently across the plot 
strands – for example, a phone call made at night from Washington is answered 
during daylight hours in Africa, and night scenes focusing on Anwar, Freeman 
and Fawal are shown in proximity to night scenes focusing on the young couple, 
morning scenes matched to morning scenes, and so on.  This suggests shared 
experience and synchronous existence, Benedict Anderson’s concept of 
organisation by ‘clock and calendar’.
693  Scenes are also organised according to 
thematic similarities: a discussion between Fawal and his wife about their 
daughter’s refusal to return her father’s phone calls in one scene is echoed in 
the following scene in which Fatima’s aunt asks her niece why she refuses to call 
her parents; later, the anti-Western rhetoric of the terrorist recruiters is 
intercut with, and played over, scenes of Anwar’s clothes being cut from his 
body and his incarceration in a small windowless cell.  A meaningful, causal 
relationship is suggested between the two occurrences: Islamic youth are angry 
because of the kind of wrongful detention typified by Anwar.  Edward Branigan 
notes: 
We use hypotheses about time to search for causation and, 
reciprocally, we use hypotheses about causality to establish temporal 
order.
694 
Since the spectator has no reason to doubt a single timeline, a link between two 
events otherwise combined only through editing is assumed.  Such hypotheses 
can produce the logical fallacy post hoc ergo propter hoc (after, therefore 
because of), a fallacy that becomes particularly pronounced when the film 
reveals ‘before’ and ‘after’ have been confused.   
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The inability to correctly interpret the tourist video (by either Fassal or the 
audience) is key: were the picture quality clearer or the camera closer, their 
identities would be apparent, so the raw aesthetic is essential if the twist is to 
surprise the audience.  The film draws attention to this video clip, self-
consciously marking it as a ‘clue’, but withholds its full meaning.  This lends 
credence to the rhetorical question asked by the first interrogator to question 
Anwar, where he lays out the ‘evidence’ (no more than co-incidence) and asks, 
‘What are we to think?’; just as the US intelligence agencies act to apprehend 
Anwar based on assumptions drawn from co-incidence, the spectator assumes a 
causality that is revealed to be mistaken, due to an incorrect interpretation of 
the links between characters.  So Rendition’s complicated time-structure does 
more than ‘trick’ the audience with its climactic revelation; in forcing a 
reconsideration of the film’s chronology, it entails a reconsideration of the 
causal relationship between events, while characterising the intelligence 
mistake as both understandable and excusable.  The inability to parse the raw 
footage for clues is an inability to interpret chronology – a pertinent issue in an 
era of ‘preemptive strikes’ and the like. 
Furthermore, it characterises the terrorism as inevitable by showing the effect 
before the cause in the Fatima/Khalid plotline.  By revealing the end of their 
plot as the beginning of the others, all other events are shown to have been 
predetermined, while Fatima and Khalid’s fate is presented as inevitable.  
Maureen Turim writes: 
By presenting the result before the cause, a logic of inevitability is 
implied; certain types of events are shown to have certain types of 
results without ever allowing for other outcomes than the one given in 
advance.
695 
The Khalid and Fatima plot line is revealed to be, essentially, one long 
flashback.  Turim continues: 
Many flashback narrations contain an element of philosophical 
fatalism, coupled with a psychoanalytic fatalism [which]… presents a 
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cynical view of history as cyclical, guaranteed to repeat that which 
we have already seen…
696 
This holds true in Rendition: any alternative outcomes are denied, with all 
choices and events pertaining to the explosion shown to be irrevocable.  As 
previously suggested, this has the effect of characterising terrorist violence, and 
the retaliatory violence of the extraordinary rendition itself, as inevitable.   
This has wider parallels with the notion of ‘blowback’ – a term originating in US 
intelligence parlance, originally to describe the ‘likelihood that our covert 
operations in other people’s countries would result in retaliations against 
Americans, civilian and military, at home and abroad’.
697  The term has since 
entered more common usage, with an altered meaning that is approximately 
synonymous with ‘unforeseen consequence’, but the original definition is more 
revealing.  Blowback is not precisely ‘unforeseen’, as it is factored into 
considerations: it is given a degree of likelihood.  It is only entirely unforeseen 
to those not privy to the actions taken by militaries, intelligence agencies and 
government representatives around the world: 
Actions that generate blowback are normally kept totally secret from 
the American public and from most of their representatives in 
Congress.  This means that when innocent civilians become victims of 
a retaliatory strike, they are at first unable to put it in context, or to 
understand the sequence of events that led up to it…
698 
As Chalmers Johnson observes, ‘the American people may not know what is done 
in their name, but those on the receiving end surely do’, listing the coups in Iran 
(1953), Guatemala (1954), Brazil (1964), Indonesia (1965) and Chile (1973); the 
assassination of Patrice Lumumba in Congo in 1960; the Bay of Pigs Invasion in 
1961; the bombing of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia in the sixties and seventies; 
support of the Greek military junta of 1967-74; the backing of the military 
government in El Salvador and the contras in Nicaragua throughout the 1980s, as 
well as long-standing actions in Afghanistan and Iraq, as ‘only the most obvious 
cases’.
699  In a broader sense, Johnson suggests, ‘blowback is another way of 
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saying that a nation reaps what it sows’.
700  Rendition dramatises this circularity.  
It transcodes the general confusion that accompanies terrorist acts, before 
revealing the ‘big picture’ (i.e., what was hidden by the rawness of the tourist 
video) and arguing that the extraordinary rendition of terrorist suspects to 
countries with poor human rights records, where torture is used to elicit 
confessions, compounds hostility and engenders further terrorism.   
In Rendition, the chaotic confusion of cause and effect in the aftermath of a 
terrorist attack is rectified and resolved through the actions of a sole CIA agent.  
His moralistic act – intervening to free Anwar – breaks the cycle, and while the 
‘twist’ is initially jarring, the extended version of the square-bombing, replayed 
at the end, is careful to leave no narrative loose-ends, in much the same way as 
the conclusion of In the Valley of Elah featured Hank Deerfield’s mental 
recreation of events, resolving any outstanding mystery.  In both films, the final 
version is clear and unequivocal, filmed in 35mm film stock (the ‘footage 
becomes a movie’, to paraphrase Pierce’s earlier quote), raw footage processed 
into lucid dramatic shape.  While raw footage may denote authenticity, 
conventional film stock is equated with veracity.  The subjective, partial 
perspective of raw footage yields to an apparently objective overview, signaled 
by the switch to a more conventional film style.  As long as we remain focused 
on the minutiae, we overlook the ‘big picture’ – a big picture that the Global 
Network Narrative, amongst other narrative forms, attempts to give dramatic 
shape. 
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11 Conclusion: ‘Unlike a movie, war has no end’
701 
 
This administration prefers to avoid using the term 
‘Long War’ or ‘Global War on Terror’ [GWOT].  Please 
use ‘Overseas Contingency Operation’
702 
-  Dave Reidel, Office of Security Review 
If the intention of the Obama administration is to tone 
down the confrontational rhetoric being used by our 
enemies, the effort is already reaping results. This 
week, in a pronounced shift from its usual theatrical 
style, the Taliban announced that it will no longer refer 
to its favorite method of murder as “beheadings,” but 
will henceforth employ the expression “cephalic 
attrition.” “Flayings” – a barbarously exotic style of 
execution that has been popular in this part of the 
world since before the time of Alexander – will now be 
described as “unsolicited epidermal 
reconfigurations.”
703 
-  Joe Queenan, Wall Street Journal 
 
Officially, the War on Terror ended in March 2009.  Its conclusion was wrought 
by neither military force nor diplomacy but, rather, was ushered out in a way 
comparable to its inauguration seven and a half years earlier – through 
alterations in rhetoric and adjustments in language.  With the term War on 
Terror retired in favour of ‘Overseas Contingency Operation’, the administration 
of the newly-elected President Barack Obama emphasised its break from the 
previous administration of President George W. Bush.  This was in-keeping with 
Obama’s rhetoric throughout the election campaign, and in his first months in 
office.  To use the State of the Union message to Congress as a guide, in which 
the President ‘recommend[s] to their consideration such measures as he shall 
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judge necessary and expedient’,
704 Obama’s 2009 address indicated the altered 
priorities.  The word ‘terror’ in any of its manifestations (terrorist, terrorism, 
terrorise etc) was uttered three times in 2009, and again three times in his 2010 
address.  In Bush’s post-9/11 addresses, the tally was somewhat higher: thirty 
six times in 2002, twenty two in 2003, twenty in 2004 and so on.  Lest this 
suggests a steady decline in usage, from the raw aftermath of the attacks of 
September 2001 to a less preoccupied, cooler state as time passed, his last two 
addresses in 2007 and 2008 featured variations on the word twenty-one and 
twenty-three times respectively.   
The shift in tone did not go unnoticed,
705 nor was it unexpected.  A significant 
component of Obama’s appeal was his marked contrast to Bush and John McCain 
with regards the war in Iraq, a difference also frequently emphasised during the 
Democratic primaries (Hillary Clinton had voted in favour of the war in 2002).
706  
During the election campaigns – first during the Democratic primary race to gain 
the party’s nomination, then in the Presidential election itself – Obama declared 
himself opposed to many of the policies passed in apparent service of the War on 
Terror, and made promises to reverse certain decisions.
707  In almost every 
public pronouncement, the key words were ‘hope’ and ‘change’, and many, 
including Nancy Gibbs of Time, were effusive in their praise: 
Some princes are born in palaces, some are born in mangers.  But a 
few are born in the imagination, out of scraps of history and hope.
708 
But cancelling out the rhetoric of the War on Terror is more complicated than 
ceasing to use its metaphors and similes; as chapter one argued, metaframes are 
persistent by design.  Crucial words have become part of the public lexicon, and 
cannot be retired with the same economy with which they were born.  Key terms 
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continue to have a seductively evocative quality that ensures their continued 
usage in the media, amongst other politicians, and, as this thesis testifies, in 
certain areas of academia.  Furthermore, Obama himself has not consistently 
resisted using inherited language when framing his stance on defence and 
international relations, even when stressing a change in policy; for example, 
arguing in 2008 that ‘we must recognise that the central front in the war on 
terror is not in Iraq, and it never was’.
709   
However, a lack of actual change to match the fresh rhetoric is conspicuous; as 
satirist Joe Queenan irreverently observes, cruel and unusual behaviours by any 
other name are just as cruel and unusual, just as a Global War against Terrorism 
continues to invite criticism from its opponents even if it is no longer referred to 
as such.  Consistencies between the two administrations are many: the Global 
War on Terrorism Service medal and the Global War on Terrorism Expeditionary 
Service medal are still awarded by the US military for ‘service in the Global War 
on Terrorism Operations on or after 11 September, 2001’;
710 George W. Bush’s 
Secretary of Defense Robert Gates continues to serve in the same capacity in 
Obama’s cabinet; the closure of Gauntanamo Bay has been perpetually delayed 
since the Presidential order was first signed; and plans to try ‘unlawful 
combatants’ in courts of law (as opposed to secret military tribunals) in order to 
re-establish habeas corpus and legal transparency were scrapped when public 
opinion was gauged unfavourable.  Furthermore, while some expected Obama to 
immediately begin winding down combat operations in Iraq (as his campaign had 
repeatedly suggested he would), he instead increased the number of deployed 
troops.  The failed attempt to detonate a bomb on a US flight in December 2009, 
meanwhile, prompted certain figures to identify Yemen as the next front in a 
far-from-concluded War on Terror (a Time report identified the country as ‘the 
next Afghanistan’,
711 while a BBC report labelled it the ‘new frontier in the US 
War on Terror’
712).  With such continuities seemingly outweighing evidence of 
transformation, it is understandable that Obama’s reputation has been 
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emphatically predicated on the favourability of his promises over the tangibility 
of his actions.  In their statement outlining the reasoning behind his award of 
the Nobel Peace Prize, only ten months after taking office, the Norwegian Nobel 
Committee singled out his ‘vision’ and the ‘hope’ his election brought, rather 
than citing any concrete examples of actual change.  The prestigious award was 
based on his role as ‘spokesperson’ for a certain diplomatic attitude, rather than 
for any specific outcome born of such diplomacy.
713 
Yet despite this, the urge to demarcate, label and retire an era is strong 
amongst journalists and historians.  The retirement of certain phrases, the 
tentative steps made in altering certain areas of policy, and the election of a 
Democrat espousing hope and change, after eight years of a Republican stressing 
fear and danger, help support the association between Presidential handover 
and closure.  In November 2009, Time offered various summarising labels for the 
period – the ‘Decade from Hell, or the Reckoning, or the Decade of Broken 
Dreams, or the Lost Decade’ – and identified it as ‘book-ended by 9/11 at the 
start and a financial wipe-out at the end’.
714  This eight-year decade (historical 
epochs are rarely matched neatly with calendar dates, but rather ‘watershed’ 
events) is associated closely with Bush; with Obama now in charge, there is an 
implied sense that the bleak times are ‘nearly over’.  Similar claims surfaced in 
May 2011 following the death of Osama Bin Laden, seen by some to provide 
‘closure’ for victims of 9/11 - though others, including President Bush, were 
careful to label it only a milestone in the ongoing ‘war’.
715 
11.1 Finding closure  
The early chapters of this thesis suggested that the rhetoric of the War on Terror 
preceded its actions, that language brought it into existence and that, 
ultimately, the War as a unified, focussed goal was an untenable illusion, riddled 
with irresolvable contradictions.  While the recent attempts to find closure – to 
provide an end to a narrative that has a clear, striking beginning and a long, 
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drawn-out middle – have also begun life in rhetoric, reversal has proven 
considerably more difficult.   
The struggle to bring official closure to a conflict that exists in rhetoric and 
ideology as much as in troop deployment and battle plans is echoed by the 
struggle to draw a satisfactory conclusion in these pages.  At the time of writing, 
there are several new film and television texts overtly ‘about’ the War on Terror 
scheduled for release, or at various stages of development.
716  While their 
content is roughly known, their form is not.  The former may undergo numerous 
changes on its way to screens and the latter’s manifestation can currently only 
be guessed at.  Furthermore, since the production cycle of a film or television 
show can feasibly last years, it is not appropriate to echo Time et. al. and place 
a closing bracket after March 2009, in order to claim something definitive about 
the 9/11 and War on Terror texts that came before, since texts that first begin 
life in one political context may be released in another.
717  The various 
arguments made in this thesis are not confined to these texts, nor have the 
trends discussed now coalesced and reached a static form about which clear, 
distinct and immutable conclusions can be drawn.  The narrative of the War on 
Terror is inconclusive, despite the best efforts of the Obama administration, and 
this thesis must necessarily share that inconclusiveness, and resist the urge to 
package together its arguments as the ‘final word’ on the matter. 
Each of the narratives discussed in these pages confronts a similar task: bringing 
their respective narratives to some degree of conclusion despite the events 
themselves lacking a clear resolution.  Some texts focus on such a specific strand 
of the War on Terror that they are able to close with a degree of finality; for 
example, United 93 ends at the moment the plane crashes into the 
Pennsylvanian earth, while World Trade Centre concludes with the rescue of the 
two trapped firefighters.  They are able to achieve this closure only by isolating 
                                         
716 For example: an adaptation of Marcus Luttrell’s non-fiction work Lone Survivor: The Eyewitness 
Account of Operation Redwing and the Lost Heroes of Seal Team 10 (New York: Little, Brown 
and Company, 2007); Exile to Babylon (Mazuran, 2011), Special Forces (Rybojad, 2011), The 
Boys of Abu Ghraib (Moran, 2012), Kill Bin Laden (Bigelow, 2012) (undergoing re-writes 
following Bin Laden’s death), and the in-development 24 movie, now scheduled for a 2012 
release.  Completed films awaiting release include: The Dry Land (Williams, 2010), Afghan 
Hound (Allesandro, 2010), and Human Terrain (Der Derian, Udris, Udris, 2010). 
717 See: Matt Singer, ‘Bush Movies in Obama’s America’ IFC, 01 Dec. 2008, accessed Mar. 2011. 
http://www.ifc.com/news/2008/01/bush-movies-in-obamas-america.php.     294 
September 11
th, 2001, treating it as an exceptional event without precedent, 
thereby treating it as its own distinct narrative and, in the process, echoing the 
War on Terror rhetoric that turned September 11
th, 2001 into ‘9/11’, the 
‘Ground Zero’ that demanded retribution. 
World Trade Centre also suggests a second mechanism for producing closure is to 
filter the political subject matter through the personal experiences of an 
individual or group of individuals.  The protagonists’ respective stories conclude, 
even if wider events do not; in In the Valley of Elah, for instance, the narrative 
comes to a close when the investigation is concluded and the protagonist has 
accepted the outcome.  The final shot of the US flag flying upside down – earlier 
explained to be a symbol of distress – indicates that Hank Deerfield believes his 
country continues to be morally compromised, but his own story has, to use 
Tzvetan Todorov’s terminology, reached a new, disillusioned-but-stable state of 
equilibrium.
718  The political-event as personal-story is a long-standing tradition 
in mainstream attempts to approach certain subjects, echoing, for instance, 
Hennebelle’s aforementioned concept of the ‘Z Movie’.  Many of the films 
discussed in this thesis fall into this category: in Stop Loss, Brandon King chooses 
to reenlist rather than escape across the border to Canada; the CIA apprehend 
the mastermind behind Body of War’s multiple terrorist attacks; September 
Tapes’ Don Larson is killed in the Tora Bora mountains; and the sleeper cell in 
Traitor are tricked into blowing each other up, allowing the undercover agent to 
reclaim his identity.  Partial closure is thus affected in each of these examples.  
The Global Network Narratives are invariably more open-ended due to the wider 
number of characters and connections explored, but there is still a sense of 
climactic closure in the way Syriana or Babel’s plots converge, or the way 
Redacted’s piecemeal structure yields to a relatively clear understanding of the 
sequence of events.   
The sense that, after the plot comes to a close, something lingers and remains 
unresolved is, according to Garrett Stewart, symptomatic of the War on Terror’s 
very conception: 
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The real problem is that it’s too shapeless for plot. Fighting terror 
with terror is one thing; finding narrative drive or closure for the 
confrontation, let alone some modicum of catharsis, is another.
719 
The portmanteau films discussed in chapter four, specifically 11’09’’01, avoid 
the problem of ‘closure’ by being formally disjointed and conflicted, their 
sections fitting together only loosely according to theme or artistic remit, 
therefore allowing for oppositional views to intermingle.  The various television 
texts, meanwhile, deliberately eschew closure, leaving their narratives open for 
pragmatic reasons: for example, the producers of Over There would have hoped 
the show would be commissioned for a second season, so would therefore not 
wish to draw their plots to too firm a close.  In the case of 24, Day Eight may 
have been designed in advance as the final season, but planned movie spin-offs 
ensure the finale is not irreversibly final; its last episode closes with Jack Bauer 
going into hiding to evade capture – which is essentially how seasons four and six 
ended, with various plot convolutions allowing for his return on both occasions.  
An ideological motive for such open-endedness can still be argued for – that a 
series like 24 is premised on the constant threat of terrorist attack, so to deny 
the continued existence of such threats by imposing too neat a conclusion on any 
of its seasons, even its last, would be to undermine its governing philosophy – 
but the practical and financial motivations should not be overlooked. 
The tension between finding closure and acknowledging the difficulties in doing 
so is also evident in the charitable appeals or political calls to action that 
frequently appear either immediately before or during the credit sequences.  
This is most consistently observable in the documentary examples.  Some pay 
tribute: The War Tapes concludes with a dedication to the New Hampshire 
soldiers accompanied by crisp snare rolls, while 9/11 closes on a photo montage 
of the FDNY firefighters killed on September 11
th, 2001.  Taxi to the Darkside, 
meanwhile, emphasises the sheer number of detainees locked up during the 
course of the War on Terror (by its count, over 83,000), referencing the broader 
political subject of which the film is representative.   
Some fiction examples achieve a similar effect, encouraging links between the 
fictional events in the process of concluding, and the ongoing political issues 
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which have been dramatised.  Stop Loss concludes with white-on-black text 
stating that ‘650,000 American troops have fought in the Afghanistan and Iraq 
conflicts’.  The message fades to black, replaced by a second statistic: ‘81,000 
of those American troops have been stop-lossed’.  In this way, the film’s final 
statement serves to underscore the narrative’s representative qualities; the 
specifics may be fiction (‘any resemblance to real persons, living or dead, is 
purely coincidental’ as the commonplace disclaimer puts it), but 81,000 
comparable stories, it suggests, are taking place across the United States.  More 
subtly, Rendition’s ‘North African’ setting could be seen to achieve a similar 
effect, its ambiguity allowing the location to double for a multitude of countries 
with ties to the extraordinary rendition programme – Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria – 
thereby increasing its referential range.   
Rendition also indicates the way that the DVD format can help circumvent the 
need for absolute narrative closure.  One plot-strand, involving Douglas 
Freeman’s distrust of his girlfriend Safiya (Hadar Ratzon), was cut from the main 
film, but is included in the deleted scenes, adding additional interconnections 
and nodes to its network.  Also included in the ‘extras’ is Outlawed: 
Extraordinary Rendition, Torture and Disappearances in the ‘War on Terror’ 
(Caldwell, 2006), a documentary about Khalid el-Masri, whose mistaken 
rendition inspired aspects of Rendition’s plot.  Again, this opens out the film’s 
plot to a wider array of meanings, while also countering the film’s ‘happy 
ending’ – no valiant CIA agent emerged to rescue el-Masri, who spent seven 
months in a secret prison. 
As this overview suggests, there is no singly applied method used to conclude the 
War on Terror texts under discussion.  Some end with an appeal to political 
action, other commemorate the dead, while many feature protagonists either 
returning to war – The Hurt Locker, Stop Loss – or having never left – Green 
Zone, Over There.  That said, the frequency with which any conclusion is 
accompanied by some degree of irresolution, suggests that the difficulty in 
narrating an ongoing conflict does not go unrecognised by the filmmakers and 
television producers themselves. 
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Garrett Stewart argues that the lack of firm resolution is a consequence of the 
War on Terror’s lack of generic stability: 
The original “shock and awe” was a war-film idea, the imperialist 
vestige of a genre fantasy, where part of the U.S. arsenal was the very 
spectacle of its unleashed power. What remains, and for the U.S. 
troops as well now, is a paranoid setting without a vivid scenario, a 
genre template left begging for the energies of plot. With no clear 
demarcation between the good guys and the bad, narrative itself 
seems stalled, balked. We found no WMDs in Iraq, just IEDs detonating 
everywhere. Strong storytelling is among the casualties of such 
“improvised” devices.
720  
This thesis has argued that, rather than destroy strong storytelling, film and 
television narratives about the War on Terror have instead found new strategies 
for containing their plots, strategies born of trans-media hybridisation, with 
news media, web navigation and globalisation as influential as the War on Terror 
rhetoric itself.  In a sense, the structures and aesthetics discussed in this thesis 
are over-determined; they are not simply the product of War on Terror rhetoric, 
but are borne of myriad influences and are applicable to multiple topics.  For 
the last decade, the War on Terror has been a ubiquitous metaframe, hence the 
Obama White House’s difficulty in retiring the phrase.  However, while 
‘Overseas Contingency Operation’ has failed to usurp it, other metaframes are 
emerging in response to more recent developments in geopolitics. 
11.2 The Arab Spring 
Let me be clear: this is not the start of some 
ideologically driven mission, without limit, in which we 
set out to cure all the world's ills.
721 
-  David Cameron 
Gaddafi Duck and Cover – The explosive adventure of a 
freewheeling Middle Eastern dictator who, not knowing 
the meaning of defeat, wasn’t going to let a little thing 
like a ‘no fly’ zone spoil his plans.  You’ll laugh, you’ll 
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cry as you watch the leader profess his hold over his 
country, all the while looking over his shoulder.
722 
-  Discdish.com 
The War on Terror has proven persistent; both in terms of its rhetoric and in the 
policies enacted in its name.  This endurance is reflected in the resistance to 
closure in the texts under discussion, but there are indications that the 
metaframe’s influence may finally be on the wane.  For the last decade, the 
West has framed geopolitics in the Middle East – if not the entire globe – almost 
exclusively in relation to the War on Terror metaframe (for example, the 
Mumbai terrorist attacks described as ‘India’s 9/11’).
723  It is therefore notable 
that the recent protests, revolutions and depositions across the Middle East and 
the Maghreb have largely resisted being assimilated into its metaframe, with 
‘War on Terror’ replaced by ‘Arab Spring’.
724 
The recent removal of Muammar Gaddafi from Tripoli by UN-supported eastern 
revolutionaries completes the dictator’s transition from being the primary target 
of President Reagan’s war on terror, to a named member of the extended ‘Axis 
of Evil’, to a prospective ally in Bush’s War on Terror,
725 to having his rule 
violently challenged by domestic protests.  The deployment of the US military in 
the region has inevitably compounded comparisons with the War on Terror, with 
critics of the strikes keen to draw parallels with the unpopular wars of George 
W. Bush.
726  But such comparisons are not as prevalent as might be expected; 
some have explicitly connected the Arab Spring and War on Terror 
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metaframes,
727 but when the ‘history repeating’ argument is made by supporters 
of the strikes, it is the Rwandan genocide and the massacre at Srebrenica that 
are more often evoked to suggest the consequences of failing to intervene.
728  
Barack Obama and David Cameron, meanwhile, have been careful to distinguish 
their decisions from those of their predecessors, with the opening quote from 
the latter emphasising limitations, rather than expansiveness.   
The ‘Arab Spring’ metaframe was initially used by commentators in 2005 to 
describe a series of only nominally-connected reforms and revolutions – Iraq’s 
first democratic elections; the announcement of the first multi-candidate 
presidential elections in Egypt since Hosni Mubarak became head of state in 
1981; the ‘Cedar Revolution’ in Lebanon; reform pledges from the newly-elected 
Palestinian Prime Minister Mahmoud Abbas; and small but significant municipal 
elections in Saudi Arabia – which were interpreted as indications of a burgeoning 
move towards democracy across the entire region.  The term deliberately 
evoked the democratisation of socialist eastern Europe in 1989, the ‘Prague 
Spring’ of 1968, and the ‘Spring of Nations’ of 1848, and was at the time 
indelibly tied to the larger War on Terror metaframe: a wave of articles and 
reports connected the various events to the foreign policy of the Bush 
Administration - for example, Jeff Jacoby noted a perceived improvement in 
Bush’s reputation in light of the ‘Spring’, asking ‘Still Think Bush Was Wrong?’
729  
Many, of course, still did, but there were nonetheless a significant number of 
commentators to whom the first Arab Spring was a vindication of the War on 
Terror – an unequivocal victory in the fight against tyranny.   
Six years later, the Arab Spring metaframe has been revived in response to a 
fresh ‘wave’ of political developments: to date, Hosni Mubarak and Ben Ali have 
been forced out of office in Egypt and Tunisia respectively, while protests have 
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taken place in Algeria, Oman, Yemen, Syria, Iraq, Jordan, Sudan, Saudi Arabia, 
Morocco, Bahrain, Iran, Lebanon, Dijibouti and, of course, Libya.  This array of 
political upheaval is too complex and myriad to elaborate on easily, which is 
perhaps why the ‘Arab Spring’ metaframe has proven useful as an organising 
term.  As with ‘the War on Terror’, ‘Arab Spring’ organises and explains events, 
in the process conflating the myriad motives, methods and outcomes traceable 
in the region.  Much as there was little outside of rhetoric to connect Iraq and 
Afghanistan, there are only broad similarities between, for example, the 
protests in Morocco and Bahrain: in the former, demands for constitutional 
reform have not implicated King Mohammed VI,
730 while in the latter, protesters 
from the Shia majority have reportedly called for an end to the Sunni 
monarchy.
731  While geographic vicinity provides some degree of similarity 
(though the ‘Spring’ already extends beyond the Arab states, with recent 
protests in Iran included in most overviews), some have projected the ‘Arab 
Spring’ over a much wider space, with Time pondering its potential ramifications 
in China;
732 The Guardian pondering whether it might ‘inspire a continent’ and 
‘spread south’ to Kenya, Swaziland, and other African countries;
733 and UK 
Foreign Secretary William Hague celebrating its potential ability to ‘ignite 
greater demands for good governance and political reform elsewhere in the 
world, including in Asia and in Africa’.
734  Interestingly, Hague does connect the 
‘Arab Spring’ to the events discussed in this thesis, but only so as to emphasise 
the former’s significance, claiming ‘it is already set to overtake the 2008 
financial crisis and 9/11 as the most important development of the early 21st 
century’.
735  
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733 David Smith, ‘Summer of Discontent: Will the Arab Spring Inspire a Continent?’, The Guardian, 
30 Apr. 2011 pp. 30-1 
734 James Kirkup, ‘William Hague : ‘Arab Spring’ Could Topple Robert Mugabe’ The Telegraph, 22 
Mar, 2011, accessed Apr. 2011. 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/libya/8398938/William-
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Organising these global strands in a comprehensible way is, as it was for the War 
on Terror, a primary purpose of the ‘Arab Spring’ metaframe.  An interactive 
map on The Guardian’s web site (fig.11.1) lays out events on a multi-grooved 
linear line – the ‘path of protest’ – with each groove corresponding to a country 
in the region, arranged in alphabetical order from Algeria to Yemen.  This 
arrangement maps the temporal development of the protests and their 
responses, but dispenses with geography.
736 
 
Fig. 11.1: Arab Spring timeline, The Guardian 
There are similarities here to the attempts to map the events of 9/11 in the 
Illustrated 9/11 Commission Report discussed in chapter three, indicating the 
way that the trends sketched earlier in this thesis are utilised to organise other 
political narratives.  Indeed, ‘Arab Spring’ films are already in development: 
producer Tarak Ben Ammar announced in January that he would be self-
financing a political thriller based on the life of Mohamed Bouazizi, the street 
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The Guardian, 05 Apr. 2011. accessed Apr. 2011.  
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vendor whose self-immolation was a catalyst for Tunisia’s Jasmine Revolution.
737  
Ammar argued that Bouazizi’s ‘story is one that needs to be preserved for future 
generations to understand that one person can make a difference’,
738 reducing a 
multifarious political event to the desperate act of one man.  In Egypt, actor 
Hani Ramzi has announced a project depicting the events in Tahrir Square;
739 
while The Cry of the Ants (Abdelaziz, 2011), which began filming prior to start 
of large scale protests, was re-edited to include real-footage of the protests that 
led to Mubarak leaving office.
740  Finally, a portmanteau film entitled 18 Days 
(Various, 2011), which featured ten short films relating aspects of the Egyptian 
revolution, was screened at the 2011 Cannes film festival, to the consternation 
of those who questioned the political affiliations of its participants.
741 
While these examples all originate within the countries in question, it is not 
inconceivable that a Western filmmaker will one day broach the topic onscreen 
(though presumably not in the ‘Gaddafi Duck and Cover’ form satirically 
suggested by discdish.com).  If a Hollywood depiction does materialise, it 
remains to be seen whether the narrative forms used to depict the War on 
Terror will be adapted for this new context, or rejected; it is certainly possibl to 
envisage a Syriana-style GNN that weaves together protests in Tunisia and Egypt, 
reactions in the Obama White House, a rebel-war in Libya backed multilaterally 
by the United Nations, and increased oppression in China in response to calls for 
a Jasmine Revolution against Beijing, with social networking and citizen-
journalists sending images across borders and inspiring others to spread 
democracy across the Middle East and Africa.   
But then again, depending on the way events ultimately transpire, the War on 
Terror metaframe may prove resurgent.  The forthcoming Dan Bradley-directed 
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remake of the Cold War action film Red Dawn is a case in point.  The original 
film’s plot – Soviet troops invade the United States of America - was to be, a 
press release announced, ‘updated to post-9/11 contemporary times’, by 
revising the threat from Russians to the Chinese.  With the US deficit at breaking 
point, Beijing decides to call in its debts (a recent estimate placed China’s 
actual U.S. Treasury securities at one trillion dollars, lending the fantastical 
scenario the slightest patina of topicality).
742  While the script’s depiction of 
fiscal relations between the two countries may contain a note of reality, the rest 
of the plot is somewhat less plausible: Chinese soldiers occupy the bankrupt 
United States, forcing a group of teenagers to take up arms against the foreign 
invaders.   
MGM were due to release the film in 2010, but the studio’s financial difficulties 
forced the date back.  When attempts to sell the film to alternative studios were 
unsuccessful, the decision was made to remove China from the film entirely, and 
re-design the invaders as North Koreans.  Since the film had already completed 
filming by the time this decision was made, the swap was done post-production, 
with special effects workers erasing Chinese flags, insignias and military symbols 
from shots, while editors re-structured the film to reflect this significant 
alteration.  The producers have argued for the change on artistic ground: 
We were initially very reluctant to make any changes.  But after 
careful consideration we constructed a way to make a scarier, smarter 
and more dangerous Red Dawn that we believe improves the movie.
743 
The studio has a more straightforward economic imperative.  Mike Vollman, 
executive vice president of worldwide marketing, is quoted as justifying the 
change on commercial grounds: 
MGM has been working with the film Red Dawn’s director and 
producers to make the most commercially viable version of the film 
                                         
742 ‘China Holds More U.S. Debt Than Indicated’ The Washington Times, 02 Mar. 2010, accessed 
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for audiences worldwide.  We want to ensure the most people possible 
are able to experience it.
744 
The change is therefore an effort to placate Chinese censors, so as to ensure 
that a significant market is not lost.  But while the motive for altering the film in 
such drastic fashion seems clear, the choice of replacement villain remains 
dubious.  The racist undertones to such perceived interchangeability aside, the 
notion that North Korea would have the resources to invade the United States – 
even a fictional near-future United States crippled by debt – seems destined to 
irrevocably dissolve the premise’s already-thin credibility.  The choice of North 
Korea can perhaps be explained with reference to Vollman’s above quote 
regarding global accessibility: the isolated North Korea is one of the few markets 
which Hollywood cannot currently hope to profit from, so any offence caused is 
unlikely to impact upon takings.   
There is, however, another potential influence: the War on Terror metaframe, 
specifically the ‘Axis of Evil’.
745  North Korea only fully makes sense as a threat if 
based on the War on Terror rhetoric that sought to establish Kim Jong-Il as one-
third of a powerful and dangerous trio of states ‘arming to threaten the peace of 
the world’
746 (Iran was presumably discounted by Red Dawn’s producers since it 
was easier to replace one east Asian aggressor with another).  A topical plot 
based on the escalating national debt of the United States of America and fears 
of an ascendant China that threatens to rival and eventually overtake the US to 
become a new global superpower, is replaced by one rooted in the reactionary 
politics of 2002.   
Whether the changes are successful in broadening Red Dawn’s appeal can be 
judged when the film is released in 2012.  The shape of the inevitable Arab 
Spring-narratives, meanwhile, will likely depend upon future developments in 
Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, Yemen and elsewhere, and so can currently only be 
guessed.  John Bolton’s ‘Beyond the Axis of Evil’ speech named Libya and Syria 
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applies his experience of fighting the Taliban to combating the North Koreans – one front of the 
War on Terror superseded by another - only underscores the connection. 
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as members of the extended axis, so there is undoubtedly potential for War on 
Terror-related rhetoric to re-emerge in this context as well – particularly if 
defence spending plays a central role in the 2012 presidential campaigns, or the 
UN decides to intervene elsewhere – Syria, for instance.  Ultimately, while the 
‘Overseas Contingency Operation’ and the ‘Arab Spring’ may be Obama 
administration’s preferred metaframes, the War on Terror has had several years 
head-start. 306 
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